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In a 1995 interview, the iconic Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish said: “Pales-
tinian poetry has, for little less than a decade, become conscious of the necessity 
of humanizing its themes and passing from Palestine as a topic or an object, to 
Palestinian as subject.” This ontological shift in poetry also holds true, I believe, 
for shifts in the political imagination, in institution building, and in knowledge 
production. The establishment in 1979 of the first Palestinian human rights organi-
zation, Law in the Service of Man (later known as al-Haq), is a prime example. The 
change in focus from Palestine to Palestinian is evident in the name itself. “Man” 
(writ large, but male nonormative, nonetheless) became the subject on three lev-
els: the individual, the collective (Palestinians as a political community), and the 
human (universal citizen with inalienable rights).
Al-Haq’s founders dared to reimagine politics by initially taking a “nonpoliti-
cal” stance in defense of the “rule of law.” This, in itself, is not highly unusual, until 
one is reminded that they did so in the context of a dominant nationalist politi-
cal culture that saw itself as leading the struggle against a settler colonial project 
which steals Palestinian land and builds Israeli Jewish colonies while incarcerating 
Palestinians and brutally repressing them. As the first Palestinian organization of 
its kind and one of the earliest in the Middle East and the world, al-Haq had an 
outsized influence locally, regionally, and internationally in terms of its innovative 
forms of self-governance and methods of data collection, seasoned by  working 
under the very difficult long-term conditions of foreign military rule. In its reports 
and published self-reflections, al-Haq produced insightful forms of knowledge 
about the external pressures on and internal contradictions of the Palestinian 
condition. The rise and inevitable crises experienced by al-Haq, especially after 
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the 1993 Oslo Accords, have profound lessons to teach all of us about the forms 
of political mobilization that are opened and foreclosed by human rights frame-
works, and about how the Palestinians’ experience enriches our understanding of 
larger global trends in struggles for justice, equality, and freedom.
Scholars have recognized the importance of al-Haq, but Lynn Welchman’s 
intimate “insider/outsider” positionality and unparalleled access to sources and 
people make this book the definitive and most compelling study. Her elegant and 
tightly structured writing have yielded a page-turning book that humanizes, so to 
speak, this human rights work. Moreover, her professional expertise on law and 
society issues provides the analytical scaffolding that links this bottom-up view to 
larger international issues and debates.
By looking at the world through the eyes of Palestinian legal activists, Welch-
man’s book contributes to the mission of the New Directions in Palestinian Stud-
ies (NDPS) book series. Among other things, the series seeks rigorous works of 
scholarship that center the Palestinian experience, introduce new narratives and 
actors, and utilize locally generated vernacular sources. NDPS values justice- 
centered academic works that, at the same time, do not shy away from critical 
analysis of internal problems. One of the important dimensions of Welchman’s 
book is her judicious and honest account of the conflicts –political, personal, insti-
tutional, and ideological—which rocked al-Haq, especially after the tragedy of the 
Oslo Accords and the failures of the Palestinian Authority came into full view. 
In hindsight, these conflicts were inevitable considering the historical moment of 
al-Haq’s formation, which straddled third-worldist anticolonial worldviews con-
cerned with social and economic development and a universalist liberal concep-
tual vocabulary concerned with international law and human rights. Welchman’s 
book, therefore, offers a prehistory of human rights work that globalizes the Pal-
estinian experience.
In focusing on Palestinians and the discourse of human rights more than 
on Palestine and the discourse of national liberation, al-Haq was, in many ways, 
ahead of its time. It inspired the formation of dozens of similar organizations, 
became an incubator of legal activists, and anticipated the rise of the Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions movement. Palestinians are the canary in the mine 
for many of this world’s most pressing challenges, and Welchman’s in-depth and 
textured study of al-Haq is rich with insights about the possibilities and limits of 
making universal human rights a central arena of struggle, and a welcome inter-
vention in long-running debates about the relationship between law, social move-





I am indebted to a large number of people who helped with the initial stages, 
lengthy progress, and eventual completion of this book. It was a joy to be back 
in touch with so many friends and colleagues from al-Haq, many of whom are 
quoted in this book and to all of whom I owe thanks for giving me their time and 
insights, whether on or off the record, demonstrating just that commitment to the 
idea of the organization that characterized al-Haq in the period examined here. 
In particular, I thank Raqiya Abu Ghosh, Afaf Abu Nakhlah, Sami 'Ayad, George 
Giacaman, Zahi Jaradat, Mustafa Mar’i, Hanan Rabbani, Mouin Rabbani, Naser 
Rayyes, Mervat Rishmawi, Mona Rishmawi, Ghazi Shashtari, Randa Siniora, and 
Issam Younis. Special thanks to Nina Atallah, who tirelessly followed up my many 
inquiries at the start of the research; Nidal Taha for providing copies of the corre-
spondence between al-Haq’s founders and the ICJ in Geneva in the late 1970s; Raja 
Shehadeh for providing hard copies of his 1980 testimony (as “M”) at the UN; and 
Khaled Batrawi, Iyad Haddad, and Abdel Karim Kan’an, for going so many extra 
miles to help the research along. Fateh Azzam and Said Zeedani shared insights 
into some difficult days at the organization. Charles Shammas was responsible for 
recruiting me to LSM in 1983 (thanks, Charles!), and intense parts of my al-Haq 
time were shared with Mona Rishmawi, Joost Hiltermann, and Jacqueline Sha-
hinian (“once an al-Haqqer, always an al-Haqqer!”). Enormous thanks of course 
also to Shawan Jabarin, general director of al-Haq, who invited me to write the 
book in the first place and then with remarkable good humor accommodated its 
delayed appearance; and Shawan and the al-Haq board for allowing me to draw on 
and quote documents from al-Haq’s archives and other internal material. Emma 
Playfair read every chapter as it emerged, and other al-Haq friends also read 
chapters and provided insightful and encouraging feedback: Charles  Shammas, 
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Raja  Shehadeh, Jonathan Kuttab, and Joanna Oyediran. Nina Dodge and Jim Fine 
helped with memories from the earliest days of the organization.
Maggie Beirne, Margo Picken, Marc Shade-Poulson, Joyce Song, and Wilder 
Tayler read chapters and gave feedback and food for comparative thought. At the 
International Commission of Jurists, I was assisted enormously by Illaria Vena, 
Gerald Staberock, and Wilder Tayler, then secretary-general, who located and 
gave permission for me to quote documents from the ICJ archives. I am also 
grateful to Anne Fitzgerald of Amnesty International and Claudio Cordone, 
then Amnesty’s acting secretary-general, for assisting with locating documents at 
Amnesty, and to the organization for permission to quote said material. Iain Guest 
directed me to his insightful report. Other helpful readings were suggested, and 
encouragement provided, by friends and colleagues from the School of Law at 
SOAS, University of London: Samia Bano, Catriona Drew, Ron Dudai, Kate Grady, 
Paul O’Connell, Lutz Oette, Nimer Sultany, Iain Scobbie, and Sarah Hibbin, along 
with Stephen Hopgood, Adam Hanieh, and Dina Matar. Lucy King cheered me up. 
 Abdullahi An-Na`im, Randa Alami, Laila Asser, Sara Hossain, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, 
and friends at EMHRF (especially Bahey el-Din Hassan and Hanny Megally) 
offered encouragement all the way. Charles Shammas and Susan Rockwell accom-
modated me in the MATTIN space next door to al-Haq for extended research 
visits; and Susan and Shari Lapp, as well as Charles, hosted my husband Akram 
and me and, with Salwa Duaibis, Raja Shehadeh and Penny Johnson, shared long 
evenings of good food and laughter as well as reflection. Diala Shammas and Yara 
Hawari updated friendships with their parents forged in the 1980s at the al-Haq 
fortieth anniversary events in 2019, where it was also a joy to see Riziq Shuqair 
demonstrate the depth of his knowledge of the Palestinian human rights move-
ment and the challenges facing it. I take this moment also to pay tribute to the 
work of Issam Younis of Al Mezan and Raji Sourani of the Palestinian Center 
for Human Rights, and to the memory of Maha Abu Dayyeh, for many years the 
director of the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counselling. Likewise, I pay 
tribute to the memories of al-Haq staffers Paulein Hanna and Khamis Shalabi.
Sarah Bowes good-humoredly undertook the cutting of the manuscript in an 
effort that went far beyond the normal limits of friendship, neatly closing the circle 
of her original introduction of me to Charles Shammas (and thus to LSM) in 1983. 
My thanks to Sarah and to Alistair Davison, James Dickins, and John Steinhardt, 
friends since we studied Arabic together at Cambridge and shared extracurricular 
times and spaces in Damascus and downtown Cairo, and who helped the finishing 
of this book with some Zermatt air in 2019. I am grateful to Penny Johnson for 
telling Beshara Doumani, lead editor of the New Directions in Palestinian Studies 
series, about the book project, and to Beshara for his enthusiastic response and 
sustained engagement; to Anthony Chase, Mouin Rabbani, and an anonymous 
reviewer for their constructive comments on the text; to Niels Hooper and Robin 
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Manley at the University of California Press; and to Nicholas Padfield QC, whose 
advice reassured me in the final stages.
Two closing points here. Firstly, the usual caveat applies: I am indebted to each 
and every one of the friends and colleagues who helped me when I was research-
ing and writing this book, but any errors in fact, interpretation, or representa-
tion are of course mine. Also, while I have tried to present differing perspectives 
on some of the contentious issues and periods in al-Haq’s history, there may well 
be some who feel under-represented in the narrative that I tried to construct here, 
and I regret it should that be the case. This book is, in the end, an attempt at a his-
tory, not the history, of al-Haq. 
And finally, my thanks go to Akram al-Khatib, beloved husband, who read 
chapters and accompanied me on research visits to his homeland Palestine, and 
whose depths of integrity, compassion, and insight continue to inspire. He has 
lived with this project since 2009 with the best of humor, and it literally could not 





This is a study of the origins of al-Haq, the first Palestinian human rights orga-
nization, and of the wider significance of the methodologies and approaches it 
instigated as it developed under Israeli occupation and into the early years of the 
Palestinian Authority. I was invited to write about al-Haq by Shawan Jabarin, who 
joined as a field-worker in 1987 and became general director of the organization 
in 2006. I worked intermittently with al-Haq from 1983 to 1993 in different capaci-
ties and, in common with many former staffers, have an enduring affection and 
respect for the organization and the people who worked there. For the record, I am 
hugely proud to have been a tiny part of it. The insider/outsider dynamics of this 
research affected the writing process somewhat, but I was not engaged in “partici-
pant observation” at al-Haq: I was working there, and those were different times. 
Thus, I step into this study in the first person very sparingly.
The book examines how al-Haq initiated, in areas of law and practice, lines 
of thinking and methodologies that were ahead of their time, and to which can be 
traced the origins of many foci of human rights work in Palestine and elsewhere 
today. It looks at the founders, the organization, its staffers (“al-Haqqers”), its work 
over its formative first decade, and its legacy. It considers the stresses placed on 
the young organization by developments under Israeli occupation including the 
first intifada, the Oslo process, and the arrival of the Palestinian Authority, and 
how such factors combined to force structural change in al-Haq in the 1990s 
and beyond. It is a study of some importance to the growing scholarship on the 
practice (and praxis) of local (as compared to international) human rights organi-
zations and, incidentally, their impact on international groups. It is also a study of 
the origins of the Palestinian human rights movement and the increasing perme-
ation of the law and rights discourse into the Palestinian public and political sphere. 
It is an account of Palestinian voices on their choice to work with  international law 
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and human rights under occupation, despite the odds, and before human rights 
first became fashionable and then fell out of favor. This book examines the imme-
diate times and places of al-Haq—that is, I do not present the longer history of Pal-
estine or its people’s struggles to stay on their land—and the West Bank (including 
East Jerusalem) is the main geographical focus, as it was al-Haq’s.
In this study, I set the memories of those involved next to public and previ-
ously unpublished documents from the time, exploring how the organization 
formed, applied, and explained its founding principles, methodologies, and 
strategies. Al-Haq has been written about by its founders, by former staffers, 
and more recently by external researchers. It has also written about itself fre-
quently; indeed, as a young organization, it engaged in a reflective practice that 
sought to explain itself to its friends and allies, to the local and the international 
communities with which it sought to engage. I have drawn on these sources as 
well as on documents from al-Haq’s fading paper archives, the records of other 
organizations (the International Commission of Jurists [ICJ] and Amnesty Inter-
national), and, from the personal archives of Nidal Taha (head of al-Haq’s Board 
of Trustees), correspondence spanning the years 1977–80 to and from the ICJ in 
Geneva and a group of correspondents in the West Bank who became founders of 
Law in the Service of Man (LSM), as al-Haq was first known. I have also drawn on 
and been guided by my meetings, discussions, and interviews with a wide range 
of individuals—colleagues and friends—who worked at and with LSM/al-Haq in 
its formative period.1
The most prolific source of written record and reflection alike is cofounder Raja 
Shehadeh, several of whose publications are key to this study. His authoritative 
legal research and analytical works include the seminal West Bank and the Rule 
of Law (1980, with cofounder Jonathan Kuttab), which was al-Haq’s first publica-
tion. It was critical to the fledgling organization’s profile and development and 
indicative of its approach.2 At the time he was assembling the material for this 
work, however, Shehadeh was also keeping a journal, extracts from which (from 
1979–80) were published as The Third Way in 1982. They provide a vivid contem-
porary glimpse into life in the West Bank at the time when Shehadeh and friends 
were setting up LSM/al-Haq. Shehadeh has published three other sets of journal 
extracts since,3 as well as a memoir (Strangers in the House, 2002), on which I draw 
for its reflections on establishing al-Haq. The book Palestinian Walks, which won 
the Orwell Prize in 2008, voices other memories and musings about the organiza-
tion and its work that are the more poignant for being prompted by Shehadeh’s 
walks in what the subtitle calls “a vanishing landscape,” in a sense the epitome of 
what al-Haq was established to prevent. In addition, Shehadeh’s recollections are 
presented in a number of journal articles and interviews. As well as reflecting the 
phases through which his own thinking has passed, these provide insights on 
the earlier times informed by perspectives developed and knowledge accrued 
over the decades.4
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Al-Haq’s first anniversary publication, Twenty Years Defending Human Rights 
(1999) includes an interview with Shehadeh as well as contributions from staff-
ers and former staffers talking about campaigns, events, and projects such as the 
1988 International Law conference. In 2005 al-Haq published Waiting for Justice, 
which doubled as a substantive annual report (along the lines of those issued 
in the first three years of the first intifada) and as an anniversary publication 
(Al-Haq: 25 Years Defending Human Rights). The report includes a retrospective 
about the organization and its work by Fateh Azzam, who joined in the late 1980s 
and who recalls with admirable brevity not only substantive work but some impor-
tant  organizational moments: for example, the time when the board resigned and 
the organization became staff-run, and the crisis of 1997 when the board sacked 
all but a handful of employees and al-Haq had to more or less start again. Azzam 
also summarizes the “very hot debates” over the killing of collaborators in the first 
intifada, and armed attacks against civilian targets inside Israel in the second.5 In 
2009, a distinctive, hard-backed anniversary publication (Al-Haq: 30 Years Defend-
ing Human Rights) includes testimonials from current and former staffers, the text 
of the first affidavit, a chronology of al-Haq’s early years (based on its Newsletter), 
photos of events and awards, a list of all publications (except the Know Your Rights 
series), and what tries to be an exhaustive list of everyone who ever worked at the 
organization. This publication was produced under the directorship of Shawan 
Jabarin, whose “Detention Memoirs,” smuggled out of prison and published in 
the organization’s third annual report, Protection Denied (1991), illustrates what an 
al-Haq field-worker would consider of relevance to the organization at that time.
There are other documents, particularly from the 1980s, which help situate the 
young organization. A promotional brochure from 1983 endeavored to explain 
LSM’s goals and activities to the public. This was followed by the Newsletter, 
published bimonthly in English and Arabic from May 1984 until the end of 1987, 
when the first intifada made it impossible to sustain. For three-and-a-half key years, 
the Newsletter diligently reported on activities, interventions, and  developments 
in the legal environment. It also took the space to reflect on the organization’s 
identity (hence, “Philosophy of LSM,” “The Role of a Human Rights Organiza-
tion under Occupation,” and “Twenty Years of Occupation: A Time to Reflect”).6 
Some of these pieces came out of collective discussions as the organization worked 
through persistent challenges in the 1980s. They are indicative of a fairly consistent 
pattern of institutional reflection, engaging management and workers across the 
organization. Those involved were more or less conscious of doing something new, 
something extraordinary, and explained themselves accordingly. Also from the 
1980s, I draw on internal documents concerned with such issues as the establish-
ment of a paid position as director, orientation/reorientation sessions for staffers, 
the methodology behind the database, and misplaced queries and interventions 
from external allies in the international human rights movement in whose educa-
tion al-Haq invested considerable time and energy.
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SCHOL ARSHIP:  AL-HAQ AND HUMAN RIGHT S
Al-Haq staffers also wrote about the organization. Joost Hiltermann published a 
number of pieces based on work he was doing with LSM/al-Haq in the 1980s, 
explaining in the Twenty Years anniversary publication that he was “forced to 
engage in extracurricular activities” such as writing these articles (and tak-
ing supplies to families whose homes had been demolished) by his frustration 
with the “infuriating but indispensable legalese of [al-Haq’s] analysis.”7 A 1994 
study of the organization by Mouin Rabbani is an informative and critical analy-
sis, drawing on al-Haq publications and Rabbani’s own experience in the turbu-
lent years of the first intifada.8 Two further examinations come from academic 
researchers who were not al-Haq staffers. The first study of the local human rights 
movement, and al-Haq’s place in it, appeared in Lisa Hajjar’s important 2001 arti-
cle, which she opens by insisting that “to understand the history and politics of the 
human rights movement in [  .  .  .  ] Israel/Palestine, it is necessary to highlight 
the politics of law.”9 Hajjar identifies LSM as playing the central role in the mid-
1980s in the process of reframing in legal language issues previously considered as 
political. In her analysis, “this served to politicize law itself.”10 Later, in her compel-
ling study of the Israeli military court system, Hajjar examined how “human rights 
provided new ways of thinking, talking about, and intervening in the conflict.”11 
Her thinking about the work of human rights and law in reframing the political 
struggle underpins her finding that “framing resistance as demands for human 
rights [  .  .  .  ] serves to internationalise local conflict”; this was key to the advo-
cacy of LSM from its earliest years.12 And the concept of human rights work as 
resistance was raised by a number of LSM/al-Haq colleagues interviewed for this 
current study. The debate on the impact of the recasting of “political” matters in 
legal/human rights language—specifically, whether this contributed to “taming” 
Palestinian resistance—is considered in chapter 4. But LSM/al-Haq’s contribution 
to building the Palestinian case in law and human rights was enormous.
The second major examination of al-Haq comes in Lori Allen’s anthropological 
study The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Pal-
estine (2013). Allen spent considerable time on field research observing different 
areas of work; her interest is in how, nowadays, human rights officials and profes-
sionals act “as if ” human rights actually matters and works—that is, “acting as if 
the human rights industry could stop abuses outside of real political, structural 
change.”13 Through interviews with the founders and a number of staffers, she con-
structs a sensitive narrative of the early years of the organization, its practices and 
priorities. Indeed, it may begin to sound as if, over the decades, these narratives 
have settled into something of an official version. “It is true,” says Tom Buchanan, 
explaining his interest in examining the origins of Amnesty International, “that 
organizations tend to develop versions of their past which serve their current 
needs and purposes.”14 In the narratives of al-Haq’s origins there is no “one man’s 
flash of inspiration,”15 even if the pile of Israeli military orders awaiting scrutiny by 
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Shehadeh in his father’s law office in 1977 is a compelling image. It is interesting 
how closely the narratives (sometimes grand narratives) are reflected in sources 
from the time. To be sure, some issues are more nuanced than usually presented: 
the role of non-Palestinian researchers at al-Haq, for example, needs unpacking. 
There are other stories that almost everyone knows (or knows bits of) but nobody 
wants to talk about—and that, I think, is a quality of discretion and compassion 
that is to be honored in the collective. But the focus on accuracy, evidence, build-
ing credibility, and documentation (Allen’s “faith in evidence”) does indeed reflect 
the impetus of the founders and the training and methodology of al-Haq workers, 
at a time when this was ground-breaking.
Allen notes that the dominant critiques of the “human rights industry” that 
interest her (inter alia, professionalization, NGO-ization and lack of account-
ability, legalization, subordination to foreign donor funding, and displacement of 
political activism proper) came after the early years when al-Haq was developing.16 
Nor indeed were the other criticisms of human rights that now preoccupy scholars 
so widespread during that period. As O’Connell observes, “it is now, in certain 
circles, in vogue to be ‘against,’ or to dismiss human rights.”17 Human rights was 
still relatively new as a discourse and as activism in the late 1970s and 1980s, and 
it was certainly unfamiliar in Palestine. Christine Bell traces a trajectory “from 
social movement outside academia, to praxis involving academics, to accepted sta-
tus as a new (multi-disciplinary) field, to new established field to be critiqued.” En 
route she feels that something is lost, perhaps, through “the academic crushing of 
law’s possibilities for good as doomed to inevitable co-option in the quicksand 
of legalisation.”18 Philip Alston has paid tribute to the lessons provided by critical 
scholarship on human rights while observing that “critical scholars too need to 
take account of the ‘unintended consequences’ of a lot of the work that they do.”19 
A key scholar in the debate, Makau Mutua, notes that he has been “othered” by 
“the human rights project” but that as a TWAIL thinker (Third World Approaches 
to International Law), he does not “seek to throw the baby out with the bath water” 
and neither does he find himself “vexed by the inherent contradiction” in the way 
he views human rights: “My project is to deconstruct, reconstruct, and build a 
world without hegemonies where conditions of underdevelopment—especially in 
the South, but also in the North—can be eradicated.”20
For his part Fateh Azzam, who moved from al-Haq to human rights roles as 
funder, academic, UN representative, and consultant, has responded to critiques 
with a certain amount of exasperation.21 Anthony Tirado Chase, as editor of the 
Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa 
(2017), argues that human rights are not in and of themselves a goal or an ideo-
logical world view: 
To the contrary, human rights are more about processes than ends—processes that 
can restrain state dominance, empower peoples and social groups, and advance indi-
vidual and group agency. What is accomplished with that empowerment and agency 
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is not determined by human rights; it is determined by those who claim, use, and 
transform human rights.22
FR AMING THE WORK
Process is certainly a better description of the initial interest of al-Haq’s founders 
in setting up the organization. All were (are) fundamentally practitioners looking 
for practical ways forward. The rule of law (not human rights) is the focus in their 
correspondence with the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva over the 
period 1977–79 examined in chapter 2. Like international law and human rights, 
the concept of the rule of law is the subject of critique, notably by law and colonial-
ism scholars: “If the legal order is based on some originating violence, as it often 
is, the legitimacy of legal rules tends to be undermined.”23 Nevertheless, Chimni 
notes that “even critics of the positivist, formal and a-cultural conception of the 
rule of law concede its value. [ . . . ] A sanguine take on the rule of law is thus not 
in contradiction with the claim that law can legitimise a system of domination and 
exploitation.” This last would appear to describe the approach of al-Haq’s founders.
Many in the initial founding group were legal professionals operating in a West 
Bank environment where Israel as the occupying power had a clear monopoly 
on the idea of the “rule of law” and forcefully presented itself as the epitome of 
a rule-of-law state. “Indeed,” as Hajjar observes, “it was Israel’s enthusiasm for 
law and the ornate legalism of official discourse that catalysed and propelled the 
development of a local human rights movement, which served as the harbinger 
of legalistic resistance.”24 A flavor of what this meant at the international level can 
be read in the 1977 report of the London-based Sunday Times on Israel’s torture of 
Palestinian detainees.25 The Sunday Times team directed its five-month investiga-
tion at Israel, according to the paper’s editorial, “because Israel occupies a special 
place in our world. Israel itself has always made justice, the rule of law and the fair 
treatment of Arabs central to its claim to nationhood.”26 The report writers under-
lined that Israel was “part of the West—and thus to be judged by Western stan-
dards,” and that indeed this was “fundamental to Israel’s ethos and to its claims for 
international support.”27 The editorial noted a “reticence” in “international bodies” 
and in the press (including the Israeli press) to report on allegations of human 
rights violations by Israel.28 Concluding that “torture has become, on the evidence, 
an accepted Israeli practice,” the INSIGHT team predicted that “some will reject 
our evidence as literally unthinkable [ . . . ] a paradox so distasteful as to demand 
better evidence than would be needed against other countries.”29
Israel’s constant pursuit of internal and external legitimation of its image and 
conduct was critical to the motivation and methodology of LSM/al-Haq’s found-
ers. In this ideological environment, the founders focused on the rule of law as 
articulated principally by the ICJ. This focus included human rights, but most 
importantly required a structural focus on cause (not only consequence) that 
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resonated with the founders’ immediate concerns. As the decades have passed, 
frameworks other than belligerent occupation and rule of law have been proposed 
in response to Israel’s developing policy and practice in the West Bank (including 
East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, then routinely referred to (inter alia by al-Haq) as 
the occupied territories.30 Israeli scholar David Kretzmer has argued that Israel’s 
rule (in view of the settlers and their treatment by the Israeli state) is “much closer 
to a colonial regime than one of belligerent occupation.”31
The interdisciplinary frame of settler-colonialism is also applied, with its 
focus on the “elimination of the native” or the “erasure” of natives’ presence by 
the settler-colonial power.32 Sparked by a 2007 report from John Dugard, then 
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian 
territory occupied since 1967, the international legal framework of apartheid 
was the subject of a major international research project led by a South Africa–
funded team and involving researchers from al-Haq.33 As illustrated in the epilogue, 
it is now routinely invoked by al-Haq and other human rights NGOs to frame 
aspects of Israel’s conduct and propose mechanisms of redress. It is easy to point to 
predictions of these frameworks in early al-Haq work. In 1985, Raja Shehadeh 
concluded, in regard to Israel’s defense of its “land acquisition policy,” that “thus, 
colonialism is to be formalized and made permanent in the guise of autonomy.”34 
Al-Haq drew attention to the “massive Israeli colonisation effort that is underway 
in the Occupied Territories,” obscured from outside view by the structure of mili-
tary legislation, in its reflection on twenty years of occupation.35 Both Shehadeh 
and Kuttab made public comparisons with South Africa’s apartheid system in the 
early 1980s.36
These early invocations of legal frameworks other than occupation through 
which to assess and resist Israel’s conduct resonated with the broader nationalist dis-
courses of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) alongside its alliances with 
the Non-Aligned Movement, Afro-Asian states, national liberation movements 
and post-colonial states, anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and  anti-colonial 
activism elsewhere, and the demands being made of the international system by 
“Third World” states and the Global South. In Justice for Some (2019), Noura Erakat 
“explores the role and the potential of law in the pursuit of Palestinian freedom” 
and applies Duncan Kennedy’s concept of “legal work” (“the work that the legal 
actor performs to achieve a desired outcome”) to survey  achievements by the PLO 
and by Israel in shaping the law.37 In a chapter titled “Pragmatic Revolutionaries,” 
she reviews the “fundamental legal achievements” of the PLO during the 1970s, the 
period during which LSM’s founders were completing their education and entering 
professional life, and which framed the discourses and expectations of the time.38 
In that sense, the founders of LSM (examined in chapter 3) were very much situ-
ated in time and place. They articulated ways in which they considered themselves 
nationalist, and their vision of LSM as part of the national struggle; in this regard, 
George Bisharat attributes such sentiments to lawyers in general:
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Both striking and working factions regard themselves as active participants, if not 
vanguards, in the struggle against Israeli power. This conviction is sometimes ar-
ticulated frankly in nationalist terms, other times, more indirectly, through slogans 
concerning the defense and promotion of the general principles of the ‘rule of law’.39
LSM/al-Haq field researchers also explained how they considered their human 
rights work to be part of the national struggle and a form of resistance. Shammas 
frames the work as struggle, while Shehadeh’s non-LSM publications underpin 
Tripp’s observation of sumud as a “recurrent theme in Palestinian resistance nar-
ratives.”40 But the founders deliberately distanced themselves from internal (fac-
tional) PLO politics in the occupied territories and the wider national movement. 
This was for professional reasons (the directive discussed in chapter 4 to “leave 
your politics at the door”), for organizational sustainability and personal security; 
but also as a result of personal disinterest and, it appears, a certain impatience with 
what they considered the limits of the prevailing nationalist discourse and tools. 
Insisting on not being affiliated with any particular tendency was novel at the time, 
and unsettling for some in Palestinian society. Instead, the founders proposed 
the rule of law as a framework for examining and resisting Israel’s conduct as an 
occupying power; human rights, as shown in the correspondence examined in 
chapter 2, was a secondary discourse.
AL-HAQ C ONTRIBUTIONS
Also in chapter 2, we see the innovative nature of LSM’s organizational setup (as 
a not-for-profit company), designed to avoid, at least structurally, what Bisharat 
termed “over-control” on the part of the Israeli occupation authorities (control 
over funding by the designated Israeli army officer) and the various PLO factions 
(via partisan takeovers from a packed membership).41 LSM’s founders shared 
definite ideas about institutional governance that revolved around active par-
ticipation and learning from staff, with the aim of growing together to build a 
“cadre of human rights activists,” as Shehadeh put it. Chapter 4 examines how, 
once the organization outgrew its initial tight group of members and the need 
for change came, the organization’s leadership reminded themselves that LSM/
al-Haq was still to “serve as an institutional model to the community,” inter alia 
with its all-staff general meeting remaining as “the highest decision-making body 
on programme-related matters.” This model did not survive the turmoils of expan-
sion and tensions of Oslo, although the underlying values are reaffirmed by some 
still in the field today. For LSM/al-Haq, seeking to set an institutional rule-of-law 
and participatory structure went alongside a declared commitment to attending to 
human rights issues in Palestinian society. This was manifested on the one hand 
in educational work about rights and legalistic resistance to the occupation, and 
the provision of the first public law library in the occupied territories; and on the 
other, in an early attention to an “internal” agenda including the rights of workers 
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and women within Palestinian society. The rule-of-law agenda here was extended 
to underpin individual and societal relations.
Human rights as a main reference for the founders developed alongside 
the ICJ’s thinking on the right to development. In his introduction to the ICJ’s 
1966 publication The Rule of Law and Human Rights: Principles and Definitions, 
ICJ’s then secretary-general Seán MacBride referred to the “new dynamic con-
cept of the rule of law” developed through a series of meetings, congresses, and 
 seminars in different parts of the world, mainly in the Global South. Jan Eckel 
considers initiatives at the UN in the 1970s by the Non-Aligned Movement and 
the Afro-Asia bloc of states to “frame their concern for economic development in 
human rights language” with the assertion of the right to development as a set of 
“human rights claims to expose the injustice of the post-colonial world order.”42 
Here, LSM’s founders can be seen to have been firmly in the corner of the Global 
South (and peers from “Third World” states and struggles), taking up the right 
to development in terms of collective as well as individual rights and attending to 
structure and causes of human rights violations (as discussed in chapter 5). In 
LSM’s case, this was a consistent focus on the ways in which Israel was pursu-
ing an annexationist agenda, itself unlawful, and which gave rise to other human 
rights violations against the civilian population when they manifested resistance 
to this agenda. The field research methodology developed by and with the field-
work unit was groundbreaking, as was the way in which the organization sought 
to organize and retrieve the data it was collecting. LSM/al-Haq’s lessons in field 
research methodologies and database development were drawn on by domestic 
and international human rights organizations around the world, and the organiza-
tion was critical to the development of a number of other Palestinian human rights 
organizations in the occupied territories.
At the same time, as already noted, the concept of human rights was not 
 familiar in the region; distrust of the human rights discourse was fueled by its 
selective deployment against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and field research-
ers recruited in the early years recall initial concerns about serving a liberal 
 Western agenda by joining LSM. LSM was among the first human rights organi-
zations established in the Arab region, and although contact was limited during 
the early years, as shown in chapter 1, some of these concerns about the liberal 
discourse were shared with Arab peers. At the same time, the concept of human 
rights includes the right to self-determination, affirmed in both of the Interna-
tional Human Rights Covenants and discussed further in chapter 1. The found-
ers of LSM refrained from attending to self-determination in any detail or calling 
for an end to the occupation as such. Others saw even in LSM’s very early work 
the inevitable conclusion that occupation had to end, but the organization did 
not explicitly make that call at first; the correspondence with the International 
 Commission of Jurists examined in chapter 2 demonstrates an extreme reluc-
tance to be perceived as making any pronouncement that might be considered 
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 “political.” It was in its 1987 editorial on twenty years of occupation that al-Haq 
produced a sustained reflection on Israel’s “systematic colonisation of the West 
Bank and Gaza.”43 “What first looked like a temporary military occupation,” said 
al-Haq, “has been transformed into a long-term Israeli effort to colonise the Occu-
pied Territories.”
This 1987 piece reflected the thinking behind al-Haq’s preparations for the first 
international law conference to be held in the occupied territories, which it con-
vened in Jerusalem in January 1988 against the background, as it transpired, of the 
opening weeks of the first intifada. The impetus for this conference was a learn-
ing process—there were simply too many questions arising under international 
humanitarian law (IHL) from what was already then (at twenty years) being called 
a long-term or prolonged occupation. Al-Haq’s plan was to invite experts in the 
field to help the organization think through some more obscure but absolutely 
vital implications of the laws of war for occupied territories under prolonged hos-
tile military rule. For a still relatively young Palestinian NGO to engage in this way 
with a range of international scholars and practitioners was unusual, and there was 
a lasting impact from the collection of papers later published and contributing to 
the wider legal debate on the development of IHL.44 The work of al-Haq’s Enforce-
ment Project arguably had an equally impactful effect in developing the thinking 
and debates on the implications for third-party states of their obligation “to ensure 
respect” for the Fourth Geneva Convention by the occupying power (evidenced in 
certain policy statements by European states) in the early nineties.
The innovative nature of this fledgling Palestinian organization and the 
 creativity that sparked from the engagement of those involved meant that as well 
as setting standards for monitoring, investigating, documenting, and  analyzing 
information on human rights violations in the West Bank, LSM/al-Haq was 
engaged in work that was to become a staple of human rights advocacy (Pales-
tinian and international) in future decades. This included, for example, a call in 
1984 for the question of Israel’s Road Plan No. 50 to be referred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, and initial efforts, early in the first 
intifada, to document “grave breaches” of the Fourth Geneva Convention with 
a view to stimulating prosecutions under third states’ domestic legislation.45 
Across the region, and indeed internationally, al-Haq is credited as an incubator 
for human rights activists, with many who worked there in its early years going 
on to hold senior and leadership human rights positions in Palestine, regionally 
and internationally.
LSM/al-Haq learned its trade in the moment of struggle that the West Bank and 
Gaza lived in the 1980s. Possibilities and challenges looked different. This study 
explores what that meant for those involved and for the organization. Interviewed 
for al-Haq’s thirty-year anniversary, Raja Shehadeh reflected on the photos that 
had been assembled for the publication:
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For my generation of founding members these pictures bring memories of happy, 
hopeful and tense times when it was still not clear whether the organization would 
survive and succeed in fulfilling those aims for which it was established. It has. For 
those who live in these much crueller times without a memory of the past early years 
of the organization these pictures provide a window into a past when resilience and 
hard work defeated defeat and pessimism.
This study begins with those earlier times, before moving to al-Haq’s present and 
“crueller” times, which includes the political and populist pillorying of the human 
rights and international law discourse on which the idea of LSM/al-Haq was 
based—indeed, before what currently appears to be a defeat for the realization of 
those principles through the systems apparently available to protect them. Erakat 
reminds us that “law’s ability to oppress is evidence not of its failure but rather of 
the fact that it can be strategically deployed.”46 It was upon their understanding 
of this that LSM’s founders acted, and in full knowledge of this that al-Haq contin-





In the late 1970s, a group of Palestinian professionals from the West Bank (includ-
ing East Jerusalem) initiated a lengthy correspondence with the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in Geneva. It resulted in the establishment of Law in 
the Service of Man (LSM, later to become al-Haq), as the West Bank affiliate of the 
ICJ, in 1979. In the next chapter, I examine the challenges identified by the group 
through this correspondence, and how they rose to them; this chapter is a short 
reminder of the times insofar as they are raised by the narrative. I focus on the 
immediate context of the West Bank at this time, not to erase the longer and still 
violent histories that preceded the 1967 Israeli occupation.
THE O C CUPIED TERRITORIES ,  ISR AEL,  AND THE PLO
The group’s initial approach to the ICJ was sent in April 1977. The West Bank 
(including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip—those parts of Palestine remaining 
outside the Israeli State since its establishment in 1948—had been under Israeli 
military occupation for just shy of ten years. Jordan, which had ruled the West 
Bank since 1948, retained its claim till the first intifada, and still maintains author-
ity over its Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic affairs and shari’a courts in occupied 
East Jerusalem, where Israel refuses to countenance Palestinian Authority juris-
diction and over which Israel has asserted sovereignty. US President Trump’s 2017 
decision to recognize Israel’s position on the city as its capital challenged decades 
of international consensus against recognizing Israel’s claims to territory acquired 
by force.1 Egypt for its part had governed the Gaza Strip as “administrator” until 
the 1967 war. The leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (originally 
founded by Arab states in 1964) was taken over by Fatah (headed by Yasser Ara-
fat) after the 1967 war. In 1970, the PLO was ousted from its bases in Jordan after 
“Black September” and armed engagements between the PLO and the Jordanian 
army. The PLO was now headquartered in Beirut. It was to be ousted in turn from 
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 Lebanon after the Israeli invasion of 1982, removing its last armed bases in a coun-
try bordering on Israel, and was thenceforth headquartered in Tunis until the sign-
ing of the Israel-PLO Gaza-Jericho Agreement in 1994. In the occupied territories, 
membership of any faction in the PLO and any contact with the organization were 
illegal, as were such manifestations of nationalism as raising the Palestinian flag. 
In LSM’s first publication, The West Bank and the Rule of Law, Shehadeh records 
the following example:
In April 1980, several students from Bethlehem University were arrested and ac-
cused of wearing T-shirts which carried the emblem of the Bethlehem University 
Student Council. The emblem contained streaks of green, black and red on a white 
T-shirt. The authorities claimed that this added up to the four colours of the Palestin-
ian flag. The University was warned that wearing these T-shirts was illegal, and the 
students were tried and convicted by a military court under Military Order No. 101.2
Gabi Baramki, who was acting president of Birzeit University after the 1974 depor-
tation of the standing president Hanna Nasir, recalls in his memoir the frequency 
with which the Palestinian flag was raised by students and the hostile responses 
of the Israeli military.3 Charles Tripp has pointed out that this kind of repression 
(whereby “it is forbidden to raise, exhibit or attach any flags or political emblems 
except after obtaining a licence”)4 made it “perversely easy to commit multiple 
small acts of resistance” which could involve large numbers of people.5
The charge of tanzhim, short-hand for membership in an illegal organization 
(i.e., a PLO faction), was leveled at activists involved in the nationalist political 
struggle. By no means were they all involved in or accused of involvement in the 
armed struggle that remained part of the resistance strategy of the various PLO 
factions (although not of the Communists).6 Lisa Taraki stresses the formative 
background of many future leaders of the women’s, union, and student move-
ments in the voluntary work committees of the 1970s.7 Writing in the first inti-
fada, Joost Hiltermann traces the emergence of a “nationalist movement of classic 
design” in the West Bank and Gaza to the 1970s, after the PLO made a decision in 
1974 to focus its energies on the occupied territories:
The local movement consisted of two branches: the underground military-political 
branch, whose members adhere directly to one of the factions of the PLO and carry 
out resistance operations on the orders of their commanders, who are usually out-
side the area; and the semilegal social-political branch, consisting of institutions and 
popular organizations set up by local activists who have attempted to mobilize the 
Palestinian masses by offering them services that were otherwise not available, while 
articulating nationalist concerns and aspirations as part of their day-to-day work.8
Hiltermann refers to an “intensive recruitment drive [that] took place among 
 students, workers, professionals and others.” The PLO’s decision to focus on 
the occupied territories came after the Arab League’s recognition of the PLO as the 
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“sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” followed by Yasser Ara-
fat’s historic address at the UN General Assembly, both in 1974 and, as recounted 
by Noura Erakat, significant outcomes of the PLO’s legal work at the UN.9 Arafat 
was presented (by then Algerian foreign minister Bouteflika) as chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the PLO and commander-in-chief of the Palestine Revo-
lution; this was the speech he ended with his dramatic appeal: “Today I have come 
bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch 
fall from my hand.”10 Erakat describes the intense efforts that led to this occasion, 
“the first time a non-state actor had taken the international podium,” and describes 
the General Assembly at that time as comprising an “automatic majority of non-
aligned states in a global context of ongoing, armed liberation struggles.”11 In the 
West Bank, those tied to the “old guard” of the Jordanian regime lost ground to 
the nationalists; in the 1976 municipal elections, “pro-PLO candidates were re-
elected or swept into office in all the major towns except Bethlehem,”12 and with the 
formation of the second National Guidance Committee (in 1978) there emerged 
“the first non-clandestine political framework” in the occupied territories.13 Hamas 
did not exist, although its parent movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, was like-
wise engaged in broadening its constituency and institution-building during this 
period.14 The West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were known as the 
occupied territories (sometimes the Israeli-occupied territories); today’s nomen-
clature of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) did not appear until the first 
intifada, with Jordan’s renunciation of its claim to the West Bank and the PLO’s 
recognition of and entry into negotiation with the state of Israel.
The Israeli government declined to recognize its status as an occupying power 
under international law, and preferred the term “administered territories”; it had 
illegally annexed East Jerusalem and applied the biblical names Judea and Samaria 
to the West Bank. In the West, Israel had been largely successful in “presenting its 
occupation of the Palestinian territories as the most benevolent in history.” This 
realization, in the face of the situation he found when he returned home from 
his law studies in London, was one of the factors to provoke Raja Shehadeh into 
“agitating”—getting a group together to write to the ICJ.15 The idea of a “benign 
occupation” and the assumption that what Israeli officials presented as truth was 
just that or a fair approximation dogged the attempts of Palestinians and their 
allies to present the facts as otherwise. This was perhaps the main challenge on the 
international front that LSM set out to meet.
Writing about the West Bank in the mid-1980s, George Bisharat reflects on the 
politically unresolved status of the territories and the issues of authority to which 
this state of “indeterminacy” gave rise:
Indeterminancy has also given rise to the phenomenon of “over-control,” the 
 subjugation of the West Bank to multiple external authorities exerting contradic-
tory pressures on the local community. Israel exercises direct control through the  
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agency of the military government. Jordan exercises indirect influence through 
its control of the flow of people and goods between the East and West banks, and 
through its network of client-notables. The PLO commands some quasi-governmen-
tal resources and enjoys the political loyalties of the majority of the Palestinian com-
munity. The result is a combination of suffocating control in matters that involve the 
interests of the three external authorities and a breakdown in the system of social 
accountability and near anarchy in realms implicating only or primarily local com-
munity interests.16
Reflections of this situation appear in the initial correspondence from the would-
be founders of LSM. The deleterious situation of the court system in the West 
Bank, with all matters of interest to the Israeli occupation authorities being trans-
ferred to the military courts or army-headed Objection Committees, exemplifies 
Israel’s effective power and lack of legitimate force.
WEST BANK LEGAL PROFESSION
Bisharat’s study focuses on the legal profession and the challenges and dilemmas it 
faced during these times, not least its internal division between striking and work-
ing lawyers. The strike by West Bank lawyers had begun with the 1967 occupation, 
when the legal profession in the West Bank as a whole went on strike in protest 
against Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem, its transfer of the West Bank’s Court 
of Appeal to Ramallah from Jerusalem, and its noncompliance with the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. As Shehadeh explains:
The general feeling among the lawyers was that to appear before the newly organized 
courts would give legitimacy to the annexation of Jerusalem, because the Jordanian 
law specifically designates Jerusalem as the seat of the Court of Appeal. It would also, 
they thought, imply that the other changes carried out by the military authority were 
being condoned and legitimized, if they continued to work as usual.17
The Jordanian Bar Association—the professional organization for West Bank law-
yers—supported the strike and undertook to pay stipends for the loss of profes-
sional income. Striking lawyers could practice—as appropriate—before the shari’a 
courts (where the judiciary had refused to give any recognition to the Israeli 
authorities) and the different courts of the Christian communities, but not in the 
military courts, which were gaining in jurisdiction, nor in the regular court sys-
tem now under the control of the Israeli occupation authorities. Practicing West 
Bank lawyers were expelled from the Jordanian Bar Association (JBA) or else not 
allowed to join when they qualified. In the early 1980s, Bisharat estimates that 
some 60 percent of the profession were striking in the West Bank; there was no 
strike by lawyers in the Gaza Strip, where the separate system administered pre-
viously under Egypt’s control had been unaffected by the changes to the judicial 
system in the West Bank.18 Bisharat considers in detail the factors that, over the 
years since 1967, brought some lawyers back into work and kept others committed 
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to the strike or encouraged them to join it upon qualifying. In regard to the system 
of justice administered by the occupation authorities, he observes:
In the minds of local practitioners, these laws are a reflection of the very power of the 
military legal system, which is not to dispense justice, but to further the policy goals 
of suppressing Palestinian nationalism and facilitating Israeli settlement of the West 
Bank. In this view, the underlying objective of the military courts is less to affix guilt 
to specific individuals for violations of security regulations than to exact a steady toll 
from the community in general for acts of resistance, in the hope that pressure will 
develop within the community itself for the disciplining of its members.19
From the early 1980s there were attempts on the part of practicing lawyers in the 
West Bank to come to some kind of accommodation with the Bar Association in 
Amman, and/or to set up a branch of the JBA in the West Bank. These develop-
ments were followed closely by LSM in its formative years, given the deleterious 
effect on the coherence and standards of the profession of the absence of a profes-
sional association. The JBA threatened to have tried for treason those involved in 
negotiating with the Israeli military government for permission to establish a West 
Bank branch.20 Shehadeh’s journal records a striking lawyer telling him, “All of you 
lawyers who work here are collaborators. Every move you make is used to consoli-
date the Israeli occupation.”21 I return to these tensions in chapter 3.
The Palestinian population included rural and urban dwellers and the residents 
of refugee camps established after the 1948 Nakba, with other refugees added from 
the internal displacements of the 1967 war; there were also scattered Bedouin 
encampments. Travel within the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza, 
and between the West Bank and Israel was comparatively unimpeded in light of 
today’s barricades of the Wall and permanent checkpoints to control movement 
of Palestinians between Areas A, B, and C. Although the whole of the occupied 
territories was a closed military area, flying checkpoints and closures after particu-
lar incidents were qualitatively different from the overall closures and partitions 
that characterize the areas today. The movement of Palestinians was controlled 
through the ID card system; in 1980, Shehadeh explained the wider significance of 
this form of control as follows:
The agony of the exile and the dispersion of thousands and thousands of Palestinians 
can be stated in terms of their inability to obtain from the Israelis an identity card, 
evidence of their acceptance and status as residents in the country they were forced 
to leave. On the other hand, the humiliation of the million Palestinian holders of 
these coveted cards and the discrimination to which they are subjected is symbolised 
by this card which may at any time be confiscated, terminating their right to stay in 
the area.22
Palestinian vehicles were identified through the distinctive area-specific license 
plates the military authorities assigned. There were checkpoints—some regular 
and others flying—but none of today’s Israeli-controlled terminals marking the 
end of “Area A” urban centers under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction; all this 
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was to come after Oslo. Provided you were not wanted by the Israeli authorities 
and had not been placed under particular movement restrictions, you could get 
a blue-plated (West Bank) servis (shared seven-passenger taxi) from Ramallah all 
the way into East Jerusalem and back, something that is no longer possible even 
for those Palestinians who have the requisite Israeli permits allowing them to enter 
occupied East Jerusalem. West Bank Palestinians holding East Jerusalem ID cards 
had relatively easier passage with their yellow-plated vehicles.
Snapshots of life in the West Bank can be glimpsed in Raja Shehadeh’s pub-
lished extracts from his journal written over 1979–80.23 Israeli settlers could be 
seen driving through the main towns of the West Bank, on their way to settle-
ments, sometimes buying supplies, sometimes smashing up cars and committing 
other acts of violence against Palestinian civilians and their property. The road 
network that links up the settlement colonies with Israel’s municipal areas and 
fractures the West Bank into atomized enclaves was not yet built, though in its 
original form it was to be the subject of one of LSM’s early reports. Settler violence 
was an early focus of the organization’s monitoring activities. The settlements were 
growing, with the active support of Israeli Prime Minister Begin. The settlers 
were armed, as were the Israeli soldiers who patrolled in jeeps or on foot through 
the Palestinian towns and villages, living in barracks and guarding the prisons and 
the headquarters of the military governor in each district. Palestinian students 
and schoolchildren were involved in protests and clashes with Israeli settlers and 
soldiers. The Palestinian population was not armed, with the exception of those 
members of the “military-political branch” of the PLO factions referred to by Hil-
termann. A different exception comprised those Palestinians collaborating with 
the Israeli occupation authorities, notably members of the Village Leagues estab-
lished by Israel to foster an alternative leadership and described by Shehadeh in 
one of his nonacademic pieces as “a criminal collaborationist grouping.”24
CAMP DAVID
The Village Leagues were established after the conclusion of the 1978 Camp David 
Accords between Israel and Egypt, the negotiations for which had been hosted 
and the agreement brokered by US president Jimmy Carter. These accords were a 
critical part of the context in which the idea for LSM/al-Haq arose, and they are 
obliquely referred to in the correspondence with the ICJ examined in the follow-
ing chapter. Carter had thrown himself into intense Middle East peace efforts since 
taking office in January 1977. In Israel, Likud came to power for the first time, and 
in November 1977 Egypt’s President Sadat made the first ever official visit by an 
Arab leader to Israel, speaking before the Israeli Knesset; Erakat notes that the sur-
prise visit derailed ongoing diplomatic exchanges between the United States and 
the PLO at the time.25 The following month, Begin presented his plan for nonterri-
torial “administrative autonomy”—that is, “autonomy was to apply not to the land 
but only to the people who lived on it.”26 The first of the two Camp David Accords 
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provided for the implementation of “autonomy” or “self-rule” arrangements for the 
Palestinians of the territories, with the exception of occupied East Jerusalem.27 The 
PLO had not been a party to Camp David, nor had the Palestinian population been 
consulted, and Egypt’s declared goal of achieving Israel’s agreement to Palestinian 
self-determination was not realized.28 Jordan refused to cooperate; Israel and Egypt 
signed a peace treaty the following year (1979), and Egypt was suspended from the 
Arab League, which moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. By the time She-
hadeh was writing his journal (1979–80), Likud was pushing the “administrative 
autonomy” concept that Hiltermann attributes  originally to Moshe Dayan, looking 
for cooperative Palestinians to administer Palestinian affairs while Israel kept con-
trol of the territories, in accordance with the Israeli government’s interpretation of 
the Camp David agreement.29 In 1981 the Israeli occupation authorities established 
a civilian administration alongside its military government in the territories; LSM 
responded with an analysis of the substance and implications of Military Order 
947 for the West Bank that set up the civilian administration.30 Raja Shehadeh was 
later to tell an interviewer from the International Review of the Red Cross that this 
was “the most important legal change” and “this was how apartheid was intro-
duced to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”31
The processes and conclusion of the Camp David arrangements were rejected 
by “national congresses” in the West Bank and Gaza, under the slogan “No to self-
government, yes to the PLO.”32 They were protested and resisted by school and 
university students and the burgeoning number of politically affiliated voluntary 
committees and professional institutions that had been forming since the mid-
’70s.33 Amnesty International’s annual report for 1977 highlights an increase in the 
number of convictions of Palestinians for alleged security-related offenses, and 
frequent demonstrations against the occupation.34 The PLO, as already noted, had 
been investing in the mobilization of the population of the occupied territories, 
building on existing organizational structures of the PLO (such as trade unions), 
voluntary work committees established locally to provide social services for the 
occupied population, and encouraging the creation of new professional associa-
tions and popular groupings. This was “to serve as an infrastructure for a future 
Palestinian state” and in the meantime to constitute an “institutional infrastruc-
ture of resistance” to the occupation, including the authorities’ plans for Israeli-
controlled administrative autonomy.35 Hiltermann theorizes this as a strategy 
of “out-administering the enemy.”36 This was not, however, a time of consensus 
among the factions of the Palestinian national movement in the occupied territo-
ries, but rather one of “acrimonious competition” over influence and control, nota-
bly among Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Communists.37 
Although membership in these political groups was illegal, Hiltermann explains 
the implications for local committees and associations as follows:
In each of these organizations and movements, individuals tend to identify with a 
particular political current in the national movement headed by the PLO, or else the 
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organization has set itself apart from similar organizations, becoming for example 
the workers’ branch of a particular current in the national movement.38
Everyday references to a particular person (or group) “being” PF/DF/Fatah thus 
intended and intend to convey that the person spoken about supports or sym-
pathizes with that faction over others, rather than alleging the individual to be a 
“member.” There was also the matter of money. Shehadeh opens his preface to The 
Third Way with reference to the 1978 decision of the Arab States’ meeting in Bagh-
dad to establish a Steadfastness Fund “to help us combat the collapse of our social 
and economic fabric, caused by the Israeli colonization of our land.”39 The fund 
was controlled by a joint PLO-Jordan committee, an arrangement which “became 
the focus of sharp criticism from nationalist leaders in the West Bank, who had 
little faith in the intentions of the king of Jordan”; according to Hiltermann, “the 
issue of Joint Committee funding was to become the main cause of contention in 
the national movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s.”40 This exacerbated ten-
sions between the inside and the outside—the nationalist movement outside the 
occupied territories, and the local leadership within. Writing about the late 1970s, 
Hiltermann describes this as a “war of the institutions.”41 This forms part of the 
background to a key concern articulated in the letters from LSM’s founders to 
the ICJ by those who built the institution: the insistence on a nonpartisan posi-
tioning for LSM. In 1978, the Joint Committee took over from the Jordanian gov-
ernment the payment of the stipends of striking West Bank lawyers.42
HUMAN RIGHT S ORGANIZ ATIONS
There was a gap among the popular and professional associations developing at 
this time. In his contribution to al-Haq’s Twenty Years Defending Human Rights 
publication, Hiltermann notes that around the same time that the initiative to 
set up LSM began to take shape, other professional and intellectual institutions 
had begun to “come into their own,” including Palestinian universities, the Arab 
Thought Forum, and the Arab Studies Society.43 As already noted, there was no 
functioning professional association for West Bank lawyers that might have pro-
vided a forum for legal challenges. There was no local Palestinian human rights 
group. From the early seventies, Quaker Peace and Service ran legal advice ser-
vices for Palestinians from an office in East Jerusalem.44 In Israel there was the 
Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), which did not deal as a rule with 
matters in the occupied territories and, according to Hajjar, neither challenged the 
 occupation per se nor took a position on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to Israel’s rule in those territories.45 There was also the Israeli National 
Section of the ICJ, which was not involved in challenging Israeli measures and pol-
icies in the West Bank and Gaza. One source of information was the Israeli League 
for Human and Civil Rights, chaired by Israel Shahak, publishing  information 
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(often culled from the Hebrew Israeli press) on human rights abuses inside Israel 
and in the occupied territories; in 1973 this group had been disaffiliated as a mem-
ber by the New York–based International League for Human Rights.46 Hajjar traces 
the “departure point for a local human rights movement” to politically motivated 
Palestinian and Israeli lawyers working in the military court system and increas-
ingly making reference to international law and issues of legality of the nature of 
Israel’s conduct of the occupation.47
Of less direct influence were developments in the human rights movement 
internationally.48 Relatively recent academic reevaluations of the historiography/
ies of human rights have cogently critiqued presentations of human rights and/
or the “human rights movement” that were concentrated on Europe and/or the 
United States. Samuel Moyn and others identify breakthroughs in the seven-
ties, with Eckel identifying Eastern Europe and South America as regions where 
“human rights came to the fore as a protest language.”49 Moyn has proposed that 
“the best general explanation for the origins of this social movement and common 
discourse around rights remains the collapse of other, prior utopias, both state-
based and internationalist”50—more generally, he argues, a move from politics 
broadly stated to a morality that sought to stand apart from (and indeed above) 
the politics of the past and of the day. This last proposition is oddly resonant 
with the positions articulated by the founders of LSM in 1979. This is not to detract 
from the cogency of Moyn’s critics, for example Joseph Slaughter, who prefaces his 
intervention with a quotation from Upendra Baxi: “An adequate historiography 
will, of course, [ . . . ] locate the originating languages of human rights far beyond 
the European spacetime.”51 Nor indeed would al-Haq locate “international” or 
“human rights” as coterminous with concepts, movement, or histories in the West 
or Global North, but would be more likely to agree with Vasuki Nesiah that “the 
human rights tradition is internally diverse and even internally conflicted, and 
a singular history does a disservice to the counter-hegemonic projects that have 
framed their claims through human rights language.”52 Still, in its origins, LSM/
al-Haq (or at least the three founders) tended to look west (rather than south), 
and to the conventionally recognized and established international human rights 
organizations, for initial support and alliances, because of their personal familiar-
ity with these groups and their contexts, but also for pragmatic assessments of 
the potential impact such groups offered in their interventions with the Israeli 
occupation authorities: To whom would Israel listen? Whose voice would Israel 
hear? As noted, they paid close attention to the struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa, noting the structural underpinnings of apartheid rule.53 As for Arab orga-
nizations, Joe Stork and Susan E. Waltz consider the turbulences elsewhere in the 
region that unsettled existing ideologies and allegiances and made space for a 
human rights discourse to emerge. This is explored briefly below, but as a number 
of interviewees for this study made clear, their real, sustained engagement with 
22    Context
Arab human rights groups and actors elsewhere in the Global South came after 
the Vienna meeting of 1993 considered in chapter 6 (and, of course, after Oslo).54
In 1977, David Weissbrodt published one of the first articles on the interna-
tional human rights movement, looking at a number of human rights NGOs with 
national sections in different countries, including the oldest of them, the Paris-
based and primarily Francophone International Federation of Human Rights 
(FIDH) founded in 1922.55 FIDH was to become an international partner for some 
of the first Arab human rights groups, those setting up in the Maghreb around the 
same time as LSM. Amnesty International, founded in 1961, is described by Weiss-
brodt as “one of the largest and newest of the nongovernmental organizations 
concerned with human rights.”56 Amnesty’s International Secretariat assigned a 
full-time research assistant to work on the Middle East region in 1970 and under-
took an extended research visit to Israel and the occupied territories in 1978; a 
twentieth-anniversary account of Amnesty’s achievements does not cover its work 
here.57 As the model of a membership organization, Amnesty’s activism revolved 
around national sections, which existed overwhelmingly in the West and did not, 
at that time, work on human rights violations in their own countries.58 The award 
of the Nobel Peace Prize 1977 to Amnesty is part of the standard narrative of the 
1970s as the breakthrough decade in the international human rights movement, 
although in Palestine, the following year’s award to Menachem Begin and Anwar 
Sadat (for the Camp David Accords) made more of an impression, and not a posi-
tive one.59 Greater impact from an external actor on a human rights–related story 
was generated in Palestine by the publication the same year of the Sunday Times’ 
report on allegations of torture of Palestinian detainees by Israeli forces.60
In the United States, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights—since 2003 
Human Rights First—was established in 1978 and was one of LSM’s earliest insti-
tutional interlocutors in the States.61 Another of today’s players, Human Rights 
Watch, did not exist as such. Its first structure, Helsinki Watch, was established 
in 1978, to follow up on the commitments to human rights and fundamental free-
doms made by state signatories to the Helsinki Accords of 1975.62 Other watch 
committees were established during the course of the 1980s, with Middle East 
Watch the last in 1989.63 In Europe, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 
was established in 1952, solidly on one side in the context of the Cold War, but 
its Geneva-based secretariat later moved determinedly and innovatively into a 
more international position considering a broader range of human rights issues, 
including social and economic rights. The ICJ had national sections, again mostly 
in Western Europe, and was best known among lawyers for its focus on rule-of-
law issues and its governing commission of prominent judges and lawyers. 64 The 
ICJ produced its first report focusing on Israel/Palestine in 1970, in the wake of a 
 funding scandal that is discussed in chapter 2 in the context of its repercussions in 
the West Bank. The ideological counterpart to the ICJ (at least historically) was the 
International Association of Democratic Lawyers, which Weissbrodt described in 
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1977 as finding “the large part of their members and support in socialist countries 
and in allied groups in nonsocialist nations.”65 One of the first substantial human 
rights reports on Israeli violations in the occupied territories was published in 1978 
by the National Lawyers Guild, a US organization affiliated with the IADL.66
INTERNATIONAL L AW
International human rights organizations in the 1970s did not address issues 
of international humanitarian law (IHL) as a matter of course, if at all.67 IHL was 
then mostly the concern of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and military lawyers in different parts of the world. Israeli law journals were among 
the few academic venues for publications on this body of law at the time, and Israel 
and the occupied territories constituted the main case study for contemporary 
application of IHL.68 It was in the Israel Law Review that Yehuda Blum published 
his arguments in support of the Israeli government’s decision early in the occupa-
tion that it was not legally bound to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), a position central to 
Israel’s annexationist agenda and part of its “lawfare” work discussed further in the 
epilogue.69 Beyond this context, however, it is hard to convey the overwhelming 
lack of interest, then, among both international legal scholars and human rights 
groups in the principles of the law governing military occupation and, indeed, 
armed conflict. There has been an explosion of scholarship and other material on 
IHL since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and, to a certain extent, in the 1990s 
context of the wars in former Yugoslavia. This has included analysis of state prac-
tice-led developments in IHL to accommodate changes to existing governance and 
legal systems in occupied territory necessitated by the “transformative goals of cer-
tain occupations” (as the occupation of Iraq is presented). These contrast with the 
“conservationist principle in the laws of war,” certain underlying rules of which, 
according to Adam Roberts, “set a framework of minimal alteration of the existing 
order in the occupied territory.”70 In the late 1970s, the lack of academic interest 
in IHL was matched by a lack of intellectual resources to support those (such as 
the founders of al-Haq) struggling to understand and work with it. By contrast, 
Noura Erakat maps considerable efforts invested by the PLO in securing admission 
with other liberation movements to the ICRC-convened Diplomatic Conference 
charged with reviewing what became the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions. However, she also reports key figures from the time as recalling that 
the PLO was not technically engaged with the law, but rather, “its strategy was to 
enter every available space in order to enhance its international standing.”71 This 
approach was also to mark the PLO’s engagement with the negotiations of the Oslo 
Accords in the early 1990s, to the documented despair of Raja Shehadeh.
As for international human rights law (IHRL), the two International Human 
Rights Covenants had come into force in 1976, developing into international 
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treaty law the principles established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). Human rights–related activity at the United Nations prolifer-
ated in  consequence, including the establishment of the UN Centre for Human 
Rights and the drafting of additional human rights treaties.72 However, the exten-
sion of this body of law to occupied territories and war zones was not yet under 
 investigation. In 2006, Roberts was still describing the “applicability of the inter-
national law of human rights to military occupations” as “a relatively new and 
controversial issue.”73
On the other hand, the Covenants share a common Article 1 that begins, “all 
peoples have the right to self-determination,” a principle that the colonial powers 
had kept out of the UDHR when it was proposed by Egypt and supported by Leba-
non. Anthony Tirado Chase observes that the context of the 1960s, particularly 
the greater involvement of states from the developing world and the Non-Aligned 
Movement in UNGA debates, allowed arguments led by Middle Eastern states in 
committee to ensure inclusion of the right to self-determination. Tolley notes fur-
ther that “new Afro-Asian members reformed Human Rights Commission pro-
cedures to hear black African and Palestinian demands for self-determination.”74 
The right of self-determination, says Chase, has been “particularly instrumental 
for grounding the South African and Palestinian struggles in international law,” 
and the fact that it is there in the first article of the Covenants is “due, in good 
part, to the Palestinian case.”75 Samuel Moyn considers self-determination to have 
been the “chief and threshold right” in the anticolonial struggle.76 In the case of 
Palestine, the “threshold right” of self-determination had not been achieved, and 
there was no national state from which to seek the promotion and protection of 
the human rights of its citizens. The argument that an occupying power would be 
bound by treaty obligations under international human rights law had not at this 
point been made, let alone won, and Israel had yet to sign on to the two Interna-
tional Covenants.
It is unsurprising that the founders of LSM mostly steered clear of the principle 
of self-determination, focusing rather on violations of the rule of law to meticu-
lously build a picture of the occupation very different from that projected by Israel 
as the occupying power. Mouin Rabbani, a researcher with the organization dur-
ing the first intifada, observed that this risked an “emphasis on micro-violations to 
the detriment of the bigger picture.”77 Nevertheless, as Hajjar has pointed out, the 
Israeli authorities clearly regarded “most Palestinian attempts to mobilise round 
a collective national identity” as a security risk and could be expected to react 
accordingly.78 In the initial correspondence with the ICJ in Geneva, examined in 
the next chapter, and against the background of Camp David, the would-be found-
ers of the new organization explicitly distanced themselves from expressing any 
view on what political arrangements should prevail in the occupied territories, 
provided the rule of law was respected, and declared themselves free of partisan 
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political affiliation. That the rule of law for them would include implementation of 
Palestinians’ right to self-determination was not made explicit.
HUMAN RIGHT S IN THE REGION
In such positioning, those who became the founders of Palestine’s first human 
rights organization were different from counterparts in the Arab region moving 
towards human rights initiatives. The founders of LSM did not consciously work 
on enabling political pluralism or on the promotion of democracy, although they 
insisted on their vision of the “rule of law” entailing internal processes of inclusion 
and equality in Palestinian society. The circumstances of occupation (and IHL) 
framed priorities here differently. It was not until Oslo and the arrival of the Pal-
estinian Authority that al-Haq was advised, by Chilean human rights leader José 
Zalaquett, that it might need to make a “certain declaration of principles about the 
connection between human rights and democracy” were it to treat such matters 
as fair elections as human rights issues.79 Nor were the three founders political 
activists, as many of their counterparts were.80 The first human rights organiza-
tion in the Arab region not set up by a political party was the Tunisian League of 
Human Rights (LTDH), formally authorized by the Tunisian authorities in May 
1977.81 Others followed: in Morocco, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights 
(AMDH) in 1979 and the Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights in 1988; differ-
ent Algerian Leagues in the mid-1980s; the regional Arab Organization for Human 
Rights in 1983;82 and the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights in 1985. The cir-
cumstances of their emergence depended on the domestic context, but there were 
common regional factors. Several of these related to Israel/Palestine: Israel’s defeat 
of the Arab forces in 1967 and the “subsequent ideological decline of Arab nation-
alism,” according to Chase, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and siege of 
Beirut, when Arab governments failed to assist and also repressed demonstrations 
by their own nationals against the Israeli action.83 According to Stork, it was this 
latter that “prompted human rights to take organizational form” in Egypt.84 The 
solidarity of the Arab human rights movement with the cause of Palestinian rights 
has been a consistent feature of regional activism since its origins.
The Arab human rights groups also had challenges in common. Their position-
ing towards their governments, of course, differed from that of LSM towards the 
Israeli military authorities, but similar balances had to be weighed to survive in 
hostile political circumstances. The founders of the politically independent Arab 
human rights groups were as keen as those of LSM to be nonpartisan and to be 
seen as such in their human rights work. Unlike the LSM founders, they often 
worked directly to create a consensus of space for human rights work among 
the different parties, sometimes by having representatives of the parties in their 
governing structures. Also unlike LSM, the groups in Tunisia and Morocco had 
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to deal explicitly with the relationship between Islam and international human 
rights, and the role that Islamists might play in their organizations.
In common with LSM, on the other hand, they found the context for human 
rights work uncomfortable: “the concept of human rights, it must be noted, was 
far from fashionable at the time,” says Waltz in relation to Tunisia. Leftists who 
constituted the majority of the intelligentsia “commonly dismissed human rights 
as a bourgeois notion and dangerously American.”85 In Egypt, a founder of the 
EOHR, Hani Shukrallah, recalled that “the existence of the [human rights] move-
ment was put in question not just by the government but by the intellectual and 
political elites, including the political parties, legal and illegal.”86 Talking of the 
reaction to the establishment of the AOHR, Crystal notes that besides the regimes 
and the Islamists, “the Arab nationalist left was also historically suspicious of the 
group’s aims, seeing human rights as an issue of Western origin designed to deflect 
concern from economic and social issues.”87
Part of the ideological association of “human rights” with the West was the use 
of human rights language by the United States (and Western Europe) against the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the States, Congress had in 1974 adopted 
the Foreign Assistance Act, section 502B of which required reports from the State 
Department on the human rights record of all those states receiving US aid; this 
was soon expanded to include all states. LSM’s first formal intervention in a third-
party state was a response to one of these reports.88 Furthermore, President Jimmy 
Carter’s January 1977 speech on taking office is framed as one of the key human 
rights moments of the era.89 Carter proclaimed “commitment to human rights as 
the centre of his foreign policy,” but implementation of the policy was predictably 
problematic.90 Dumbrell notes that in contrast to the way liberals received it, “for 
conservatives, the policy offered a lever against communism and its abuses” or, as 
one US administration staffer put it, “to really beat up morally on the Soviets.”91 
A distrust of the discourse of human rights among Palestinians—particularly but 
not exclusively those educated on Soviet scholarships, and the many Communist-
aligned activists involved in civil society groups—was to be part of the context of 
LSM’s early years. “The idea about human rights,” says Khaled Batrawi, coordina-
tor of al-Haq’s fieldwork unit in the late 1980s and a graduate of Kiev, “was that it 
was a new form of colonialism, or imperialism, a western discourse.”92
At the same time as declaring his commitment to human rights, Presi-
dent Carter was cosigning the 1978 Camp David Accords that signally failed to 
secure Palestinian rights and were the object of so much protest in the occupied 
territories. Jimmy Carter went on, after the end of his presidency, to set up the 
annual Carter-Menil Human Rights Prize, which in 1989 was awarded jointly to 
al-Haq and to the then new Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem.93 Carter 
remained engaged with the area into which he had put so much energy, and with 
so few of the results that he apparently anticipated: the title of his 2006 book, Pal-
estine: Peace not Apartheid, was designed to provoke a primarily US audience into 
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acknowledging the reality of “the abominable oppression and persecution in the 
occupied territories.”94 This is part of the current “crueller times” that Shehadeh 
referred to in his 2009 reflection for al-Haq’s 30 Years publication, including sus-
tained siege on Gaza, the systematic effort to permanently dispossess Palestinians 
in East Jerusalem, and US president Trump’s 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem 




In the spring of 1977, four Palestinian legal professionals—three lawyers and a 
judge—wrote from the West Bank to the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 
in Geneva, initiating a correspondence that would culminate in the establishment 
of LSM as an ICJ affiliate.1 The ICJ, with its key mandate vested in the judiciary and 
the legal profession, was an obvious and attractive international partner to this 
group of legal professionals, and they were seeking to establish a branch of the ICJ 
in the West Bank, as they explained:
Sir,
We the undersigned are a group of lawyers and judges working in the occupied 
West Bank of Jordan. One of us is a member of ‘Justice’, the British Branch of the 
International Commission of Jurists.
The situation now in the West Bank is such that there is no Law Council, Bar, 
or any other association of lawyers, in operation. There is also no centre for legal 
research.
All of us the undersigned believe in and uphold the principles of the rule of law. 
We believe that it is at this time more than at any other time that it is important 
that these principles be promulgated, developed, and applied, especially since we 
are on the brink of a new re-organization of our society here.
We also believe in and uphold all the principles of human rights and liberties as 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Therefore and in order to uphold and strengthen these principles which we 
believe in and in order to help in promulgating these and also in order to assist in 
every way the existence and maintenance of high principles of justice, we are desir-
ous of  establishing a society here to be a branch of your commission and whose 
objects conform with the objects which your commission was established to help 
promulgate.
We would however like from the outset to describe to you all the difficulties  
that we would be facing. The first is that, unfortunately, these objects which both 
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you and we uphold are not as yet part of the tradition of this land nor are they 
commonly understood or believed in. We believe that in order to make them com-
mon  knowledge and in order to win more adherents it is imperative that we should 
have the means both intellectual and financial to write, publish, translate articles, 
pamphlets and books and to do whatever else we deem necessary to achieve that 
goal. Although we would be able to draw to some extent on the means available to 
us here, yet, due to the unnatural and most difficult conditions we have to operate 
under, we shall be in need of assistance if we are to operate effectively. We would, 
furthermore, like to make it absolutely clear from the outset that we have no 
political affiliations nor would we support or advocate any specific political creed 
or future. We would advocate and pursue the ideas which the commission was 
founded to uphold such as the supremacy of the rule of law and which we believe 
should prevail as the foundation stone upon which any such structure should be 
constructed. However, and in order that this may be ensured, the ground must 
be prepared and this we hope with your help to do by establishing here a branch 
of your commission which would do what it would deem necessary in the way of 
publishing, lecturing, sponsoring research etc. The Branch would also be active in 
preparing reports on the administration of justice in the area and would be willing 
to cooperate with other Branches of the Commission abroad by exchanging litera-
ture on jurisprudence and working on joint projects in comparative law.
We would like to know at your earliest convenience your readiness to assist in 
the establishment here of a branch of your commission and of your readiness to 
help us financially if not directly then perhaps through the contact of your central 
office in Geneva.2
This is the letter of a group anticipating social and political change and seeking to 
promote and uphold the rule of law (and “also,” in a subsequent paragraph, human 
rights). They want to do this—and be seen to do it—almost without  reference 
to the highly political context. The impetus is very much focused on rule-of-law 
issues in Palestinian society, on the need for promotion and dissemination of 
these principles, despite “the unnatural and most difficult conditions we have to 
operate under.” This oblique reference is the only mention of the Israeli occupa-
tion. The insistence on their lack of political party affiliation or a view on the polit-
ical future (the disposition of the Palestinian territories) may have been included 
to reassure their ICJ interlocutors (and any Israeli interceptors of the correspon-
dence) of their distance from nationalist (PLO) politics that the Israeli authorities 
considered a security threat. In fact, the secretary-general of the ICJ at the time, 
Niall MacDermot, was considerably more politically outspoken on such matters 
than his West Bank correspondents were able to be.
On receipt of the letter, MacDermot responded with interest. “Our timing was 
impeccable,” Shehadah was later to write: “The respectable human rights organiza-
tion was looking for partners to work with on the issue of the Israeli occupation.”3 
The ICJ already had a section in Israel, headed by Justice Haim Cohn, who was also 
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at the time an ICJ commissioner.4 It was under the names of Cohn as chairman 
and the group’s honorary secretary that early in 1970 the Israeli National  Section of 
the ICJ had released a statement to “register its protest against the publication 
in the Review of the International Commission of Jurists, of a Report entitled: 
‘The Middle East: War or Peace,’ because of its being tendentious and mislead-
ing.”5 The 1969 ICJ report, its first on the Middle East, was published under the 
leadership of the previous secretary-general, Seán MacBride.6 MacBride was an 
imposing figure who among other things had fought against the British for Irish 
independence, been a politically committed lawyer and then a minister of foreign 
affairs in Ireland, and helped Amnesty International get started; he went on to be 
awarded both the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 and the Lenin Prize for Peace among 
Nations in 1977, and to be closely involved in different United Nations initiatives.7 
The Israeli section’s statement of protest against the ICJ’s 1969 report was a two-
page single-spaced defense of Israeli government positions, current and historical. 
Inter alia, it read:
As far as allegations of “disrespect for the civilian population” are directed against 
the Israeli authorities, the Report fails to mention that in Israel, unlike some other 
countries, every person, without distinction of race or religion, domicile or national-
ity, political or other affiliation, has free access to independent courts of justice which 
exercise jurisdiction over all Israeli public officers and which enforce the Rule of Law 
without fear or favour. [ . . . ]
Much capital is made in the Report of the non-compliance (by Israel of course) 
with various resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other 
 organs of the United Nations, and several such resolutions are adduced as proof of 
“flagrant violations” (by Israel) of the United Nations Charter (p. 13), of military ac-
tion (by Israel) endangering the “maintenance of peace” (ibid.), and even of “the vio-
lation (by Israel) of human rights in the Arab territories occupied by Israel” (p. 12). 
[ . . . ] To present readers of the Review with the one-sided picture of censures passed 
against Israel is to imply that there was, indeed, nothing to censure in the Middle East 
War but what the Security Council was allowed, without being vetoed, to censure; 
and to demand respect for such resolutions on the part of Israel is to ask a nation up-
holding the Rule of Law to submit to political machinations calculated to undermine 
the Rule of Law and supersede it by procedural and political tactics. Compliance by 
an innocent party with United Nations resolutions of this kind would amount to a 
suicidal self-castigation which is morally, legally and politically unjustifiable.
The Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, which is 
second to none in its dedication to the Rule of Law, comprises among its members 
many jurists and lawyers who are, and have for many years been actively engaged 
in the administration of military justice including, since 1967, the administration of  
justice in the occupied territories. They deeply resent the wholesale allegations  
of violations of human rights, even if emanating from United Nations origins and if 
echoed in publications such as the Review, as slanderous war propaganda. As they 
will not let themselves be deviated from their duty to enforce the laws justly and 
impartially, so will this Section be and always remain vigilant for the observance of 
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the Rule of Law and the protection of human rights. But the purposes and concerns 
of the Rule of Law appear badly served if its promoters allow themselves to be made 
the mouthpiece of partiality and prejudice.8
This image of Israel as a state firmly based on the rule of law was shared broadly in 
Israeli society; the Israeli National Section of the ICJ was to become a significant 
platform for articulating Israeli government positions in this regard.9 The broad 
acceptance of this image in the West constituted both major motivation and vital 
context in and against which the founders of LSM/al-Haq consciously sited their 
efforts. The Israeli section’s disdain for the UN, a little over two years after the 1967 
war, seems in part a response to MacBride’s own insistence (in the ICJ report) on 
the necessary role of the international body in resolving the conflict. Also clear 
in this letter are allusions to the Cold War context in which the Soviet Union 
championed its Arab allies and the Palestinian cause.
Like his predecessor at the head of the ICJ, Niall MacDermot had come into 
human rights after a career in law and then in politics, although in this case in 
the British parliament. A political contemporary recalled MacDermot as “the most 
surefooted, on-top-of-the-job, confidence-inspiring ministerial performer of all 
the talented 1964 Labour government.”10 His highly promising political career 
was stymied after British intelligence (MI5) briefed against him as a security risk to 
the then Labour prime minister, Harold Wilson, and in frustration he left politics 
and quite soon took over from MacBride at the ICJ.11 Tolley reports from a jour-
nalist who watched him in action at the UN Commission on Human Rights that 
“no one talked down to MacDermot, and no one ignored him. Diplomats deferred 
to him, and dreaded his rebuke.”12 In 1977, The Review of the ICJ ran a piece titled 
“Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territories,”13 which MacDermot later summa-
rized as follows:
In our Review of December 1977 we in the Secretariat of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists sought to show what we believe to be the fallacies in the Israeli argu-
ments. [ . . . ] No country supports Israel in opposing the repeated UN resolutions 
declaring that the settlements have no legal validity. All the permanent members of 
the Security Council are agreed upon their illegality. To me the Israeli settlements  
are the touchstone of Israeli intentions.14
The ICJ’s rule-of-law approach enabled (indeed required) a structural approach to 
violations that went directly to the concerns of the LSM founders. MacDermot had 
already robustly told his audience at the UN’s Palais des Nations in Geneva that 
“the Israeli government say they cannot negotiate with terrorists. For my part I am 
unmoved by this description of those who fight for their liberation.”15 In the same 
venue the following year he turned his attention to those matters of politics from 
which his West Bank interlocutors had distanced themselves in their initial com-
munication. He told his audience how a recent study “shows clearly how unaccept-
able to the Palestinians are the so-called autonomy proposals of the Camp David 
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Agreement” and closed with the observation that “the PLO should be included” in 
detailed negotiations that might lead to “an acceptable transition period if, and it 
is a big if, the people of Israel could bring themselves to accept the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinians, and accept the idea of self-determination for the Palestinian 
people and their eventual right to erect their own sovereign state.”16 Very differ-
ently placed from the LSM group, MacDermot lost no opportunity to link human 
rights and international law to a just and durable peace process realizing the goal 
of self-determination. Carter’s Camp David impressed MacDermot no more than 
it had the Palestinians.
At the same time, MacDermot had to bear in mind that not all of his commis-
sioners—those ultimately responsible for governance at the ICJ—saw things the 
same way. Hiltermann recalls that into the late 1980s “in the United States a Pales-
tinian was an adjective modifying the noun terrorist.”17 At the 1979 meeting, Mac-
Dermot began by noting that “on such a controversial subject as this, it is difficult 
for me to say anything other than platitudes which would meet with the approval 
of all my Commission members”; his views and comments were to be taken as his 
own.18 Tolley notes that “after MacDermot pressed a reluctant Executive Commit-
tee to recognise Palestinian rights, the ICJ became one of the few non-communist 
NGOs to criticise Israel.”19
The ICJ had things in its past that would lend themselves to rumor and 
distrust in Palestine: its own website describes its Cold War origins (in 1952) as 
“born at the ideological frontline of a divided post-war Berlin.” Things changed 
in the 1960s; with the recruitment to its ranks of more jurists from Asia, Africa, 
and South America, the ICJ worked for “the endorsement of economic devel-
opment and social justice objectives” of which, as Richard Pierre Claude points 
out, “ICJ anti-communist founders heartily disapproved.”20 Tolley notes that 
“ICJ advocacy of development as a human right sought to bridge a major North-
South divide.”21 Despite these principled changes in direction under MacBride’s 
leadership, in 1967 the ICJ was embroiled in a scandal when the press broke 
what Claude refers to as “the tale of the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) in secretly bankrolling the formation of the ICJ as an instrument of the 
Cold War” through the “conduit” of the American Fund for Free Jurists.22 Tolley 
notes that MacBride “denounced the CIA and asserted that he had no informa-
tion about covert funding through conduit foundations.”23 The ICJ survived the 
initial fallout through funding from the Ford Foundation and an energetic battle 
by MacBride to counter any reputational damage; Neier’s assessment is that the 
organization “was never severely discredited” by the revelations.24 At the end of 
1970, MacDermot took over as secretary-general from MacBride. “Oh paradox!” 
wrote a reviewer in 1981, welcoming the ICJ’s copublication of LSM’s The West 
Bank and the Rule of Law: under MacBride and MacDermot, the ICJ had been 
transformed into a “veritable international power [ . . . ] whose reports are feared 
like the plague by dictatorships of the right, totalitarian regimes of the left, in brief 
by oppressors.”25
Beginnings    33
Back in 1977, MacDermot wrote back to his Palestinian correspondents, rais-
ing what he must have known would be for them a most political matter, as well 
as one of principle: the ICJ’s Executive Committee, he anticipated, would expect 
him “to invite the comments of our Israeli Section on your application.” He asked 
his Palestinian interlocutors whether they would agree to MacDermot’s forward-
ing a copy of their letter to Justice Haim Cohn for his comment or whether they 
would prefer to approach Cohn themselves.26 In response, the four replied that 
after serious consideration they had come to the conclusion that “we have nothing 
to gain from such contact.” They were located in the “occupied territories of Jordan 
whereas the other Branch is in Israel.” And:
We would therefore appreciate it if you would consider the Branch we intend to 
establish as entirely separate and independent and that you do not invite the com-
ments of the Israeli Branch on this matter. As we are legally-speaking in two different 
countries you are not under any obligation to consult the Israeli Branch.27
There is another reference here to “this occupied area which is approaching a 
political reorganization.” Given that the founders wanted the protection of the ICJ 
against the likely hostility of the Israeli occupation authorities, along with their 
sensitivity to being considered to be coming under an Israeli principal in any mat-
ter, it was an answer that MacDermot might have anticipated. When he in turn 
replied, he reported on the meeting of the ICJ’s Executive Committee to which he 
had submitted the West Bank letters and also a comment from Justice Haim Cohn 
(an ICJ commissioner) whom he reported as writing:
I welcome the establishment in the West Bank of a Section of the Commission, com-
posed of legal practitioners without “political affiliations” whose purpose is not to 
“advocate or support any specific political creed or future.” [ . . . ] If some formula 
can be found to recognize this group without (expressly or impliedly) recognizing 
the West Bank as a state, the Israeli National Section will be glad to cooperate with it 
in fostering and promoting the Rule of Law.28
Clear here is the significance of LSM asserting a nonpolitical stance. The response 
underlines antipathy to the idea of a “state” in the West Bank (and/or Gaza Strip). 
Fully in line with official Israeli positions at Camp David,29 Justice Cohn suggested 
that the ICJ might furnish him with the names of the West Bank signatories, which 
MacDermot had removed from the copy: “I would have pleasure in inviting them 
to an informal meeting in which some patterns of cooperation could perhaps be 
worked out.” MacDermot advised the West Bank group accordingly:
The Executive Committee fully understand and agree that your organisation should 
be totally separate from the Israeli National Section. [ . . . ] However, in view of Mr 
Justice Haim Cohn’s friendly reply, they hope very much that you will agree to meet 
him, and authorise me to disclose your names and addresses to him for this purpose.
This point was pursued by the ICJ in subsequent correspondence. Given the 
 international context at the time, it is entirely possible that certain Executive 
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 Committee members were keen that a potential Palestinian partner be approved by 
the established Israeli section, however informally this was to happen, and despite 
the fact that the author of a history of the ICJ describes the latter at the time as “the 
inactive Israeli national section nominally headed by Haim Cohn.”30 Shehadeh 
describes this as getting “clearance.”31 MacDermot himself seems to have viewed it 
as a matter of practicalities beyond convincing his committee:
It seems to me almost certain that before the authorities will agree to the creation  
of your association, they will consult Mr Justice Cohn, since he is one of the Com-
mission members and President of the Israeli Section. It will be difficult for him to 
lend his support to the application if he has not met you. I think you will find that 
he fully accepts that your association should be wholly independent of the Israeli 
national section.32
The issue was raised with Charles Shammas when he met with the ICJ in Geneva 
in the summer of 1978, and he was reminded later that year: “We think the stage 
has been reached to approach and inform Mr Justice Haim Cohn of the develop-
ments, something we understood you agreed on, here in Geneva.”33 The follow-
ing year, informing Jonathan Kuttab of the Executive Committee’s approval of the 
application, a postscript from MacDermot notes that “The Executive Committee 
hopes that you will keep Justice Haim Cohn informed of developments and of 
your activities. They consider that it may prove to be in your own interest to do 
so.”34 By then, Charles Shammas and Raja Shehadeh had indeed paid an infor-
mal visit to Justice Cohn, and engaged an institutional relationship that was to be 
tested in the next few years. Shehadeh describes the encounter as follows: “With 
his kind but authoritative manner, he asked us a few questions, which we answered 
honestly. The verdict he communicated to Geneva was that ‘we were okay. But too 
political.’ ”35 Shehadeh assumes that the finding of “political” rested on their view 
that the building of settlements was in violation of international law. For his part, 
Shammas recalls that he and Shehadeh were struck by “how completely unaware 
he [Cohn] was of the practices of the military government.”
Back in the West Bank, the group was working on the technicalities of regis-
tration. A long letter in early 1978 set out the “three species of corporate entities” 
that were available: registration as a charitable society, as a cooperative society, 
and as a limited public company.36 This first explanation to the ICJ of the choice of 
a company framework set out the powers of regulation in regard to the first two 
types of entity over permission to establish, over operations, and over member-
ship of the Executive Committee, as well as, in the case of charitable societies, 
over “each transfer of funds from abroad.” These powers under Jordanian law were 
now in the West Bank exercised (in the case of the establishment and committee 
membership of charitable societies) by the delegated Israeli army officer. As the 
letter pointed out, “for any proposed society whose objects appear to any degree to 
be problematic from the standpoint of the Military administration, permission 
to register is simply withheld indefinitely.” LSM’s continuing interest in this 
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as a  rule-of-law issue was to be demonstrated by the publication in 1982 of the 
collected laws and military orders applying to charitable societies in the West 
Bank, which like other military orders were not routinely available.37
Having set out the legal constraints, the group proposed the option of the lim-
ited public company, “not considered as a public trust and therefore [  .  .  .  ] not 
subject to the same degree of regulation and control by the relevant minister or, as 
things stand, the relevant officer of the Israeli army.” This option involved techni-
cal transactions between the company, the association it would set up, the ICJ in 
Geneva, the shareholders, and the elected officers of the association. By way of 
further explanation, the letter observed:
Incorporating the branch’s charter into a contract between the company and a for-
eign provider of funds for the branch should make it more difficult for local forces to 
compromise the branch’s functional independence and non-political status or to im-
pose modifications in its internal processes or its complexion without precipitating 
its closure. [ . . . ] A branch organized as a subsidiary project of a holding company 
would not be reporting directly to any authority, civil or military.
Although not picked up immediately in Geneva, this paragraph was trying to con-
vey a further concern to do with interference from “local forces.” The reply from the 
ICJ shows discomfort at this proposed setup, which clearly constituted a departure 
from the normal institutional form of unincorporated membership organizations. 
“The scheme you propose seems extremely complicated,” responded MacDermot, 
and “I doubt whether our Executive Committee would favour entering into a con-
tract of the kind you suggest.”38 MacDermot offered to “take the matter up with the 
Israeli authorities in advance” on the assumption that “whatever form of organisa-
tion you adopt, the creation of the association is going to require the consent in 
some form of the Israeli authorities, civil or military.”
In the autumn of 1978, with Shammas’s visit to the ICJ in Geneva in between, 
the West Bank group wrote back with a five-page letter addressing the ICJ’s con-
cerns and reservations “with respect to our proposal to organize within the frame-
work of a company.” This letter revisits some of the points in regard to applicable 
law and practice but also addresses the “contextual constraints” within which the 
group saw itself operating and which the proposed institutional framework was 
intended to accommodate:
Both our choice of framework and the procedure which we propose to follow in 
establishing an effective non-politicized affiliate of the International Commission of 
Jurists reflect, on the one hand, restrictions on freedom of assembly and association 
that have been in force since the Israeli occupation and, on the other hand, certain 
problematic characteristics of our society’s internal processes which those restric-
tions have exacerbated.39
The authors detailed the restrictions on freedom of assembly and association 
imposed under the terms of Israeli Military Proclamation 101 that would challenge 
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attempts to hold meetings and activities as an “ad hoc committee,” which was one 
structural suggestion from the ICJ. The following paragraphs are a dense exposi-
tion of the challenges the drafters saw themselves facing:
Economic and political developments to date have provided little impetus or leeway 
for the generation of modern institutional forms and internal alignments typical of 
a society organized around production for exchange rather than patronage and sub-
sidy. [ . . . ]
Consequently efforts such as ours must be carried out within the context of a still 
vigorous sectarian order whose subjects have some difficulty accepting at face value a 
public interest or social development project with whose proclaimed objectives they 
may wholly identify. This difficulty has been aggravated since 1967 by the prohibi-
tion of all organized political activity, the effect of which has been to cause political 
expression to assume a cryptic idiom, thereby giving sectarian political overtones to 
even the most loosely organized pro bona initiative.
In light of the above, we strongly believe that the effective promotion of the rule 
of law within our context requires an organizational vehicle that proclaims as well 
as assures the non-sectarian nature of the enterprise if it is to attract participants on 
a non-sectarian basis. An arrangement which lacks either an incorporated institu-
tional foundation or a democratic, constitutional process of internal regulation will 
not under the prevailing conditions win sufficiently broad participation because it 
calls for the commitment to a visible group process of individuals whose civil rights 
are highly circumscribed and precarious, and who have uncertain expectations of 
each other’s conduct and a weak tradition of ad hoc association. Failure to attract 
participants across sectarian lines would seriously diminish our ability to spread the 
ideas we uphold within the society at large.
Part of what the authors are referring to here was the tendency in Palestine to 
ascribe to any group or organization a political character in the sense of associat-
ing it (and its actors) with a particular PLO faction or the Communists or, alterna-
tively, with loyalty to the Jordanian regime or to even more dubious allies, foremost 
among these last the CIA. The fledgling West Bank affiliate did not escape such 
characterizations, and the effort to establish the organization as “nonpartisan”—as 
emphasized in its earliest literature—is examined in the following chapters.
The group raised the need to be inclusive of all West Bank lawyers who iden-
tified with their objectives, whether they were striking or practicing. The group 
writing to the ICJ included both, and in this letter informed their interlocutors 
in Geneva that they had decided not to pursue an earlier idea of including a Gaza 
branch in their establishment plans: Gazan lawyers had established a functioning 
professional guild after the Israeli occupation, which constituted “a prospective 
framework already in existence within which to establish a local Gaza affiliate of 
the ICJ.” Colleagues in Gaza, they reported, preferred to “initiate their own direct 
contacts with the ICJ to study further the feasibility of a unified West Bank/Gaza 
framework”: and moreover, “some of our colleagues have expressed concern about 
how the authorities might construe a unified initiative at this juncture.”
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This long letter is something of a tour de force in its attempt to have the ICJ 
in Geneva understand the particular challenges of setting up an affiliate in the 
West Bank in the late 1970s. The creativity of the very idea of LSM was matched by 
the ingenuity of the response to these challenges in terms of structure (the com-
pany framework) and process. The group proposed registration of company shares 
in the names of four local lawyers, a contractual arrangement with the ICJ, an 
unpaid executive staff elected from among the unpaid employees (the members) 
and the employment of paid full-time staff. Variations on this theme appeared in 
later correspondence once the ICJ’s Executive Committee had understood “after 
some explanation why you choose to operate in the proposed way.”40 In 1979, a 
letter from Jonathan Kuttab opened with “Good news: We have been officially 
registered.”41 This letter responded to a number of concerns that had been raised by 
the ICJ. The complex relations with Gaza had been explained to an intermediary 
with whom “lengthy meetings” had been held. The form of cooperation “remains 
to be worked out and depends to a large degree on the preferences of our col-
leagues in Gaza.”42
The group were at pains to explain anticipated internal political dynamics 
requiring, in their view, structural safeguards for the organization:
The limitation on shareholders is deliberate. It is intended to insure a measure of 
control over the Company by those who are serious and active. There is a real fear 
that, if our Company’s activities come to arouse a broad interest or achieve any sig-
nificant impact, we may be flooded with “members” who have neither the dedica-
tion nor the willingness to work on behalf of the Company’s goals. The procedures 
followed give a special voice and measure of influence to a core group of founding 
members, together with those who have proven their interest in the Company by 
serving as directors. This group of shareholders can exercise pivotal powers, and 
insulate the Company from partisan take-over attempts. [ . . . ] We strongly believe 
that retaining this set-up is wise and necessary in light of the intrusive pressures of 
internal politics in the West Bank.
This paragraph addresses a key element in the structure that was to character-
ize LSM: it was not, fundamentally, a “membership organization” in the manner 
of, notably, the Tunisian league (LTDH). Its idea of “LSM members” referred to 
all those working with it, not to a formalized membership base. “We wanted to 
make sure it wouldn’t be factionalized” says Kuttab, “so we had to write the by-laws 
in such a way as to keep people out.” The letter points up two related concerns: 
the desire to maintain the influence of the “core group” and the need to prevent 
“partisan take-over attempts.” Elsewhere in the region, the new human rights 
groups faced similar concerns, and recruitment mostly proceeded at first through 
personal contacts. Waltz describes the LTDH as having begun “as an experiment 
closely governed by a fairly intimate band of professionals who shared a com-
mon vision of justice,” which had a membership of around a thousand in 1982, 
tripling by 1985. Despite a measure of control through membership being, at 
38    Beginnings
this time, by recommendation, the central leadership became “wary of the loss 
of control implied by precipitous expansion” and began debate on a charter that 
would set out the position on a set of human rights, based on the UDHR, to which 
members would have to commit. Action was also taken against local branches 
judged to present a partisan political risk, whether from leftist groups or from 
the government party.43 In his 1991 study, Kevin Dwyer presents the reflections 
of two leading LTDH activists on these challenges, and similarly the comments 
of one of the founders of the AMDH to the effect that the young Moroccan 
Association also had to find a way to control the membership: “We couldn’t let 
everyone join who wanted to. To remain in control of the work you had to have 
a pretty tight structure.”44 Groups sought to involve a range of political parties 
while avoiding their jeopardizing organizational independence and the integrity of 
the work.
In the meantime, in the West Bank, the limited public and not-for-profit com-
pany structure served LSM/al-Haq well for many years, until in 1997 staff share-
holders attempted to dismiss the new board. The tangled events leading up to the 
1997 crisis are examined in chapter 7. Back in 1979, three more West Bank lawyers 
had joined the group; eight of the nine signatories were shareholders, with only 
Shammas omitted as holding neither a law degree nor a West Bank or Jerusalem 
ID card. The company, LSM, was registered. In October 1979, MacDermot wrote 
with news that the ICJ Executive Committee had approved affiliation with the ICJ. 
MacDermot then passed the relevant registration documents to the PLO represen-
tation in Geneva. A cover note reads:
A group of Palestinian lawyers approached the ICJ in 1977 with a proposal to form 
an organisation in the West Bank to work for the rule of law in that area, and to be 
affiliated to the ICJ.
The ICJ showed interest and encouraged them to proceed. Eventually the group 
formed a limited liability company called “The Institute of Law in the Service of Man, 
Limited.” This is known for short as Law in the Service of Man or LSM.
A company was formed because it was the view of these lawyers that in this way 
they would be able to avoid some of the more paralysing controls imposed on other 
forms of association by the occupying authorities. [ . . . ]
Operating Regulations have been prepared, under which there will be an elected 
Executive Council and three operating divisions concerned respectively with a) re-
search, library and documentation, b) legal reporting, c) legal aid. It is intended to 
ensure that the Company remains non political.
The founders believe, and the ICJ’s enquires support the belief, that the LSM, if it 
succeeds in getting itself established and in operation, will be widely welcomed and 
supported by Palestinian lawyers in the West Bank.
November 1979.
The note is on unheaded paper and without attribution. A handwritten note at 
the top reads “handed to PLO Representative by NMD 19/11/79.”45 MacDermot’s 
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experience and diplomatic background likely prompted this initiative to ensure 
that the PLO, as the major political force in the West Bank (albeit lacking any 
legal presence there) and specifically Fatah, which held the representative posts in 
diplomatic missions around the world, need not feel unsettled by developments 
outside its control. MacDermot certainly seems to have understood the “cryp-
tic idiom” of the group’s letter of September 20, 1978, and to have done what he 
thought appropriate to secure space for “an organizational vehicle that proclaims 
as well as assures the non-sectarian nature of the enterprise.” The note is dry and 
in the manner of a courtesy; it does not seek approval or permission, nor does it 
present the ICJ as an intermediary between LSM and the PLO; the LSM corre-
spondents were not informed.46
In January 1980, MacDermot paid his first visit to the occupied territories,47 
where with Nidal Taha he signed an agreement between the ICJ and LSM.48 The 
ICJ secured seed funding from private sources for its new affiliate.49 MacDermot 
also met with others in the occupied territories and in Israel, including an inter-
view with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, with unanticipated results. In 
early spring 1980, a letter from Nidal Taha updates MacDermot on LSM’s activi-
ties since their meeting,50 reporting visits paid to introduce LSM to the mayors 
of Nablus and Hebron. The former, Bassam Shaka’a, was to lose both legs a few 
months later in a series of bombings carried out against West Bank mayors by 
underground Israeli Jewish groups after an attack by armed Palestinians on Israeli 
settlers in Hebron. The mayor of Hebron, Fahad Qawasme, was to be deported 
after the attack, along with the mayor of nearby Halhul, Muhammad Milhem, and 
Shaykh Rajab al-Tamimi, judge of the Hebron shari’a court. The Israeli authorities’ 
official response included a lengthy curfew imposed on Hebron and conduct by 
the occupation forces that subsequently gave rise to “shocking revelations” in the 
Israeli press.51 The failure of lawyers’ attempts to prevent the deportations through 
recourse to the Israeli High Court—in only the second case of its type—is the sub-
ject of Shehadeh’s last (and rather despairing) journal entry for 1980.52
Nidal Taha’s letter also pointed up challenges which the fledgling organiza-
tion was meeting in the aftermath of MacDermot’s visit: questions being raised in 
the West Bank about who or what was the ICJ and, by extension, its local affiliate 
LSM. MacDermot had made a speech to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
which Tolley describes as the moment when “MacDermot began confronting 
Israel.”53 The speech was selectively reported in the Israeli press, and Taha’s letter 
describes the consequences:
These quotations gave the expression that you are in favour of the Israeli occupation-
al authority; this consumed much of our energy in answering questions from nearly 
everyone who knows or doesn’t know about our group or the commission. But for-
tunately your report as a whole illustrates this point and we translated it and wanted  
to publish it in the local magazines. But the Israeli military censor refused to permit 
the publishing of the Arabic translation of the report which you find enclosed.
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As things stand now there is only one way in which this may be achieved: the 
publication of your report in some European periodical that is received and/or circu-
lable here, and the local newspapers’ subsequent translation and publication of same. 
Should the censor again refuse permission for its publication we will be in a position 
to raise an action contesting the censor’s ban.
This appears to be the first time that LSM had its material censored; it was not 
to be the last. The misquoting of MacDermot’s statement drew unwelcome local 
attention to LSM. ICJ protection had been sought against the forces of the Israeli 
occupation, but in this first challenge it was Palestinian society that was asking 
the questions.
MacDermot reacted swiftly to Taha’s letter. In the June issue of The Review, the 
section on “Human Rights in the World”—contributed by the ICJ  Secretariat—
included an entry titled “Palestine: Torture in the Occupied Territories.”54 It 
opened as follows:
To attempt to write or say anything impartial, objective or balanced about the situ-
ation in the occupied territories of Palestine is a thankless task. Either side in the 
argument will quote and make use of those passages which support its own case so 
as to give a distorted impression of what has been said.
At the 1980 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights the Secretary- 
General of the International Commission of Jurists made an oral intervention de-
scribing a recent brief visit to the occupied territories and an interview he had had 
with the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Begin, who invited him to raise any matters 
concerning human rights. Those extracts of his speech which seemed favourable to 
the Israelis were reported in the Israeli English language and Hebrew press with no 
mention of the criticisms he had made. There is a group of Palestinian lawyers in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip affiliated to the ICJ who work to promote the legal 
protection of persons in the occupied territories. Seeking to redress the balance, they 
prepared a translation of the full text of the speech with a view to its publication in 
the Arabic press in Jerusalem. When it was submitted to the Israeli censors, the en-
tire speech was deleted, including even the passages which had already been quoted 
in the  Israeli press.55
The piece then turned its attention to “further use of the speech” made by “a dis-
tinguished human rights activist in the United States” whose treatment was first 
quoted and then corrected as being “wholly inaccurate” in one part and contain-
ing “other inaccuracies” elsewhere. The specific focus was on allegations of torture 
and ill treatment of detainees under interrogation. The ICJ secretary-general, said 
The Review,
did not say he received ‘no reports of torture’. He said he had received no reports of 
physical torture in the last eighteen months, but that he believed that unacceptable 
methods of psychological pressure were being used. Many victims of these forms 
of psychological torture considered this type of torture more difficult to bear than 
physical torture.56
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The Review then proceeded to reproduce in relevant part MacDermot’s speech, 
including his reference to “prolonged periods of sleep deprivation, accompanied 
by prolonged standing or sitting, bound hand and foot and hooded and in com-
plete isolation” and his invocation of Begin’s own account of the effect of sleep 
deprivation on prisoners.57 MacDermot had told the Commission, “I urged 
Mr. Begin and other Israeli authorities to whom I spoke to lay down very clearly 
what methods of interrogation were permissible and what impermissible, and to 
have a system of inspection or spot checks to ensure that the rules were adhered 
to.” Some years later, the Israeli authorities—prompted by a domestic scandal over 
interrogation techniques and General Security Services agents’ false testimony 
about their use—adopted the recommendations of the Landau Commission (1987). 
These endorsed “moderate physical pressure” and annexed a secret set of guidelines 
for use by interrogators.58 Clearly, this was not what MacDermot had had in mind.
There are two things to note here for the purposes of the current study. On the 
positive side, the ICJ’s emphasis on social and economic rights was to influence 
its colleagues in LSM in terms of the development of LSM’s thinking on collective 
rights and the right to development.59 On the downside, the story of covert CIA 
funding (which had been briefly raised again in 1975) surely fed into the questions 
being asked in 1980 in the West Bank, when for Palestinian nationalists the CIA 
was on a political par with Shin Bet or Mossad.60
MacDermot’s early action in response to an appeal from his Palestinian col-
leagues was indicative of energetic support; he was, of course, also responding 
in defense of the integrity of the ICJ’s own work. Two months after Taha’s let-
ter, in May 1980, MacDermot was sitting day after day listening to Shehadeh give 
evidence to the UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting 
the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.61 This episode, 
already exciting enough in its own right, was to lead to LSM’s first and seminal 
publication, one that propelled the organization onto the public stage at home 
and abroad. It had come about during a trip to New York the previous year, when 
Shehadeh had secured an introduction to an influential UN human rights staffer 
who worked with the committee. Shehadah had told him that in his view the com-
mittee was “doing consequences not causes” and needed to include in its exami-
nations the legal changes being effected by Israel in the Palestinian territories.62 
In April 1980 the committee sent Shehadeh a letter inviting him to appear and to 
“talk on the matters which are concerned with the property rights of the civilian 
population in the occupied territories” and “to deliver to us information on the 
developments of the recent month, involving measures affecting the civilian popu-
lation and their property.”63
Shehadeh and Kuttab set to work compiling the presentation, collecting and 
ordering the myriad military orders and regulations through which the Israeli 
occupation authorities had been amending the existing Jordanian law, and 
 drawing out their implications. This was the challenge that had first attracted 
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Shehadeh’s attention when he was assigned to sort out the pile of Israeli military 
orders stacked up behind the door in his father’s law office.64
Meanwhile, the situation in the West Bank was tense. Shehadeh’s journal 
extracts from the time talk of Israeli settler leader Meir Kahane’s “visit” to the 
Ramallah town hall with members of his Kach movement to announce that 
“the only solution is for the Arabs to be sent out of here,” of everyday clashes 
between Israeli settlers and soldiers and Palestinian students and schoolchildren, 
of the attack on settlers in Hebron followed by the deportation of two Palestinian 
mayors and the imposition of a curfew, and of the confirmation of a massive land 
expropriation in the Jordan valley.65 Shehadeh writes:
Jonathan has been coming here every night for a month. [ . . . ] The biggest difficulty 
is keeping it secret, explaining away exhaustion during the day. And at night, as we 
sit with the lights on, I feel so exposed.
But these documents we are collecting are on the state of law, and it seems too late 
to speak of law now. They are just words, and it all seems too late. But we can’t stop. We 
must not give in to the fear that silences samidin. The world must hear what our legal 
system has been reduced to—hear about the violation of basic human rights. Who-
ever cares should know how the Israelis are cloaking their brutality in legal garb.66
Together the two of them prepared “huge notes,” and when it came time for Sheha-
deh to leave for Geneva, he focused on defiance rather than despair. Looking back 
at this experience, he recalled:
I went fully prepared to cover as many of the legal changes and human rights viola-
tions as time would allow. I believed that by revealing to the UN Committee the 
 immensity of these violations, they would certainly take action. Israel would no 
 longer be able to proceed as before with its administration of the occupation. Conse-
quently the occupation would crumble.67
This wry recounting of his early expectations of international actors is in tune 
with his belief in the Israeli public’s likely reaction to the information in The West 
Bank and the Rule of Law, discussed further below. It also indicates his (and LSM’s) 
understanding of the strategic importance to Israel’s conduct of the occupation 
of its systematic and policy-based violation of IHL rules—these were the causes of 
the consequences with which the committee had been concerned. At the time, 
Shehadeh remembers, “I thought I was doing something very heroic and danger-
ous!” On the plane to Geneva, he reports thinking, “I haven’t had any time to 
think what this will lead to. A report in the Post? Twenty years in jail? Banish-
ment?”68 At the UN, “out of fear of Israeli reprisals, I insisted on being referred to 
in the document as ‘M.’ ”69 The meetings were held as closed sessions. In extracts 
from his journal published as The Third Way in 1982, there is no reference what-
soever to this episode at the UN, only to the book The West Bank and the Rule of 
Law, which was already a public document by the time the diary extracts were 
published.70
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What happened, according to the records of the committee sessions as well 
as to Shehadeh’s own recollections, was something of a marathon.71 The meeting 
began on a Tuesday morning, and the committee called Shehadeh back for a sec-
ond day, then a third and then a final Friday morning session, with questions to 
think about in between sessions and requests for follow-up information when he 
was back. Starting with land seizure and closure, the system of land law in the West 
Bank, rulings by the Israeli High Court of Justice in land cases, and the obstacles 
that Israeli military orders placed before Palestinians trying to prove their own-
ership or usufructory rights to the land, he warned the committee that “there is 
a programme, a full programme, to settle the whole of the West Bank. I have a 
copy of this programme.”72 In subsequent sessions, he set out the legal system in 
the West Bank, the jurisdiction of the Israeli High Court of Justice, and the range 
of amendments made to Jordanian law. He invoked in support of his argument a 
ruling by Justice Haim Cohn on the restricted ability of the occupying power to 
amend local law.73 He detailed the parlous state of the West Bank judicial system, 
and the fact that Israeli military orders were not made available to the general 
public (while “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” according to security legisla-
tion). The rules on labor law, tax and customs duties, municipalities, and security 
offenses were all examined. On the Friday morning, Shehadeh delivered a sum-
mary of his testimony. The record shows how he tried to get across the enormity of 
the gap between what Israel was doing in the West Bank and how it was presenting 
its conduct to the outside world in 1980:
The intention of the Israeli Military Administration of the West Bank, the intention 
seems to be as follows: To keep the façade that a legal system is continuing to oper-
ate. That this legal system is following Jordanian law. That this legal system is not 
interfered with by the Israeli Military Administration. That this legal system is run by 
Arabs who act as judges and who are employed in the various departments and that 
the lawyers are also Arabs and therefore that the whole system is given freedom to 
continue to go on as it was going on during the Jordanian time without interference 
from the Israeli Military. That for security offences, military tribunals have been set 
up. These military tribunals are dealing legitimately with security offences. That these 
tribunals follow the Geneva Convention. That when there are any needs for appeal, 
a decision of the military administration, the local Arabs can be brought to the High 
Court of Justice in Israel and this is also an addition or something that is unprec-
edented on the part of an occupying power to make open[ly] available its own courts 
to the inhabitants of the occupied territories and that in view of all these conditions 
Israel is doing very well and acting very fairly in its administration of the occupied 
West Bank. Having painted the picture to the world outside, and as far as my reading 
goes of literature that is published internationally on the West Bank, this seems very 
much to be the picture that the writers of these books and papers seem to have.
Whereas this is the picture that is presented, the reality is entirely different. The 
reality is that one of the first steps taken by Israel was to change the law in order to 
take the power to appoint judges, to deprive the courts of a whole area of litigation 
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having to do with administrative law, to reduce the stages, the levels of appeal from 
four to three, to appoint less judges and employees than are necessary under the 
conditions and in view of the big number of cases, to control the purchase of land 
and the laws concerning land and control the land departments and all the depart-
ments which are related. To change Jordanian law so that the legal system is deprived 
of many of the powers which it had originally had under Jordanian law as it stood in 
1967. To take many of the offices which previously, and according to Jordanian law, 
should be held by various individuals who sometimes are controlled or sometimes 
are related in one way or another to various ministries, to assume all these offices and 
vest them in the Officer in Charge of the Judiciary, or as the case may be so that the 
checks and balances which the Jordanian law had provided are no longer available 
and all the power is united in the hands of one man who under the present circum-
stance is the Officer in Charge of the Judiciary who comes to hold 14 offices besides 
all his functions as minister empowered as Minister of Justice. And also to give the 
military courts the power to look into cases which the military have an interest in so 
that in cases where a certain employee is not wanted to continue office, he is charged 
with corruption and he is not tried at the civil court, he is tried at the military court 
because there is an interest there in making him lose office.
And finally changing Jordanian law to a great extent and in various areas which 
have no relation to security the most important of which have to deal with the ad-
ministration of justice, natural resources including land and water, town planning, 
expropriation, municipalities and administration of the towns and villages, granting 
of licences of businesses, income tax and fees and value added tax, pensions and 
rights of civil employees as well as employees of the police force. Also the laws con-
cerning the police force have been amended [ . . . . ] so that now the police is a branch 
of the Israeli police and there is co-operation between the two and control by one of 
the other. The setting up of objection committees which have assumed the powers 
which previously were in the hands of the civil courts. These are some of the most 
important areas where there has been change of Jordanian law by military orders. 
Having taken all these steps the desired outcome has been achieved and the law that 
is now being exercised over the West Bank is entirely different from Jordanian law as 
it existed on the eve of the Six Day War. [ . . . ] If one compares the situation in Jordan 
now and the level at which the courts operate and the judgements that are made 
there is great disparity between the Jordanian practice presently and the West Bank 
practice which is an indication that it is not inherently problematic to the West Bank 
or the Jordanian system of courts, but it has to do with the effects of the occupation.74
The way this summary was delivered gives some indication of the outrage pro-
voked in Shehadeh by his close examination of the military orders and the changes 
made to the legal system in order to concentrate the Israeli military’s control over 
a huge range of quotidian civilian, infrastructural, economic, and other matters. 
The international law on military occupation (specifically the Hague Regulations) 
generally requires a military occupant to maintain local governance and local 
economic and legal systems unless “absolutely prevented.” Israel’s narrative—as 
explained by  Shehadeh—was that this was what it was doing, while in fact it was 
effecting massive transformations with almost entirely prejudicial consequences 
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for the occupied population. Against the 2003 invasion of Iraq and attendant 
 developments in the law of occupation, Roberts observes that “certain occupants—
and not only those with a generally transformative purpose—have been able to 
give cogent reasons” why they were prevented from maintaining existing elements 
of the legal system. His example is “in the Israeli-occupied territories some signifi-
cant changes were made to laws, including by abolishing the death penalty.”75
Back in Geneva, Niall MacDermot, according to Shehadeh, did not miss a single 
session. When I finished, he took me aside and let me know that the text of my tes-
timony was destined to stand on the shelf in the UN office in Geneva gathering dust 
and that nothing would be done about it. He suggested that I write a book based on 
the material presented, which the ICJ would be willing to co-publish with Al Haq. I 
was delighted. What better way to start off the organization and let the world know 
of the Israeli violations.76
MacDermot proceeded to review the manuscript line by line with Shehadeh, 
with the eye of a keen editor as well as a demanding interlocutor on matters of 
evidence. The result, LSM’s first publication, is considered in the following chapter. 
By the time it was published, most of the original group had left LSM. There were 
sensitivities over the reporting of MacDermot’s meeting with the Israeli prime 
minister and the allegations of CIA-ICJ links. There had also been a tightening 
of the fault line between working and striking lawyers. During his testimony in 
Geneva, Shehadeh had told the committee that a large meeting of working lawyers 
had recently decided to negotiate with the Jordanian Bar Association in Amman 
on the issue of the strike.77 Bisharat records a delegation of “young working law-
yers,” who had established a Committee of Working Lawyers (CAL) in Jerusalem 
and subsequently the rest of the West Bank, going to Amman to discuss the estab-
lishment of a branch of the Jordanian Bar Association in the West Bank. Not only 
“rebuffed,” the delegation was “violently castigated”; certain working lawyers, it 
was alleged, had held meetings with US and Egyptian officials:
The strikers charged CAL with complicity in the ‘Camp David Scheme’ to circum-
vent the political authority of the PLO and impose a settlement against the will of the 
Palestinian people, and with posing itself as an alternate local leadership compliant 
to Israeli and American interests.78 
Internal differences in the group led to sometimes acrimonious meetings. Kuttab 
recalls “the same old political arguments,” with someone questioning whether the 
Shehadeh law office “was really viewed as nationalist,” and questioning Kuttab’s 
own standing (“who is he, just back from the US, we don’t really know him”). 
Shammas was even more of an unknown quantity, with his Brooklyn Lebanese 
origins and his interest in and unusual approach to matters economic. Certainly 
Kuttab, Shammas, and Shehadeh had very clear ideas of what they did and didn’t 
want the organization to do and to be. “It was a new concept, new to this society,” 
says Kuttab; and new in those days tended to be distrusted. Unlikely as individuals 
46    Beginnings
to have been minded to compromise, together they seem to have formed an unset-
tling alliance in the face of established local figures.
The initial approach to the larger group, says Shehadeh, was made “because we 
thought we had to have legitimacy.” Had it worked, LSM might have developed 
more along the lines of its counterparts elsewhere in the region, with a broader 
set of local professionals (at least to some extent representing different political 
tendencies) involved in its growth. In the event, the striking lawyers withdrew 
together, and a final meeting voted to dissolve the group. Nidal Taha was one of 
those to leave. “There were lots of rumours here, lots of us withdrew, it was very 
difficult.” He himself left to practice law in Nablus, returning to al-Haq’s board of 
directors in the difficult days of the internal crisis in 1997, subsequently heading 
the board. The three who remained, wearied like everybody else from the pro-
cess, decided to proceed alone. The company shares were reregistered under the 
names of Shehadeh and Kuttab, who were named as codirectors of the reconsti-





This chapter considers the individual concerns and motivations of the three men 
who cofounded LSM and formed its first Steering Committee—the two codirec-
tors Raja Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab, along with Charles Shammas—and how, 
in responding to the challenges of the time, they articulated and built the val-
ues, ethics, and approaches of the new organization. A number of documents are 
quoted at length, particularly those which are not available online.1
R AJA SHEHADEH
Raja Shehadeh described as follows the coming together of what a former 
researcher refers to as “the Triumvirate,” the group of three who succeeded in 
establishing LSM as a working entity:2
During my stay in London I had learned of an organization called Justice, the Brit-
ish section of the International Commission of Jurists, whose headquarters were in  
Geneva. This was an organization dedicated to the promotion of the rule of law. I 
began to dream about the creation of a Palestinian section of the ICJ, to promote 
the rule of law in the West Bank. It was my good fortune that I then met Charles 
Shammas, a Lebanese American graduate of Yale University who had come to the 
West Bank to try out new ideas. He was exceptionally bright with a highly devel-
oped ethical sensibility. [ . . . ] Together we began the difficult process of creating the 
first professional nonfactional organization in the West Bank dedicated to working  
on issues of an essentially political nature. We were soon joined by a third partner 
who proved of immense help to us, Jonathan Kuttab [  .  .  .  ] He was an American  
lawyer whose family had emigrated after he finished high school in Jerusalem. 
He was looking for ways to serve the Palestinian cause through the law and had  
written to ask me for ideas. I told him about the new organization and he soon left 
the law office in New York where he had been working and came to help us with our 
new project.
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We were an enthusiastic trio. We put all we had into our work, writing letters, 
meeting people, and devising strategies. With Charles’s meticulous mind and Jona-
than’s flair I was in very good company.3
Shehadeh had completed a degree in English literature at the American  University 
of Beirut after two years at Birzeit Junior College. He then qualified in law in 
 London, where he was called to the bar. He began his two years as a stagier (trainee 
lawyer) in the law office of his father and his uncle, who had been among the 
first West Bank lawyers to leave the strike and return to practice after the occu-
pation. It was the task of preparing a subject index of Israeli military orders that 
revealed the extent and implications of changes made to Jordanian law by the 
Israeli  military authorities: “all these changes weren’t random, there was a method 
to it,” and here, he thought, was a role that he could usefully play. Shehadeh’s tes-
timony at the UN and LSM’s first publication, The West Bank and the Rule of Law 
(WBRL), were direct results of this examination. The little book sets out the UN 
position that the West Bank—including East Jerusalem—is occupied territory and 
explains that Israel has refused to recognize this status and denies that the Fourth 
Geneva  Convention applies, while insisting that it is “willing to be governed” by its 
humanitarian provisions (not specifying which these might be).4 Israel insists that 
“the framework of Jordanian law has been retained and that only those amend-
ments necessitated by humanitarian and security considerations and proper and 
effective administration were made.” Shehadeh then explains:
It is not a primary purpose of this study to examine the status of the West Bank un-
der international law. Without accepting the official Israeli position as stated above, 
the intention here is to study the situation now prevailing in the West Bank, using 
universally accepted standards, to assess whether the principles of the rule of law are 
being observed. As Israel has declared that Jordanian law continues to be applied in 
the West Bank, this body of law will be used as the frame of reference.
It must be emphasized from the start, however, that the military occupation itself 
places the greatest limitation on the rule of law. As long as it continues all essential re-
quirements of a society under the rule of law such as the right to self- determination, 
representative government and an independent judiciary will continue to be denied. 
As matters now stand no indigenous central government machinery or legislative 
body of any sort is in existence. The judiciary is the only national institution that 
continues to function in the occupied territories. For this reason and for the reason 
that an essential requirement of a society under the rule of law is the existence of an 
independent and respected judiciary, and an independent legal profession with a 
professional body to uphold its standards, this study will focus first on the position 
of the judiciary and the legal profession.5
The systematic debilitation of the West Bank judiciary during the Israeli occupa-
tion was a major source of concern and a prime motivator for Shehadeh upon his 
return from abroad; it also involved the issue of the lawyers’ strike. LSM intro-
duced itself as follows on the back cover of the book:
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Law in the Service of Man, which became an affiliate of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists in 1979, was formed by a group of West Bank Palestinians to develop 
and uphold the principles of the rule of law in the West Bank, carry out legal re-
search, and provide legal services for the community.
For its part, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) described itself on 
the inside back cover as “a non-governmental organisation devoted to promot-
ing throughout the world the understanding and observance of the Rule of Law 
and the legal protection of human rights.” The omission of human rights from the 
LSM blurb was no doubt deliberate: because the initial focus was very much on 
law, and/or because the term human rights might attract unwanted attention from 
the occupation authorities, or indeed because the existing legal regime of human 
rights had less to do with the structures of occupation than did the rule of law. 
The rule-of-law theme fed into the methodological approach of taking seriously 
official Israeli claims about the occupation’s approach to the law and testing these 
normative assertions against the facts of the conduct of the occupation: funda-
mentally, it was about legality, a form of “rightful resistance.”6 Summing up his 
motivations, Shehadeh explained:
If we wanted a Palestinian state (and I did, I thought we did), we’re going to have to 
work for it, have the rule of law, different to what I saw around me. So the main thing 
was: the rule of law, Israeli violations and correcting the record and not letting the 
Israelis get away with it.
Howard B. Tolley Jr. reports that publication of the book was funded by a Kuwaiti 
donor (presumably sourced by MacDermot) and translated into five languages 
by national sections of the ICJ. The UN Human Rights Division bought five 
hundred copies to distribute to the UN General Assembly; “foreign missions in 
Geneva made bulk purchases,” and “Jordan requested copies for UN Commission 
members.” Israeli representatives, says Tolley, “made outraged denials.”7 Al-Haq’s 
archives contain press clippings of reviews and notices published in international 
press outlets.8 This was quite an impact for what Shehadeh spoke of as “our dry 
little book on the niceties of law.”9 Later, he noted, “It was a short, modest book, 
but it made a strong impact because it was understated and because most of what 
it revealed [ . . . ] had not been known.”10 Understatement became a hallmark of 
al-Haq’s work. Recalling his earlier fears, Shehadeh remembers being telephoned 
by the Israeli adviser on Arab affairs to the military government, who told him that 
“they had considered banning the book, but decided against it because ‘that would 
make you a national hero.’ ”11
Not all of the reviews were as distanced from the political implications as was the 
book itself. A positive review in Afrique-Asie predicted that the publication “will 
mark a date in the history of international law” and “will be a weapon for other 
occupied peoples—Sahrawis, Namibians, Eritreans.”12 Closer to home, the Israeli 
press picked up on the mostly unspoken conclusion; a review in the  Jerusalem Post 
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observed that “it is not a better, more just, more humane occupation he is after, but 
the end of the occupation.”13 A publication of the Israeli left observed:
Shehadeh’s survey, though he does not say so, is meant to serve as a tool for lawyers, 
politicians and any other interested individuals who are in some way involved in the 
ideological-informational battle against the Israeli occupation and for Palestinian 
self-determination.14
Not all reactions were positive. A letter forwarded by a charitable organization 
shows a US lawyer writing that “from a legal standpoint the pamphlet strikes me 
as sheer nonsense.” Shehadeh records the following encounter:
I was asked to lunch with an Israeli law professor who has written quite scathing 
criticisms of the military legislation on the West Bank. I was invited together with 
a well-known international human rights figure. When our host greeted us—I had 
as usual lost my way in Tel Aviv trying to find his home—he was very gruff and 
cold, and I thought it was because we were late. We sat down to lunch and suddenly, 
without any warning, he turned to me and began shouting a barrage of insults about 
the book—how dare I—I don’t know what I’m talking about—he would not give me 
a first-year pass mark in law school, such ignorance, lies, distortion. [ . . . ] It turned 
out (and this I still cannot quite believe, I don’t know what to make of it) it turned 
out, he had not read it either.15
The response of the Israeli legal profession, endorsed by Justice Haim Cohn, was 
swift and had immediate effects. The ICJ secretary-general had opened his preface 
to WBRL by stressing that Israeli military orders “which have constituted the only 
form of legislation applicable to the area for over 13 years, are not published and 
are not to be found in any library,” the orders mostly being “distributed to practis-
ing lawyers” and some being “sent to the people directly affected by them.” In a 
much-quoted passage, MacDermot noted:
There have been isolated cases, as in Chile, where one or two decrees of a military 
government have been treated as secret documents and not published. However, this 
is the first case to come to the attention of the International Commission of Jurists 
where the entire legislation of a territory is not published in an official gazette avail-
able to the general public.16
Shehadeh recalls that Israeli officialdom appeared particularly stung by compara-
tive reference with the Chile of that time. In his 1994 article about al-Haq, Mouin 
Rabbani noted further:
The frenzied Israeli reaction to the publication of the West Bank and the Rule of Law 
served to expose the Achilles’ heel of the occupation and that which makes it unique 
among modern occupations: its dependence upon the perception of legality fostered 
by a constant attention to legalistic detail. To accuse Israel of repressing Palestinians 
was one thing, but to accuse it of doing so illegally quite another.17
A discernible impact became the more regular publication and distribution of 
military orders, although LSM was still investing considerable effort in collating 
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and compiling collections for the first few years of its existence.18 In 1983, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Joel Singer of the Israeli army’s International Law Branch wrote to 
Shehadeh and Kuttab that “for more than a year, two book stores are selling to the 
public copies of the military government orders” which he said was “in addition to 
the regular method of distribution of the orders.”19 In public, however, the Israeli 
establishment tended to simply deny the facts as presented. Perhaps nowhere was 
this more evident than in the response of the Israeli national section of the ICJ, 
titled The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by Israel (1981) and without the ICJ 
as a copublisher. Haim Cohn contributed the foreword, referring to “the area of 
Judaea and Samaria,” which along with the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights “came 
under the control of Israel by virtue of belligerent occupation.” He then noted that 
“no claim has been laid by the State of Israel so far to any of these ‘administered 
areas’ ”—apart from “the city of Jerusalem which, including its eastern part, has 
always been regarded by the State of Israel, and under its laws, as an integral part 
of the territory of Israel.” With no comment on the contradiction between Israel’s 
action in Jerusalem and the prohibition on annexation under international law, 
Cohn described as “largely academic” the debate on the application of the laws of 
occupation because “it has from the very first been the declared policy of the State 
of Israel that its military and civil organs abide by the humanitarian provisions of 
the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 as if they were 
binding and applicable.”20 Shehadeh pointed out with some alacrity that the report 
failed to examine the military orders affecting Israeli settlements as an example by 
which to test the lawfulness of Israel’s conduct; in a later piece he observed: 
Not only did this position conceal the truth regarding the denial of the Palestinians 
as a national group with the inalienable right to self-determination, it also left Israel 
entirely free to pick and choose which international legal norms it wished to adhere 
to [ . . . ] because it did not at any point define what were these “humanitarian provi-
sions,” and it certainly never considered them to include the prohibition against the 
establishment of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories.21
Acknowledging that “Israel administers these territories as an uninvited ruler,” the 
foreword explained:
Rather than dissipating her resources on political polemics, Israel has preferred to 
concentrate her efforts on steadfastly ameliorating the administration of the terri-
tories and raising the living standards of the population—with the result, of course, 
that the voices of resentment have grown progressively stronger and have appeared 
to win the day by default.
The political agitators have now, however, been joined by reputable legal scholars 
who have inscribed the motto “Law in the Service of Man” on their banner and who, 
thanks to their sincere motivation as co-fighters for the Rule of Law, have won affili-
ation with the International Commission of Jurists.22
Cohn observed that “the study of Messrs. Shehadeh and Kuttab can in no way be 
accepted as a correct statement either of the facts or of the law” while welcoming 
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the challenge “to state both fact and law as they really are.”23 He then continued, in 
regard to the Israeli study:
While this study is neither government-sponsored nor government-backed, it is 
mostly the work of lawyers who do their reserve duty in the Israel Defence Forces as 
legal advisers to the military commanders in the administered areas [ . . . ] keeping 
a constant and jealous watch for any infringement or diminution of the Rule of Law 
at the hands of military men and administrators not trained in the law. If they have 
not always succeeded, it is because security considerations, which are not within 
their competence or expertise, have been regarded as overriding—as indeed they are 
under the provisions of international law.
Most authors remained anonymous, but Cohn did pay particular tribute to Joel 
Singer, head of the army’s International Law Branch. Cohn then dealt with the 
Israeli High Court of Justice and its assumption of jurisdiction—given his own 
role as a judge in that court—and concluded:
It cannot in fairness be denied that, in the history of military occupations through-
out the world, the Rule of Law has never been better served and implemented than 
by affording the rights and remedies that Israel has made available to the residents of 
her administered territories.24
Raising once again “the prevailing military concepts of security requirements,” he 
indicated his own unhappiness at “certain aspects” but wrote that, given “terrorist 
influence and attacks, those concepts must prevail.” In his final paragraph, Cohn 
addressed “the international legal community,” anticipating that “the analytical 
mind of the lawyer” would
easily differentiate between a tractatus politicus and a sober statement of law and fact. 
Not that a political pamphlet has no justification, especially if it is overtly presented 
as such and does not purport to pose as what it is not; but lawyers, as distinct from 
politicians, are hardly in the habit of contenting themselves too easily with what at 
best amounts to political argument, unsupported by evidence and authority.25
Cohn’s assumptions demonstrated either real ignorance about the situation in the 
occupied territories or an inability to acknowledge such a dent in Israel’s image as 
a rule-of-law state.26
The Israeli ICJ’s publication provoked further reviews of the two reports. “Dis-
agreements on the ‘facts’ abound,” wrote one reviewer in The Nation. “The outsider 
lacking first-hand knowledge of life on the West Bank (as I do) cannot evaluate 
the truth or the falsity of the conflicting claims. .  .  . Whom does one believe?”27 
The authors of WBRL clearly spent considerable time responding to the reactions; 
a 1982 letter from Shehadeh to a coeditor of the US-based Human Rights Inter-
net Reporter, responding to her review regarding the (then) availability of mili-
tary orders,28 noted that “perhaps because of the publicity which the ICJ and LSM 
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report has caused, most of the Military Orders have now been printed and copies 
of them are now on sale at local book stores.”29
This was “the beginning of the organisation in the public eye,” says Shehadeh; 
“we began to have the feeling that we were ‘called upon’ and had to keep up with 
changes and alert the world.” Different Arab radio stations and the local Palestin-
ian press reported on the publication of WBRL,30 which Shammas reports was 
“very influential for domestic perceptions.” Shehadeh reports working lawyers 
discussing WBRL and recalls suggestions that Prince Hassan of Jordan had raised 
it with the Jordanian Bar Association (JBA). An Arabic translation was soon pub-
lished in Jordan.31 The organization began to recruit, widening its profile through 
informal networks. Shehadeh reports that they met with “scant interest” from law-
yers when looking for recruits for the work;32 the next lawyer to be drawn into 
LSM’s activities on a long-term basis was Mona Rishmawi, who had grown up in 
the Gaza Strip, completed her law degree in Cairo, and joined the Shehadeh law 
office for her training.
The section in WBRL on “The Legal Profession” dealt entirely with the lawyers’ 
strike, ending with the dismal consequences of the “lack of any organization of 
the profession.”33 Shehadeh recalled later, “I found no professional satisfaction in 
a ruined legal system.”34 Shammas describes Shehadeh as being “in shock at what 
he found back home.” Shehadeh talks of “an emasculating experience” and of the 
“crippling use of negative power” on the part of Palestinian political forces, lest 
anything novel should lead to a new form of political force: “None of these factions 
[of the PLO] supported work that would improve the conditions of the judiciary. 
Such activity was seen as reformist and implied an acceptance of the status quo. 
Under these conditions, the fate of the lawyer was simply to endure.”35
It was in the Shehadeh law office in Ramallah that a number of lawyers met in 
1971 to “openly declare their position against the strike and call for its  suspension”; 
the following day, Shehadeh’s father and uncle were disbarred for life by the JBA, 
and his father’s Jordanian passport was withdrawn.36 Shehadeh describes the 
first case that drew his father back into practice after the occupation, involving a 
friend’s young daughter who had been charged with offending the Israeli flag after 
an incident at the Allenby Bridge crossing from Jordan into the West Bank.37 The 
case is typical of circumstances that brought lawyers back to the courts under 
the occupation: requests to defend those charged with hostile activity by the Israeli 
authorities in the military courts, land confiscation orders, ongoing cases in the 
civil courts, and the fact that in their absence, the occupation had allowed Israeli 
lawyers to practice not only in the military courts of the occupation but also in 
the civil courts, with no reciprocal recognition of Palestinian lawyers from the 
occupied territories. On the other hand, there were the arguments against recog-
nizing the occupation by appearing in their courts and under their rule. George 
Bisharat, who came as a summer intern to LSM in 1982 while he was a law student 
54    Founders
at  Harvard, describes conflicted feelings that gave rise to his subsequent scholar-
ship on this issue.38 In a socio-legal inquiry into cause lawyering published after 
Oslo, he reflects on the lawyers’ dilemma:
Should they accept invitation into the courts of the occupying power, to defend cli-
ents and press their claims? Or would they in doing so validate Israelis’ assertion that 
theirs was a ‘benign occupation’ and so sap urgency from calls to end the occupa-
tion? [ . . . ] Has their advocacy ultimately legitimated the occupation or contributed 
to its prolongation?39
Accused of “collaboration” by a striking lawyer, Shehadeh acknowledges:
This is a nightmare that haunts those of us who didn’t go on strike. [ . . . ] I find myself 
suddenly thinking of us lawyers here on the West Bank as the daylight equivalents 
of the people dragged out in the middle of the night to whitewash over the slogans 
painted on the wall. It is as if by our very willingness to function under the distorted 
rules of “justice” that they have set up here we are providing the occupation—the 
theft of our land and liberties—with a clean bill of legalistic health.40
The choices for lawyers in the earlier years of the occupation were complex and 
often painful. Bisharat talks of the “palpable impact” of the discussions on the 
legitimacy and costs of lawyers’ practice in the occupation’s courts that led to 
the “fragmentation of the legal profession.”41 He wonders whether the activities 
of working lawyers on behalf of their clients “may have helped channel anger and 
resentment against the military government into relatively harmless forms.”42 This 
is examined further in the following chapters.
The benefit of legal advocacy under the occupation, besides relief for indi-
vidual clients that might infrequently be won, Bisharat identifies as the appeal to 
the “court of public opinion.” Insisting on “mini-trials” or “trials within trials” on 
allegations of torture and ill-treatment drove up the costs of the occupation. The 
premise for such activities, Bisharat notes, is Israel taking seriously the principles 
of democracy and the rule of law. Bisharat finds that “on balance, Palestinians’ 
election to seek representation in Israeli courts, and lawyers’ choice to assist them, 
has been justified” and that one result was in helping build a Palestinian human 
rights movement.43 The broader issue, however, outlasted the West Bank lawyers’ 
strike and continues to preoccupy at least some of those involved. Bisharat reports 
prominent Israeli rights lawyer Felicia Langer abandoning her practice in defense 
of Palestinians after 1990, due to her “fear that legitimation costs had exceeded the 
benefits of continued legal practice during the intifada.”44
In his foreword to the Israeli ICJ’s publication, Haim Cohn had argued that 
allowing Palestinians recourse against acts of the military authorities to the Israeli 
Supreme Court—acting as High Court of Justice—validated Israel’s claims to 
respect the rule of law. Would recourse to the High Court “legitimate” Israel’s rule? 
Some Palestinian defendants chose not to recognize the jurisdiction of Israel or 
the Israeli Court and declined to appeal. Others appealed. Bisharat observes:
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Given the understandable choice of Palestinian deportees, administrative detainees, 
expropriated landowners and others to fight military government actions against 
them, the question again was whether they would be represented by politically com-
mitted lawyers or other lawyers with other motivations and interests.45
In 1980, Shehadeh recorded in his journal the return of the two West Bank 
mayors (Fahd Qawasme and Muhammad Milhem) deported after the armed 
attack on settlers in Hebron; they were allowed back to appeal to the Israeli High 
Court against their deportation orders. Shehadeh’s father Aziz was preparing 
one affidavit to the High Court on the Fourth Geneva Convention’s prohibition 
of deportation and another on the illegality of deportation under the Jordanian 
constitution and the status of the British-issued Defence (Emergency) Regulations 
(1945) under which the orders had been made.46 Shehadeh reported “wild hope 
amongst many” and wrote that “even the political die-hards who say we should 
never appeal to, or recognize, any Israeli institution are excited.”47 The hearings 
took place at the Allenby Bridge. At the end of his journal, Shehadeh records 
hopes crushed when the High Court declined to recommend the repeal of the 
 deportation orders. Some Palestinians continued to have recourse to the High 
Court; others continued to refuse. In a study on deportation for al-Haq in 1986, 
Hiltermann reproduced extracts from the statement of two men who had refused 
to appeal at all, whether to the Military Advisory Committee or thereafter to the 
Israeli Supreme Court:
We refuse to participate in measures which will give the deportation orders the ap-
pearance of legality, while they are contrary to international law, the rules of natural 
justice, and the law accepted by civilized nations, even in times of occupation .  .  . 
There is no reason to go through the legal measures when we are convinced that the 
[Advisory] Committee’s hearing, like the hearing before the Supreme Court later, 
will only serve the State of Israel, which wishes to project a democratic image to the 
unjust and arbitrary deportation orders [ . . . ] The law is only the continuation of a 
policy, and as such we do not believe in it [ . . . ] We are not prepared to have the oc-
cupation authorities act as enemy and judge at one and the same time.48
In its early years, LSM had on occasion to educate foreign organizations who failed 
to recognize the stand behind such positions. One such, whom al-Haq asked in 
1987 to intervene against the deportation of a Gaza resident who had decided not to 
appeal the order, telexed to say that it would be difficult for them to intervene if the 
man “wanted to be deported.”49 Despite the more general acceptance of recourse 
to the Supreme Court in later years, it remains the case that the Court’s record has 
been mixed and not encouraging. Reviewing David Kretzmer’s study of the Court’s 
record in 2005, prominent Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard reminds his 
readers that the court has refused to rule on the legality of Israel’s settlement policy, 
although it has taken on individual cases; and it has also not decided whether the 
Fourth Geneva Convention applies.50 Sfard addresses the “existential dilemma of 
56    Founders
the human rights lawyer” with his question: “From the perspective of human rights 
and of those who seek a quick end to the occupation, was (and is) the justiciability of 
the occupation a positive development?”51 Given a lawyers’ professional and moral 
obligations to their clients, Sfard suggests that this question should be answered by 
academics. “I reject the argument, which can be heard from time to time by human 
rights neutralists, according to which there must not be a linkage between object-
ing [to] human rights violations and objecting [to] the occupation.”52 Al-Haq’s own 
voice on this is no longer “neutralist”—it is far more explicit about seeking an end 
to the occupation than was LSM in its early years.
Decades later, Shehadeh was to write: “I sometimes doubt whether our struggle 
will ever succeed in liberating us. What I’ve always been sure of is that, regardless 
of the cost, nothing proved more important in the fight against Israeli expansion-
ist ambitions than our staying put on our land, our summoud.”53 Looking back 
at the Israeli response to WBRL, Shehadeh tracked the development of the inter-
pretive arguments in the responses of the Israeli jurists Cohn and Singer forward 
to the positions enshrined in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995.54 
In particular, noting the agreement on “due regard to internationally accepted 
norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law” included in the text of 
the 1995 Interim Agreement, Shehadeh observes:
If ever there was an empty gesture that exemplified hypocrisy and token adherence 
to principles of human rights, this was it. With this cynical assertion of the applica-
tion of human rights, it was the Israeli position enunciated in 1982 by Justice Haim 
Cohn that won the day.55
It was clear after the publication of WBRL that the Israeli legal establishment 
would respond vigorously to Palestinian attempts to establish a narrative of the 
legal and human rights situation in the occupied territories, including an account 
of the applicable law, that differed from that of the official Israeli narrative. As 
 Shehadeh put it, “The debate on the legal and human rights aspects of the Israeli 
occupation between Israelis and Palestinians had begun.”56 Whether the responses 
comprised denial of facts or denial of the legal classification of those facts as 
 violations, they more than supported the insistence of all three cofounders that 
rigor had to be the basis of everything LSM did and said. Stanley Cohen, him-
self a significant actor in the Israeli human rights movement, classified the pos-
sibilities of denial according to “what exactly is being ‘denied’: literal, interpreta-
tive and implicatory.” Literal denial “is the type of denial that fits the dictionary 
 definition: the assertion that something did not happen or is not true”—hence, 
“the fact or knowledge of the fact is denied.” In the second, interpretive denial, 
“the raw facts (something happened) are not being denied. Rather, they are given 
a different meaning from what seems apparent to others.” And in the third, impli-
catory denial, “there is no attempt to deny either the facts or their conventional 
Founders    57
 interpretation. What are denied or minimized are the psychological, political or 
moral implications that conventionally follow.”57
There is more than a note of “implicatory denial” in the response by a senior 
Israeli legal figure to Kuttab and Shehadeh’s next publication, a dry legal analysis 
of Military Order 947 (1981) establishing the Civilian Administration which the 
authors identify as “among the most important” of the “physical as well as legisla-
tive changes” being pursued through “energetic policies” by the Israeli authorities 
in line with the “autonomy plan agreed upon at Camp David.”58 Introducing their 
analysis, Kuttab and Shehadeh set out their understanding of what was going on 
in the occupied territories:
A survey of the legislation promulgated by the military government legislation over 
the past fifteen years would lead one to conclude that this period was one of extensive 
and deliberate activity intended to fulfil the following policies:
1. The assumption of control over the local Arab population of the territories.
2. The close determination of the pace, extent, and manner of the development of 
key sectors of Palestinian society in the Area. The development of infrastructures 
and institutions that could serve as a basis for an independent Palestinian state has 
been inhibited. This control is achieved by prohibiting the exercise of a wide range 
of activities without permits and licenses which are within the total discretion of 
the military government to grant and which are withheld whenever the activity 
concerned conflicts with Israeli objectives in controlling Palestinian development.
3. The creation of a situation whereby many of the economic benefits which would ac-
crue to the State of Israel from an annexation of the territory are obtained. Some of 
the ways through which this has been achieved are: the extension of elements of the 
Israeli taxation system to the West Bank; the incorporation of the West Bank into 
the Israeli customs cordon; the establishment of labour bureaus to channel West 
Bank labour resources; the regulation of employment of West Bank workers and 
the tying of other aspects of West Bank services and governances to those of Israel.
4. The facilitation of the creation of a strong, large and dominant Jewish civil-
ian presence in the Area through the acquisition by the military Government 
of large areas which have been classified as “State land,” the development of a 
communications network, the establishment of administrative, legal, defence, 
economic, and other structures for the Jewish settlements; and through the 
determination of the development of the Arab society in such a way as not to 
conflict with the proposed growth of the Jewish settlements.59
The particular areas of concern noted were not obviously “human rights” concerns 
as understood by the civil and political focus of the international movement at 
the time; it was very much a rule-of-law approach. LSM/al-Haq was subsequently 
to initiate projects and publish studies on planning and taxation and Know Your 
Rights publications on workers’ rights which fitted more into the ICJ’s growing 
thinking on economic and social rights and development.
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Joel Singer responded in print again and forwarded copies of his article for 
 Kuttab and Shehadeh with the “hope that this article will clarify some of the 
 questions raised in your analysis of January 1982.”60 Shehadeh’s 2008 reflection 
considers Singer’s response as follows:
Singer (1982) published a lengthy article defending this development and denying 
it had any prospective political objectives. He proposed that the newly established 
civilian administration intended to facilitate better rule of Palestinians in the areas 
he referred to as the “territories administered by Israel.” Twelve years later when the 
Oslo Accords were drafted with Singer’s help, the apartheid structure established in 
1981 became more entrenched.61
By the start of the 1980s, then, with the publication of WBRL and the analysis 
of Military Order 947, LSM had provided evidence of what Israel was doing and 
how, and what it was planning for the future of the occupied territories following 
Camp David.
In al-Haq’s archives is the text of Shehadeh’s presentation to the First Interna-
tional NGO Meeting on the Question of Palestine, convened in Geneva in 1984 
by the UN Division for Palestinian Rights, telling of the profile the young orga-
nization had already won. Shehadeh opened with the assertion that in the seven-
teenth year of occupation, “it is possible, with some authority, to speak very clearly 
about what seems to be already in place and what are the plans for the future and 
what is the vision that Israel sees for the population of the Jewish minority of less 
than 4 per cent and the Palestinian majority in the West Bank.”62 Starting with land 
confiscation and settlement, he moved to town planning and the proposed Road 
Plan No. 50, published that year by the Israeli authorities:
The West Bank does have roads, these roads are adequate for its purposes and it is 
not a case of an area which did not have roads suddenly being brought civilization 
and better road systems. What is really intended behind this road plan is to tie the 
Jewish settlements to Israel and to do this by avoiding the Arab towns and villages.”
Shehadeh informed his audience that the Israeli High Court of Justice had already 
reviewed and approved the Road Plan, and thus “we have come to a dead end as far 
as the possibilities of resorting to legal action within the existing legal framework 
that the occupation has provided us with.” He suggested therefore that those pres-
ent ask their governments to work for an advisory opinion from the International 
Court of Justice. An LSM publication later that year made the same recommenda-
tion in relation to the Road Plan, arguing that it was fundamental to Israel’s plans 
for annexation of large parts of the West Bank and to its settlement policy.63 Mac-
Dermot asked the UN Commission for Human Rights to propose to the General 
Assembly “that it seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice 
on the [following] question”:
Is a military occupant entitled in international law to make major changes to the 
road system of an occupied territory in the supposed interest of the local  population 
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(such as that in Road Plan Number 50 of February 1984) in the absence of any re-
quest or support from, or full consultation with, the inhabitants of the occupied ter-
ritory and their elected representatives?64
In the West Bank, a committee was formed and hundreds of objections submit-
ted against the plan; but neither the Shehadehs nor LSM built up the complex 
legal arguments or mobilized the necessary political support (local, regional, 
international) to seek the advisory opinion. Much later, Shehadeh wrote later that 
LSM had made sure the PLO received the study but received no response, and 
he doubted that the PLO was particularly interested.65 Nevertheless, the analysis 
was prescient and two decades later, at the request of the UN General Assembly, 
the International Court of Justice issued its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Con-
sequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.66
Shehadeh’s scholarship in subsequent years demonstrated a continuing focus 
on the land. A different kind of publication, Palestinian Walks, was in 2008 
awarded the Orwell Prize, which describes itself as “Britain’s most prestigious 
prize for political writing”67—not the sort of accolade that Shehadeh could have 
been expected to seek or welcome back in his earlier life. In one passage in this 
book he describes walking in the hills around Ramallah with Jonathan Kuttab 
in the early 1980s, making exuberant plans for frustrating the “existential threat” 
of the settlements through use of the law and the energy of LSM; twenty-five years 
later, he wrote, “those times seem aeons away.”68
JONATHAN KUT TAB
Jonathan Kuttab’s family had left Jerusalem for the United States after he finished 
high school, and he took a degree in history followed by a JD. Qualifying at the 
New York Bar, he worked in corporate law in Wall Street to pay off his law school 
debts. With this done, he turned his attention back to Palestine, writing to the 
Shehadeh law office in Ramallah (“because they were the number one”) to offer 
his services. He had the “specific purpose of doing something of service, of using 
the law as my contribution to helping the situation here in Palestine, helping the 
Palestinian cause.” His letter found its way to Shehadeh, and Shammas met Kut-
tab in New York to explain the ongoing project to establish LSM and use the law 
in precisely the way that Kuttab was seeking; Shammas remembers that “wanting 
to be of service, that was exactly how Jonathan was presenting it.” Kuttab came 
over late in 1979 on a volunteer status and subsistence wages with the Mennonite 
Central Committee: “I wrote my own job description, which was to learn Hebrew, 
understand Israeli law and work for justice, human rights and international law in 
the Palestinian community.” Kuttab qualified at the Israeli Bar as a foreign attorney 
(taking advantage of the military order allowing Israeli lawyers to practice in the 
West Bank),69 and then became a member of the Israeli Bar, later qualifying also 
at the West Bank Bar.
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Kuttab’s positioning distinguished him from both Shehadeh and Shammas, and 
his role in the organization built on his strengths. The following is an extract from 
a presentation he made in 1985 to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House 
of Representatives:
My name is Jonathan Kuttab. I am a Palestinian attorney residing in Jerusalem. I 
studied at the University of Virginia Law School and am a member of the New York 
Bar Association, as well as the Israeli Bar. I am director of Law in the Service of Man, 
a human rights organization which is the West Bank affiliate of the International 
Commission of Jurists. I am addressing this Committee on behalf of the Palestine 
Human Rights Campaign, a non-profit, American organization which focuses ex-
clusively on Palestinian human rights. PHRC’s membership is comprised of church, 
peace, academic, Arab-American and Jewish communities who are concerned about 
peace in the Middle East. [ . . . ]
I am quite familiar with the legal and human rights situation in Israel and  
the West Bank, and speak from the perspective of those in the US, in Israel,  
and among Palestinians who actively seek peace and justice, advocate human  
rights, and would like to see US aid and assistance become a constructive force leading  
to moderation, reconciliation, justice and peace in the Middle East. At the same 
time, as an  American, I realize that governmental foreign aid is a limited resource 
that must be carefully distributed in accordance with well defined priorities; that  
it must be properly accounted for, and that it is an instrument of policy which  
needs to accommodate US interests while meeting the needs of others throughout 
the world.
One of the several interests the US seeks to achieve through its foreign aid 
 program is greater respect and observance for human rights and democratic prin-
ciples by recipient nations. [Here Kuttab brings up the State Department country 
report for 1984 and other human rights reports about the situation.] The basic cause 
for most of the complaints is that Israel is attempting to pursue in the Occupied Ter-
ritories policies of annexation and expansion contrary to international law, United 
Nations resolutions and to the vision of the US concerning the ultimate disposition 
of the territories. While the US believes the final status of the Occupied Territo-
ries should be determined in the context of a peaceful settlement whereby Israel 
exchanges territory for peace and recognition, Israel has been actively undermining 
that vision by attempting to Judaize the Occupied Territories (which it calls Judea 
and Samaria) and annexing them into the Jewish state. This course of behaviour 
necessarily leads to violations of the human rights of the indigenous Palestinians, in-
cluding their right to self determination, their democratic rights, freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. It requires an oppressive military 
regime that denies them due process and imposes on them collective punishment. 
It also leads to systematically robbing Palestinians of their land and water resources, 
placing such resources in the hands of Jewish settlers for whom an entire infrastruc-
ture and separate regime is created. A classic de facto apartheid system has thus been 
created, with two separate and differing structures, courts, residences and rights—
one for Palestinian Arabs and another for Israeli Jews.
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This behavior is not only violative of human rights generally, but is specifically 
contrary to US interests and is a major liability to the US policy in its relations with 
the Arab world.70
Kuttab speaks here “as an American,” a US attorney, as well as a Palestinian, 
 addressing US policy interests as a citizen. LSM’s understanding of causes (Israel’s 
annexationist agenda) and consequences (human rights violations) is clear in this 
presentation. Kuttab was an engaging public speaker, especially in the United States, 
often hosted by different church and peace groups that he drew into LSM’s network. 
He was an active member of church groups and was engaged with the practice of 
nonviolence in resistance strategies.71 To the founders, it seemed, LSM’s organiza-
tional identity and rule-of-law framework rendered unnecessary any explicit refer-
ence to nonviolence in its own methodology. Nor, until later in its development, did 
the organization take a view on the use of violence in resistance to the occupation. 
Kuttab, however, was actively interested in the principle of nonviolent resistance, 
and in the early 1980s he helped set up the Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-
Violence.72 In an interview in 2001, Kuttab was discussing the need to involve US 
Christian churches in the campaign of nonviolent resistance to the occupation:
Any challenge to the policy of domination is viewed as a threat against the survival 
of the state of Israel. We need to uncouple these two things before we can be effective 
in a nonviolence campaign. As a Palestinian Christian, I can be for the Palestinians, 
for the state of Israel, and for God—while at the same time be against the illegal oc-
cupation and the settlements.73
Kuttab’s early public speaking commitments were much about building a network 
for LSM. “To survive under military occupation, we realized we needed a large 
network of people who knew about us and cared enough to fight for us if we got 
detained.” Then there was the need to get information out, which under occupa-
tion and in the days before electronic communications was rarely straightforward. 
Al-Haq’s archives hold copies of a large number of letters from Kuttab to lawyers, 
church leaders, people he had met on planes, etc. The letters enclosed publications 
and information about LSM. In 1982 Kuttab was at a meeting in Strasbourg: “My 
agenda was to go and collect as many cards as I could to build up our mailing list.” 
He ended up—almost by accident, as he tells it—being proposed as the delegate 
for the Middle East group on the governing Council of the Human Rights 
 Information and Documentation Systems (HURIDOCS), which was holding 
its founding assembly. This was probably LSM’s first contact with the develop-
ing Arab human rights movement. HURIDOCS describes itself as “an NGO that 
helps human rights groups gather, organise and use information to create positive 
change in the world.”74 It was to be a long relationship; Kuttab worked with the 
organization until 2009. Observing that he was by no means a documentation 
systems specialist, he has the following to say on his role:
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I was always bringing up the base of activists in the field, that we need proper tools 
to prepare proper documents for those activists. I always used to talk about the phi-
losophy of documentation, how important it was for human rights work because the 
first line of defense for any oppressive regime is denial—what are you talking about, 
this doesn’t happen. So if the documents are not of a high enough level of credibility, 
they can be dismissed. I was always drawing on our experience at al-Haq, in support 
of what HURIDOCS was trying to do.75
Kuttab became LSM’s Steering Committee member responsible for the Field-
work Unit, the quality of whose work is widely considered as behind the young 
organization’s reputation and credibility. He shared a professional insistence on 
this with Shehadeh. It was Kuttab who leapt to the defense of the organization 
when its fieldwork-based credibility was directly and very publicly challenged 
in a key international forum by an Israeli official. The occasion was the joint 
LSM-ICJ publication of a report titled Torture and Intimidation in the West Bank: 
The Case of Al-Fara’a Prison.76 In the report, LSM described “the conditions at al-
Fara’a using the statements under oath of those with first hand experience.”77 The 
ICJ released it in Geneva. “Four days after publication of the LSM report,” wrote 
Niall MacDermot, “the 41st session of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
opened in Geneva and its first item was the Israeli Occupied Territories. The dis-
cussions began with interventions by the representatives of Syria and the PLO, 
both of whom referred at some length to the Al-Fara’a report.”78 MacDermot also 
spoke, mostly on Israel’s Road Plan No. 50, but noting that “the Al-Fara’a report 
was the first convincing report of the systematic use of torture by Israeli forces to 
reach the ICJ for over 10 years.”79 The Israeli ambassador responded the same day 
and also in a written statement a few days later, in which he referred to the report 
as “prepared by an ICJ’s affiliate in the West Bank who intitulates itself bombasti-
cally ‘Law in the Service of Men’ ” [sic] and to LSM as “a notorious front organiza-
tion created by local PLO sympathisers.”80 Kuttab recalls his response to the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with a copy to the ambassador) as “one of my best 
ever letters”:
We fully understand the political and often polemical nature of statements made 
before that forum [the Commission on Human Rights], particularly by representa-
tives of the different states, and we do not wish to engage in such debates, and will 
not address here most of the points raised by the statement of Ambassador Dowek. 
None the less, there were some very serious charges and innuendoes made in that 
statement which we cannot ignore, since they come from an official representative  
of the state under whose authority we are living in the occupied territories, and be-
cause they carry serious consequences for our organization.
Most serious of those is the charge that Law in the Service of Man is a “ . . . front 
organisation, created by local PLO sympathisers . . . ” Such a charge is very serious, 
and if proven, would render LSM illegal under the prevailing Military Orders in the 
West Bank and would subject members of LSM to prolonged prison sentences.  Other 
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statements published in the papers attributed to Israeli spokesmen have  labelled 
LSM a “hostile” organisation. Mere contact with a “hostile” organisation under  
Military Order No. 284 subjects a resident of the West Bank to a prison term of up 
to ten years.
We therefore wish to state categorically that LSM is a fully independent body af-
filiated with the International Commission of Jurists, that it is not a “front” for any 
body or organisation, and that it is duly registered with the competent authorities of 
the Military government. Such false accusations concerning the character of the or-
ganisation and its independence, therefore, go beyond political discussions or even 
polemics and can have serious legal consequences for us.
Secondly: Ambassador Doweik states that LSM has the “open aim” to (1) discredit 
Israel, (2) stain its reputation of integrity and clean hands, (3) attract world attention, 
(4) blow up minor details out of all proportion and (5) give the semblance of cred-
ibility and respectability to unfounded allegations. LSM admits that one of its aims 
is attracting world attention (aim No. 3) but emphatically denies all of the four other 
aims attributed to it.
The true aims of the organisation are clearly stated in its articles of incorpora-
tion and reflected in its yearly activities. They are the promotion of the principles of 
the rule of law and of respect for human rights, and compliance with international 
norms. It is true that in pursuit of these goals LSM objectively monitors the human 
rights record of the Israeli military authorities and it is not surprising that the re-
sults of such investigation is not pleasing to the Israeli authorities. They should not 
be. However it is both false and dangerous to deduce from this that the “open aim” 
of LSM is to “discredit Israel and stain its reputation for integrity and clean hands, 
etc . . . ” LSM endeavours to investigate these matters with integrity and objectivity, 
but it cannot be blamed for the substance of the violations it documents and the 
results it brings to light.
Thirdly: The statement of the Ambassador contained a direct attack on the cred-
ibility and truthfulness of LSM’s documentation. Specifically it stated that “In the 
past, many affidavits, including quite a few channelled through “Law in the Service of 
Men” (sic), were proven, after proper investigation, as completely unfounded (my 
emphasis). Another spokesman referred to the Al-Fara’a report as an “unfounded 
web of lies.”
LSM strenuously endeavours to maintain the highest possible standards of ac-
curacy and truthfulness. Great care is taken in collecting information and sceptically 
investigating allegations of human rights violations. Evidence which does not meet 
our exacting standards of accuracy is never published. Our identity as a human rights 
organisation is closely linked to this careful approach to facts. That being the case, we 
would be most grateful to learn which of our affidavits have been proven to be un-
founded. Even more, we hereby commit ourselves to amend, or retract any published 
material that is proven to be materially inaccurate and to publish such corrections or 
retractions as widely as possible. Such a commitment is not a concession by LSM but 
an essential ingredient of its nature as a serious human rights organisation on which 
it stakes its credibility. We therefore welcome a specific reply indicating which of our 
published material you believe you have proven to be false or inaccurate. Barring 
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that we would appreciate it if official spokesmen for your ministry would refrain in 
future from making unsubstantiated attacks on LSM’s credibility.81
The insistence on accuracy and “sceptically investigating allegations” was a corner-
stone of the organization’s methodology: “We’d drill it into everybody at al-Haq, 
field-workers and everyone else,” says Kuttab, “that our credibility and accuracy 
was our greatest asset.” Kuttab’s preoccupations came through in his contribu-
tion to the first international law conference held in East Jerusalem, convened by 
al-Haq just as the first intifada moved into its second month in January 1988.82 
In “Avenues Open for Defence of Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territo-
ries,” Kuttab addressed Jordanian law and the Israeli High Court as “avenues that 
present themselves to the local practitioner.” He noted “practical obstacles” to the 
International Court of Justice as an avenue of recourse, and then moved on to:
the ‘court of public opinion’ and the engagement, through implication, of major seg-
ments of the international public, foreign governments, international human rights 
organizations, and even sectors and organizations in the Israeli public itself. Israel 
has shown itself as vulnerable, if not more vulnerable than other states, to inter-
national pressure but there have always been a number of serious and important 
qualifications surrounding this aspect. Individuals and organizations who attempt to 
work in this direction must keep in mind a number of factors that will determine the 
effectiveness of this method.83
The first of these factors was “specific, detailed, and accurate documentation of 
human rights violations and a detailed account of the responsibility of the Israeli 
government or the military authorities in causing or failing to curb such viola-
tions.” Kuttab contrasted “generalized, exaggerated, and heartfelt but inaccurate 
descriptions of the human rights situation” with Al-Haq’s “sober listing” based 
on “careful documentation through affidavits, medical and other records.”84 This 
resonates with Shehadeh’s reference to “understatement” and goes also to other 
issues of methodology: according to Kuttab, “we never put out a ‘condemnation’ 
(istinkar), everyone else was doing that, we didn’t want to start taking meaningless 
positions.”85 Shehadeh agrees that “the reason we survived was that we were very 
careful at every step, it was always careful legal language.” This caution extended to 
the formalities expected of the cofounders; Shehadeh recalls feeling increasingly 
resentful at being the “someone who had to keep the balance and to be ‘establish-
ment,’ always formally dressed and so on.”
The second factor to which Kuttab turned was tone and political content:
Proper work for human rights [  .  .  .  ] requires an objective and dispassionate ap-
peal to internationally recognized principles which apply to friend and foe alike 
[ . . . ]  Appeals and attempts to defend human rights by working through the ‘court 
of public opinion’ require that the issue not be stated in political terms, but rather 
stated in terms of universal principles coupled with a willingness to apply these same 
 principles to all parties in the dispute.86
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For Kuttab, the universality principle was a key presumption shared by himself, 
Shehadeh, and Shammas when they came together to form LSM.87 This meant that 
they expected to work, through LSM, on practices in Palestinian society as well. 
At the time, Kuttab says, “this wasn’t a common presumption.” However, al-Haq 
almost never commented on violations in other countries: it was not an interna-
tional human rights organization.88
Kuttab then looked at the “use of publicity” and, against the background of 
the uprising, confirmed that “the mere presence of foreign observers and access 
to international media has an ameliorating effect on human rights violations.”89 
 Moving on to “implicating other groups,” Kuttab drew on work initiated by 
Charles Shammas that was growing into the Enforcement Project, referring to 
third-party state obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and “the stake 
that every nation has in peace and in the value of adherence to human rights by 
every other nation.” Here can also be read Kuttab’s appeal to what Shammas has 
called “human rights as a high form of morality.”90 Finally Kuttab turned to the 
“Israeli court of public opinion”:
Some success can be achieved by appealing directly or indirectly to elements within 
the Israeli public itself or even the Israeli establishment. To do this, however, a hu-
man rights activist must obtain a full understanding of the structure and true goals 
and interests of Israeli society, and must avoid thinking of Israelis or even of the mili-
tary government as a monolith, or a totally evil structure, and must be able to address 
it on its own terms, while being aware of the dangers inherent in this approach.91
By the time Kuttab was writing this paper, addressing interventions to the Israeli 
military or other authorities was well established as a methodology—and as he 
said, it “is often a necessary prerequisite to further intervention.”92 The passage 
reiterates the approach of taking seriously what the Israeli system—especially the 
legal system—said about itself in order to then face this system with its claims and 
with the facts that contradict them. Hiltermann was later to observe that:
The genius of the method fashioned by al-Haq’s founders was that al-Haq took Israel 
at its word (of being a democracy, as well as a self-declared reluctant, tolerant and 
benign occupier) and, playing fully by the rules of a democratic society, held it to its 
commitments, pressing it further and further as it retreated into a growing tangle of 
self-generated contradictions.93
This issue of legitimation of Israel’s self-image and external projection, along 
with the impact of this on its conduct and reaction to challenge, has been widely 
theorized since, but it was clearly understood and consciously acted upon by the 
Palestinian practitioners who established al-Haq.94 An early example of LSM/ 
al-Haq’s approach came in the wake of a raid on LSM’s first office in a basement 
flat in Ramallah in November 1982. It was Kuttab who corresponded with Haim 
Cohn,95 among others, describing the disruption of a regular evening meeting by 
a group of Israeli soldiers, which involved physical violence against LSM’s first 
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field-worker, Ali Jaradat, questioning, and the summoning of civilian Israeli police 
investigators to conduct a further search. An Amnesty International representa-
tive was a guest at the meeting. “The police seemed anxious to explain that what 
had prompted this action was that several cars with yellow Jerusalem plates were 
parked outside. The army wanted to know what was going on.” After an initial 
response from Cohn, noting that he had written to the Judge Advocate General, 
a subsequent letter provoked Kuttab into pointing out a set of inconsistencies in 
the report that Cohn appeared to have received on the incident. These included 
apparent misreporting or selective reporting of Raja Shehadeh’s testimony, a fail-
ure to interview Ali Jaradat (misrepresented as Jaradat’s own failure to show) or 
to take up the offer of a statement from the Amnesty International representative. 
Kuttab concluded:
The whole matter is hardly worth pursuing since more serious events occur regu-
larly on the West Bank except for the fact that it illustrates the manner in which 
irregularities by the military government are insulated from the scrutiny of consci-
entious people like yourself who are genuinely concerned with the rule of law. In this 
case a worker from a recognized, and I trust credible, human rights organization is 
beaten in the presence of a representative of Amnesty International. And after going 
through the motions of a full and thorough investigation, I am surprised to receive 
your letter that implies you are now satisfied that there is no evidence that Mr. Jara-
dat was beaten or otherwise assaulted.96
Facing Justice Cohn with the possibility that he was not getting the full facts from 
the Israeli side, Kuttab presents this distortion and the practices it covered up as a 
matter of systemic practice, as well as reminding Cohn of the presence of a third 
party of potentially significant standing. In a sense, all these elements are key to 
the way LSM/al-Haq identified its priorities and pursued its objectives.
CHARLES SHAMMAS
In the 1982 raid on the office, some suspected that the soldiers had also been 
 unsettled by the sight of Charles Shammas’s “portable” computer. Shammas’s 
engagement with new technology is discussed further below. Of the three 
 founding Steering Committee members, he has worked most closely on the tech-
nical  implications of the contractual obligations of third-party states with Israel 
 (particularly EU states). Shammas insists that early on, “the most important thing 
in common was that we all wanted to effect change in situations we saw around 
us from our practice. [ . . . ] We were pragmatists, and law and human rights was a 
tool to use to reach out.”
The idea was there was no way [  .  .  .  ] of getting any international support to re-
strain what Israel was doing without engaging the third states, the international en-
vironments under normative language that they themselves understood. That was 
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the  attraction of it. None of us started out as human rights people. [ . . . ] The idea  
was we had to engage them in the language that they understood. And also the  
idea was to use law, but because law sets down what other actors have accepted. So 
we were starting from a starting point of the accepted discourse and norms that were 
not really being used as part of the struggle of people for their rights. The whole 
question was what was the nature of our struggle. What did the struggle consist of? 
I mean either we struggle alone—however we understand it and of course the scene 
was not very promising (that was the patronage and subsidies)—or we have to enlist 
others, we had to enlist other power. And the idea was not just they didn’t under-
stand what Israel was doing, which is the first step, but we had to figure out also how 
to make claims on them, on power, that ultimately led to the enforcement approach.
Al-Haq’s Enforcement Project took institutional form in 1988 and departed amid 
some organizational controversy in 1992 (see chapter 5). In the period leading up 
to the establishment of LSM, Shammas, the only nonlawyer of the three, recalls 
that between himself and Shehadeh, “it wasn’t talked about in terms of human 
rights but it was talked about in terms of the rest of the world is letting this  happen 
and we’re not fighting the larger battle.” If Shehadeh’s shock came from realiz-
ing what was going on with the legal system and the land, Shammas’s came from 
observing the “culture of dependency.” The letter to the ICJ quoted in the previous 
chapter that referred to a “society organized around [ . . . ] patronage and subsidy” 
set out Shammas’s thinking at the time. Born and brought up in Brooklyn to Leba-
nese American parents, Shammas had spent some years in Lebanon after complet-
ing his degree in philosophy of knowledge at Yale, and had developed an interest 
in the “structural causes of economically driven migration”:
My interest in the economy was because I saw it as a fundamental problem in terms 
of the subjugation of the society and dependency. For me the issue was a culture of 
dependency that could only be alleviated or rectified if there were some structural 
economic changes. Dependency on foreign patronage, dependency on subsidies, de-
pendency on cash flows. [ . . . ] We weren’t generating wealth internally. I was struck 
by the fact that the economy was undocumented. I could see the patronage, I could 
see the dependency, I could see the fact that initiative was basically being squelched 
and neutralised, that if you wanted to survive, the way you accommodated to reality, 
was that you affiliated yourself with somebody and promoted their interest against 
their competitor’s interest.
Here, Shammas reflects Bisharat’s understanding of the dynamics of “over- control” 
in the West Bank at that time. In Shammas’s case it was a question of
looking at it from a standpoint of the economic foundations, basically how people 
earn their bread and butter, what they have to depend on makes all the difference in 
the world. [ . . . ] The economic issue was because of the general structure of Pales-
tinian political life and how Palestinian efforts to cope with their Israeli adversary 
would be neutralised or made dysfunctional[ . . . ]—the economic side was that so 
much of the dysfunctionality was related to patronage, dependency, and the fact that 
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the first form of control is economic. I had never thought of economics before seeing 
that. [ . . . ] I’m not an economist, and I’m not a human rights person, by definition; 
for me those are all tools that are necessary to implement human rights but each one 
is a kind of an enterprise that is too limited [ . . . ]
It was struggle, it was the notion of struggle. I often use the word predatory, for 
me that was a very significant word, I saw it as a predatory process, and the question 
was how to overcome the dysfunctionality and the ineffectiveness and the inadequa-
cy of the response to that predatory process. In principle it shouldn’t be allowed to 
occur. Now, what to do about it?
In Lebanon, Shammas had developed some of his theories about patronage and 
the culture of dependency through observing the way the PLO was conducting 
itself. He inherited a clothing factory from the family business in Brooklyn and 
arrived in the West Bank in 1976 with the intention of setting up a “laboratory 
manufacturing venture” with an experimental structure. This was to be MAT-
TIN, an Arabic acronym translating as the Centre for Applied Production Devel-
opment.97 Among other things, MATTIN began producing silk lingerie for the 
export market, inter alia to test the declared commitment of the (then) European 
Community to Palestinian development and to direct export from the occupied 
territories, in line with the Europeans’ nonrecognition of Israeli control over the 
West Bank economy. Over the years, MATTIN was at the forefront of these efforts, 
sometimes working with other Palestinian producers, sometimes (as in the case 
of the lingerie) itself testing the practical viability of export routes and document-
ing Israeli obstruction of the same. Just before the outbreak of the first intifada, 
Shammas contributed the cover feature of an issue of al-Haq’s Newsletter under 
the title “Restrictions on the Export of Goods from the Occupied Territories to the 
US,” setting out the arguments in regard to Israeli settlement produce entering US 
markets labeled as “made in Israel” and the exclusion by law of West Bank/Gaza 
goods from that same market.98 He framed the human rights argument in terms 
of the right to development and the prohibition of discrimination. This and other 
attempts to mainstream Shammas’s particular interests at al-Haq did not at the 
time attract much of a following.
Alongside the substantive activities led by Shammas went a capacity-building 
approach to labor and management and workers’ rights that sought to “work 
towards a collective, public interest, rather than private interest allying one group 
against another engaged in the same activity.” Now considering himself “very 
naive at that time,” Shammas nevertheless points to several successes in the MAT-
TIN venture. As discussed in the next chapter, his colleagues in the first LSM 
Steering Committee had somewhat similar approaches, insisting on the individ-
ual investment of each worker in the substance of the work. In LSM/al-Haq, this 
became increasingly unwieldy as the organization grew. At MATTIN, the work—
and Shammas’s approach to economic development and hostility to the culture 
of dependency—drew some negative interest from leftist Palestinian groupings, 
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particularly those associated with the PFLP. The Israeli authorities took a hostile 
interest and eventually the factory was forced to close, with Shammas and a few 
colleagues continuing to pursue project-based ventures involving Palestinian pro-
ducers and the EU.99
Of the three members of the Steering Committee, Shammas was probably the 
least easy to place, and the MATTIN connection made some leftists at al-Haq 
uneasy. He also worried away at language all the time, working in both Arabic and 
English, whether written or spoken, to render in the most precise terms exactly 
what was intended—Shehadeh recalls Shammas revising and correcting letters to 
the ICJ word by word late into the night. Kuttab remembers that “Charles was 
always the thinker, and a large part of what Raja and I did was to try to understand 
him; when he talks, even in English, he’s hard to understand.” British researcher 
Candy Whittome summed up Shammas’s distinctive contribution to al-Haq’s col-
lective leadership as that of a strategist focused on “how to get from A to B in a way 
that works, but that wasn’t always massively straightforward.”
With no formal legal training, Shammas argued international obligations and 
normative understandings with leading international jurists of the day, including 
senior ICRC mandate officials, relishing opportunities to pin down what law was 
supposed to do, and how to get it to do it. In London in 1989, at the first of sev-
eral European symposia held through the efforts of al-Haq’s Enforcement Project, 
Shammas presented his thinking on the “what”:
I work hard with an organization that is dedicated to defending human rights and 
promoting the rule of law. In highlighting the importance of enforcing international 
law to the process of dispute settlement, I do not mean to speak as a diplomat or 
politician. However, the fact that this Symposium has brought together human rights 
workers, jurists, politicians and civil servants is in large measure due to the fact that 
the defence of human rights, the enforcement of international humanitarian law  
and the process of dispute settlement are inextricably intertwined.
The problem that we all must now confront is as follows: Twenty-two years of 
military rule in the West Bank and Gaza have occasioned extensive and systematic 
violations of basic human rights and a radical undermining of the rule of law with-
in the occupied territories. Inevitably, the prosecution of this occupation has also  
further eroded respect for human rights and the rule of law within Israel itself.
Palestinians and Israelis are, as a result, locked into an increasingly brutal conflict 
perpetuated by the fact that constraints and limits on coercive and conquestatorial 
options are necessary to inspire the will to seek accommodation. Such constraints 
and limits, starting with those clearly prescribed by international humanitarian law, 
have not been effectively applied or sufficiently felt.
In the final analysis, any durable settlement is reliant on, or presupposes, a de 
facto situation in which international law is respected, international agreements are 
enforced, and third party guarantors can be relied upon to perform their role vigor-
ously, objectively and effectively. The will to seek accommodation presupposes con-
fidence that, having forsworn conquest and coercion, reparations and  concessions 
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can establish peace. But this in turn presupposes confidence that international guar-
antees and the restoration of the rule of law can make peace durable. To satisfy this 
precondition, and to enhance the perceived feasibility of achieving a durable settle-
ment, third party states and other prospective guarantors of a settlement must start 
by demonstrating their will and practical commitment to enforcing the body of hu-
manitarian law that applies. They have not. [ . . . ]
The Fourth Geneva Convention is good law for Palestinians and Israelis alike. 
Innovative and serious efforts at enforcement can only have a positive impact on 
both parties to the dispute. Continued failure by the international community to en-
force the most basic standards of humanitarian law in the occupied territories, on the 
other hand, can only create doubt in our two national societies about the possibility 
of utilising international guarantees, international law, enforceable treaties and guar-
antees, to finally put an end to a conflict which has afflicted us all for far too long.
If I were to outline an agenda for dispute settlement [ . . . ] my first point would 
be that some process must contain the dynamic of brutalisation and dispossession 
which continues to generate sentiment antithetical to accommodation within two 
political societies, the Palestinian as well as the Israeli. [ . . . ] My second point would 
be that an occupant who possesses overwhelming military superiority and all of the 
instruments of coercion must be checked in the scope and quality of his utilisation 
of those instruments of coercion. The political society of the occupant must have its 
assessment of the feasibility of prosecuting an agenda of conquest reduced, in order 
to be willing to entertain other political visions and options. Third, it is essential to 
build trust, through observing the minimal standards set forth in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, in the will of the adversaries to be bound by law, regardless of the bal-
ance of power prevailing between them.100
Having learned IHL (and the intricacies of different areas of EU legislation) on 
the job, because he needed to understand it, Shammas has become a recognized 
authority and significant interlocutor in certain legal as well as technocratic and 
political circles.
In the early period, it was the MATTIN experiment that led to Shammas’s 
investment in information technology: “We used computers to develop a system 
to manage and regulate and document the whole production process.” This needs-
based engagement with information technology meant that LSM/al-Haq was 
remarkably up-to-date on technical developments insofar as the circumstances of 
the occupation would allow (LSM managed to get a telephone line only in 1984, 
and Shammas introduced email communications at the organization a few years 
thereafter). Shammas also pioneered the development of the database. The idea 
“was to bridge between a critique of the institutional aspect of governance, the 
established facts in practice and the thematic violation. Cases of individuals had 
to be related to institutional governance issues. To do that effectively you needed a 
database.” The following extract is from a draft document titled “Whence and Why 
the al-Haq Database?,” undated and unattributed but probably from 1984–85 and 
authored (at least mainly) by Shammas:
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In 1984, al-Haq, facing proliferating files and no adequate method of restoring and 
retrieving relevant information, began to explore ways in which it could organize its 
entire collection of materials into a manageable computerized database to facilitate 
storage and retrieval, and hence to improve its ability to make available al-Haq re-
sources for research and other needs.
The purpose of the al-Haq database is quite clearly to serve the research and 
intervention capabilities of al-Haq staff in the first instance, and then secondarily 
also to provide public information collected by al-Haq in a useful format to con-
cerned parties outside the organization. This particular purpose has dictated an 
 idiosyncratic methodology of database development, reflecting as it does al-Haq’s 
role as an activist human rights organization rather than as a public relations bu-
reau serving the human rights bureaucracy in the western world. We have opted, 
for example, not for a bibliographic system of indexing information or for the lat-
est in documentation technology, but for the type of structure and technology that  
(a) would respond adequately to al-Haq’s objectives, and (b) is readily and cheaply 
available in the West Bank.
Al-Haq is not in the business of documenting any and all human rights violations 
that occur in the West Bank and transmitting the information in bibliographical 
format to other parties, thus allowing outsiders free and easy access to such informa-
tion. There are other organizations who play that role, and who are better equipped 
than al-Haq to play such a role. Al-Haq rather aims primarily to document certain 
patterns of violations which are seen to exist and which may be of importance to al-
Haq’s work at any given time, in order to process the information thus obtained and 
act—usually locally—on the basis of our increased knowledge and understanding of 
the situation. We have therefore decided to focus on events as units of analysis, and 
to break these down into their constituent parts to discover or verify and test the 
 patterns which al-Haq is interested in addressing.101
The issue of software, and which system would suit which kind of organization, 
became the subject of some disagreement as the possibilities of information 
technology—and the prospects of harmonization of information systems—
advanced through the 1980s. Hiltermann later wrote an overview of the debates 
among human rights organizations on this, and the different priorities and needs 
that organizations in the Global South and international ones in the West had 
of their software.102 Nina Atallah, who took over this work under Shammas’s guid-
ance and went on to head up the Database Unit and later the Monitoring and 
Documentation Directorate at al-Haq, recalls intense discussions within al-Haq’s 
database committee at the time. Hiltermann reports that at a 1986 meeting with 
HURIDOCS and other conveners, an al-Haq representative criticized “the exclusive 
use of bibliographically-based programs”; a compromise was eventually worked out 
whereby al-Haq and other similarly minded organizations could be accommodated 
to link up to the central system without themselves having to fundamentally change 
the way they stored and retrieved data.103 In 1988, al-Haq joined the HURIDOCS 
“taskforce to produce standard formats for recording human rights events.”104
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LSM STEERING C OMMIT TEE
Lori Allen found Shehadeh, Kuttab, and Shammas to have “an assertive faith in 
facts and logic, which fuelled their earnest optimism that they could confront the 
occupation successfully through law.”105 The three men constituted LSM’s Steering 
Committee, its basic governance structure for many years. As noted above, Sham-
mas had strong views and innovative ideas about how an organization might be 
run, views that were shared in different ways by Shehadeh and Kuttab, and that 
arguably shaped the organization in ways not entirely anticipated by its founders. 
The three men were in many ways quite disparate, with different personalities, 
interests, and focuses; Shammas recalls that in the early years, “we had a ‘live and 
let live’ approach, each had a specialised area and the others gave him their confi-
dence.” “We supported each other with shared values,” says Kuttab. Candy Whit-
tome recalls three men with “massively different personalities, massively different 
talents,” who came together in an extraordinarily strong collective leadership. At 
the same time, Rabbani observes that “until the end of 1991 al-Haq was governed 
by only four (later three) individuals who came from nearly identical class, geo-
graphic, educational, confessional, and professional backgrounds.”106 Here Rab-
bani was including, as the fourth of the governing group, lawyer Mona Rishmawi, 
who joined the Executive Committee that replaced the three-man Steering Com-
mittee in 1985. She had finished her law degree in Cairo in 1981 and volunteered 
with LSM during her trainee period at the Shehadeh law firm, including writing 
most of the organization’s Arabic publications for that period. She left in 1990 after 
two intense intifada years as al-Haq’s first executive director.
Shehadeh, Kuttab, and Shammas set up and worked with LSM/al-Haq as vol-
unteers, as did Rishmawi until she was employed as director. They all had other, 
full-time professional occupations, Shehadeh in his law practice with his family 
firm in Ramallah, Kuttab busy requalifying and then building his own legal prac-
tice, and Shammas heading up MATTIN. They were part of the professional elite, 
decidedly nonaffiliated politically, all from Christian families and all educated at 
least partially abroad. They were at something of a distance from the majority of 
Palestinian society by a “class and culture gap” that some of those interviewed for 
this study found significant. They themselves were aware of this, and of the poten-
tial limits it set to their goals for the work of LSM. How the three (and then the 
four) managed to get LSM/al-Haq up and working, what the young organization 





LSM began the 1980s as the only organization in the occupied territories focused 
on legal and human rights issues in the West Bank. It recruited its first paid staff 
members in 1981 and was managed by a volunteer Steering Committee. By the 
end of 1987, when the first intifada began, it had developed into one of the biggest 
private employers in Ramallah. It had a substantial international profile, secure 
funding from western European and US nongovernmental foundations and agen-
cies, new offices, a legal advice program, and a long and varied list of publications 
in English and in Arabic; and it was no longer the only Palestinian human rights 
organization in the area.1
The ambitions and aspirations of LSM’s Steering Committee members were 
matched by their energy levels, but events outside the organization’s control natu-
rally affected the speed and direction of its development. In 1982 Israel invaded 
Lebanon and besieged Beirut. The armed PLO factions and the PLO leadership 
were evacuated to Tunis. The occupied territories, as well as other areas in the 
Arab world, saw widespread protests against the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila 
refugee camps and the other events of that summer. In 1985, Israeli planes bombed 
the PLO headquarters in Tunis, with substantial casualties, and Israeli comman-
dos entered Tunis from the sea and assassinated Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), Ara-
fat’s second in command and a man closely engaged with pro-Fatah activists in the 
occupied territories.2
In the West Bank, with anger continuing at Camp David, the nationalist move-
ment was regrouping after losing many of its original leaders to Israel’s deportation 
policy in the 1970s. In the summer of 1985, then defense minister Yitzhak Rabin 
introduced the “new policy of intensified administrative punishments dubbed the 
‘Iron Fist,’ ” which is the background for Hiltermann’s 1986 study on deportation 
for LSM/al-Haq.3 Hiltermann contextualizes the reintroduction of deportation and 
intensification of administrative penalties (imposed without judicial process) such 
as administrative detention: “The Israeli military authorities presumably wish to 
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keep their hold on the Occupied Territories as tight as possible, so that in the event 
of negotiations over the territories’ future disposition, no strong dissenting voice 
will emerge to thwart Israeli interests.”4 Hiltermann notes considerable pressure 
on the Israeli government at the time, with sustained protests by the settler move-
ment following the May 1985 prisoner exchange which saw over a thousand Pales-
tinian political prisoners released from Israeli prisons in exchange for the return 
of three Israeli soldiers held by the PFLP-GC in Lebanon. The final context was 
“that the brunt of resistance activity occurring during spring and summer of 1985 
did not seem to have been ordered and directed by the Palestinian leadership out-
side, but consisted of attacks carried out by individuals operating autonomously” 
from inside the occupied territories.5 The nationalist leadership (and Palestinian 
society more generally) in the West Bank and Gaza opposed Jordanian-Israeli 
talks, sanctioned by the PLO, to facilitate future negotiations between Israel and a 
joint Jordanian-PLO delegation.
This was the context in which LSM built its organizational structure and public 
profile in the 1980s, in accordance with its declared objective of promoting the 
principle of the rule of law in the occupied territories. The founders’ focus on 
causes and the structural nature of Israel’s policy-based violations, and their sensi-
tivity to issues of documentation and credibility, led them to recruit not only legal 
researchers but field researchers with access to and the confidence of individuals 
and communities subject to the violations. LSM also expected to engage internal 
Palestinian processes, conduct, and expectations in its promotion of the rule of 
law. A consciously reflective practice is documented in public and internal docu-
ments, and the innovative structure of the organization reflected the founders’ 
desire to develop “activists in the field of human rights rather than employees in a 
human rights organisation.”6 How this was attempted is the subject of this chapter.
WHO ARE WE? IN 1983
The first promotional document in al-Haq’s archives is an introductory leaflet 
published in 1983, which presents the organization and its activities to the public 
locally and abroad, opening as follows:
Law in the Service of Man (LSM) is the West Bank affiliate of the International 
Commission of Jurists, which is based in Geneva, Switzerland. LSM was founded 
in 1980 by a group of West Bank lawyers and other individuals concerned with the 
legal protection of individual and collective human rights, and with developing  
and  promoting the rule of law in the area.7 Its other objectives include providing 
services to the legal profession and extending legal aid and information to the non-
legal community.
Here, the presentation of LSM has developed from the description given in WBRL, 
keeping a focus on the rule of law but including human rights, both individual 
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and collective. The reference to collective human rights invokes the principle of 
self-determination, which was not explicit at this point in LSM’s focus, probably to 
avoid drawing the attention of the Israeli authorities as being political or express-
ing nationalistic aspirations. It also reflects a growing awareness of international 
developments (specifically at ICJ meetings) on social and economic rights and the 
right to development. The reference to legal aid was to be realized with the open-
ing of the Legal Advice Bureau in February 1985.8
The document then proceeds to describe the “projects” through which “LSM 
pursues its organisational objectives.” These confirm Rabbani’s 1994 observation 
that in its early years the organization
from the outset has been at least as involved with understanding its environment as it 
has been in attempting to change it [ . . . ] Legal research, as opposed to human rights 
monitoring and intervention as narrowly understood, assumed pride of place during 
al-Haq’s formative period, and to this day the organization defines itself as both a 
legal research and human rights organization.9
The “projects” are divided between information, research and documentation, and 
the library.
The first item under the information subtitle is the preparation of “documented 
studies and reports in both English and Arabic assessing systematic practice 
and legislation enacted by the military authorities which appear to violate those 
internationally recognized principles.” The broad reference to principles here is 
to normative concepts of human rights and the rule of law, and LSM’s structural 
approach is emphasized in the focus on systematic practice by the occupation 
authorities. The second is:
Preparing concise handbooks in Arabic advising local residents of such rights, pro-
tections and avenues of recourse that could be invoked in various situations where 
their interests are affected. These generally take the form of “what to do if . . . ” or 
Know Your Rights monographs. LSM’s members share the conviction that, even un-
der conditions of belligerent occupation, an informed public is able to win certain 
important protections and benefits through assiduous recourse to the Law.
The Know Your Rights series was at this point authored by Mona Rishmawi and had 
already produced two important publications: The Land: Legal Means of Defend-
ing It (1982) and The Citizen: Search, Arrest, Military Trial (1983).10 The order of 
these two publications can be seen as reflecting LSM’s causes-before-consequences 
focus. Thus, the first was on how Palestinians might seek to protect their rights and 
access to their land against predatory action by the Israeli occupation authorities 
and its agents, action recognized by LSM as fundamentally about the prosecution 
of an annexationist agenda to the benefit of Israel’s settlement policy. The second 
dealt with some of the measures taken by the military authorities against Palestin-
ians resisting this predatory practice and other manifestations of the occupation’s 
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annexationist ambitions. In the last sentence of this paragraph, the capitalization 
of Law is in the original English version; the articulation of expectations invested 
in “Law” and the protective possibilities hoped for from it reflect LSM’s thinking at 
the start of its journey. The reference to “LSM’s members” invokes the innovative 
participatory governance arrangements that distinguished LSM in its early years, 
discussed below.
This section also refers to the Newsletter, which appeared for the first time in 
May 1984 in both English and Arabic and which is a mine of information on the 
activities, reflections, and aspirations of LSM/al-Haq over the four years from 1984 
through 1987.11 It was here that LSM informed its readers of its decision to phase 
out the name Law in the Service of Man. As lawyer Mona Rishmawi insists, “We 
weren’t al-Haq then. The clue is in the name: it wasn’t ‘right’ (haqq), it was ‘law’; 
it was a law-based organization.” However, from the beginning LSM deployed 
 “al-Haq” as a logo on its letterhead and publications. By 1985, the Arabic Newslet-
ter was routinely referring to “al-Haq” while the English version still used LSM; 
field-workers used both names.12 At the start of 1986, the English version of the 
Newsletter explained:
LSM has since its foundation come under criticism, some joking, some serious, be-
cause of the sexism inherent in the English version of its name.
As a Palestinian organization, LSM decided on a name in Arabic, which was only 
later translated into English. The Arabic word ‘insaan’ means ‘human being’, and this 
was translated as ‘man’ with the intention of conveying the generic sense of the word. 
Members of LSM have repeatedly been called on to explain this, and they have found 
their explanations increasingly unconvincing. Although we enjoy receiving letters 
which have “Man” in quotation marks, we have now decided to phase out the name 
‘Law in the Service of Man’ in favour of ‘al-Haq’, the name by which LSM has long 
been known locally.13
There is a self-deprecation here in setting out the discomfort generated by a deeper 
reflection on the implications of the English name. The company registration 
remained in the name of LSM.
In the second section, on research and documentation, the 1983 leaflet includes 
reference to its developing methodology: “collecting affidavits from witnesses to 
and victims of human rights violations; monitoring, confirming and recording 
alleged violations brought to LSM’s attention.” The choice of affidavit as the pri-
mary documentation tool is discussed further in chapter 6; the insertion of alleged 
is a reminder of al-Haq’s legalistic approach. Then the leaflet refers to “systematic 
field investigation and documentation projects on selected practices, employing 
standardized information gathering and certification procedures,” where the refer-
ence to selected practices underlines the fact that LSM did not intend to investi-
gate all violations.
In the third section, on the library, the leaflet states that “LSM’s library is the 
first public law library in the West Bank.” This was a matter of considerable pride 
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for the organization, and substantial investment was made over the years in devel-
oping the library’s resources. Following Shehadeh and Kuttab’s points about the 
unavailability of Israeli military orders, made to such impact in WBRL, these 
orders were available to lawyers and the public in the LSM library, along with other 
applicable laws and “reference sources on international law and human rights.” 
The leaflet explained why:
The library’s resources are made available in the belief that people’s knowledge of 
their basic human rights and imposed legal restrictions bestows an important mea-
sure of protection and constitutes a fundamental requirement for any progress to-
wards achieving the rule of law in the long term.
This last sentence underlines an important element in LSM/al-Haq’s public voice 
and commitments: that is, towards Palestinian society and, in the future, a Pales-
tinian state, which LSM/al-Haq aspired to see characterized by law-based gover-
nance and a fully functioning judicial system. At this point, in 1983, LSM did not 
feel able to articulate this explicitly.
In 1983, the offices comprised a small first floor flat set back off Ramallah Main 
Street and recalled by Hiltermann:
The receptionist (who doubled as administrative assistant) sat in an entrance space 
immediately off a small glassed-in veranda. The dining room served as meeting 
room-cum-library. Two small bedrooms offered working space for researchers. And 
the tiny bathroom accommodated copies of the organization’s few but accumulating 
publications, stacked neatly on thin metal shelves.14
Communications were rudimentary, with no phone line till 1984;15 the Newslet-
ter and other reports were typed up in the office and photocopied, publications 
(such as occasional papers) were sent out to be printed, center-stapled, and card-
covered. Distribution was by mail, and many of the Newsletters and other pub-
lications never made it to their intended recipients.16 LSM called on the physical 
help of traveling staffers and allies to get them out. Censorship of materials in the 
local press by the Israeli military authorities is noted in the Newsletters and docu-
mented in correspondence to and from the office of the chief censor.17
Two subjects not mentioned in the 1983 brochure, LSM’s funding sources and 
LSM’s methodology of making “interventions” to the Israeli authorities, were 
covered in the first Newsletter in 1984. The English text explained that LSM was 
“funded by non-governmental organizations supporting human rights and devel-
opmental work—funders include OXFAM, ICCO, Humanitas International, 
the Ford Foundation, and various church organisations—together with the sub-
scriptions of LSM associates.”18 The Arabic version omitted mention of the Ford 
Foundation and church organizations. The first Newsletter included a section on 
“Interventions and Responses,” listing letters that LSM had sent to various Israeli 
officials (the minister of Defense, the attorney general, the legal adviser to the mili-
tary government, the commissioner of prisons, and others) on subjects of pressing 
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concern—including prison conditions, the right of appeal against decisions of the 
military courts in the West Bank, attacks on Palestinian schools with accompany-
ing threats sprayed on walls that went inadequately investigated by the police, and 
the arrest of school students during the period of their final (tawjihi) examinations.
Whether to accept funding from the Ford Foundation had been debated at 
LSM’s weekly meeting. Ford was subsequently to become one of al-Haq’s most 
supportive funders, and two of al-Haq’s senior staffers later became human rights 
program officers at Ford’s Cairo office.19 The second issue discussed was whether 
directly addressing the military government conferred some form of legitimacy 
upon it. Interventions to the military government and other Israeli officials were 
to become standard LSM procedure, as indicated by their inclusion in the News-
letter. But neither issue was obvious at the start. Resolution of these and other 
issues occurred within the context of the wider organization, in accordance with 
the structure set up with the conscious aim of involving every worker in every 
decision significantly affecting the organization.
This organizational vision prevailed in the 1980s. It is described in a 1988 
draft document setting out proposed structural change. By 1988 an Executive 
Committee had replaced the initial Steering Committee and was comprised of 
Kuttab,  Rishmawi, Shammas, and Shehadeh. The document, “Draft Study of al-
Haq’s Structure: Past, Present and Future,” summarizes the organization’s growth 
through to the late eighties. The thrust is the need for a full-time executive direc-
tor, and it is perhaps remarkable that it took nearly ten years for al-Haq’s leader-
ship to come to this point. The following extract describes the early structure:
When Law in the Service of Man was first formed, it was conceived as a group of 
lawyers and non lawyers dedicated to the protection of human rights who through 
coming together in a group can do more than what each individually can. Even after 
the establishment of the group, they continued to carry out human rights activities 
on their own, but much of what they did was done in the name of the organization. 
Slowly the organization was getting credibility and standing.
Initially the preference was that all administrative aspects of the work will be kept 
at a minimum and that there would be complete sharing in everything. In this spirit, 
little money was sought from outside, members gave some of their own money to the 
group, the premises rented were humble, publications were produced in-house with 
the members and their friends doing all the work of printing, collating, stapling . . . . 
To unify everyone’s thinking and keep up with the changes and developments which 
others were going through concerning the subject, there was a meeting once a week 
when information was exchanged and discussed and forms of action were decided 
upon and tasks assigned. At that time the administrative staff consisted of one, a 
secretary, who joined the weekly meeting.
In order to learn more and to check what we picked up, a field worker was 
 employed who covered the entire West Bank. The field worker was the first staff 
member [ . . . ] chosen because of his suitability for the job at hand. But still he was 
expected to develop his skills generally in order to assume a more integral work in 
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the  organization. The attempt was, even since that time, to have everyone be able 
to share and assume all the responsibilities and risks which members of a human 
rights organization necessarily need to assume. It was hoped that through the gen-
eral meeting, through working with others, through the opportunities provided for 
further education and reading, this will happen.
The expectation was that the group would, through its existence, its mode of op-
eration and structure, develop a group of human rights activists who are dedicated 
and qualified and who would increase the initial core group of three.
As the organization grew, it needed more resources. [ . . . ]
The directors originally did not see themselves as directing a large institution but 
helping through discussion and exchange of experiences and opinions to give direc-
tion, leadership, to a group of self-directing, motivated, dedicated people. This was 
not an ideal hope. The work spent in discussing and working closely with everyone 
was expected to give this return and relieve the directors from having to assume 
the normal responsibilities which directors in a proper hierarchical structure would 
necessarily have to assume.20 
This extract evokes how, over a sustained period, LSM’s leadership sought to widen 
commitment to and participation in rule of law and human rights objectives. The 
following section considers the political context in which they tried to do this.
THE POLITICS OF LSM
In the early 1980s the term human rights activist was not a familiar one in the West 
Bank. Activist generally meant politically active. The core group had in mind the 
development of a different form of activism, explicitly outside the existing politi-
cal factions and discourses. Interviewed for al-Haq’s Twenty Years publication, 
Raja Shehadeh explained, “We were trying to create a politically independent and 
committed organization; al-Haq was the first of its kind, most other NGOs in the 
Occupied Territories were politically committed.” Jonathan Kuttab invokes as a 
“new value” the aim of the core group of “avoiding factionalism: we fought to stay 
independent; it wasn’t easy.”
LSM was not created by supporters of a particular political group recruiting 
members of the same tendency and promoting the profile of the faction through 
the work done and services provided. Rather, the LSM founders insisted that 
 staffers were to apply a rigorous impartiality. “Leave your politics at the door” 
was the mantra explicitly voiced by the core group as they recruited during this 
 formative period and the only way they dealt directly with the issue of factional 
politics. As much as anything, this was a matter of methodology. Shawan Jabarin, 
general director of al-Haq since 2006 and originally recruited as a field-worker in 
1987, recalls:
The founders put it across very clearly—it’s no business of mine what your political 
thought is. My business is your conduct as related to the work of the organization. 
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You have your convictions, but they may not affect your work with us. Your own 
political opinions, you leave them at the door, outside. When you come in here, you 
discuss on a different basis.
The critical and distinctive contribution field-workers made to the capacity and 
credibility of the organization is widely attested. As well as enabling the organiza-
tion to monitor and investigate patterns of human rights violations, they were the 
face of the organization outside the Ramallah office. It is clear that the Steering 
Committee was well aware of its own limits in reaching different sectors of  society, 
and consciously sought to recruit field researchers with their own networks, 
credibility, and reach within the community. Several of the first field- workers 
were social science graduates from Birzeit often associated with leftist factions, 
in  several cases having spent time in prison on charges of membership in such 
groups. Shehadeh recalls:
Most able young people, as we saw it, were committed (or at least could be counted 
as supporters [of particular factions]) and we couldn’t say we only recruit people  
who don’t “do politics.” But the agreement was, you do your political activity as you 
like outside, but you don’t bring it into the weekly meetings, into discussions or into 
the organization.
“Whether this could be done,” mused Shehadeh, “was something else.” He went 
on to say that there was a conscious effort to recruit people from different regions 
and classes: “I was still worried the organization was too elitist, still run by middle-
class people and not getting entrenched.” 
The field researchers were recruited to work in their home areas where they had 
their own name and credibility. Ghazi Shashtari, recruited as a field researcher in 
Nablus in 1983, explains:
I saw the work and saw something I was convinced of. But the idea wasn’t very well 
known then; people in order to be convinced needed someone who knew them. If 
Lynn comes [to ask questions], they don’t know Lynn, they know Ghazi. Socially I 
was good in the town and people knew me. It was important to us to expose the oc-
cupation, but we were extremely objective in our work. I didn’t influence what people 
said. I was a certain color politically, but our point was not to go to people of the 
same color but to anyone who was a victim.
Shashtari’s words remind us that the idea of human rights and the role of human 
rights monitoring and documentation were not familiar.21 The role of the field 
researchers in explaining this idea was as important as their ability to gain access 
to victims and survivors of violations. Secondly, his reference to exposing the 
occupation goes to the employment of human rights methodology as a form of 
resistance, and to the critical criterion of objectivity in this work. Third is the prin-
cipled irrelevance of personal politics to human rights methodology. Years later, 
Fateh Azzam, then program coordinator of al-Haq, was to address the issue in a 
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piece for al-Haq’s “Human Rights Corner” in the local Arabic press, two years after 
the Madrid Conference and just before the 1993 Declaration of Principles:
The decision of the human rights defender must be an independent decision, not po-
litical, relying in its essence on the principles and laws that set out and defend human 
rights, regardless of the political positions of the person responsible for the violation 
and of the victim of the violation, in equal measure. Equality is the most important of 
human rights, and the non-governmental organisation must defend rights in equal-
ity, that is regardless of political, intellectual or sectarian tendencies of the concerned 
parties. The tools of the struggle for human rights [ . . . ] are based on equality and 
objectivity [ . . . ] The credibility of non-governmental organisations depends entirely 
on integrity in their work and unwavering commitment to these principles.22
In the 1980s, part of the struggle was to distinguish LSM—and the budding human 
rights project—from other civil society organizations in the occupied territories, 
affiliated with particular factions of the Palestinian (and specifically nationalist) 
body politic. The desire to be nonpolitical and to be seen as such, in the sense of 
being nonfactional, applied to the image of the organization with both Palestinian 
and non-Palestinian audiences. Zahi Jaradat, who also started as a field-worker in 
1983 and later became field research coordinator, notes:
I had my own political convictions, but I used to feel that al-Haq for me was com-
pleting these, not abrogating them. The organization respected me and my opinions, 
but al-Haq’s policy of being far from politics was also political. It chose not to have 
politics, and this was a strange idea at the time. People would say al-Haq is leftist, I’d 
say no, there’s so-and so, others would say it’s Fatah because of so-and-so, and I’d say 
no [and so on].
The point about choosing not to be political being a political choice is well made, 
and goes to the broader issue of nationalist politics. Khaled Batrawi, fieldwork unit 
coordinator during the first intifada, observes that
it was known that some people had contacts with the national movement, certain po-
litical commitments and contacts with factions, but this had no impact on the work. 
[ . . . ] The board was very clever, they brought in those with political commitment, 
strong clean people [ . . . ] There were people from different factions, not just one. But 
people still talked, and people’s talk doesn’t take you forwards or backwards. What’s 
important is what al-Haq did. The idea of promoting human rights and rule of law 
was not known in society then, how to introduce it, this was not easy.
Even before the first intifada, several field-workers were subjected to arrest, admin-
istrative detention, and travel bans. In October 1985 the Newsletter informed its 
readers that “LSM has undergone major growth and development and also suf-
fered disturbing setbacks.” The growth included four new staff members at the 
office and the recruitment of new field researchers. The setbacks included “a severe 
blow” when two field-workers, Ghazi Shashtari and Zahi Jaradat, were placed 
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under six months’ administrative detention (imprisonment without charge or 
trial) within a day of each other. LSM reported that “even before the fieldworkers’ 
arrests, the Israeli authorities appeared to be taking a close interest in LSM’s work, 
and had questioned several of those working for LSM about their work and about 
the  organization.” The Newsletter dealt in detail with administrative  detention, 
part of Israel’s Iron Fist policy announced in August 1985 and the subject of 
LSM’s first occasional paper.23 Then the organization turned to the issue of its 
field researchers:
Both Ghazi and Zahi have been doing fieldwork for LSM since 1983. Their work is of 
two kinds. They apprise LSM of possible violations of human rights which they learn 
about and make enquiries about other violations which have come to LSM’s atten-
tion. If it appears to LSM that, prima facie, a violation has occurred, the fieldwork-
ers are asked to document this in ways satisfactory to the organization. Their work 
inevitably brings them into frequent contact with those who are quite possibly under 
the close surveillance of the Israeli security services, but these contacts are required 
by their work for LSM and being made for that purpose are purely legal.
It is true that no organization can take full responsibility for all the activities of 
its members. However LSM believes that had the two fieldworkers been personally 
involved in illegal activities without LSM’s knowledge, charges would have been 
pressed against them and evidence would have been presented in open court to ob-
tain a conviction [ . . . ] That this has not been done strengthens LSM’s belief that the 
two are being victimised for their human rights work. Further evidence that there is 
no real suspicion that they have committed any offence is afforded by the fact that 
both Ghazi and Zahi confirm that they have not been questioned or interrogated 
about an alleged offence. Both however report that they had been questioned more 
than once during the course of their work about their human rights activities.24
This careful explanation shows the organization’s concern in relation to both the 
defense of its workers and its own ability to function. A letter to Niall MacDermot 
two years later serves to illustrate the response that even al-Haq’s closest allies 
might make to official Israeli explanations for the treatment of al-Haq workers. A 
senior al-Haq worker had been denied a document needed for travel to Geneva 
on al-Haq work. The ICJ intervened at the request of al-Haq and received a reply 
from the Israeli mission in Geneva, stating that this staffer’s travel to the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation conference would “hamper public order” and that “the 
person is known as an activist of the terrorist organisation the Democratic Front 
and was arrested and detained several times during the period 1976–1983.”25 The 
ICJ subsequently wrote to al-Haq with a set of questions essentially concerning the 
al-Haq member’s political affiliation and activism. Raja Shehadeh’s response set 
out the facts on the record (including earlier convictions in Israeli military courts 
for membership, no arrest since 1981). He then continued, “It is never our practice, 
either at the time when we recruit people, nor during the course of their work 
with the organization, to ask them about their political views. I cannot therefore 
respond to the other questions in your letter under reference.”26
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This response seeks to educate the ICJ on what al-Haq considered was and 
was not its business. For al-Haq, the argument rested on the evidence of why par-
ticular staffers were harassed or detained in specific instances—that is, for their 
human rights work. A further concern for the organization was the need to rebut 
 allegations about particular staff members being primarily political activists and 
the organization being some kind of “PLO front.” This was a matter of protection: 
of individuals, of the organization’s ability to function under the occupation, of 
the credibility of the organization with its international audience, and of the 
human rights message they wanted to put out to the Palestinian community: 
that human rights work was, in this sense, “nonpolitical.” This challenge remains 
today, albeit in an altered political context and with the basic approach now widely 
accepted. US professor Iain Guest, who conducted a study on human rights work 
in Palestine in 2006–7, observed as follows:
It is an article of faith that credible and effective human rights monitoring requires 
political neutrality and a strict separation from any political agenda. This was strong-
ly affirmed by all those interviewed for this report. It is particularly important, said 
many, because the Palestinian factions—which evolved into political parties during 
the Oslo years—are widely seen as ideological, resistant to change and corrupt.
In spite of this, it is not easy for human rights organizations to remain politi-
cally detached. Many emerged from left-wing political factions after the first intifada 
(1987–1991) and their members retain strong political ties to these factions. Palestine 
is a highly political society and individuals who go into human rights are committed 
and political.27
These challenges surfaced explicitly later in al-Haq’s history. Mona Rishmawi 
reflects as follows on the presentation of human rights work as nonpolitical in 
the 1980s:
You have to take it in context. The PLO was an illegal organization. Every Palestin-
ian, even if not factional, had feelings one way or the other towards the PLO, and we 
couldn’t have al-Haq being dismissed as an arm of the PLO, which a lot of organiza-
tions were—and they did try.
Besides the factional politics, there was the broader issue of being considered 
“nationalists.” Rishmawi insists, “We were starting a new way of being nationalist. 
Nationalism was seen then as being part of the factions, the PLO; ours was a differ-
ent way of doing it, and for many people it wasn’t easy to think about.”
It is clear that the initial core group of three had no confusion about the direc-
tion of their efforts. Shammas insisted on “the notion of struggle.” Kuttab recalls 
an Israel Radio journalist asking whether al-Haq was a nationalist organization. 
After a moment’s pause to weigh the possible consequences, “I said, ‘I don’t know 
what you mean. No, we have no connection with the PLO. But are we Palestinians? 
Yes. Are we part of society, do we care about society? Yes. That’s a clear framework 
to be nationalist.’ ”28 As for Shehadeh, he later reported that “Israeli security could 
not believe that there was a Palestinian activist who was not engaged in politics 
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and, consequently, involved with the PLO” and decided that Shehadeh secretly 
belonged to the PLFP, while “the PLO thought that the Palestinian struggle against 
Israel was political and that human rights work was a distraction inspired by the 
CIA.”29 In a longer reflection on this phase of LSM’s work, Shehadeh observes:
The nonviolent activities of Al Haq did not impress the Organization [the PLO]. In 
their view, when Palestine was liberated, all illegal actions carried out by the occu-
pying forces and their military government would be annulled as though they had 
never been. Why then bother to document and resist such interim measures? There 
was also the popularly held position that the struggle, in essence, was political and 
that concentrating on human rights could be distracting.30
In interview, Shehadeh acknowledged, “We were deaf by principle; we decided 
we’d just block our ears. If we responded to everything, we’d never get anything 
done.” These particular issues seemed so straightforward to the founders that an 
impression comes across of impatience or even intolerance of mainstream politi-
cal discourse and engagement. Someone who knew them at the time describes 
them as having “a strong sense of mission and not a lot of self-doubt.” Shehadeh 
was later to say of himself, “I acted and operated as though there was no reality to 
this political context. I was incomprehensible to most people, and quite possibly 
 insufferable.”31 In sum, three ideas involved in the issue of “nationalism” emerge: 
first, that those involved in the founding and running of the organization con-
sidered themselves engaged in the national struggle; secondly, how they were 
regarded by the Israeli authorities (and for personal security and the sustainability 
of the organization, the point was not to cross a line into recognizably political 
activity); and thirdly, how they were regarded by Palestinian society.
A number of Palestinian staffers from this period recall comments from their 
own circles about LSM/al-Haq’s alleged CIA connections or otherwise dubious 
intent towards the national struggle. These staffers did not come with training 
in human rights or rule-of-law principles; one of al-Haq’s activities during this 
period was to work on the development of the first local curricula for human rights 
courses.32 But they did nearly all come, office-based staff and field-workers alike, 
with a general or particular nationalism that necessitated a conscious  working 
through of the “nonpolitical” framework that applied at LSM and was part of the 
core group’s vision of developing “human rights activists.” Sami 'Ayad, who joined 
LSM as the organization’s second field-worker in 1982, addresses this as follows:
I didn’t feel that the legal and human rights referential framework of the  organization 
conflicted with the national discourse. It was new and strange in methods, and  
for me it was new, strange, and attractive. This objectivity depended on accuracy  
and accountability and responsibility of the person speaking [ . . . ] It was a method-
ology of struggle, especially in its first focuses—settlements, the Road Plan, collec-
tive rights . . .
Shawan Jabarin remembers wondering “who were these people behind it, maybe 
they’re liberals,” and continues:
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Human rights as individual rights, this was a Western liberal school, tied up with 
capitalism, the right to private property, etc. I used to think, where are the  collective 
rights? The right to self-determination is there, economic and social rights are 
there . . . So I began to read, I wanted to reconcile myself, as I can’t live a contradic-
tion—had I stopped being Marxist, progressive, and opted for a capitalist idea with 
its focus on the individual and on private property?33
Jabarin’s concerns apparently receded when he read LSM’s Arabic translation of 
the ICJ’s 1966 text The Rule of Law and learned of the “different schools, different 
meanings, all the different rights” intended in this discourse.34 “When I looked at 
it,” he says, “it wasn’t in conflict with my commitment to the bigger national cause 
of self-determination.”
Field researcher Iyad Haddad recalls:
I remember in 1986, people had basically no idea of something called human rights. 
Secondly, the Palestinian intelligentsia treated these concepts as if they were a 
 Western weapon aimed at undermining the Palestinian struggle. I didn’t just feel 
or hear this; a leader in the Palestinian Communist Party at that time told me that 
the party didn’t support these organizations; they were American organizations and 
possibly the CIA was behind them, but as he said, everybody had to earn a living 
[ . . . ] I thought that if I found a contradiction, I could effect change [ . . . ]. But when 
I joined the organization and saw that I had a role, I stayed on, especially when I 
realized that a good number of other employees working in the organization [ . . . ] 
were coming from the same position. The things that came up weren’t in contradic-
tion with the national struggle. Subsequently I understood more clearly that my own 
political affiliation was in support of peaceful struggle, and human rights is a form 
of peaceful struggle.
Field researcher Ghazi Shashtari agreed that the field researchers had a lot of 
awareness raising to do in their communities about the organization. “It became 
tangible for people when you got results,” for example successfully challenging the 
military authorities’ refusal to issue a driver’s license to an individual; “so it became 
known,” he says, “and even before the first intifada people were seeking us out 
as al-Haq to tell us what had happened.” Nina Atallah remembers hearing that 
“society thought that LSM was CIA”; so she asked around and was told, “There’s 
nothing serious, that’s street talk.” When she settled into the work, she remembers, 
“I felt no conflict with my political positions; this was purely about the occupa-
tion and its practices and it was only different in terms of method, not substance; 
there was the struggle in the street and there was the struggle with the law.” Roger 
Heacock, a professor at Birzeit University who worked on a number of projects 
with LSM in the early 1980s, was “skeptical of human rights as ideology-free” but 
recalls that Shehadeh and Kuttab convinced him that “this was a worthy activity and 
had political purpose.” Abdel Karim Kan’an, who joined LSM as a field-worker in 
1985, remembers:
There were some political sides who considered we were working to tame the Pales-
tinian people, move them away from the armed struggle to a legal, liberal struggle 
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[ . . . ] Who is this Raja Shehadeh for example? This is all CIA stuff to make the Pal-
estinians nonviolent. I heard that more than once, but mostly people were happy to 
sign [the affidavits]. I didn’t have the same reservations. It was part of the struggle 
to show the world what was going on, very important; it was one form of struggle.
The concern that human rights work was a liberal project to “tame” or “defang” the 
Palestinians as a national movement recalls the questions put by Bisharat and oth-
ers as to whether the choices made by LSM to act in the courts of the occupier 
worked in fact to sustain the occupation by drawing energy away from the “politi-
cal” struggle and channeling anger into “relatively harmless forms.”35 For Hilter-
mann, al-Haq was a “methodology of struggle: in the end, we were fighting to 
end the occupation.” He nevertheless acknowledges a “major tension and a valid 
debate” in the question as to whether doing human rights work was simply mak-
ing the occupation look better.36 While not agreeing, he concedes that, given the 
limited real progress that has been made in the years since, “it is not a debate that 
has been resolved.”
Mouin Rabbani, a Palestinian brought up in the Netherlands, came to al-Haq 
by default in 1988 (the universities he had applied to being all closed after the start 
of the intifada), and remembers:
I had no interest in al-Haq. I knew it was an organization which appealed to the 
Israeli authorities with respect to human rights, which is something that never quite 
made it through my logic processes [  .  .  .  ] I couldn’t comprehend the concept— 
occupation is based on denying human rights, so why apply to the occupier to re-
spect them? This was in the 1980s, when the idea that you promote individual rights 
seemed in tension with simply pursuing the right to self-determination. I also didn’t 
quite recognize that the strategy had more to do with building an international case 
against Israel’s occupation regime than any illusions Israel’s conduct would improve.
In his study of al-Haq written after he had left the organization, Rabbani revisited 
this concern, observing that to “de-politicise the human rights debate also bore 
its costs. If only subconsciously, it translated into [  .  .  .  ]a reluctance to engage 
the points of intersection between human and national rights.”37 Rabbini found the 
clearest example of this to be al-Haq’s failure to examine the right to self- 
determination in the same way that it examined other rights.38 In the early period, 
while clearly upholding the right to self-determination, LSM invoked it without 
analyzing it, and nor did it call for an end to the occupation, whether out of con-
cerns for the organization’s security or reluctance to join the dominant political 
discourse. It was not until the Enforcement Project in 1988 that al-Haq articulated 
the structural argument that linked rule of law with the end of occupation. At the 
time, the project met opposition from within al-Haq as being political in its meth-
ods as in its arguments. In later times, in 2008, as al-Haq’s director, Shawan Jabarin 
criticized “certain local and international organisations in the human rights field 
in Palestine who regrettably fail to address the occupation per se as a major cause 
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for the continuing degradation and infringement of human rights” and who “claim 
that demands to terminate occupation are political.”39
Al-Haq did invoke the right to self-determination in several key publica-
tions in its early years, beginning its discussion of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in an article published in 1985 with the statement that 
“We are denied the right to self-determination and the right to pursue our eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.”40 The first sustained invocation came 
in the conclusion to the organization’s first annual report, Punishing a Nation, on 
the tumultuous first year of the intifada. The last line reads, “The occupier’s attack 
on this nation is—no more and no less—a punishment for its desire to be.”41 This 
position became more direct over the years as human rights discourse developed 
and the political situation in the West Bank and Gaza changed. Al-Haq’s accep-
tance speech, when it was awarded the 1989 Carter-Menil Human Rights Award, 
declared, “The  fundamental rights taken for granted by other nations have been 
denied to us, most importantly, the right to self-determination.”42 It is worth not-
ing the disagreement in al-Haq over accepting this prize: Raqiya Abu Ghosh, who 
joined as a librarian in 1987, demanded in the general meeting to know whether 
“Carter, the architect of Camp David, which is against Palestinian self-determi-
nation, has changed his mind?” Despite strong arguments being made against 
accepting it, Hanan Rabbani recalls the majority being eventually convinced by 
the international exposure it would bring.
Another gap in LSM’s legal research was the right to resistance. In her 2006 
report, Hina Jilani, UN special rapporteur on human rights defenders, situated 
peaceful human rights work as a legitimate form of resistance to the occupation, 
and resistance itself as “a legitimate right of the Palestinian people.”43 The idea of 
human rights as intimately related to the political sphere is more widely accepted 
now than in LSM’s formative period. Indeed, José Zalaquett, a prominent Chilean 
human rights defender invited by al-Haq to assist in its organizational review in 
1994, identified one of the gains of the international human rights movement (“to 
which al-Haq belongs”):
Human rights has emerged as the central notion of political ethics of our time. De-
spite persistent efforts at weakening or relativizing this notion there is no doubt that 
it has gained an increasingly prominent place (whether for sincere or opportunistic 
reasons) in ethical discourse as well as in the agenda of most States, political parties 
and a variety of other social actors.44
The academic debate is ongoing, and the backlash against the selective deploy-
ment of human rights discourse by powerful Western states in pursuit of evidently 
political goals includes cogent critiques. The acceptance of (at least some) human 
rights arguments made about the Israeli occupation appears to have had no impact 
on the action states are prepared to take to restrain Israel. In a comment echoed 
by several of those interviewed for this study, Charles Shammas speculates that 
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LSM’s early insistence on the nonpolitical nature of human rights was “due to the 
youth of the human rights movement. We all said we’re nonpolitical, but of course 
human rights is political.” It was also, at the time, due to concern for the security 
of the young organization.
While those interviewed agreed with the nonpartisan approach for the orga-
nization as a whole, at least some took exception to the personal impatience of 
individuals in the core group towards prevailing nationalist politics and expres-
sions of resistance. Jabarin insists that “politics is a discipline; in those days, the 
factions—unlike now—used to be schools, they built people [ . . . ] That political 
discipline could also teach you things, how to talk to people, reach the masses, 
how to get to an incident, how to get the information.” Here Jabarin is clearly 
 linking the personal political experience of certain al-Haq staffers to the success-
ful fulfillment of their functions at the organization. Iain Guest, quoted above, 
agrees on the reduced role and significance of political factions in more recent 
times.45 In early 1987, al-Haq conducted an in-house organizational reflection or 
“orientation” discussed further below. Among the written feedback from staffers 
was the following:
I was not comfortable with the organisation’s claim to its “objective” and 
 “non- political” approach. In my view, the decision to not be a political party is itself 
a  political decision. I also felt that there was some elitism vis-à-vis political organisa-
tions in that they were too easily dismissed. This attitude in my opinion only contrib-
utes to isolating LSM from the community and therefore making it difficult for LSM 
to achieve its ultimate objective of being a dynamic component in the process of our 
society’s change and progress.46
Another interviewee observed that “not being politically affiliated themselves, the 
founders were rather unaccepting, rather judgmental about people who were.” 
Also of interest is their perspective on al-Haq’s “ultimate objective” with regard 
to Palestinian society: asked what they meant by the “rule of law” in relation to 
internal Palestinian processes, Shehadeh responded, “As in to improve society’s 
consciousness of the importance of being governed by the rule of law, it would 
be fairer to everyone, there would be processes, different relationships between 
people, and we stressed that. We believed in it. I did.”
At the end of 1985, these principles were set out in a long Newsletter that intro-
duced LSM/al-Haq to an expanding audience (including new staffers perhaps) 
who “may not be aware of the principles and aims of the organization or of some 
of its activities.” Against the background of Israel’s Iron Fist policy the final two 
paragraphs, under the subheading “Philosophy of LSM,” read:
The unique situation of the West Bank being occupied territory under international 
law brings to the forefront issues of compliance by the occupying power with the 
standards and requirements of international law with respect to the protection of 
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civilians who fall under the authority of a country other than their own. Yet the 
issue of the rule of law is much broader than that. It requires dedication to a set  
of universal principles and standards which should be applicable in every coun-
try and in every situation and to which all authorities must be held accountable 
 regardless of the political situation. LSM deliberately seeks to state its position  
with respect to events not based on the political leanings of its members or of their 
perceived interests, but rather on the same universal standards which it is willing to 
apply to friend and foe alike. LSM further believes that these standards are useful  
and necessary for the functioning of a new society and trusts that education in  
the field of human rights will yield favourable results to any society regardless of the 
political context.
In this respect LSM endeavours to carry out rigorous documentation that is ob-
jective and verifiable and which is based on universal principles generally accepted 
rather than on a narrow political vision. [  .  . . ] Every attempt is made to appreci-
ate extenuating circumstances and justifications that may be offered or presented by 
violators of human rights in order to ensure that the central message remains that 
of respect for human rights rather than partisan political views. This often means 
understating the case rather than exaggerating it. It also means that many politically 
offensive and injurious events which are contrary to the interest of Palestinians are 
totally outside the scope of LSM’s work because they do not necessarily involve a spe-
cific violation of recognized human rights. Finally it means that LSM is concerned 
with education in human rights and with those violations which occur within Pales-
tinian society as well as those relating to the occupation.47
This piece is addressing LSM’s local profile and aspirations. The standards or val-
ues of the rule of law, human rights, and universality were those that the founders 
sought to transfer to the staffers of the growing organization, and more broadly to 
Palestinian society, in their effort to “build human rights activists.” Staffers stress 
that different members of the Steering Committee established their own standing 
and credibility in the community, in particular the lawyers through their profes-
sional practice, with examples given of Shehadeh’s work on land cases such as that 
of Sabri Gharib,48 and the visits to detained al-Haq field researchers and others by 
Rishmawi and Kuttab. Looking back, some doubt that the organization was ever 
in fact as isolated as perhaps it felt. As the years passed and the political situation 
developed, the local profile and credibility of the organization increased; in the 
words of some staffers, it was “nationalized,” in the sense of being recognized as a 
part of the national struggle, not apart from it. This was to become clear in the first 
intifada. Sami 'Ayad presents this as follows:
Were it not for the founders [ . . . ], this professional depth, this knowledge base, who 
gave the organization this message and vision [ .  .  . ] and on the other hand, were 
it not for the field researchers, with their credibility in their local community, and 
expertise and knowledge, and their readiness to transmit a new thought to our com-
munity, al-Haq couldn’t have got as far as it did. It was complementary.
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PARTICIPATION,  VOLUNTARISM,  AND WEDNESDAY 
EVENING MEETINGS
In his consideration of human rights activism in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Joe Stork describes two models of human rights organizations:
One model involves a large and active membership that sets policies and priorities. 
Such organizations typically rely on members as volunteers to carry out their work. 
Another organizational model emphasizes a paid staff having professional skills in 
monitoring, advocacy, and provision of services like legal aid.49
The Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), established just before LSM, was 
a membership organization, even if its membership was “carefully scrutinized” 
and not intended as a mass movement.50 LSM was the first regional model of the 
second type, and its founders sought modest start-up funding for their projected 
activities and benefited also from in-kind assistance. It appears that substantial 
funding at the very beginning came from church groups, before broadening to 
development agencies and foundations; LSM did not seek funding from any gov-
ernment, on principle. The “highly divisive” foreign funding issue that was and is 
raised against other Arab human rights organizations was not raised in the same 
way in Palestine, where there was no national government whose sovereignty 
might be defended against external interference; these issues came after Oslo and 
the arrival of the Palestinian Authority (PA).51
Still, LSM’s early focus went well beyond a paid staff and professional skills. The 
Steering Committee members worked as volunteers throughout their  involvement 
with the organization, fitting their responsibilities around full-time commitments 
elsewhere. Others also played significant voluntary roles, including some who later 
became paid members of staff. Shehadeh explains the founders’ thinking behind 
the structure they set up:
We also had the conscious objective of creating a truly democratic organisation, 
an organisation completely owned and run by the team working in it. The spirit of 
voluntarism was also extremely important. Those who participated in creating and 
developing al-Haq had a singular and strong commitment.52
These principles—organizational democracy, staff participation, and  voluntarism—
continued to underpin LSM/al-Haq’s culture even as it grew exponentially from 
the middle of the decade and into the first intifada. Kuttab recalls the Steering 
Committee struggling with “being a democratic organisation, and being a profes-
sional organisation”:
At the beginning, it was like a family, we’d get round for the Wednesday meeting, all 
decisions were taken by everybody, including whether to get [then secretary] Paulein 
curtains or a swivel chair. We wanted them involved, we wanted to instill a sense of 
ownership, and there were ideas that had to permeate the organization, not come 
top-down. It was very important that they internalize the values, and we’d do that 
by involving everyone in decision-making. But the flip side was that many began to 
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think that collective decision-making was part of human rights. We’d say no, there is 
nothing human rights-ish about collective decision-making.
The family motif is used by others recalling those early days; they also talked 
about the sense of “belonging” (intima’).53 Ghazi Shashtari says, “I still have a sense 
of intima’ to al-Haq. The old ones, the early ones, I felt we were a family.” The 
emphasis on “belonging” came from the founders, says Nina Atallah. The Wednes-
day evening meetings were legendary. This was the highest policy and program 
decision-making body in the organization.54 Attendance (and preferably participa-
tion) was mandatory for all office-based staff; field researchers were not obliged to 
attend, given that they were based out of the office in different parts of the West 
Bank. As Shammas says, “We didn’t want to be bosses, we wanted participation. 
That’s not a human rights issue, that’s rather people trying to organize in a demo-
cratic way; you function better and make the most of staff resources.”55 “The whole 
thrust of the Wednesday meeting,” says Shehadeh, “was that we all discuss, we all 
participate, it was collective responsibility. This was deliberate.” Also:
From the beginning I wanted to leave—I didn’t want the burden of being in an or-
ganization as a manager—I wanted it and us to grow together so there would be no 
mysteries about why this or that happened . . . And human rights was not there as  
a profession, so the idea was to create the profession. It was very important to raise a  
generation of such people, and that could only happen if we discussed everything 
and grew together . . . We’re all equal in our ignorance.56
Opinions vary of the general (Wednesday evening) meetings as a form of gov-
ernance, although most staffers from the early days remain positive about it as a 
“great democratic tradition,” in the words of one. Sami 'Ayad recalls:
Things raised at the meetings would be policies, structure, issues, methodology, so 
this was how—to a certain extent—we learnt how to do the work. I was field research 
coordinator, we had part-time field researchers in different areas, and I’d report to 
the meeting on what we knew of what was going on in the occupied territories. We’d 
discuss how al-Haq would address these issues, everyone had a point, everyone had a 
role. Mostly things were agreed by consensus; if there was disagreement, there would 
be an attempt to agree so that as an organisation we had one perspective. If I had 
reservations, there had to be bases for them, not just a personal opinion; it had to 
be studied, not superficial, you had to come with evidence and arguments. It was 
professional, the marja’iyya was the rule of law and human rights.
The role of field research at LSM/al-Haq was key—the organization was very 
much driven by what was happening on the ground. The meeting was a key part of 
the knowledge transfer, “growing together” and taking responsibility at which the 
founders were aiming. Zahi Jaradat recalls:
We’d vote on any decision for something al-Haq was going to work on, even if it was 
a big decision. This helped a lot in building the idea of belonging to the organisation. 
I used to feel that I was helping construct the organization and the future of human 
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rights by my participation in these decisions—if we ask for something, is this useful 
or not, you discuss and decide and vote. It wasn’t always an easy discussion. It was a 
very good tradition.
Non-Palestinian LSM members agree on the positive dynamics of the gen-
eral meeting at this time. Roger Heacock notes that “the relational dynamics at 
the meetings were exemplary: young and (relatively) old, local and international, 
intellectuals and nonintellectuals all participated on an equal footing.” He credits 
this “relational issue” as being “very important to the organization’s administra-
tion during its days of glory: that between the triumvirate and the administrators.” 
The youth of the organization was matched by the relative youth of most of those 
involved; the founders were in their early thirties, the staff mostly in their early or 
mid-twenties.
But the meeting, along with the structure that it underpinned, was challenged 
within a few short years. Shammas recalls that by 1984–85, he was more critical 
of the Steering Committee’s approach to governance. “Al-Haq’s structure was an 
ideal, another utopian ideal.” Something of a turning point—at least in expecta-
tions—appears to have been reached when the Steering Committee brought the 
issue of Ford Foundation funding to the Wednesday general meeting. According 
to Kuttab:
Raja was determined, everyone had to be involved in the decision, at the meeting. It 
was political. Some said we can’t take Ford money. Raja said everyone must decide on 
that. There was a vote. The meeting voted not to take a decision but to turn it back to 
us: we had to take the decision. They didn’t want to take the political consequences 
of deciding to take money from Ford. Raja was very disappointed.
Whether or not Ford was particularly suspected of CIA connections, the prospect 
of defending a decision that entailed “taking money from the Americans,” this 
close to Camp David, was not one that leftists at al-Haq might be expected to rel-
ish. While taking the Ford Foundation funding, the Steering Committee decided 
that no more than 20 percent of LSM’s budget would be sought or accepted from a 
single source.57 By late 1985, with the Iron Fist policy in full force and LSM/al-Haq 
expanding in focus, staff, and finances, the 1985 Programme Report announced 
a second relocation across the road on Main Street, Ramallah, and a change in 
organizational structure:
LSM’s decision-making structure was revised in 1985 in response to its increased 
workload and staff membership. All decisions of policy, budget approval, recruit-
ment and entry into relationships with third parties are now decided upon by a new 
five member executive which includes, ex-officio, LSM’s two directors and admin-
istrative director. All staff, members of the executive and invited consultants meet 
at LSM’s weekly general meeting. The general meeting reviews the week’s activities, 
makes decisions, discusses policy and initiates research ideas.58
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The Executive Committee comprised Shehadeh, Kuttab, Shammas, Rishmawi, 
and a newly recruited administrator. The 1986 Programme Report, which is a 
much lengthier document addressed to associates, funders, and the local com-
munity, talks of a further period of growth with the weekly general meeting “at 
the heart of the organisation.”59 Judith Dueck, the administrative director, says the 
Wednesday meetings
were the right thing at the time. They profoundly affected the major directions of 
the organization, the strategies that were developed, and the tactics executed. The 
meetings dealt with major aspects as well as some less significant items such as office 
furniture: some things could have been better dealt with in other organizational fora.
Dueck found the building of organizational culture and the transfer of knowledge 
and values to be very effective. When Steering Committee members and other 
staffers addressed visitors to al-Haq, others in the office, time permitting, would 
join to listen, and “everyone learned in these circumstances.” The sustained par-
ticipation of the founders in leadership, hands-on projects, and detailed tactical 
moves was essential as the young organization grew. Broadly, Shehadeh dealt with 
legal research, Kuttab with field research, and Shammas with the database (and 
later with the Enforcement Project), although there was always a degree of over-
lap. Shawan Jabarin speaks of how meetings “built a way of thinking, including 
self-criticism, and a high level of responsibility regarding the data, as well as orga-
nizational issues; the feeling of responsibility towards this was very important, it 
built a mindset (dhihniyya) in the organization.” Zahi Jaradat similarly talks of 
the “al-Haq mentality” (‘aqliyya). When it worked, this early approach helped the 
development of reflective practitioners in the human rights field.
By 1986, however, the strain of expansion was showing, embodied in the physi-
cal unwieldiness of the Pending File, a physical lever-arch file containing all cor-
respondence of the week, placed in the library for LSM/al-Haq members to review 
and from which all matters needing follow-up were reported to the Wednesday 
meeting. The draft proposal for an executive director and consequent further 
changes in structure, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, and which went 
through several reviews by Shehadeh and Rishmawi, read in 1988:
The reality has become that al-Haq is a group which is composed of individuals 
with a career commitment to human rights. All along, even during the most diffi-
cult times, the organisation has retained its distinctiveness: all members get together 
once a week and discuss everything. This should always be encouraged. The case 
remains, however, that the final responsibility for decisions and execution and policy 
is not assumed by all the members of staff. As the organisation is growing in a solid 
manner, the responsibilities put on the shoulders of its existing Executive Commit-
tee are growing as well. The risk to the continuity of the organisation now lies in 
the extremely heavy demands that its expanded scope of work makes on its Execu-
tive who are consequently unable and unwilling to give the time and effort needed 
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to discharge the responsibility of their directorship. This is what has necessitated  
this review.60 
Emma Playfair refers to the “rapid and huge expansion of al-Haq” over the second 
half of the 1980s as “a continuing disaster for al-Haq: the new staffers didn’t get a 
chance to absorb the ethics of the organization, they didn’t have the same sense 
of close interaction with the directors, they missed that opportunity.” Charles 
Shammas, intellectually and pragmatically interested in “how people react to new 
knowledge,” talks of LSM/al-Haq’s need to “find people already looking for some-
thing to challenge their understanding”:
We didn’t know then that this was crucial, so we didn’t look for it. The ethics of the 
organization didn’t bring out the idea that you had to reach, strive for something that 
wasn’t comprehensible to you but it was to someone else. I assumed too much readi-
ness to learn . . . It’s not “what I know.” We are not “all the same,” we needed people 
to struggle to find the sense that others see in things.
The following observations are from George Giacaman, a philosophy professor 
from Birzeit University who worked with al-Haq as research coordinator when the 
university was closed in the intifada:
The work is crucial. People are not equal in terms of their abilities, their information, 
their judgement . . . They are equal in rights but that’s a very different matter and it 
confuses things. There are rights that belong to everyone, but not everyone can share 
in the decision-making on issues if those people have neither the experience nor 
background nor training [ . . . ]. So to have a general meeting of everyone, I think, 
confuses roles. It’s a form of populism and confuses things.
Several interviewees observed that the structure that the founders created could 
only work with a very small organization. As it grew in resources and profile, it was 
becoming unsustainable. According to Shehadeh:
The organization was getting frustrated. We three all had other work, everything had 
to wait for us, there was frustration on both sides [ . . . ] I had to read everything, we 
couldn’t risk something getting out that was against the “balance” [ . . . ] It was clear 
that it wasn’t working, this strange structure of everyone having to be involved [ . . . ] 
People working day to day in the office were frustrated by the fact that we weren’t 
working there, and for our part we had an idealistic view of how things should be—
but the office was always a mess. [ . . . ] And in the general meetings, so much was 
unsaid, there were all these assumptions, people weren’t speaking out, there would be 
these heavy silences when everyone was supposed to speak out. 
This was the time of the build-up to the first intifada. At the turn of 1986–87, al-
Haq presented to the public, in its Newsletter editorial titled “The Role of a Human 
Rights Organisation under Occupation,” how it saw its role and internally orga-
nized a series of (re)orientation sessions for its staffers, old and new.
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During its recent period of expansion, al-Haq has been evaluating its role and  
giving renewed thought to the role of a human rights organisation under occupa-
tion. Given the extreme circumstances of military rule, should [al-Haq] restrict itself  
to monitoring and censuring the occupying power’s actions? Or should it also con-
cern itself with the standards within its own society, and consider violations within 
that society? How should it play its part in preparing for the uncertain future of  
its society?
Al-Haq believes that a human rights organisation operating under these circum-
stances must play two roles [ .  .  . ] On the one hand it must do its best to act as a 
watchdog for the rights of the population, living under the rule of a foreign power. 
On the other hand, it should also work towards ensuring that the society of which it 
is a part maintains and develops its own standards of human rights, equipping it for 
the future as well as for the present.[ . . . ]
People living under occupation are living under alien rule. [ . . . ] Where there is 
a conflict of interest between the interests of the occupier’s civilian population and 
the population of the occupied territories it is perhaps inevitable that the former 
will normally prevail. The latter have no state to represent their interests and restore  
the balance.
Human rights and other indigenous organisations must do their best to compen-
sate the people for this lack. In the case of the human rights organisation, it must 
constantly represent the rights of the occupied population, ensuring that discrimina-
tion does not go unremarked for lack of representation and trying to halt and obtain 
redress for violations of human rights.
The usual tools of human rights organisations, such as the lobbying of politicians 
for change in the law, or use of the courts for testing issues, may be unavailable or 
inappropriate under occupation. Equally, the voice of a human rights organisation 
which is itself part of the occupied population may carry little weight with the oc-
cupier. Other ways of achieving progress must therefore be sought.
A human rights organisation is in a position to try to mobilise external support 
providing that it first establishes and maintains its reputation for veracity and reli-
ability. By linking in to the network of human rights organisations, and other con-
cerned bodies, and providing them with information on which they can rely, it can 
reach wider communities who will thus be better equipped to weigh, evaluate and 
act on the available information. At the same time it can apply pressure on states, 
directly and through other organisations, to fulfil their obligations in relation to 
conventions they have signed, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
which regulates occupations.
The legal framework within which a human rights organisation works differs 
 under occupation from that applicable under normal circumstances. International 
law places specific limits on an occupier’s actions. An effective human rights organ-
isation must try to see that these laws are respected by the occupying power. If the 
occupying power refuses to acknowledge the applicability of such laws, or violates 
them notwithstanding, the organisation must seek to find means of enforcing the 
laws, in a situation where the domestic courts will not enforce the law and there is no 
state to take the occupying power to the international forum.
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It must further explain to a public who may be quite unaware of their rights, that 
there are limitations to an occupier’s power and what these limitations are. This may 
be particularly necessary with a prolonged occupation, since a people deprived of 
rights over a long period of time may come to accept this deprivation as a necessary 
evil of the situation and not contest it.
[ . . . ] Even if given a civilian face, an occupation is essentially maintained by the 
military, and in the case of the Israeli occupation the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial arms of the occupying power are all in the hands of the military. The separation 
of these powers is one of the prime requirements of the rule of law, and the lack of 
separation is therefore a serious threat to the administration of justice. [ . . . ]
[ . . . ] It must clearly be high amongst the aims of any human rights organisation 
that, whatever the political situation, its own society should be one which respects 
both individual and collective, civil and political rights. [  .  .  .  ] The population of 
 occupied lands are not able to express their support for such concepts by instigating 
appropriate legislation, but much can be achieved by education and communica-
tion of the principles of human rights, to promote genuine acceptance of these con-
cepts. [ . . . ]
Where the local legal structure has been fractured and the legal profession to 
some extent disempowered, the human rights organisation can perform some of the 
duties normally carried by a bar association. Subject to available means, it can make 
legal materials available, correlate, analyse, index and monitor current legislation 
and even provide legal education. At the same time it can seek the establishment of 
an independent bar association [ . . . ]
[ . . . . ] A non-discriminatory attitude towards the rights of women, minorities, 
and racial or religious groups and respect for the rights of workers and for civil and 
human rights in general is as essential for the health of a society under occupation 
as in any other situation. To ignore or postpone criticisms of violations within the 
society would not only undermine the validity and good faith of criticisms of viola-
tions perpetrated by others, but more importantly would endanger the nature of the 
society itself.
In al-Haq’s evaluation of its work and planning for the future, it thus seeks to 
maintain a balance between its concern for the violation of the rights of Palestinians 
living under occupation by the Israeli authorities, and its efforts to promote respect 
for human rights within its own society.61
This piece of reflection sought to do a number of things, among them to situate 
the organization within the wider human rights movement, to link human rights 
to the rule of law, to present the particularity of occupation as a context for human 
rights work, and to insist on human rights as a framework for societal values and 
conduct. The organization had already recruited a retired schoolmaster to work 
on human rights education. Rishmawi’s occasional paper on the legal position 
of Palestinian women under the British, Jordanian, and Israeli legal regimes in 
the West Bank had been published in Arabic that year and the rights of workers 
were under study, with two Know Your Rights booklets published.62 The organiza-
tion had resumed publication of its “Legal Corner” in al-Quds newspaper, and 
Organization    97
the same Newsletter included reports of al-Haq staffers giving talks at secondary 
schools and other public events. “All too often in the West Bank,” commented the 
Newsletter, “the debate on human rights is reduced to a defence of the rights of 
Palestinians at the risk, in al-Haq’s view, of ignoring the violations that take place 
within Palestinian society itself.”63 The editorial points to the thinking that was to 
develop into the Enforcement Project, including the invocation of state obligations 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The insistence on establishing and main-
taining its “reputation for veracity and reliability”—primarily through the cred-
ibility of its primary data collected through field research—was, as ever, a primary 
focus. At the end of this Newsletter, for the first time and under the shadow of the 
Iron Fist, came a section titled “The Year 1986 in Statistics” giving lists of Palestin-
ians subjected during the year to administrative punishments—deportation, town 
arrest, administrative detention, and house demolition. 
In the meantime, recognizing the building frustrations, the organization’s lead-
ership was planning a series of directed discussion sessions “intended to lead to 
a thorough overhaul of the organization, its structure and its work.” Originally 
envisaged in three stages, the first focused on “a critical evaluation of al-Haq’s work 
and development since 1979, through the conflictual approach—why were things 
done in a certain way and not in another way.” The document sets out the themes, 
including a number of questions that those leading the sessions might use “to elicit 
further information, provoke argument or call into question assumptions made.”64 
Some of the questions clearly invoke issues bubbling under or spilling over in the 
organization at the time. Some elicit discussion around the substantive issues cov-
ered in the Newsletter. Others raise concerns preoccupying at least some in al-
Haq: is human rights non-political, is al-Haq—and should it be—“representative,” 
what is the nature of al-Haq’s interventions with the Israeli authorities, what is the 
function of the Wednesday meeting, who do we take money from and why, and 
so on. A summary of the first session from the organizers lists a number of criti-
cal comments that had been made by participants; perhaps the al-Haq leadership 
were sensitive to particular criticisms, or were getting tired of explaining:
If there is a genuine desire for reassessment and a willingness for change, there 
should be no need for defensiveness in responding to criticism.
Concern was expressed at an impression given that our work is important and 
that that of some other organizations working in a different way is not.
Are we really non-political and objective? Needs further discussion.
Rule of law—needs further discussion.65
Another document in al-Haq’s files lists suggestions that appear to have arisen 
from this exercise, including the training of al-Haq members as paralegals and 
the initiation of campaigns on single subjects, both of which were followed up 
in the coming years, as was a suggestion for an annual report, although this was to 
happen under the particular circumstances of the first year of the intifada. Under 
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“matters postponed for discussion,” this document includes some of the questions 
considered not to have been resolved in the orientation, including those regarding 
contact with the military authorities, what it meant to be a human rights activ-
ist, how to get more local associates, and “Is the balance in our work between 
 individual and collective rights reasonable, or should we concentrate more on the 
right to self-determination etc?” As for the completion of the three-stage orienta-
tion, it appears that much got postponed in the buildup to and the outbreak of the 
first intifada.
MEMBERS AND STAFFERS
Some of the questions and comments above reflect the growing pains that any 
organization would suffer, let alone one that was substantively dependent upon 
the voluntary contributions of its Steering Committee. By the end of 1986, “the 
members of al-Haq now include fifteen local full-time employees, five volunteers 
seconded to al-Haq from several international organisations,66 three field-workers 
and two professionals on substantial retainer.”67 It was to continue to expand into 
the first intifada, reaching at one point nearly forty staffers; it became the largest 
ICJ affiliate and had three times as many staff as the ICJ Secretariat in Geneva.68
Other issues raised are perhaps more specific to al-Haq or to a certain type of 
NGO in Palestine at that period. The question “Why do we have foreigners work-
ing with us?,” suggested for discussion in the orientation document of 1987, was 
one that had already been given space in a 1985 training day, and that continued to 
need both reflection and clarification.69 Mouin Rabbani, the first Palestinian from 
abroad to join the research staff, observed that “al-Haq has been slow and ineffec-
tual at implementing its stated goal of attracting and developing local Palestinian 
skills to replace those of transient foreign volunteers upon whom it has relied.”70 
Non-Palestinian staffers, and Palestinians from outside the oPt, found their way to 
LSM/al-Haq in a variety of ways. LSM/al-Haq relied heavily on these staffers in the 
production of its research publications, which were written first in English for dis-
tribution to the English-speaking West and Israeli society. They were subsequently 
translated into Arabic.71 Publications written in Arabic for the local community—
notably the Know Your Rights series—were not translated into English. There was 
little contact with allies in Arab countries, and, as already noted, apart from Kut-
tab’s work with the Middle East group of HURIDOCS, sustained engagement with 
the Arab human rights movement came in the early 1990s.72
In al-Haq’s research work, English language skills were one thing, research 
training and educational background another. Many of the “transient foreign 
volunteers” came with advanced research and writing skills, albeit not in human 
rights per se. The education system in the West Bank and Gaza did not provide as 
strong a training; the Palestinian universities were young, with study frequently 
interrupted by closures imposed by the military authorities, and there were very 
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few advanced degrees on offer. A third factor was sheer time. The Palestinian staff 
put in long hours, but they had family and social obligations (“they had lives”) 
that mostly did not apply (or at least, not to the same extent) to foreign staffers 
or Palestinians raised abroad. As far as the social scene was concerned, Ramallah 
was a very different place from the cultural hub packed with bars and events, film 
festivals and literature festivals, that it had become, for some, by the time of the 
Arab Spring. Looking back at long hours in the office in the mid-1980s, Hilter-
mann recalls:
Even under occupation, a normal working day is something everyone’s entitled  
to. We [foreign staffers] came as individuals, we mostly had no families there [ . . . ] 
Plus what else was there to do? There was nowhere to go out, some socializing at 
friends’ homes perhaps, but it was mostly just work, work, work, and that made  
you happy and satisfied. There was a tension about that. After all, it was their struggle 
not ours. We’d come in and “do” much more the way they saw it—but of course they 
“did” more than us in another sense, as they had to live the consequences of the 
 occupation [ . . . ] Some [foreign staffers] were sensitive to the need for Palestinian 
staff to feel sovereignty over the organisation’s work—it was a Palestinian organ-
isation, not a foreign implantation, we took direction from Palestinians, because it 
wasn’t our organization.
The foreign staffers were not homogenous, and some were more aware than others 
of their place in the work and in the organization. Raja Shehadeh further recalls 
tensions “between foreigners with different perspectives and approaches.” Hil-
termann recognizes that it was easier for the foreign staff to travel and present 
al-Haq’s work abroad: “We’d travel and meet people, and we’d get the kudos, the 
plaudits.” In Ramallah, not all Palestinian staffers were able to address the many 
and varied foreign delegations and visitors who came to the office seeking brief-
ings on the human rights situation. Inside and outside the organization, there were 
concerns about foreign staff “speaking for” Palestinians at al-Haq. For many years 
the Wednesday meeting was held in English, perhaps accidentally to start with, 
since there were foreign staff who did not speak enough Arabic to cope with the 
meeting. The Steering Committee members were perfectly comfortable in English, 
and office-based Palestinian staff and the fieldwork unit coordinator mostly had 
good English language skills. Judith Dueck observed that in her time, some field-
workers were “not comfortable in English,” and this was one reason that they did 
not attend some meetings, although there was also the practical challenge of get-
ting back home in the evening.73 Fieldwork unit coordinator Khaled Batrawi used 
to hold meetings of the unit on Wednesday afternoons, so that field-workers who 
were able to stay on would do so. Batrawi recalls that it was after a request from 
field researchers that the Wednesday meeting began to be conducted in Arabic, 
with informal translation provided to foreign researchers who needed it.
My interviews with field researchers raised a particular sensitivity—dating 
from slightly later—over “non-Palestinian researchers who’d come from abroad 
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for two or three months, use all the information we had collected and publish 
a study with their name on it.”74 Zahi Jaradat observes that this division of labor 
was “no-one’s fault, the field researcher stays in place, I can’t say I’m going to 
stop doing fieldwork and write a study on my fieldwork in Jenin now please.” He 
adds, however:
There should be some fairness in this; perhaps the credit should be shared? All the 
work we do is an achievement of the field research. The field researcher is the one 
who takes the most risk, doing field research under occupation, with the settlers and 
the army.
In the office, sensitivities arose when work by Palestinian members of the legal 
research unit was not published as readily as that produced by non-Palestinian 
research staff; the first al-Haq annual report, Punishing a Nation, after the first year 
of the intifada, is given as an example. For Randa Siniora, it was clearly an issue:
Those of us working in the research unit always felt that foreign staffers were given 
more attention by the organization’s leadership, at the expense of more time and at-
tention being invested with the Palestinian researchers. We felt we were marginalized.
For Charles Shammas, the issue was one of principle and pragmatism. He recalls 
repeated explicit discussions in al-Haq’s Executive Committee about the organiza-
tion’s overreliance on foreign staff and the need to invest more in Palestinian staff, 
citing as a major regret that he and his colleagues did not in fact do that. During 
its early period, the organization did express explicit commitment to “stimulat-
ing professional development among its staff,” a topic addressed in both the 1985 
and 1986 Programme Reports. The Newsletter too carried reports of visits abroad 
made by Palestinian staff members to training courses, study sessions, confer-
ences, and so on. In the spring of 1985, the Newsletter reported:
For the second consecutive year, one of LSM’s Palestinian researchers is attending 
a special teaching programme on ‘Development, Law and Social Justice’ at the In-
stitute of Social Studies in The Hague [  .  .  . ] LSM believes that as a human rights 
organisation it should actively seek to advance its employees’ understanding of the 
subject and the relevant law. Furthermore it believes that the broader perspectives, 
international contacts and knowledge of other areas gained on such a course are 
invaluable in widening interest beyond narrow and political concerns, while at the 
same time shedding new light on those concerns.75
The activities listed under “professional development” in the 1986 Programme 
Report included a human rights training course in Strasbourg (at the Interna-
tional Institute of Human Rights) attended by two al-Haq researchers; the report 
notes that as well as the theoretical introduction to human rights issues, this 
course provided a rare networking opportunity for the al-Haq staffers.76 Other 
 activities included a two-week internship with various international organi-
zations in Geneva undertaken by the human rights educator, a member of the 
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 administrative staff doing an internship in Oslo on human rights documentation, 
conferences on feminist perspectives in law, communication and human rights 
(in Italy), and database techniques (Britain); local computer training courses and 
a specialist database training course; and monthly training seminars for the field 
researchers and regular translation workshops for the translators. Finally, the staff 
were “encouraged to study English or Arabic, sometimes with modest financial 
assistance from al-Haq.”
Some of the field researchers nevertheless felt that they missed out on interna-
tional exposure and learning opportunities that were more open to office-based 
staff. Later on, field researchers were sent to Tunis and to Strasbourg for human 
rights training, and the first al-Haq field-worker whose LLM study in the UK 
was facilitated by the organization was the Rafah field researcher Issam Younis, 
who joined the legal research unit on his return from the UK in 1993. Younis was 
encouraged in his plans by Said Zeedani, who came from Birzeit University to 
become program director at al-Haq in late 1990, and was to remain involved for 
many years, most notably as a board member. Zeedani was particularly focused on 
equipping Palestinian staff for the research and writing work at al-Haq—not just 
the research publications but also, for example, press releases in English. “It’s an 
ownership issue,” he says, “you can’t keep relying on people coming from outside. 
You create a cadre who can take over and reduce reliance on foreign volunteers 
from the US/UK.” A number of Palestinian staffers took their LLMs in quick suc-
cession, institutionalizing such arrangements as part of professional development; 
Zeedani considers this to have been a “turning point” in the organization.
INTO THE INTIFADA:  
T WENT Y YEARS OF O C CUPATION
With hindsight, the expanding al-Haq was caught up in the atmosphere as the 
occupied territories moved towards the first intifada in December 1987. Argu-
ably it contributed to the buildup, providing a distinctive language and framing 
as Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza grew in political awareness of their 
own space for action.77 At the same time, al-Haq’s founders and Steering Com-
mittee were finding the governance system they had set up unsustainable in terms 
of time, energy, and aspirations. The success of the organization’s work brought 
its own challenges, including rapid recruitment and an organizational shift away 
from being a place where “everyone did everything” and becoming more process-
oriented in its administrative structures.
The founders, conscious of the need to reduce reliance on their own voluntary 
and part-time input into program implementation, were looking to appoint a full-
time in-house executive director. They nevertheless wanted to continue the vital 
element of staff participation that had distinguished their vision of the organiza-
tion. A further version of the draft document (1989) setting out the need for an 
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executive director proposed that the general meeting should ratify a new board of 
trustees (comprising the three founding members) with “legal responsibility for 
the organization, and the final authority to approve, review or change policy in 
accordance with its mandate and the organizational procedures described below.” 
The document continued, “The new structure seeks to maintain and continue to 
refine the basic qualities and principles developed by al-Haq over time. The most 
important of these principles is wide staff participation in decision-making, while 
maintaining clear lines of responsibility.”
Because of the participatory nature of the organisation in its decision-making 
 processes, the responsibility that falls on every employee goes beyond the terms of 
employment. This being the case, the ability of each responsible employee to exercise 
his or her privileges called for in the present situation must be taken into consider-
ation before said employee is confirmed.
The draft also noted that it must “also serve as an institutional model to the com-
munity.” The general meeting was to remain “the highest decision-making body on 
programme-related matters.” A slightly later draft clarified that the general meeting 
was to decide on matters by consensus, and if unable to reach a consensus was to 
delegate the matter to the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee was to con-
sist of the executive director, the administrative director, and three staff members to 
be selected by the board from five nominees elected by staff (with eligibility linked 
to length of service). There was to be a study group to include all researchers and 
field researchers to identify patterns of violations emerging and propose courses of 
action to the general meeting. There was also to be a staff council comprising the 
administrative director and a number of staffers elected by the staff body.
Mona Rishmawi was appointed as al-Haq’s first executive director after she 
returned from completing her LLM at Columbia in 1989, in the middle of the 
first intifada; Shehadeh, Kuttab, and Shammas constituted the board of trustees. 
The handover from the board to their former colleague on the Executive/ Steering 
Committee was not smooth, with both parties struggling to agree about the lim-
its on authority. Rishmawi reflects now that “expectations were very high, we 
were all young and had limited experience. And this colored a lot of what hap-
pened afterwards; a lot of it was simply that—age and perspective—because we 
were focusing on something else, the pressures caused by the urgencies of the 
work.” Of all the organizational crises that al-Haq has seen, this first is the one 
that people are least inclined to discuss: it was very hurtful for all involved. Per-
ceptions now seem to fall between “it was bound to happen” (given the setup of 
the handover and the unavoidable turf war caused by the structure rather than 
by the individuals involved) and “it should never have happened” (given the com-
mitments of all four to the organization and the swiftly reestablished professional 
relationship between al-Haq and Rishmawi). Rishmawi left the West Bank for the 
ICJ’s  Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in Geneva, where she 
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stayed in  regular  contact and cooperation with al-Haq. The board stepped back in 
to cover the daily running until it could appoint another executive director—“we 
did so grudgingly” says Shehadeh, remembering a series of “rebellious” weekly 
meetings. It was a difficult time for management and staff alike, but by no means 
al-Haq’s last management crisis.
A succession of executive directors (and boards) was to follow. Said Zeedani, 
who was appointed by the board following Rishmawi’s departure, observes that 
“this whole issue of democracy in the organization—meetings deciding policy 
issues or financial issues—this was a lousy idea . . . It didn’t work here, and I don’t 
think it could work anywhere, as a model. If there is no hierarchy, you can’t lead.” 
On the other hand, Fateh Azzam observes:
Even with all these other really difficult things, the weekly meeting was still going on, 
things were being decided, there was a sense of open discussion about the program, 
that was one of the main strengths of al-Haq . . . It was quite an extraordinary setup. 
Everyone complained, the meeting got longer and longer as everyone had to have a 
say, there were concerns about why should people who don’t know the work have as 
much say as someone like Raja, for example. It was not an easy process, but a very 
useful and important one, I think.
Some staffers at al-Haq acknowledge that the troublesome relationships between 
board, director, and staff were at least in part a misapplication of the feelings of 
ownership and belonging that the founders had intentionally sought to inculcate. 
Looking back at the earlier years and also at subsequent crises in the organization, 
Nina Atallah recalls:
At first it was lovely, we all did everything, there was no difference because of politi-
cal opinion, everyone felt “al-Haq is mine and ours and we all work and help,” the 
founders and the staff were involved in everything . . . Then, when new boards came, 
some didn’t like it, the idea of belonging (intima’) can be a mistake, you start to think 
“this is my house and they’re interfering,” well, that’s their job! This was the negative 
side of “belonging”: “who are these people coming from outside?” [ . . . ] But if we 
invite them to do a job, we have to accept them!
Issam Younis, founder and director of the human rights NGO Al Mezan in Gaza, 
has a similar reflection. His experience of al-Haq’s governance structures gave him 
what he considers invaluable experience in staff participation, adding however that 
“belonging (intima’) is not a problem, it’s good, but not when it becomes ‘who’s this 
director, where are they from, we are the organization, we built it’ and so on.” With 
hindsight, certain appointments to management posts were unfortunate and there 
were, doubtless, board members who pushed their own agendas. However, many 
have suggested that the strength of al-Haq lies in the very fact of its institutional-
ization and its distance from a one-person organization model—it never was any 
individual’s “shop.” Getting the critical balance between staff empowerment and 
managerial authority and leadership was never going to be easy.
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Meanwhile, back in 1987, al-Haq was intensively engaged in planning for the 
first international law conference to be held in the occupied territories. This was 
scheduled for January 1988, which turned out to be the very beginning of the first 
intifada. According to Emma Playfair, the idea “was conceived in 1986 in one of 
al-Haq’s weekly meetings. Facing yet again a problem of law to which we found no 
answer, Raja Shehadeh suggested appealing to the world’s experts in the law of war 
for their help in clarifying the international laws governing Israel’s administration 
of the West Bank and Gaza.”78 Introducing the volume of papers she edited from the 
conference, Playfair talks of al-Haq’s work in addressing violations of individual 
human rights but also of the importance it attached to “monitoring the treatment 
of the territories themselves and their infrastructure by the military authorities, 
since this is critical to the rights of the Palestinian people as a whole.” She contin-
ues, “While there have been a number of situations of belligerent occupation since 
World War II, none has become institutionalised to the extent of Israel’s occupa-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, many of the issues raised by this 
occupation have not been faced since the Fourth Geneva Convention came into 
force.”79 The conference was a pragmatic response, to engage with internationally 
recognized scholars who would help al-Haq work through the implications of key 
patterns of behavior on the part of the occupying power. In the interim, in summer 
1987, al-Haq produced a substantive essay titled “Twenty Years of Occupation: A 
Time to Reflect,” discussing Israel’s occupation, the use(s) of law, and the organiza-
tion’s key and pressing concerns.
[  .  .  .  ] Twenty years have passed since Israel forcibly took control over the  
Territories in the June War of 1967 [  .  .  .  ] What first looked like a temporary  
military occupation has been transformed into a long-term Israeli effort to colo-
nise the Occupied  Territories. Over the past two decades Palestinians living in the 
area have therefore had to readjust their expectations, and so also the way in which  
they live their lives under occupation, and deal with the occupier. This is true as  
well for Palestinian institutions that have emerged during the occupation, like  
al-Haq itself.
[  .  .  .  ] There was much talk in the beginning about an early withdrawal  
following some type of negotiated settlement of the conflict. With the increasing 
confiscation of Palestinian lands in the 1970s, however, and the establishment of  
Jewish settlements, Palestinians’ analysis of the situation had to be modified. Today, 
after twenty years, few have doubts about what may be the occupier’s primary aim in 
the West Bank and Gaza: to take the land and exploit human and material resources.
To Palestinians, the Israeli enterprise is strongly reminiscent of events that  
took place during the height of the colonial era in the 19th and 20th centuries, when 
European nations conquered African and Asian land and mobilised indigenous re-
sources by force [ . . . ] What is different is the Israelis’ apparent long-term goal of 
population displacement, as well as the unique methods that they employ: they have 
given their colonising effort a legalistic veneer in the form of the military occupa-
tion.[ . . . ]
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Al-Haq’s Goals
Operating under such circumstances, al-Haq, as an organisation dedicated to the 
protection of human rights and upholding the rule of law, devised its own methods 
of achieving its aims: it confronts the illegal acts of the occupier by documenting 
and contesting human rights violations, while at the same time it seeks to analyse, 
promote understanding of, and improve or alter existing legislation, in short, enforce 
adherence to the rule of law. Although al-Haq sees the effort to strengthen the rule of 
law as its primary goal, in the early years of its existence its activities were by neces-
sity limited to the very basic tasks.
It is one of the unfortunate facts of life under occupation that the efforts of any or-
ganisation in the Territories are defined by the immediate needs of the situation pre-
vailing at any time. Al-Haq, for example, has spent considered energies in pressuring 
the military authorities to publish and distribute the military orders and regulations 
they had been enacting since 1967, because lawyers continued to receive cases of 
individuals charged with violating an order of whose existence they were unaware.
Even after military orders had finally become available to the public, al-Haq faced 
the intimidating task of analysing this body of military laws and examining its legal-
ity in light of international conventions pertaining to occupied territories, primarily 
the Hague Regulations of 1907, and the IV Geneva Convention of 1949. One of the 
problems in this respect was to explain to a lay audience abroad how the occupier 
has used a complex legal structure at once to cover up and to justify its political and 
economic aims of colonising the Territories.
The Occupier’s Use of the Law
The process of colonisation is very real for Palestinians who may wake up one morn-
ing to find that bulldozers have started to uproot the trees on their land to make 
room for an Israeli settlement. It may not be so visible to outsiders, however. This is 
so because colonising efforts, like the confiscation of Palestinian land, are justified by 
the occupying authorities either as required for Israeli military security needs or as 
desirable to promote the interests of the local population and—so it is argued—are 
effected within the bounds of the law, both local law and international conventions 
pertaining to occupied territories. According to the IV Geneva Convention, the oc-
cupying power cannot amend the laws in existence in the territories it occupies other 
than to serve its overriding security needs or the interests of the local population.
On the face of it the authorities’ arguments might be convincing to a lay  audience, 
especially if no violation of applicable laws can be seen to take place. There are, 
 however, serious flaws in these arguments. Al-Haq has spent a disproportionate 
amount of time and energy during the past seven years . . . in attempting to set the 
record straight.
Response to Israeli Arguments
[ . . . ] Security concerns are routinely cited for any measure which cannot otherwise 
be justified without incurring opposition [ . . . ] Even the Israeli High Court of Justice 
so far has not been able to pose a serious threat to the military authorities’ own defi-
nition of their security needs [ . . . ]
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The authorities have consequently been able to promote Israeli settlement of the 
Territories by defining some of its elements, like the construction of new roads, as 
beneficial to the local population. To them, however, “local population” is not only 
the Palestinians in the Territories, but is also the Israelis living in the settlements, 
even though the presence of the latter in the Territories is illegal by applicable inter-
national law, Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention. [ . . . ]
Jordanian law, which applies in the West Bank, and the combination of British 
Mandatory and Egyptian law that is in force in Gaza, have been altered beyond rec-
ognition by the occupying authorities [ . . . ] What has emerged [ . . . ] in reality con-
stitutes a radical departure from the law that nominally prevails, and which accord-
ing to international law should prevail. [ . . . ] Partisan interpretations of terms such 
as “security needs” and “interests of the local population” ensure that the military 
authorities can deflect charges of violations of international law with relative ease.
The structure of military legislation serves to obscure the true nature of the mas-
sive Israeli colonisation effort that is underway in the Occupied Territories. With ev-
ery military order enabling the confiscation of a patch of land for “security” reasons, 
the ultimate goal of the colonisation project has been brought one step closer. With 
every order limiting the economic activities of the Palestinian population, the occu-
piers have come closer to their goal of taking the land they have set out to conquer, 
without the population that lives on it today.
Role of al-Haq under Occupation
As a human rights organisation, al-Haq endeavours to support the human rights of 
the Palestinian population under occupation. Al-Haq has documented in the past 
serious violations of such rights, including torture and maltreatment in prisons, ad-
ministrative punishments like deportations and house demolitions, censorship of 
publications, and repression of trade union activities. In al-Haq’s view, the funda-
mental problem which gives rise to these violations—a problem that is rarely voiced 
in discussions about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—is the system of colonisation 
of the West Bank and Gaza: a consistent expropriation of Palestinian lands, exploi-
tation of human and material resources, and undermining of social and physical 
infrastructure. This goes hand in hand with a refusal on the part of the occupier to 
maintain the status quo in the Occupied Territories, much less to allow the area’s de-
velopment in a manner beneficial to its population or to agree to negotiate seriously 
the Territories’ final disposition.
Al-Haq has been forced by the situation to focus on exposing the occupier’s goals 
by analysing the legal structure that has been built to justify them. This has taken 
much energy, and has inadvertently led to a reduced emphasis on the organisation’s 
more long-term goals: to provide, through education and training, the legal resourc-
es of the Palestinian society of tomorrow, as well as to help give shape to the stan-
dards and principles that will serve as moral underpinnings of that society.
Twenty years of occupation having passed, including seven years of al-
Haq’s work during which the organisation succeeded in doing much of the basic  
ground work needed for its future activities, al-Haq now intends to dedicate more 
time and  resources to the realisation of its long-term aims. In the first stage this 
means  upgrading its human rights education program, and encouraging young 
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 Palestinians to join its primary mission: the protection of human rights, and analysis, 
evaluation and improvement of prevailing law. This will facilitate the future task—a 
task shared by all Palestinians—of building those values and institutions which will 
be necessary in a future independent Palestinian state.80
This compelling piece speaks for itself in its urgency. The invocation of European 
colonialism is a departure for the organization, as is the criticism of Israel’s refusal 
to “negotiate seriously” and the final reference to a future independent Palestinian 
state, both broadly political statements that the organization is now comfortable 
making. The reference to the occupier’s goal of “taking the land without the popu-
lation that lives on it” can be read as an implicit reference to the historical Zionist 
presentation of Palestine as “a land without a people for a people without a land.” 
Key to al-Haq’s reading is the link between the violations of human rights and 
Israel’s systematic colonization of the occupied territories as a matter of policy. 
Al-Haq’s determination to “devote more time and resources to the realisation of its 
long-term aims” was to be thwarted by the massive events of the first intifada and 




During the 1980s, LSM/al-Haq developed and systematized its working 
 methodologies and tightened its articulation of its priorities in response to devel-
opments in Israel’s declared policy and documented practice. The basis, however, 
remained the understanding that serious violations of civil and political rights by 
the occupation authorities were committed in the service of pursuing a primary 
annexationist agenda. For legal analysis and underpinning of appeals to third par-
ties, LSM/al-Haq moved from early invocations of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), on the one hand, and international humanitarian law 
(IHL) on the other (the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 and the Hague Regula-
tions 1907), and began looking also at international human rights instruments, 
at this stage for their moral and declaratory authority. The organization experi-
mented with formats through which to publicize its findings, with the hope of 
prompting  cessation or correction of the violations addressed. In the 1986 Pro-
gramme Report—a lengthy document that demonstrates ongoing reflection on 
the work to date—al-Haq stated that the organization
undertakes to detect, document and investigate human rights violations; to look for 
and identify patterns of violations and to investigate their antecedents and causes; to 
inform and educate individuals, groups, governments and international bodies re-
garding the facts, and their rights and obligations under law in the presence of those 
facts, as well as to consider their actions in the light of universal legal and human 
rights principles; and to challenge legislative acts and practices which contravene or 
prejudice the principles and rights which al-Haq seeks to uphold.
The critical question of “impact” currently being asked of all human rights 
 organizations (by donors, by constituencies) may not have been phrased in quite 
the same way, but al-Haq’s approach, both pragmatic and strategic, meant that the 
question of “what works” very much defined what it did with the information 
held through its fieldwork and legal research, as well as informing the direction 
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and methodologies of this research. Field and legal research and interventions are 
identified in the 1986 report as the “core programme.”
This chapter considers how the different elements of al-Haq’s core program 
worked together. This includes how it developed and deployed what it termed 
interventions, how it sought to mobilize and work with allies, and the particular 
form and fate of its Enforcement Project.
INTERVENTIONS
As already noted, by 1984 LSM/al-Haq had an established practice of making 
interventions to identified persons with particular responsibilities for and author-
ity over different aspects of life in the West Bank. Although this is now considered 
a standard form of human rights work, it was not then, nor was the decision to 
incorporate it as part of LSM’s methodology straightforward or taken in one go. 
According to Emma Playfair:
It seems obvious now, you write to those responsible and put the case and await a 
response, on the record. But then, it was really weird. [ . . . ] Any contact with the 
occupier was seen as immoral; it wasn’t done then.
The first intervention was made in 1983.1 Sami 'Ayad fieldwork coordinator at the 
time, recalls discussions about
how to frame it, addressing the occupying power whose very presence you reject. 
You denounce the violation on the basis of evidence and give a list of demands for 
improvement, based on their obligations, military orders, etc. For example, the  
treatment of prisoners: you object to the prisons, but you demand action from  
the authorities. We were very careful who we addressed—the minister of defense, the 
military governor, for example. You have a relationship with the occupying power 
which you object to in the first place.
A draft document of Programme Objectives for 1987 defines both an “activist” and 
a “promotional” role for al-Haq, addressing both the local and the international 
communities. The first address under the activist heading is interventions with 
the Israeli government and military authorities, which the organization states it is 
undertaking in order “to redress and inhibit specific violations, provoke  disclosure 
of information, elicit clarification of the criteria used by its personnel in actions 
taken vis-à-vis the local population and the implicit and explicit policies imple-
mented in the Occupied Territories.” An explanation of what goes into the making 
of an intervention begins with the organization’s critical reliance on documentation:
When satisfied that a particular action constitutes a violation of a legal principle 
and after all relevant facts have been established and properly documented, al-
Haq  addresses the appropriate authorities, and/or requests other organisations and 
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 individuals to do so. Such interventions include a presentation of the evidence in 
al-Haq’s possession; legal arguments asserting that there has been a violation of a 
recognised principle and that this must be remedied; and a petition to desist from 
the offending practice, to provide redress to the victim, to carry out an official inves-
tigation, or to provide other relief or action.2
By 1986, interventions were grouped into five broad subject areas:
(1) law and structure;
(2)  deaths, injuries and harassment (“at the hands of all sections of the Israeli 
army, the police, Jewish settlers and Israeli-sponsored ‘village leagues’ ”);
(3)  arrests and detention (including “cases of illegal arrest and detention, prison 
conditions and harassment of prisoners during and as a result of their deten-
tion”); 
(4)  collective punishment (including house demolition and sealing and  
punitive curfews); and
(5)  control measures preventing West Bank residents from “going about their 
normal business” (these included “restrictions on travel out of the West Bank, 
withholding of building permits or driving licences, restrictions on leaving a 
town or district within the West Bank, and closure of trade unions”).3
An example of the process was al-Haq’s intervention after the use of tear gas in 
Jnaid prison early in 1987. The organization had made interventions in a num-
ber of previous cases of the use of gas against political prisoners in the confined 
spaces of prisons. When the Jnaid incident happened, “al-Haq was then convinced 
that its unpublicised efforts to persuade the Israeli military authorities to stop this 
inhumane practice had failed” and it therefore “felt compelled to publicise its con-
cern.” Al-Haq issued a press release (which was censored by the Israeli authorities 
who barred the Arabic press from publishing it); this was attached to the Newslet-
ter, which carried news of this intervention.4
In 1986 al-Haq reported nearly eighty interventions to date, which had met 
with “varying degrees of success.”5 The Draft Programme Objectives for 1987 noted 
that “despite al-Haq’s disappointment at its past lack of success it plans to continue 
its efforts in this area, while at the same time seeking support from local and inter-
national partners who can assist.” This had often been a feature of  interventions—
LSM would send a letter to the military authorities and a copy to the ICJ or to 
Amnesty, for example, or to ACRI, or would seek their direct intervention in a case 
or an issue within their mandate. The thinking around such appeals to allies was 
developing strategically in parallel with the organization’s frustration or “disap-
pointment.” In his paper for the 1988 al-Haq conference, Jonathan Kuttab acknowl-
edged the difference that an individual Israeli officer might make but noted that 
“such appeals are rarely effective, and have become even less so in recent times.” 
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He also noted a change in practice on the part of “different constituent parts of the 
military government, and the civilian administration, to refer any complicated or 
controversial issue to the office of the legal adviser.” He observed: 
To the extent that the holder of that office was conversant with international 
 humanitarian law, and valued the concept of the rule of law, such appeals could be 
useful. At least a reasoned response would be forthcoming that is aware of the pos-
sibility of adverse publicity in case of a totally unintelligent response. For this reason 
it became an almost routine procedure for al-Haq, after carefully investigating and 
adequately documenting a human rights violation that came to its attention first to 
write a carefully worded intervention to the legal adviser, and await his response, 
both as to the factual accuracy of our statements, and for his legal response to the 
arguments we make.
Unfortunately, the present staff of the legal adviser’s office do not seem to be con-
cerned about the rule of law, and protection of human rights. Their responses are 
very delayed, perfunctory, and lacking in substance. [ . . . ] We can no longer see in 
the legal adviser, even remotely, a possible avenue for redress.6
While continuing to place facts and petitions on record, al-Haq was developing 
its network of allies among Israeli lawyers and human rights activists and in the 
international community. It framed a theory of international protection or, more 
specifically, addresses to which appeals for third-party state intervention with 
the Israeli authorities might be made, on an international law basis, by members 
of the civilian Palestinian population of the occupied territories. In January 1988, 
at the beginning of the first intifada, al-Haq addressed its first such appeal directly 
to High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Before this, the only communication with a third-party state made by LSM that 
could be classed as an intervention had been two responses to the chapter on Israel 
and the occupied territories in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
prepared by the US State Department for the US Congress covering the years 1982 
and 1984.7 The idea of preparing the response seems to have come from groups in 
the United States,8 and the drafter of the first observes:
I do think there was some belief that the human rights reports were ‘evidence-based’ 
and by supplying evidence there was a possibility that future ones might better reflect 
reality. [ . . . ] As with the other projects, the aim was to produce objectively verifiable 
“facts” to establish a case—this was very much the LSM philosophy then.
The first LSM Newsletter reported that “we considered it necessary to correct the 
erroneous impression of the human rights situation as found by the American 
report, through critiquing and responding to it section by section.”9 The LSM 
response was sent via the US consul general in Jerusalem and included a letter to 
the US secretary of state noting that LSM had found “certain omissions and mis-
representations” and expressing the hope that “the information and  observations 
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contained in LSM’s reply will be given careful consideration by you and your staff 
in the course of preparing the report for 1983, and that any necessary amendments 
to the 1982 Report be made for the record.”10 It was not to be long before LSM 
 realized that this hope was overly ambitious, if not entirely misplaced: the US 
authorities had no intention of amending their own reports, particularly on Israel, 
simply in light of facts presented.
LSM’s response to the 1982 US report opened with the “immense amount of 
US aid to Israel [ . . . ] which enables, for example, Israel to finance the expansion 
of its settlement programme in the occupied territories” and explains that the fact 
that “decisions on the granting of US aid are, by law, dependent on the human 
rights report” was the reason for LSM preparing its response.11 Among the features 
that LSM particularly objected to were the absence of context, the “practice of 
recording Israeli opinions and government statements as facts, while referring to 
any information provided by Palestinians as ‘allegations’ and ‘complaints,’ ” and the 
impression that actions by Israeli actors that violate Palestinian human rights are 
“in response to supposed acts of Palestinian terrorism and as such are understand-
able.” The LSM response continues:
The word terrorism is mentioned seven times in the Report, although a thorough 
review of the Israeli press during 1982 fails to find these acts of terrorism, unless the 
definition is to be greatly expanded to include groups of stone-throwing students, 
commercial strikes, and peaceful demonstrations.12
Skipping the State Department’s Country Report for 1983, al-Haq published a sec-
ond response on the report for 1984, a document in a rather different style. This 
time, the New York–based Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) had 
asked al-Haq to prepare a response, which LCHR then sent to the State Depart-
ment endorsing al-Haq’s conclusions, and met with the US assistant secretary of 
state for human rights; al-Haq also sent its response itself to the State Depart-
ment.13 In the preface to al-Haq’s response, Hiltermann writes:
In this reply [ . . . ] al-Haq concluded that, although the State Department had some-
what improved the content of its report compared with previous years by paying 
more attention to detail and correcting at least some of the errors al-Haq had pointed 
out in its earlier critique, a number of serious distortions and omissions of vital areas 
of the human rights situation in the Occupied Territories continued to undermine 
the Report’s value. [ . . . ] Al-Haq’s purpose in making public a written reply to the 
State Department’s human rights report on this occasion was not so much to point 
out all individual errors committed by the Report’s authors, as it had done in the 
1983 reply, but to place the errors in their conceptual context: Why were such errors 
permitted to recur over and again? And why did al-Haq’s previous critique, and cri-
tiques provided by other parties, have so little impact on the accuracy of subsequent 
State Department reports, or—in light of Israel’s record in the area of human rights, 
described in these reports—on the continued high level of US economic and military 
aid to Israel in general?14
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The context as presented by al-Haq included a proposed dramatic increase in eco-
nomic and military aid to Israel, the creation of new settlements and “thickening” 
of existing ones, deterioration in prison conditions, an increase in settler aggres-
sion, and the entrenchment of the dual system of law “as exemplified by a military 
directive issued in 1984 which made it impossible for Palestinians to register com-
plaints against Israeli citizens in the West Bank without a permit from the military 
authorities.”15 The response refers to “a political climate in Israel that is profoundly 
unfavourable to discussing Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza, let alone 
the Occupied Territories’ final status. As a result the status quo is allowed to fur-
ther evolve, bringing ever closer the day that the annexation of the West Bank 
and Gaza will be accomplished all but in name.” The mode of reporting includes 
placing “Palestinians and Israelis on an equal level in terms of their conduct and/
or the violence to which they are exposed.” The Report persists in referring to 
“information provided by Palestinians as ‘claims,’ ‘allegations’ or ‘complaints’ while 
the Israeli authorities ‘state’ ”; there are serious problems with presenting the Israeli 
authorities’ claims that they do not condone political killing, and a downplaying 
of the economic, social, and cultural situation in the occupied territories—here 
the response quotes then Israeli minister of defense Yitzhak Rabin as stating that 
“there will be no development [in the territories] initiated by the Israeli govern-
ment, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry [there], 
which may compete with the State of Israel.”16 Omissions include the introduction 
of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, and collective punishment imposed 
“in retaliation for individual acts of resistance by Palestinians.” There is also the 
major contextual issue of Israel’s military occupation which “combines repression 
with economic exploitation to deprive the Palestinian population of its most fun-
damental, inalienable rights”:
The report’s orientation is in keeping with the traditional western definition of  
human rights as individual political rights, at the risk of ignoring such collective 
rights as the right to social and economic development, which the US government  
is “not prepared to recognize as a basic human right” (p. 7). This makes it possi-
ble for the report’s authors to gloss over the impact of Israel’s growing control of  
land and water resources, the building of new settlements, the denial of trade  
permits and licenses to set up industrial enterprises, and collective punishment—
which are indeed key features of the violations of human rights suffered by the  
Palestinian population.17
The structural link to context and insistence on collective social and economic 
rights are key features of al-Haq’s analysis, and the development in the nature of its 
response is evidence of an organization critically examining the impact of its past 
intervention. Al-Haq informs its readers that having pointed out “empirical and 
conceptual errors” in its two responses to the US Reports, and “in the absence of 
a substantive change in the State Department’s reporting,” the  organization “has 
now decided that it would not be productive to compose a critical reply to the 
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annual human rights report on a yearly basis.”18 This was an organization critically 
examining the impact of its past interventions and adopting a pragmatic response.
Al-Haq went on to issue three more public responses, against the changed and 
charged background of the first intifada, for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991. After 
this, it was to be more than fifteen years before al-Haq would publicly intervene 
again with the US State Department on the contents of its Country Report for 
Israel and the Occupied Territories, in the aftermath of the 2008–9 war on Gaza. 
This intervention was made in the form of a letter sent by al-Haq and sixteen other 
Palestinian and non-Palestinian organizations on the subject of the preparation 
of the US report for the year 2009.19 In particular, this intervention invoked find-
ings of “gross and massive violations of human rights constituting war crimes and 
possibly crimes against humanity” made public in the reporting period (2009), 
focusing especially on the Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission to Gaza, man-
dated by the Human Rights Council (the “Goldstone report”) after Israel’s assault 
on Gaza in December 2008–January 2009.20 The charge of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are significant features of the current Palestinian NGO human 
rights discourse, and were arguably pioneered in Al-Haq’s work on grave breaches 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention at the end of the 1980s. 
There is another point to note about this intervention: the letter is addressed 
to Michael Posner, who for just over two months had been assistant secretary of 
state for democracy, human rights and labor in Barack Obama’s government, but 
before that had for some thirty years been the first executive director of LCHR and 
then of its successor Human Rights First; it was under his leadership that LCHR 
had requested a critique of the 1984 State Department report from al-Haq, and it 
was Posner who played the leading role in LCHR’s 1988 report on Israel’s detention 
of four al-Haq field-workers along with two Gazan lawyers.21 “We were gratified 
to learn,” says the 2009 letter, “that someone with your human rights advocacy 
record has taken the helm of this important section of the State Department.”
This kind of intervention was, however, the exception in al-Haq’s earlier years. 
Most were addressed to the relevant military government authority responsible for 
the violation. The first Newsletter details interventions made to the Israeli minis-
ter of defense, with copies to the attorney general and the Knesset State Control 
Committee, regarding the fact that there was no system of judicial appeal against 
the decisions of Israeli military courts in the West Bank; and to the Minister of 
Defense, the attorney general and the coordinator of activities in the occupied 
territories seeking a full police investigation into the placing of “bombs or other 
explosive devices” at schools in the Ramallah district, coinciding with slogans and 
death threats on school walls “accompanied by the name ‘Terror against Terror’ 
and a number of Israeli flags.”22 It also reported a response to an intervention it had 
made in June 1983 and in March 1984 to other human rights organizations locally 
and internationally, as well as to the military authorities, on the subject of the arrest 
of secondary school students during the period of their tawjihi  (“matriculation”) 
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exams concluding their high school education. LSM/al-Haq reported receipt of a 
copy of a letter sent by the office of the coordinator of activities in the occupied 
territories to the Israeli human rights group ACRI who had addressed him on 
the basis of the information sent by LSM. The official cited “security reasons” and 
insisted that it was “pure coincidence that the arrests occurred at the time of the 
tawjihi exams.”23
Al-Haq was to continue following the issue of tawjihi arrests for the next few 
years, seeking inter alia to establish that they were anything but coincidental. Sami 
'Ayad recalls the efforts made by LSM to establish systematic intent on the part of 
the Israeli authorities to cause these students to miss their final exams: “We col-
lected lots of information, in different years and different places where the  students 
were arrested. Sometimes there was no demonstration [going on at the time]. There 
were surprise detentions at exam time. It showed that there was a methodological 
intent in targeting them.” The Introduction to a 1986 Newsletter, titled  “Al-Haq’s 
Action to Defend the Right to Education,” reviewed al-Haq’s efforts in regard to 
this practice from 1983, including communications by ACRI, the ICJ in Geneva, 
and Amnesty International.24 Al-Haq had not received responses itself, but con-
sidered that it had achieved its objective of making this violation better known. It 
had been heartened by the decrease in numbers of reports of such arrests: “Despite 
the fact that it was clear from its enquiries that students are in fact still being 
arrested without either interrogation or charge, it still had reason to hope that its 
efforts and those of other human rights organizations locally and abroad had led 
to the end of this particular type of arrest.” It had noted substantial decreases in 
the reported numbers and had had no reports for late 1985–86. In the meantime, al-
Haq reported that in 1984 the organization “had a discussion with the Legal Advi-
sor to the civilian Administration as to how it should deal with urgent matters. An 
agreement was reached whereby in urgent cases al-Haq could make quick contact 
by telephone or telegram so as to get immediate response to enable a violation to 
be halted before any permanent harm was done.” When it learned, therefore, of 
further such arrests in 1986, the organization sent a telegram to the legal adviser in 
accordance with the agreement that had been reached, “but the response was by a 
letter received only when it was already too late for the students to sit their exams.” 
It also then began to learn of other, unreported tawjihi arrests in previous years.25 
Al-Haq reflected on what might now be called a “small win” as follows:
It is true that al-Haq was able through its efforts to reduce the number of students 
arrested from 38 in 1983 to 8 in this year. However, it had hoped that the violation 
would stop entirely, especially after it became well-known and documented. This 
hope was not realised. Despite a low number of student arrests this year in compari-
son with other years, this cannot be considered as a final resolution of the violation.
This sequence of events has caused al-Haq to reflect on its expectations of 
 progress in defending human rights in the Occupied Territories, and on its mode 
of operation. 
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Reflections such as the above are always necessary. The organization must con-
tinually reassess the manner in which it works, if it is to seek with all means available 
to find the best way to fulfill the objectives or tasks for which it was established, and 
refuse to accept the continuation of any violation, whatever its origin.26
The issue of the malicious arrest of tawjihi students was updated in the following 
Newsletter, but it was quite shortly to be overtaken by the closure of all educational 
institutions in the West Bank—and prohibiting of alternative arrangements for 
education—in response to the first intifada, described by al-Haq in 1988 as Israel’s 
“war on education.”27 The interventions on the tawjihi arrests illustrate a number 
of features of al-Haq’s intervention methods, including the difference that a change 
in personnel at particular Israeli officer posts (such as legal adviser) could bring. 
They also illustrate what Kuttab describes after the raid on the first LSM office 
in 1982; LSM wrote a letter of four paragraphs to the military authorities setting 
out their concerns (as recalled in chapter 3) and copied the letter to Haim Cohn, 
who wrote a letter of three paragraphs to inquire about the matter. “Some very 
high-level officers came, and they had very specific instructions to investigate and 
answer each of the three paragraphs; they didn’t care what we wrote, but they cared 
what Haim Cohn wrote, they didn’t even have a copy of our letter, it was his. It was 
a lesson for us: it matters who you write to.”
Both ACRI and the Israeli section of the ICJ—or more specifically Haim 
Cohn—were early recipients of LSM’s interventions, which were copied to these 
Israeli organizations that were more likely than LSM to get a response if they raised 
the issues with Israeli authorities. Less formally, Raja Shehadeh recalls regular 
meetings in the early 1980s with ACRI, the Jerusalem office of Quaker Peace and 
Service, and the ICRC. According to Shehadeh, it was during these meetings that 
ACRI became interested in the issue of settler violence and harassment against 
Palestinian civilians and property in the West Bank, and particularly on the issue 
of the apparent lack of proper investigation of such incidents by the police or 
military authorities. ACRI did not at that time work on the occupied territories, 
and at a retreat for human rights NGO leaders in Crete in 1989, a board member 
indicated the dilemmas the organization felt it still faced in choosing to get more 
involved, or on the other hand in choosing not to.28 Back in 1981, the Israeli attor-
ney general had appointed a commission of inquiry under the leadership of the 
deputy attorney general Yehudit Karp; her report, submitted in spring 1982 but not 
published until 1984, showed that of seventy cases of “murder, damage to prop-
erty and vigilante activities allegedly by settlers,” only fifteen had been investigated 
by police.29 By 1985, Raja Shehadeh, who had given evidence to the State Control 
Committee of the Knesset on the West Bank legal system following publication 
of the Karp report, was recording still no action on its recommendations.30 LSM/
al-Haq continued to make interventions to the military authorities, for example a 
letter to the military commander of the Central Area in July 1987 following a raid 
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by around two hundred armed Israeli settlers on the Palestinian refugee camp of 
Dheisha near Bethlehem.31 The organization did not, however, publish separately 
on this subject until the annual reports of the first three years of the intifada, each 
of which contained a chapter on violence by Israeli settlers. Besides documenting 
the facts of different settler-related incidents, al-Haq’s interventions stressed the 
issues of accountability and the development of two separate legal systems in 
the West Bank. In its intervention on the 1987 incident in Dheisha camp, for exam-
ple, the organization asked the following questions:
1.  What are the criteria used by the authorities in arming civilians in the West 
Bank, and what precautions are taken, if any, to ensure that they will not misuse 
their weapons?
2. Are the authorities investigating the reaction of the armed forces to the raid 
in order to establish whether or not they performed their duties according to 
international law?
3. Why was a 24-hour curfew imposed [on the camp], one camp entrance closed, 
and a high fence erected along one side of the camp following incidents which 
were provoked by the raid by Kiryat Arba settlers on the camp?
4. Why are the settlers who were arrested being tried in an Israeli court in Jerusa-
lem, and not in the West Bank, despite the fact that the raid took place in the 
West Bank and the settlers are living in the West Bank?32
Other indications of LSM/al-Haq’s rule-of-law focus include interventions in 
relation to the arrest or ill-treatment of lawyers, its monitoring and reporting on 
changes to the legal system, and its pursuit of the need for a professional body 
for lawyers in the West Bank. The first part of The West Bank and the Rule of 
Law, it will be recalled, was on “The Judiciary and the Legal Profession,” and 
besides the professional engagement of both Shehadeh and Kuttab with the legal 
system, the organization had demonstrated a consistent commitment to the pro-
tection of an independent judicial profession under occupation. This included 
interventions on the discriminatory treatment of West Bank lawyers to which 
LSM objected as arising from Military Order 145, which allowed Israeli lawyers to 
practice in West Bank courts.33 It also included a sustained interest in the establish-
ment of an independent bar association for working West Bank lawyers who had 
been struck off or (if more recently qualified) were unable to join the Jordanian 
Bar Association. In this matter, there was a small win for the profession in the 
autumn of 1987. The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled on a 1984 petition from a 
group of West Bank lawyers asking that the military authorities be ordered to show 
cause why a bar association should not be permitted to establish itself in the West 
Bank. Al-Haq’s Newsletter led with this judgment, providing a background of 
the  petition, the strike, the provision under Jordanian law for a bar association, 
and the usurpation of the authorities of a bar association under Military Order 1164 
in 1986 while the West Bank lawyers’ petition was still pending at the High Court. 
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The order  purported to establish a “Lawyers Council Bar Association under the 
 direction of the Civilian Administration”; the latter would assume all powers of 
appointment and regulation of all financial matters internal to such an associa-
tion.34 Al-Haq had intervened with the minister of defense, while the West Bank 
petitioners maintained their petition to the High Court, arguing, among other 
things, that establishment of an independent bar association “did not harm any 
military interest” and was consistent with international legal obligations regulat-
ing an occupying power. According to al-Haq’s presentation, the military com-
mander responded:
that elections to a professional association did pose a danger to security since in his 
view all elections in the West Bank are based on the political orientation of the can-
didates and as such expedite the attempt of “hostile” organisations to enhance their 
influence over the population.
Possibly because the issue involved a professional legal body, the Israeli High 
Court did not accept the security argument at face value. Referring to both the 
“right to organize,” even under military occupation, and the need for “due regard 
to the social order and the security of the state,” the ruling concluded:
The Military Commander had not demonstrated that the independence of a bar 
association, with respect to the issue of the election of council members and con-
trol over the council’s budget, would threaten security. Moreover, assuming that a 
“reasonable likelihood” of danger existed, the commander, on the evidence, had not 
properly weighed the factors involved. Neither had he considered alternative ways 
of dealing with the anticipated danger while at the same time maintaining, as far as 
possible, the independence of the new organisation.
Al-Haq gave a partial welcome: “in accordance with our belief in international 
human rights principles and norms and the rule of law, we see the independence 
and the proper functioning of the legal profession as an essential cornerstone 
of these standards” which would not be realized through an association set up 
under the terms of the military order. In particular, it welcomed the statement 
regarding the right of association, and the fact that the court had “looked into the 
issue of whether in exercising his authority and his discretion the Military Com-
mander had weighed the relevant consideration” as a “fundamental principle of 
administrative justice.” Al-Haq warned, however, that this decision was “by no 
means a victory” since it did not order the military commander to permit the West 
Bank lawyers to establish a bar association as provided for in Jordanian law. “The 
matter rests in the Military Commander’s hands,” concluded al-Haq, “and to date 
no action has been taken.” The Newsletter carrying this article was published at the 
beginning of January 1988 and promised its readers that the next Newsletter would 
cover the events of the intifada, which had started on December 9, 1987. Events 
overtook the ruling on the bar association, and in 1997 the Palestine Bar Associa-
tion was established under the Palestinian Authority.
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LSM/al-Haq’s focus on the legal profession was a key feature of its relation-
ship with the ICJ. Of the international organizations upon whose solidarity al-Haq 
called in specific interventions, the ICJ was perhaps its most steadfast ally, given 
the institutional relationship with LSM/al-Haq and the robust attitude of the ICJ’s 
Niall MacDermot. In 1985, an important principle of al-Haq’s methodology of 
intervention—this time, intervention by publication—was to be clarified in acri-
monious exchanges at the UN Commission on Human Rights around the report 
on torture in al-Fara’a prison, copublished by LSM and the ICJ.35 One of the com-
plaints made by the Israeli ambassador to the commission was that “prior notice of 
the report had not been given to the Israeli authorities, and that the ICJ Secretary-
General had not disclosed its forthcoming publication to the Israeli Ambassador” 
when MacDermot had paid the ambassador a courtesy call some days before pub-
lication of the report.36 Responding in an editorial in the ICJ’s Review, MacDermot 
gave first reply to LSM:
LSM comments “It is not LSM’s practice to present its reports to the Israeli govern-
ment for comment before making them public. We do however make interventions 
and request specific replies on human rights violations that come to our attention. 
We address such letters to the Minister of Defence in his capacity as minister with ul-
timate responsibility for the Military Government of the occupied territories. When 
a reply is received, which is not always the case, it is only after a long period of time 
and comes generally from the Legal Advisor to the Civilian Administration of the 
West Bank. . . . It is precisely because of the gravity of the circumstances related in  
the report that we are not willing to delay issuing the report while we wait for a re-
sponse which experience has shown we are unlikely to receive.”37
For his part, MacDermot explained that he had not felt “at liberty to disclose 
the forthcoming publication to the Ambassador without prior consultation with 
LSM” but that he had since told the ambassador that “he considers it would have 
been preferable to have advised LSM to give a summary of the report to the Israeli 
authorities before publication and invite their comments.” Al-Haq did not alter 
its practice. Having taken the decision on the (limited) utility and the principle of 
corresponding with the military authorities to seek clarification of orders, direc-
tives, and practice, as well as in regard to the treatment of specific individuals or 
groups of individuals and events, and to set out its law-based concerns on such 
matters, al-Haq did not consider that it was in any way bound to follow the prac-
tice of other organizations, local or international, in submitting their publications 
for comment, in this case to the authorities of the occupying power. With the 
arrival of the Palestinian Authority in the summer of 1994, following the signing 
of the Israel-PLO Gaza-Jericho agreement, al-Haq was to revisit this practice in 
relation to the PA, though not in relation to the Israeli authorities. Its first report 
on PA directives and practice, The Right to Freedom of Assembly, appends the cor-
respondence between al-Haq’s coordinator Fateh Azzam and the director-general 
of the Palestinian Police, Brigadier-General Ghazi al-Jabali, to whom al-Haq had 
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presented the draft report “in order to provide him with a further opportunity 
to express his opinion and address the issues discussed herein.” No response was 
received to this particular request for comment.38 The decision to submit the draft 
to the PA official had been taken after considerable discussion at al-Haq in the 
tense days of Oslo.
The 1985 report on al-Fara’a prison comprised a set of affidavits from former 
detainees. One section included three affidavits complaining of seriously inad-
equate medical care. LSM had in fact raised this before, as reported in its first 
Newsletter:
LSM has also recently received reports of the involvement of Israeli medical  personnel 
in the ill-treatment of detainees undergoing interrogation at West Bank detention 
centres. LSM has written to the Israeli Medical Association informing them of the 
allegations, pointing out the complete incompatibility of such involvement, if true, 
with all principles of medical ethics, and asking the Association to investigate the 
matter further.39
This straightforward paragraph had behind it a critical organizational 
challenge. The allegations against members of the professional Israeli medical 
authority (the IMA) were extremely serious; it was a huge professional issue, and 
the field-workers worked hard to collect and verify the information. Sami 'Ayad 
recalls the complexities, for example, of trying to identify as a doctor or nurse 
a person not known to the prisoner but who warned of the risks of their medi-
cal condition. The second Newsletter reported serious developments in the inter-
vening two months. This time al-Haq was more open about specific allegations 
regarding the involvement of Israeli medical personnel in interrogating prisoners:
The alleged involvement appears to take three forms: 1) Advising the interrogators 
on particular points of weakness in the detainee’s body or health, following an initial 
medical examination; such points of weakness are then made use of in the inter-
rogation. 2) Advising the interrogators as to the detainee’s ability to sustain further 
interrogation. 3) Advising the detainee that unless he confesses and receives imme-
diate medical attention his health could be permanently impaired. The methods of 
interrogation reported include beatings and other cruel and degrading treatment.40
Having sent its original letter to the IMA at the beginning of May, LSM was 
awaiting a reply when a press release was issued by the IMA on June 7 and 
reported in the Hebrew press, “accusing LSM of making malicious, unsubstan-
tiated and libellous accusations against members of the Israeli medical profes-
sion” and naming Raja Shehadeh. The president of the IMA wrote back to LSM, 
in a letter mailed after the press release, and “repeated the allegation of ‘slander.’ 
But after stating that it was impossible to imagine an Israeli physician behaving 
in the way described he expressed readiness on the part of the IMA to investigate 
the reports if further details were given.” By the time the IMA’s letter arrived at 
LSM, the organization had already felt obliged to “respond publicly in order to 
Interventions and Allies    121
defend the organisation’s integrity and that of its co-director” in light of the IMA’s 
press release. LSM issued its own press release attaching the original letter to the 
IMA and confirming that “LSM does hold prima facie evidence of the practices 
alleged which will be released if, on completion of its investigations LSM is sat-
isfied that the allegations are well-founded.” LSM also sought a public apology 
from the IMA, and noted in the Newsletter that “both the organisation and Mr 
Shehadeh are contemplating legal proceedings against the IMA if a full apology is 
not received.” Neither the accusations to the IMA nor the grievance of LSM and 
Shehadeh resulted in legal proceedings, but it had been a tense time for LSM/al-
Haq, which returned to its findings in regard to Israeli medical professionals in the 
1985 al-Fara’a report.
In the early summer of 1985, LSM reported receipt of a letter from the IMA 
president (dated January 28, 1985) informing the organization that the general offi-
cer of the IDF Medical Corps had investigated and had found LSM’s allegations 
to be groundless; but that “in future medical staff would be identifiable by their 
white coats.”41 While welcoming this undertaking, LSM’s response focused on the 
reliance placed by the IMA president on the fact that to the best of his knowledge 
no prisoners’ complaints on this subject had been raised by the ICRC. His conclu-
sion was that “either the prisoners did not consider the complaints made to be 
very serious, or that the complaints had no serious basis.” Al-Haq’s concerns about 
how the ICRC’s role was used by the Israeli authorities in such situations were to 
grow over the following years and are discussed further below. Its concerns about 
the role of Israeli medical personnel were taken up by others, including at the UN 
Committee against Torture during Israel’s first appearance there in 1994, and in a 
dedicated Amnesty International report in 1996.42
Al-Haq continued to monitor the conduct of Israeli medical personnel, par-
ticularly in prisons and detention facilities. Early in the intifada, their role was 
raised in relation to access for the families to official Israeli investigations, includ-
ing autopsy reports in cases where a family member had died in circumstances 
arousing suspicion that law enforcement personnel had been involved—notably, 
deaths in detention.43 An overview of how al-Haq worked on what it described as 
“the main, precedent-setting case” illustrates the significance of its allies in differ-
ent parts of the human rights movement.
ALLIES
The treatment of the case of Ibrahim al-Mtour illustrates the significance of the 
relations al-Haq was building. In this case, a Scottish forensic pathologist had 
been asked by the detainee’s family (via al-Haq, after appeal to the Israeli High 
Court by the family’s Israeli lawyer) to conduct a second autopsy some months 
after their son had been buried.44 He held that a named prison doctor had com-
mitted “prima facie, a serious breach of medical ethics” by following an order 
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from the commander of Dhahiriyya Military Detention Center to administer an 
injection of tranquilizers to the detainee who was at the time bound hand and 
foot “in an otherwise empty cell” where the commander had used tear gas on 
him.45 Invoking the UN Principles of Medical Ethics (1982) and the Declaration of 
Tokyo of the World Medical Association (1975), Derrick Pounder recommended 
that “all the case information should be forwarded to the appropriate Israeli 
 Medical Authorities with a view to initiating disciplinary proceedings” against the 
doctor and noting a suspicion that unethical practice by prison doctors was “a 
widespread problem.”46
Pounder directed this and his other recommendations to four organizations: 
Amnesty International, Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), the 
American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and the Copenha-
gen-based Committee of Concerned Forensic Scientists (CCFS). PHR and AAAS 
had sponsored Pounder’s visit, and CCFS was involved in sponsoring later inter-
ventions. Israeli lawyers (notably Leah Tsemel and Felicia Langer) acted for the 
family of the deceased in addressing the Israeli authorities and the High Court. 
Pounder’s report was significant not only in itself but for the combined efforts 
of the Palestinian and Israeli human rights actors and international allies in 
the professional medical communities, and the courage and determination of the 
family of the deceased, Ibrahim al-Mtour. Deaths in Israeli detention centers had 
increased during the first year of the intifada; Joost Hiltermann, who worked on 
a number of these cases for al-Haq, wrote that it was the occurrence of five such 
deaths in one week in the summer of 1988 that prompted the development of an 
approach of seeking “small, step-by-step precedents” in response.47 At the end of 
that year, in its first annual report, al-Haq reported:
Independent investigation into the cause of these deaths has been made impossible 
by the authorities’ refusal in many cases to make public the results of the official 
investigations (including autopsy reports), and by their refusal to allow independent 
forensic experts either to be present at the official autopsies or to conduct second 
autopsies on behalf of the families of the deceased.48
By the end of the second year of the intifada, al-Haq was able to report some—
albeit mixed—results of the efforts to challenge the official Israeli narrative on 
these deaths and gain answers around deaths in detention, explaining these efforts 
as follows:49
Al-Haq’s aim has been, in the first instance, to gain the right for relatives of the 
 deceased to send a representative of their choice to attend the autopsy and to 
 obtain, within a reasonable amount of time, the results of both the autopsy and 
the  investigation into the circumstances of death; and, in the second instance, 
to  discourage excessive use of force by the army and GSS through threat of legal 
 prosecution. Al-Haq’s method in accomplishing these aims was to challenge the au-
thorities’ findings with expert opinions.50
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Al-Haq had concluded in the second year of the uprising that there was a “state of 
lawlessness” in the occupied territories. The organization proceeded to methodi-
cally review Israeli law and practice and to seek to hold the occupation authorities 
to the terms they had set themselves. It also reviewed these terms under the stan-
dards of IHL, and drew on reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial 
summary or arbitrary executions. This examination (critical to Israel’s claims to 
be following the rule of law) can in itself be described as “forensic.”51 Its review of 
events in 1989 included a detailed presentation of developments in the investiga-
tion into the death of al-Mtour and certain other deaths in detention, and with 
some reservations it is clear that al-Haq felt that “the consistent pressures of the 
past year have begun to pay off.”52 Nevertheless, its conclusions were somber. Feli-
cia Langer’s petition for a new investigation into the death of al-Mtour had been 
rejected by the High Court “despite overwhelming evidence, disclosed by Military 
Police investigators,” that he had been severely abused in detention. Langer con-
cluded that “not only was justice not seen to have been done, justice was not done 
at all.”53 Derrick Pounder had concluded that “the cause of death was asphyxiation 
due to ligature pressure on the neck” and continued:
It is my opinion that more likely than not the mechanism of death was hanging. I 
consider that, for the three days prior to his death, the decedent was subjected to 
treatment which was prima facie, cruel, inhuman and degrading. I consider it pos-
sible that the decedent took his own life to escape this abuse. If such was the case, 
I would regard the death as an “aggravated suicide.” On the information available,  
the possibility of homicide cannot be excluded. I consider the initial investigation  
of the death to have been inadequate and the information presently available to me 
to be incomplete.54
The increasing phenomenon of deaths in Israeli detention and al-Haq’s efforts to 
determine cause and establish accountability had significant impact in the orga-
nization. Whether a detainee had died as result of torture or other illegal conduct 
or was thought to have taken his own life as a result of such treatment, the loneli-
ness of such an end lingered in the mind, among the most compelling evidence 
of the lawlessness of the Israeli occupation, which was a central finding in the 
second year of the intifada. Al-Haq opened its report A Nation under Siege with an 
account of the death of Khaled al-Sheikh ‘Ali, and closed it with that of Ibrahim al-
Mtour, reproducing the organization’s speech on accepting the 1989 Carter-Menil 
Human Rights Award:
On 18 October 1988 Ibrahim al-Mtour was seen by other detainees at the Dhahiriyya 
military detention centre in the West Bank. Blood was flowing from his head and 
he was heard screaming: “I am Ibrahim al-Mtour. They are beating me to death. 
Detainees, witness!”
Three days later, Ibrahim was dead. “Suicide,” the prison authorities declared. It 
is our collective duty to answer Ibrahim’s call, to witness, to act, so that in the future 
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not only will the Ibrahims of this world be heard and not have to die but so that they 
will not have to scream at all.55
Al-Haq workers involved in following these investigations were deeply affected 
by the processes. Khaled Batrawi, then head of the fieldwork unit, commences a 
moving piece about al-Haq’s work on autopsies and deaths in detention, written 
some two decades after Batrawi left al-Haq, with a tribute to all the martyrs of 
the uprising, “especially those whose skin was split by the autopsy razor. [  .  .  . ] 
At the time of the autopsy, they felt no pain, but I felt pain [then] and I still feel 
it.”56 Palestinians had, as already recognized in the Karp report, no faith in Israeli 
investigations (process or outcome), and had reason to fear repercussions should 
they seek to challenge them.57 In addition, as Batrawi notes, it was not necessarily 
an avenue that Palestinian families would wish to pursue: “Palestinian society, like 
other Arab societies, did not accept autopsy for religious and social reasons, and 
the overriding concern for the family of martyrs was to bury them, given [the say-
ing that] ‘to honour the dead is to bury them [swiftly].’ ” And suicide was difficult 
to accept even where the efforts of human rights actors established “aggravated 
suicide” at the hands of their captors. The families of the detainees traveled a very 
difficult road, and their human rights contacts were bound to accompany them.
By the mid-1980s, al-Haq was also cooperating with other Palestinian human 
rights organizations in the occupied territories. LSM/al-Haq had actively assisted 
in the establishment (as an ICJ affiliate) of the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law in 
1985, including copublishing a study of the military court system written by a 
shared researcher.58 When the GCRL became mired in internal difficulties, the 
Gaza affiliate of the ICJ became and remains the Palestinian Centre for Human 
Rights (PCHR), established in 1995 under the directorship of lawyer Raji Sourani. 
Al-Haq also cooperated with the second human rights organization to be set up in 
the West Bank, the Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC), which 
operated out of Jerusalem. PHRIC was established in 1986 by the Arab Studies 
Society and published large amounts of data on human rights violations, particu-
larly after the start of the intifada. In a 1988 comparison, Penny Johnson attributed 
“a more activist agenda” to PHRIC and less of a focus on legal research than al-
Haq: “Director Jan Abu Shakra emphasizes that the Center sees its primary con-
stituency as local, because ‘rights must be claimed.’ ”59
Despite their cooperation, Rabbani has pointed to certain tensions between 
PHRIC and al-Haq because of the latter’s sometimes perhaps overly painstaking 
approach and its “predictable refusal to comment on events in the Gaza Strip dur-
ing 1987–1988 because it did not have its own sources of information.”60 Tensions 
also arose with the first Israeli group to initiate systematic human rights work in 
the occupied territories. A new type of relationship was required when in 1989 
B’Tselem was established. Rabbani’s comment here is telling:
It was not unexpected that, as an Israeli organisation [ .  .  . ] it would immediately 
acquire the exposure, credibility, and funding which had eluded al-Haq for 10 years. 
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But when several B’Tselem staff began to conduct themselves as if it was they who 
had been in the field for a decade, relations began to deteriorate, reaching their low 
point in November 1989 when B’Tselem [ . . . ] was named as al-Haq’s co-recipient 
of the 1989 Carter-Menil Human Rights Award for transparently political motives.61
It is surely clear that political reasons did indeed underlie the prize givers’ deci-
sion to divide the honors due the ten-year-old al-Haq with an Israeli organization 
of one year’s standing. Rabbani’s piece conveys something of the rancor of that 
time and points to difficulties in working out peer relationships (rather than “rela-
tions of paternalism”) between citizens of an occupying power and members of the 
occupied population. An explicit recognition of the power relationships involved, 
and a determination to address them, are among the requisites of such relation-
ships as outlined in postcolonial literature. At the retreat organized in Crete in 
1989 for “active and creative leaders in non-governmental human rights organisa-
tions,” a question was raised as to “the degree to which NGOs within the state of 
an occupying power and within the occupied territory” were able to cooperate. 
Among the participants were Raja Shehadeh and an ACRI board member. No 
discussion is recorded, only the summary that “there were clear risks for both par-
ties in such cooperation, but also strong potential benefits.”62 Rabbani for his part 
noted a marked subsequent improvement in relations between al-Haq, B’Tselem, 
and PHRIC, “in an admirable show of common purpose”—given the real exigen-
cies of the situation—and by dint of a “functional division of labour” which he 
described as follows:
Al-Haq’s comparative advantage is in its legal knowledge, fieldwork, and its excellent 
contacts with the diplomatic corps and foreign elites; the PHRIC’s in comprehensive 
documentation and reporting, rapid intervention, and an extremely professional in-
ternational distribution network; and B’Tselem’s—in addition to the quality of its 
own research—in its access to the media and official sources, and the crucial con-
tribution of an Israeli Jewish certificate of authenticity to reports of Israeli human 
rights abuses.63
Until the intifada, al-Haq’s international interventions were directed at peers in 
the “community of human rights organizations”; the Draft Program Objectives 
for 1987 observed that al-Haq had “come some way towards having them mobilise 
their resources in exposing and challenging human rights violations in the Occu-
pied Territories.” According to the report of the Crete retreat, “Al-Haq’s primary 
strategy is to publicize violations through international channels, and to work with 
International NGOs investigating violations in the occupied territories.”64 John-
son quotes Mona Rishmawi on al-Haq’s concentration on information work in the 
international NGO community at that time and continues: “Al-Haq has pursued 
this route perhaps more systematically than any other organisation in the occu-
pied territories to date. Its publications are geared to this audience.”65 While both 
the Steiner report and Johnson’s piece note al-Haq’s outreach work in the local 
Palestinian community (especially its human rights education program), the focus 
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on international allies is striking. It was, as someone from the time put it, “the first 
experiment where a local Palestinian organisation has a completely international 
law reference point and there are organisations outside backing it up; as soon as 
something happens you resort to your network—that’s very common now but it 
wasn’t then.” It was physically also very labor-intensive work in the era before elec-
tronic communications (“countless hours sending faxes”).
LSM/al-Haq’s first institutional relationship was with the ICJ under the leader-
ship of Niall MacDermot, and it benefited enormously from this relationship and 
different activities that developed. As did the ICJ; al-Haq was one of the most—if 
not the most—active of the ICJ affiliates with an international reputation of its 
own and eventually a size that exceeded that of its parent organization. LSM’s 
affiliation with the ICJ was sought for a combination of motives but primarily 
for the possibility of protection that the founders felt might come if they estab-
lished under the ICJ umbrella. Solidarity—in the form of interventions on issues 
within their mandates, including the harassment of LSM/al-Haq workers—was 
also sought from other international human rights organizations. Amnesty Inter-
national was among LSM’s early visitors. Al-Haq/LSM—and staffers whose cases 
were addressed—benefited from Amnesty’s existing position in regard to mem-
bership of the PLO and the status of “prisoner of conscience.” In a 1991 response to 
the Israeli Ministry of Justice, the organization acknowledged:
Amnesty International has a long-standing disagreement with the Israeli  government 
over the relevance of issues such as the membership of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganisation (PLO) in determining whether someone is a prisoner of conscience. The 
Israeli Government maintains that such membership of itself automatically amounts 
at least to advocacy of violence against Israel. Amnesty International disagrees.66
This was not a new position, nor one that Amnesty had newly adopted in response 
to the situation in the occupied territories. The status of prisoner of conscience, a 
cornerstone of Amnesty’s mandate and advocacy, was reserved for those impris-
oned solely on the grounds of their nonviolent expression of their political or reli-
gious beliefs. Adoption by Amnesty as a prisoner of conscience meant personal 
advocacy by individual Amnesty members as well as significant moral recogni-
tion.67 Amnesty’s explanation to the Israeli Ministry of Justice stated that it
recognizes that the PLO remains committed to the legitimacy of the use of violent 
means in its opposition to Israel, that factions of the PLO have carried out acts of 
violence against Israelis, and that obviously a large number of PLO members approve 
of or sympathize with that. However, it also understands that the PLO is an organiza-
tion composed of several factions and bodies involved in political, social and cultural 
activities as well as military or violent activities. The vast majority of Palestinians 
view the PLO as their sole representative and the only vehicle for organized expres-
sion of their national aspirations. Palestinians may join or be otherwise associated 
with the PLO because they share its overall political objectives without necessarily 
agreeing with all its policies, including those relating to the use of violence.
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Amnesty International does not consider that membership of or association with 
the PLO or one of its factions is in itself conclusive evidence that a certain individual 
has used or advocated violence. In determining whether an individual is a prisoner 
of conscience, Amnesty International looks into whether the individual personally 
used or advocated violence in the circumstances relating to his or her arrest.68
Amnesty applied these criteria inter alia to the status of a number of al-Haq field-
workers arrested in the early years of the intifada. Amnesty’s first substantial 
report on administrative detention (1989) examined their cases in some detail, as 
indeed did a report by the LCHR.69 A detailed exposition was made in a letter from 
Amnesty’s secretary-general to the Israeli minister of defense in 1990 in relation to 
the administrative detention of Shawan Jabarin.70 Amnesty’s seven-page interven-
tion went methodically through Jabarin’s arrest and detention record, including 
a relatively reduced prison sentence in December 1985 because the Israeli mili-
tary judge acknowledged that “relations between Shawan Jabarin and the PFLP 
had undoubtedly been broken at a certain stage.” It raised one of the most notori-
ous parts of Jabarin’s detention history, when his lawyer won disclosure of part of 
the secret material on the basis of which he had been administratively detained, 
only for it to be revealed that the alleged incident had taken place while Jabarin 
was already in custody.71 The Amnesty letter also included a report of a conversa-
tion between an Amnesty researcher who visited Ketziot (Ansar 3 prison camp) 
with Jabarin’s lawyer and very unusually managed a conversation “in private and 
 without time limits.” The letter sets out a summary of Jabarin’s answers to the 
researcher’s requests for clarification of various aspects of the Israeli allegations 
relating to his current administrative detention order, including stone-throwing 
and inciting disturbances (including during his detention). A letter from the Min-
istry of Justice had described Jabarin as a “hardened terrorist”; it is possibly this, as 
well as Jabarin’s standing as a field-worker with al-Haq (and confiscation of human 
rights–related materials during a search of his house) that prompted the in-depth 
response from Amnesty to the Israeli authorities. After spending a further page-
and-a-half analyzing the available evidence in regard to Israel’s allegations, includ-
ing the use of secret evidence, Amnesty’s letter concluded that
bearing in mind the pattern of use of administrative detention by the Israeli authori-
ties and the circumstances of this case so far as information is available to us, Am-
nesty International believes that it is reasonable to conclude that Sha’wan Jabarin is 
a prisoner of conscience, held on account of his non-violent political beliefs and/or 
his human rights activities, and that he was unable to exercise effectively his right to 
challenge his detention order.
As it happened, Amnesty’s intervention was sent just three days before Jabarin was 
scheduled for release, but its significance is in illustrating Amnesty’s application 
of its policy on prisoners of conscience to Palestinian detainees and the organiza-
tion’s questioning of the assertions by Israel’s military judicial system and govern-
ment of Israel’s security exigencies.
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The letter also reiterated Amnesty’s then position on administrative detention, 
outlined in the organization’s 1989 report, recommending that all those held in 
administrative detention “on account of their non-violent political opinions or 
activities be immediately and unconditionally released and all others to be  provided 
the opportunity to exercise effectively their right to challenge their detention”; and 
since administrative detention should not be used to avoid the safeguards of the 
criminal justice system, the Israeli authorities should “review the appropriate-
ness and necessity” of maintaining the practice. Although Amnesty did not at this 
point work under the framework of IHL, the fact that “internment” was contem-
plated (albeit in extreme circumstances) by the Fourth Geneva Convention meant 
that the organization did not take a position on human rights grounds calling 
unequivocally for the end of Israel’s use of administrative detention.72 The change 
in this position came at Amnesty’s Yokohama meeting in 1991; Amnesty’s Interna-
tional Council “decided to oppose as a matter of principle the detention of admin-
istrative detainees unless they are to be given a fair trial within a reasonable time.”73 
Other changes directly relating to Amnesty’s work on Israel and the occupied 
territories were also made at the 1991 meeting, which decided that Amnesty “will 
oppose the forcible exile of people on account of their non-violent beliefs” and “in 
principle to oppose the demolition or sealing of houses as a punishment imposed 
for political reasons.”74 Part of the background to the changes in Amnesty’s 
mandate was pressure from certain southern sections of Amnesty for a position 
shift in favor of substantive opposition to these administrative penalties. Another 
part of the context, however, was Amnesty staffers’ discussions with al-Haq and 
other Palestinian human rights organizations. Claudio Cordone, then Israel / 
occupied territories researcher at Amnesty, recalls intensive discussion with 
al-Haq staffers on IHL (given Amnesty’s then reliance on IHRL) and notes 
that “certainly work on the Occupied Territories and with al-Haq contributed to 
our thinking.” Cordone himself began to argue whether “IHL is more or less pro-
tective of human rights” and to consider IHL more systematically over the next 
few years.
An issue that took longer for Amnesty to address, that was fundamental to 
al-Haq and other Palestinian human rights groups, and that to their minds lay at 
the root of Israel’s other security justifications and resulting violations of civil and 
political rights was settlement policy and practice. Human Rights Watch took even 
longer. In this one can see a reflection of the disagreement reported by Steiner 
from the 1989 retreat, with the southern groups criticizing Westerns INGOs for 
too narrow a focus on individual civil and political rights and a failure to address 
in any depth the causes of human rights violations.75 Peter Rosenblum recalls “great 
internal struggles” in the late eighties at HRW and LCHR, in particular “over the 
extent of their advocacy on Israel and the Occupied Territories.”76 Rabbani offers 
several illustrations in support of his statement that “the activities of LCHR in 
particular have been hostage to a political agenda.”77 Neier describes HRW’s work 
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on Israel/Palestine as “the work that attracted by far the greatest controversy” for 
the organization’s Middle East division, referring to “widespread denunciations” 
of “findings critical of Israeli government practices.” In 2009 he found himself 
obliged to respond to a New York Times op-ed by HRW’s founding chair, Robert 
Bernstein, criticizing HRW’s coverage of Israeli violations during Israel’s assault on 
Gaza in 2008–2009.78
Al-Haq was engaged in collaborative work with its INGO colleagues on facts and 
fact-finding. As Steiner’s report of the discussions at the Crete retreat continued:
Gathering information is the principal occasion for cooperation between NGOs and 
INGOs. Local groups have greater access to the facts and can provide better docu-
mentation. But no simple division of functions exists. National NGOs do not “find 
the facts” which INGOs then incorporate into their reports.79
In the late 1980s it is clear that a certain amount of tension existed around the 
issue. For al-Haq, it was crucial to get the information on what was going on out 
to international allies with wider reach in terms of public and advocacy; but there 
was a considerable time and effort cost, especially for field-workers, who would 
often accompany researchers from INGOs in their field investigations, introduc-
ing them to a range of contacts.80 The relationship differed between different orga-
nizations and indeed their different representatives; Claudio Cordone of Amnesty 
recalls of al-Haq in the late 1980s:
I was very impressed by the number of people involved, the quality of their thinking. 
It wasn’t just “give me information,” that was even too much, it was the discussions 
[ . . . ] I mean al-Haq was doing affidavits and getting the information, but it was the 
discussions of strategy, what do we do with them that were even more valuable.
From al-Haq’s perspective, assisting research visits by international actors was 
a matter of methodology and principle, and of hard work. In the case of spe-
cial international delegations not familiar with the context, it also represented a 
considerable degree of risk, beyond risks taken by the field-workers, which was 
sometimes not appreciated by delegation members. Foreign delegates variously 
fell asleep in meetings with Palestinian interlocutors, failed to pay attention, can-
celed meetings at short notice and for no apparent or acceptable reason, and on 
at least one occasion saw no problem in accepting lifts with an Israeli army jeep 
on a strike day when their transport could not be organized on time.81 Al-Haq’s 
international allies, it turned out, brought potential liabilities not foreseen by 
the organization.
Al-Haq files contain a confidential letter from Raja Shehadeh written in the 
late 1980s to an international organization that had dispatched a delegation to 
the territories. Al-Haq was hosting the delegation and as the visit unfolded became 
more and more concerned at its direction and the conduct of individual members. 
Shehadeh’s letter referred to al-Haq’s “dashed hopes” and attached a detailed confi-
dential report as a record, in the hope that this might “facilitate planning for future 
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missions.” The details in the report are embarrassing. For its part, the letter talks of 
a unilateral narrowing of the scope of the mandate—on the basis of which al-Haq 
had agreed to host it—by members of the mission, with the result, in al-Haq’s view, 
that the problems encountered were not necessarily understood in their proper 
context; of a doubt on al-Haq’s part about the desire of the mission to fulfill an 
investigative function, of a lack of preparedness and a lack of probing. Shehadeh 
concluded with an explanation of how such matters affected not only al-Haq’s own 
credibility and reputation, but potentially the effectiveness of the delegation:
Al-Haq’s position as a Palestinian human rights organisation, arranging a  programme 
which involved meetings with Palestinians, Israelis and the Israeli authorities was a 
sensitive one. The mission failed to appreciate the difficulties and jeopardised the ef-
fectiveness of their mission by inappropriate and insensitive behaviour which caused 
disquiet among the Palestinian community. This could have led to a refusal to coop-
erate with the mission on the part of Palestinians in the Territories.
Field-workers interviewed for this study stressed the effort that went into assist-
ing and accompanying international delegations. Candy Whittome, a UK lawyer 
who acted as coordinator in the office for many of the international delegations or 
partners, remembers that “normally I was pretty annoyed with them.”82 She spent 
considerable time reminding these visitors that it was a two-way relationship; 
there was “such a journey” to be traveled in the relationship between international 
human rights groups and their local counterparts; there was no joint planning, 
the field-workers were “running around and barely getting any thanks, grace was 
lacking.” Pondering on this later, she reflects:
I’m not sure I was brave enough to use the word at the time but exploitation is the 
word that springs to mind. I felt very strongly that people came with models of how 
things should be and they were simply thinking about it in their terms, we need this 
information you’ve got, then we—the great, the good, the powerful—we can publish 
it and then we’ll make everything all right for you [ . . . ] Obviously I’m exaggerating 
the point, but there was a strong feeling that this was not a partnership or a collabo-
ration, it was “we need this from you, we need the information, where is it?” Obvi-
ously some were better than others and you saw that quite clearly.83
Whittome stresses the importance of these episodes in building the relationship 
and getting out al-Haq’s information, and reports productive discussions when 
the human costs and complexities of al-Haq’s contribution to their visit were 
explained to members of different delegations. Increasing confidence and 
improvements in communications technology have changed much. For one 
thing, as Donatella Rovera of Amnesty International says, the local-international 
NGO dynamic has changed: “The days are gone when international NGOs would 
squeeze local ones for their data—now the local NGOs can publish it themselves, 
why should they give it to internationals?” In some cases, international organi-
zations now publish joint reports with local ones. Palestinian (and indeed other 
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Arab) human rights groups expect peer relationships with their international 
counterparts,  particularly given increasing recognition of the formers’ founda-
tional role in the global movement.
THE ICRC
One of the most significant disagreements that al-Haq had with an international 
partner was with the ICRC. ICRC delegates arrived in Israel a few days before the 
1967 war, alerted by growing tensions in the region to the likelihood of a need for 
its presence.84 The 1967 war was a turning point for the working methods of the 
ICRC, with a “fundamental shift in the behaviour of the institution as it now antici-
pated its possible interventions.”85 Another distinguishing feature is pointed out by 
Moorehead, writing in 1998 that, despite fluctuations in the number of delegates 
and offices over the years, “it [Israel] is the only country which the Committee 
has never judged sufficiently peaceable to enable it to withdraw all its delegates.”86 
A posting in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem was a formative experience for ICRC person-
nel.87 The many complex contextual issues include the ICRC’s notoriously dismal 
record in regard to Jewish and other victims of Nazi Germany in the Second World 
War, when the ICRC by all accounts (including subsequently its own) “lost its nor-
mative compass.”88 Moorehead’s history of the ICRC invokes a “famous meeting” 
when it was agreed that “it was not in the best interests of the International Com-
mittee or of the victims of war they had been set up to protect to speak out about 
the concentration camps.”89 This goes most immediately to the ICRC’s deployment 
of its confidentiality policy and the decisions it takes on when to speak out. In 
regard to ICRC delegates in Israel, Moorehead says, “in no other country does the 
Committee’s war time past surface so relentlessly.”90
The Swiss organization’s status and mandate is distinct from human rights 
NGOs, lawyers’ groups, and other international allies. It is a humanitarian agency 
specifically focused on IHL, the “guardian” of the Geneva Conventions. ICRC 
 delegates—in LSM’s early days a role restricted to Swiss nationals—were in regular 
contact and dialogue with LSM from the start. Under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, the occupying power is obliged to request or accept “the offer of the services 
of a humanitarian organisation, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers”91 
should the system of protecting powers fail and the protected population of the 
occupied territories be left without a neutral state to act as representative of all the 
state parties to the convention in safeguarding their rights and interests as pro-
tected under the convention. Early in the occupation, and “in spite of the ICRC’s 
persistent representations,” the Israeli government “declared that it wished ‘to leave 
in abeyance for the time being’ the question of the applicability of the Fourth Con-
vention in the occupied territories, preferring to act on a pragmatic basis by grant-
ing delegates practical facilities.”92 Holding that the convention applied de jure, in 
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1972 ICRC made a formal offer to act as an official substitute for the protecting 
power, which Israel declined; by now unequivocally holding that the convention 
did not apply as a matter of law, the Israeli authorities claimed that they would 
abide by its “humanitarian provisions” but not its “political provisions”—a distinc-
tion not recognized in the convention itself, nor by the ICRC and state parties.93
This was the position advanced by Haim Cohn in his introduction to the Israeli 
ICJ’s response to LSM’s The West Bank and the Rule of Law. In 1977, the ICRC 
had made a public statement to the effect that a number of problems it had been 
raising regularly with the Israeli authorities remained unresolved, and they were 
still not allowed to see detainees under interrogation.94 Negotiations continued, 
and in 1978 the ICRC and the Israeli Government concluded a formal agreement 
to govern the ICRC’s action in the occupied territories.95 The Israeli government 
undertook to inform the ICRC twelve days after any arrest of Palestinians from the 
occupied territories and to grant delegates access to the detainee within fourteen 
days of the arrest; during a visit, the ICRC delegate could speak to the detainee 
“only about his personal situation and the state of his health” and was “prohibited 
from transmitting any information whatsoever to an outside body or to the fam-
ily of the detainee other than the date of arrest, the place and date of visit and the 
detainee’s state of health.”96
As Shehadeh acknowledged, the argument in support of this arrangement was 
that such visits were better than no visits at all.97 When mass arrests began in the 
first intifada, al-Haq itself was only able to find out the whereabouts of some of 
its detained field-workers through the ICRC. However, frustration was growing 
with the limits—both contractual and self-imposed—of the ICRC’s activities in 
the occupied territories. Shehadeh noted that the fourteen days before ICRC visits 
provided the military authorities with ample time to isolate and interrogate and 
mistreat detainees, and that “in the opinion of many ex-prisoners, the visits of the 
ICRC were of little, if any, significance or practical help.”98 With its work on al-
Fara’a prison in the forefront, al-Haq was beginning to feel like a voice in the wil-
derness, as one interviewee recalled, and clearly they felt that the ICRC should be 
speaking out. A 1985 Newsletter set out concerns about the use made by the Israeli 
authorities of the fact that the ICRC did not (could not) share its information or 
its reports with “anyone other than the Israeli authorities”; this was in  relation 
to LSM/al-Haq’s investigation of complaints against Israeli medical personnel, 
described above. Al-Haq noted, “It is the Israeli authorities’ practice to refer to the 
Red Cross visits whenever allegations are made about prison conditions, as though 
the silence of the Red Cross disproves the allegations.”99 
Al-Haq was becoming frustrated with the confidentiality policy of the ICRC—
not a policy specific to the occupied territories—and its reluctance to go public 
even with broader concerns that would not violate its agreement with the Israeli 
authorities. In its second report in the uprising, al-Haq noted the ICRC’s public 
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statements on the Iran-Iraq war in 1983–84 in regard to the duty of all state parties 
to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions:
It is therefore surprising, although irrelevant from a legal point of view, that the 
ICRC has made no such public appeal to state signatories in response to Israel’s 
22-year-old occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The danger clearly inher-
ent in such a policy is that the ICRC’s silence may be interpreted as tacit approval of 
Israel’s policy. In such an event the continued presence of the ICRC might become 
counterproductive.100
Al-Haq’s relations with the ICRC were becoming fraught. As the first intifada wore 
on, the ICRC did make a number of public statements about Israel’s treatment 
of Palestinian detainees, stating in 1992, for example, that through private inter-
views with those under interrogation “it has reached the conclusion that to obtain 
information and confessions from detainees, means of physical and psychological 
pressure are being used” in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and that 
ICRC representations to the Israeli authorities had had no effect.101 It might have 
been this public intervention that was the cause of a return to “icy formality, and a 
very literal interpretation of our mandate” by the Israeli authorities, described by 
a former ICRC delegate.102 On the practical level, the ICRC’s medical, health, and 
other services to the West Bank and Gaza increased in range and in focus as the 
occupation dragged on.103
It is now clear that a further distinguishing feature of the ICRC’s relationship 
with Israel and the occupied territories arose directly from Israel’s sustained refusal 
to acknowledge the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and its 
equally persistent structural violations manifested most obviously in settlement 
policy. At the start of 2012, an interview with Raja Shehadeh was published in the 
International Review of the Red Cross as part of a special thematic edition on occu-
pation. Selected for interview as “someone who has lived and practised law in an 
occupied territory,”104 Shehadeh was asked what his expectations had been of the 
ICRC. Shehadeh first paid tribute to the “help given on a small scale” to detainees 
otherwise in isolation, which was “not to be underrated.” However, looking back, 
he observed, “Maybe my expectations were simply too high. [ . . . ] Maybe that’s 
always a problem when you start out with high hopes—the hopes are dashed.” He 
then went on to regret what he had perceived as
reluctance on the part of the ICRC to take up issues in an effective way, to speak 
out openly against the settlements or the civil administration, and to use every pos-
sible power the organization has to help put a stop to these detrimental violations. 
Sometimes I detected more fear of speaking out against Israel than I had witnessed 
in Israel itself.
He had himself challenged ICRC delegates on many occasions. He agreed with the 
importance of “being economical in the frequency of public statements”—after all, 
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this had also been the practice at al-Haq. However, he was of the opinion that “the 
ICRC did not speak out when it should have.”
The same volume of the Review, published on the 150th anniversary of the 
founding of the ICRC, included a paper by the then ICRC president, Peter Maurer, 
on “Israel’s occupation policy,” presented as a decision by the ICRC “to engage in 
a public debate over these issues.”105 Maurer tells his readers that “the particular 
challenges of humanitarian action” in Israel and the occupied territories cannot 
be tackled without “an honest look at certain Israeli policies that have become key 
features of the occupation.”106
The ICRC has been unable to engage in any meaningful dialogue with the Israeli 
 government on the impact for Palestinians of Israel’s annexation of East Jerusa-
lem, the routing of the West Bank Barrier, and the presence and further expansion 
of Israeli settlements. The ICRC has therefore opted to engage with civil society,  
academia, and the Israeli public directly in explaining its position regarding the 
 discrepancies between IHL and the Israeli Government’s policy in the Occupied 
 Palestinian Territory.107
If this initiative was a departure for the ICRC in method, it was not a change in 
position. The ICRC had, in previous public communications over the years, made 
clear its position on the IHL rules governing Israel’s occupation of the Palestin-
ian territories (including East Jerusalem).108 Introducing the reader to the 150th 
anniversary issue of the Review, the editor-in-chief stated that “over the years 
the ICRC has chosen to develop direct and confidential dialogue as its privileged 
method of engagement with its interlocutors”—this approach was “at the core of 
its identity.”109 At stake was access to those the ICRC was committed to assisting, 
which meant building and maintaining the trust and confidence of its interlocu-
tors. Bernard insisted on the effectiveness of the confidentiality approach “from 
the humanitarian point of view” while stressing that it was not unconditional, that 
progress must be made, and that the quality of the dialogue was important.
As part of engaging in public debate, the Review solicited and published a 
response to Maurer’s piece by Alan Baker, who had served as legal adviser to the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as a military legal adviser in the Israeli 
army, among other positions.110 It is hard to read into Baker’s response any positive 
movement towards the ICRC’s suggestion of a public debate and dialogue. Baker 
repeated the official Israeli positions on all the issues of law and policy raised by 
Maurer as core concerns for the ICRC, repeating the standard assertion that in any 
case the convention did not apply.111 He did not take up the issue of the confiden-
tiality dilemma posed by Maurer for discussion, but rather took the ICRC to task 
on another of its core principles, the “fundamental principle of neutrality.” Baker 
tackled Maurer for his use of the designation “occupied Palestinian territory,” 
which Baker rejected as “inaccurate historically and legally, and [ . . . ] inherently 
and clearly politically slanted.”112 Turning at the end to the ICRC’s idea of a public 
debate on Israel’s occupation policies, Baker told the ICRC president:
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Engaging the public, whether through public speeches and statements, the public  
use of politically-generated terminology, reliance on biased and inaccurate infor-
mation, and the adoption of formal policy positions based in political assumptions 
that have the potential to influence, undermine or prejudice ongoing processes of 
negotiation and reconciliation, would all appear to run contrary to the fundamental 
principle of neutrality.113
For Baker, insisting on IHL principles risked disrupting rather than underpinning 
political negotiations. These arguments are similar to those that blocked devel-
opment of law-based political positions by European states in deference to a US 
political agenda following the first intifada.
THE ENFORCEMENT PROJECT
Notwithstanding al-Haq’s criticism of the ICRC in the 1980s, a dialogue had been 
opened up with delegates in Jerusalem and through them with officials in the 
Geneva-based Department of Principles, Law and Relations with the Movement. 
From al-Haq’s side, this effort was led by Charles Shammas and focused on the 
rights and duties of Israel’s coparties to the Fourth Geneva Convention in afford-
ing protection to the Palestinian population. Al-Haq Draft Program Objectives for 
1987 noted that it was
imperative for al-Haq to seek to activate alternative mechanisms of enforcement and 
accountability within the international community of law. Towards this end, al-Haq 
plans to address governmental and non-governmental members of the system who 
proclaim adherence to the body of human rights and humanitarian law with the 
intention of enforcing on them their obligation to investigate and intervene against 
violations, and to participate in enforcement.114
The first direct “Appeal to State Signatories to the IV Geneva Convention” was 
issued as a press release (its tenth ever) by al-Haq five days into the first intifada, 
calling on states “to intervene urgently with the Israeli authorities to halt the  killing 
and wounding of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.”115 Describing 
its repeated interventions with the Israeli authorities over the previous three years 
regarding instances of death and wounding caused by the use of live ammunition, 
and noting the authorities’ “tacit approval of the ‘shoot-to-kill’ practices of the 
military,” the organization explained:
Al-Haq is calling upon the state signatories to the Fourth Geneva Convention to car-
ry out their legal and moral obligations under the Convention. Under Article 1 of the 
Convention, signatory countries have undertaken not only to respect the Convention 
themselves, but also to ensure respect for the Convention. The underlying principle 
on which the Convention rests, namely respect for human life, is being violated.116
The next month, as the European Parliament was considering the ratification of 
new trade protocols with Israel, the Israeli authorities issued nine deportation 
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orders as their violent reaction to the intifada continued. A memorandum by al-
Haq explained the organization’s standing to make a direct claim on state parties 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention:
Al-Haq has addressed the enclosed memorandum to the European Community, its 
President, Parliament and member states, in its capacity as part of the protected pop-
ulation recognised by the Convention, and on behalf of that population. We present 
it as a Palestinian petitioner with standing under the Convention, with a right to 
claim the protection of the Member States and of the European Community. In so 
doing, we affirm our obligation to help activate the body of humanitarian law, the 
respect for which we believe unites us.117
The memorandum reminded state parties of their “duty under Article 1 to ‘ensure 
respect’ by third parties” and argued:
To renew preferential trading privileges in the face of Israel’s continuing serious 
 violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and in the face of Israel’s proclaimed 
intent to persist in committing such violations, would be an act of acquiescence to 
Israeli lawlessness.118
It followed that, before ratification of the EEC trade agreement with Israel, states 
should request, “as a condition precedent, an undertaking by Israel to comply with 
its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention.” It was a departure for al-
Haq to directly address elected parliamentarians in this manner. In the autumn 
of 1988, the Enforcement Project was formally established with the recruitment of 
a full-time worker (myself), based in London and going between Europe and 
Ramallah, and the participation of staffers in Ramallah. The end of 1988 saw al-
Haq publish its first annual report, a development driven entirely by the continu-
ing escalation of the intifada and Israel’s reactions to it, rather than by forward 
planning. The conclusion invokes Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as 
a basis for “active international intervention to safeguard the lives and rights of 
the Palestinians as protected persons.”119 Its more planned-for successor, A Nation 
under Siege, gave sustained attention to the arguments being developed by the 
enforcement team.
During 1989, the second year of the intifada, al-Haq delivered interventions 
to governments through their consulates in East Jerusalem, calling for in situ 
 monitoring and intervention by consular officials and the conduct of consular 
investigations, notably after a massive raid and multiple casualties in the West 
Bank village of Nahhalin and after “tax raids” in Beit Sahour.120 The first of these 
protested “the failure of State Signatories to the Fourth Geneva Convention to 
provide any effective measure of international protection to the Palestinian popu-
lation of the Occupied Territories” and appears to have been the first intervention 
in which al-Haq specifically drew attention to the category of grave breaches of the 
convention. The second urged consuls (in the absence of a protecting power) to 
“visit Beit Sahour and intervene with the Israeli military and tax authorities there, 
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in order to provide a measure of physical protection for the inhabitants of the town 
in line with your duties under Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949.” 
Consuls-general of seven European states set out on a fact-finding visit, only to be 
turned back at a roadblock by an Israeli officer who stated that the town had been 
closed “for operational reasons.”121 The British consul-general also visited Nablus 
and called for an investigation into a killing by the Israeli army.122 Following a 
formal complaint made against the British consul-general by the Israeli ambas-
sador in London, a parliamentary question prompted a Foreign Office minister to 
confirm that the consul-general had “done nothing without instructions from the 
British Government” and “nothing outside his proper role.”123
In the meantime, the Enforcement Project was also developing its Europe-
focused advocacy and allies. In the summer the first of four “enforcement sympo-
sia” was held, each with the participation of legal and political actors. These were 
the result of steady efforts in making contacts, presenting arguments, drafting par-
liamentary questions, sending letters to ministers, and other interventions. Other 
advocacy groups use similar methods, but al-Haq’s efforts were distinguished at 
the time by its focus on IHL and third-party states’ law-based rights and responsi-
bilities. Besides setting out to a wider audience al-Haq’s thinking on the law-based 
role of third parties, the symposia provided related opportunities; in London in 
1989, for example, to draw out the ICRC. In response to a letter sent to its president 
by the two British MPs convening the enforcement symposium, the director of the 
ICRC’s Principles, Law and Relations with the Movement Department wrote back 
confirming that:
The ICRC considers it vital that the States party to the Geneva Conventions take all 
possible steps to ensure respect for that body of law, the purpose of which is to lessen 
the suffering of people affected by armed conflict. It is moreover a legal obligation for 
them to do so because, in becoming party to the Geneva Conventions, those States 
have undertaken not only to respect the said Conventions themselves, but also to en-
sure respect for them by other States in all circumstances. This is the tenor of Article 
1 common to the four Conventions.124
The ICRC response had taken a while to be drafted (the MPs’ letter was sent over 
three months before), but it arrived in time to be included in the publication aris-
ing from the symposium.125 Back in Ramallah, al-Haq was preparing its second 
annual report, A Nation under Siege, which was to show the impact of the develop-
ing enforcement thinking. A chapter titled “The Role of the International Com-
munity” set out how different law-based options and roles came together in this 
context, and the report’s exposition of violations committed over the course of the 
year identified those constituting “grave breaches” of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. As a category of violations, grave breaches are the only instance where other 
state parties are required to take specific action, promulgating legislation allowing 
them to prosecute those against whom there is relevant evidence wherever the 
violation occurred.126 In Ramallah, fieldwork coordinator Khaled Batrawi opened 
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“grave breaches” files in an early attempt to collect documentation for use in crimi-
nal cases against alleged perpetrators, albeit the organization’s understanding of 
evidential and other requirements was, at that time, rudimentary.127
The Enforcement Project was thus from the start distinguished from al-Haq’s 
treatment of the law, and documentation of violations, by its focus on how to 
get third states acting in support of the law.128 The exigencies of the intifada and 
the Israeli authorities’ response thereto gave enormous impetus to the work and 
secured an audience for the arguments. As Shammas has put it, “largely untutored 
in the workings of international law, the Project’s approach was based on logi-
cal necessity: we needed the law to work, and logically it had to work: we had to 
work out how.”129 With the ICRC, he recalls, “we [the Project] were recognised as 
a kind of very operational provocateur in terms of questions of doctrine.” In 1990, 
Shammas was invited as a panelist—along with members of the international legal 
community—at the Fifteenth Roundtable of the International Institute of Human-
itarian Law in San Remo, an annual event convened by the ICRC and other non-
governmental and intergovernmental actors, to contribute to the discussion on 
Article 1’s requirement of state parties to “ensure respect for” the convention. The 
summary of proceedings reports that the majority in the working group took 
the view that “although the majority of the participants in the Diplomatic Con-
ference of 1949 [which adopted the texts of the Conventions] did not intend the 
phrase ‘ensure respect for’ to engage the responsibility of third States, it had now 
become clear that Article 1 created both a right and an obligation for third States 
to ensure respect for IHL.”130
The ICRC’s interpretation is not accepted by all IHL scholars and experts, but 
it is a measure of the reach of this advocacy that those who disagreed nevertheless 
paid attention to the arguments made by al-Haq and its allies. Prominent Dutch 
jurist Frits Kalshoven explained as follows the arguments of those he referred to as 
“the Palestinians and their supporters”:
Their argument: by virtue of common Article 1, all states, and particularly those 
with close relations with Israel, are under an obligation to ensure that Israel respects 
all the rules of the Fourth Convention relative to military occupation. In support  
of their contention, they rely squarely on the ICRC Commentaries to the Conven-
tions. Their interest was, and is, of course, to see that Israel remains under constant 
international pressure to relinquish the territory it keeps occupied. Given that inter-
est, they may be forgiven for accepting the ICRC stance as gospel truth.131
That same year, 1990, also saw significant action by regional and intergovernmen-
tal bodies in regard to the application of IHL to the occupied territories—and, 
critically, the role of third-party states. The context included key events in the 
ongoing intifada as well as developments in Israel and internationally. The then 
Soviet Union was exercised about reports that large numbers of Jewish Soviet citi-
zens emigrating to Israel under recently agreed arrangements were being  settled 
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in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, and sought to have the 
issue of settlements addressed in the Security Council. The United States, while 
 generally avoiding asserting its previous position of the illegality of Israel’s settle-
ment policy in favor of insisting that settlements were an obstacle to peace, held 
up a significant US loan guarantee to Israel for the housing of Soviet immigrants 
when Israel declined to give assurance that the funds would not be used directly 
or indirectly to support settlement activity in the occupied territories and par-
ticularly East Jerusalem. In the meantime, the killing of seven Palestinian workers 
inside Israel in May and the killing of fifteen and wounding of some two thousand 
others during ensuing protests in the occupied territories prompted the drafting 
of what became known as the “protection resolution” at the UN Security Council. 
This envisaged a Security Council Commission being dispatched to recommend 
“ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians 
under Israeli occupation.” At the end of May, the United States vetoed the draft 
resolution, but the issue returned in October, particularly after mass killings and 
injuries at al-Haram al-Sharif in East Jerusalem. With Israel still refusing to receive 
a team from the UN secretary-general, a report was written without a visit, giv-
ing specific focus to the obligations of Israel and also of third-party states under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. Negotiations began at the Security Council on the 
text of a resolution.
These negotiations were still in progress when in December Israel announced 
deportation orders against four Palestinians from Gaza. The UNSC adopted 
 Resolution 681 (1990), which called upon state parties to the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention “to ensure respect by Israel of its obligations in accordance with Article 1.” 
Dormann and Serralvo give this resolution as an example of states actively seek-
ing to prevent violations of IHL in furtherance of their duty under Article 1 “to 
ensure respect” for the convention, acting as they did on Israel’s announcement 
of its intent to commit the violations.132 These developments were analyzed by 
al-Haq in its third annual report, Protection Denied. Al-Haq described the adop-
tion of Resolution 681 as “a milestone.” It was the first time the organization had 
reviewed UN developments in this way.133 Elsewhere in the region, in August Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, and in January 1991 US-led forces engaged Iraqi troops in Kuwait 
in Operation Desert Storm. The aftermath of this included fresh efforts by the US 
administration to broker Israeli-Palestinian talks that were to lead to the Madrid 
talks later in 1991. In Protection Denied, al-Haq inter alia drew attention to the 
fact that the Security Council had been quick to explicitly allege grave breaches of 
the Geneva Convention by Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait, while remaining 
unable to agree on a text that would refer to Israel’s policy-based grave breaches in 
the occupied territories.134
In June 1990, after the United States had vetoed the draft “protection  resolution” 
at the Security Council, al-Haq and the PHRIC in Jerusalem issued a statement 
titled “Representation to State Signatories of the Fourth Geneva Convention” 
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that addressed a set of possible measures to be taken, firstly through the United 
Nations and secondly by individual states. The accompanying supplement was 
titled “The Need for International Protection.”135 This representation is the most 
indicative statement of the thinking of al-Haq on enforcement in the circum-
stances of that period. It began with the possibility for protection to be afforded 
by the action of third-party states through the United Nations in accordance with 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) and the stationing of an observer force 
in the occupied territories. In the end, it was not until 1997 that the UN General 
Assembly employed the Uniting for Peace mechanism to establish the Tenth Emer-
gency Session (on “illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of 
the occupied Palestinian territory”).136 This forum reconvened over the years and 
gave rise to three conferences of High Contracting Parties on “measures to enforce 
the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territories” (in 1999, 
after further vetoing by the United States at the UN; in 2001 after Ariel Sharon’s 
visit to al-Haram al-Sharif and the eruption of the second intifada; and in 2014, 
after Israel’s summer assault on Gaza). These conferences produced no discussions 
on mechanisms to operationalize the law.137 The introduction of “refugee protec-
tion officers” by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), follow-
ing Security Council Resolution 681 (1990), was to prove important in many indi-
vidual cases, although the public reporting mechanism quickly ceased to operate. 
The other observation/monitoring mechanism instituted by international actors 
in the occupied territories, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
(TIPH), was established after the massacre at the Ibrahimi mosque by Israeli set-
tler Baruch Goldstein at the end of 1994. The TIPH was created outside the frame-
work of IHL and given no public reporting mandate or authority to intervene; it 
remained in the city of Hebron until expelled by Israeli prime minister Netanyahu 
at the end of January 2019.138
As for action by states “jointly and severally,” the 1990 representation suggested 
how states might instruct their consular officials and asked states to confirm that 
monitoring Israel’s compliance with the convention was a principal duty of these 
officials and in their own national interest, given their obligations under Article 1. 
The eliciting of statements from “like-minded states”—which would acknowledge 
a common interest in upholding the norms and protections of IHL—was an initial 
focus of the Enforcement Project, supported by its advocacy efforts in the countries 
and institutions of the then EEC. The reaction of PLO representatives and officials 
in different European countries at the time was varied, sometimes supportive and 
excited, mostly rather disinterested; direct contact at the time would have posed a 
risk to al-Haq, but the arguments were presented through intermediaries.
The circumstances of the time allowed a measure of success to these efforts. At 
the end of June 1990, the Dublin Declaration, issued by the European Council 
at the end of the Irish presidency, included an unprecedented reference to the obli-
gation of parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to respect and ensure respect 
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for the convention in the occupied territories.139 In December the adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution 681 (1990) also provided space for efforts to 
encourage “like-minded states” to consider ways of operationalizing the law 
through efforts to act in cooperation (in accordance with United Nations princi-
ples) in defense of the law. The secretary-general was asked to solicit the opinions 
of member states on ways and means to ensure the safety and protection of the 
Palestinian population, specifically seeking their input on the idea of convening 
a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention. In 
May 1991, a common response from the then twelve member states of the Euro-
pean Community supported the idea of a meeting at a “favourable time.” In the 
meantime, they would be considering the establishment of a “consultative com-
mittee” which could seek ways of ensuring respect for the convention in the occu-
pied territories.
The final part of al-Haq’s 1990 representation to the signatory states concerned 
the duties of third-party states in regard to grave breaches of the convention by the 
occupying power. The exercise of universal jurisdiction over grave breaches had 
been an early focus for the Enforcement Project, being the only measure of enforce-
ment that state parties to the convention are under an obligation to take. At the 
time, there was considerably less interest, knowledge, and activity around the issue 
of universal criminal jurisdiction than is the case now; the International Criminal 
Court was nearly a decade away. The only available criminal court recourse, failing 
that of the occupying power, remained the national courts of third state parties, 
which had no history of being put to such use. The initial research and contacts 
made by al-Haq’s Enforcement Project, although valuable, could not take such 
hugely complicated efforts forward. It was not until many years later that moves 
towards prosecutions in third states for grave breaches began in earnest.140
In 1990, the scale of violations taking place during the intifada and the quite 
desperate situation of the civilian Palestinian population, combined with a grow-
ing international perception of Israel’s intransigence and a relatively facilitative 
international climate, had made it possible to secure some developments towards 
a law-based approach, in particular on the part of EU states and their diplomatic 
personnel. This was short-lived. As of the spring of 1991, against the background 
of the first Iraq war, these developments and initiatives were shelved in deference 
to the US-led political initiative in the region. The Madrid talks, the Oslo pro-
cesses, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority transformed the context 
yet again.141 Hajjar notes in relation to the political process that “the biggest blow 
for the human rights movement was the direction the negotiations took, namely 
the emphasis on security and territory rather than rights.”142 The United States 
began to consider IHL as an unacceptably tight constraint on its political inter-
ventions, and European states had no political will to challenge the US on this. 
From being the law that was designed to facilitate an end to conflict, IHL came to 
be viewed, by powerful third parties, as itself an obstacle to peace.143
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By the time of the 1993 Declaration of Principles, the institutional home of 
the Enforcement Project had moved away from al-Haq and was now hosted next 
door in the office of MATTIN as the ambitiously named Centre for International 
Human Rights Enforcement (CIHRE). By the late 1990s, the work had devel-
oped into MATTIN’s core program, and Shammas and his colleagues worked 
with European and Palestinian allies (as well as advising Palestinian officials) in 
an increasingly technocratic focus on “passive enforcement” in sustained engage-
ment with European Union states and bodies.144 The articulation of the established 
state duty of nonrecognition as the legal obligation incurred in the Article 1 text 
“to ensure respect” was a key development that has also been taken up by other 
Palestinian human rights organizations and allied advocacy. Shammas has termed 
this approach noncontentious, while noting that “more unusual was its applica-
tion, in technical detail, to areas of state practice such as community law, rules 
of origin and other texts of trade agreements.”145 In 2013, Shammas’s sustained 
work with MATTIN colleagues on the responsibility of EU member states in this 
regard was credited in an al-Haq position paper in further illustration, perhaps, 
of how work once regarded as controversial in the human rights field has been 
mainstreamed.146 In the summer of 2013, in a major breakthrough, the European 
Commission issued a notice implementing a previous position that “all agree-
ments between the State of Israel and the EU must unequivocally and explicitly 
indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.”147 Al-Haq 
posted on its website a notice welcoming this development in the name of the Pal-
estinian Human Rights Organisations Council (PHROC), with the logos of eleven 
council members attached.148 In a further breakthrough, in 2015 the Commission 
gave “interpretive notice” on the identification of the origins of goods from the 
“territories occupied by Israel since June 1967”—as PHROC hailed it, “EU label-
ling of settlement products” to ensure they do not enter EU markets as “produce 
of / made in Israel.”
However, at al-Haq in the early nineties, the Enforcement Project was increas-
ingly being seen as problematic. As the work took a higher profile both locally and 
internationally, a number of doctrinal and political challenges were posed. Perhaps 
the most significant was—and is—whether there is a conflict, or contradiction, 
between working to achieve the implementation of IHL in the occupied territories 
and working to achieve an end to the Israeli occupation. This objection was made 
by local and international interlocutors at the beginning of al-Haq’s Enforcement 
Project; and it has been, and continues to be, voiced explicitly by individuals with 
an interest in the law, including legal practitioners and academics, as well as by 
actors engaged in the broader political debates and—implicitly—by those tired of 
the rhetoric of international law in the face of its manifest failure to protect.
Against the background of massive violations of IHL during the first intifada 
and unprecedented media coverage of the same, this anxiety reflected concerns 
that for external actors to oblige Israel into an attitude of compliance with its 
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 obligations as an occupying power would be to return to the previous image of 
Israel as a benign occupier. If Israel were obliged to correct its conduct, would the 
international attention given to addressing the situation, prompted and fueled by 
the ferocity and visibility of ongoing violations of IHL, be reduced and the politi-
cal impetus to bring Israel into negotiations about ending the occupation falter?
Al-Haq’s Enforcement Project—and its successors—argued that the logic of the 
law is otherwise.149 IHL does not “preserve” a situation of occupation, but does reg-
ulate it. It should serve as a holding mechanism for the status of the occupied ter-
ritories and the rights of the population, but also facilitate ending the occupation. 
Fundamentally, the law establishes protections for an occupied population and 
prohibits the occupying power from pursuing an annexationist agenda. Properly 
implemented, the law protects the prospects for political settlement from being 
derailed by the rancor caused by serious human rights abuses, and from impasses 
created by policies of conquest and annexation, in pursuit of which abuses are 
committed. By rendering such policies and their results illegal in and of them-
selves, the law is supposed to remove potentially intractable obstacles from the 
negotiating process, and to offer the occupying power, prohibited from acquiring 
any significant advantage from the land or resources, little prospect of gain in pro-
longing its occupation. Conversely, reluctance by powerful third parties to act in 
defense of the law when challenged by the occupying power can undermine both 
the will to negotiate and support for those charged with negotiating. In the case 
of Israel, after years of failure to ensure Israel’s compliance with IHL, its violations 
of international law became the basis upon which negotiations, once started, were 
premised. Failure to respect or ensure respect for the law thus had (and contin-
ues to have) tangible consequences for both human rights protection and dispute 
resolution. In the case of the occupied territories, de facto toleration of its non-
implementation has led to the “creation of facts” in violation of the  convention—
most notably settlements and the annexation of East Jerusalem—that continue 
to constitute some of the most difficult and apparently intractable issues on the 
negotiating agenda, such as it is.
Doubts about the political utility of seeking law-based conduct by the occu-
pying power had been posed to al-Haq’s founders and field-workers since the 
establishment of the organization. Nevertheless, Rabbani’s 1994 understanding 
of the Enforcement Project was that it occasioned a “gradual politicization” in 
al-Haq, whether through those whom the project was engaging (“politicians as 
a primary audience”) or the associated “necessity to develop appealing political 
 arguments”150—what might be described as utilitarian arguments linking law-based 
action with political goals desirable to European political interlocutors. Some al-
Haqqers apparently worried that the enforcement approach might undermine the 
political battle to end the occupation and realize the right to self-determination.
This argument became pertinent again alongside internal developments. The 
talks in Madrid and Washington began to bring out political differences among 
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 al-Haq staffers that were not easily submerged by the considerable ongoing work-
load. The Madrid talks of 1991 also provided the immediate cause for Raja Sheha-
deh’s decision to leave al-Haq’s board when invited to join the Palestinian delegation 
to Madrid and then the United States as a legal adviser. Jonathan Kuttab left at the 
same time—he and Shehadeh, as well as Shammas to a certain extent, had wearied 
of the heavy responsibilities and the increasing wrangling among al-Haq staffers. 
And all had other professional engagements to which they wished to devote more 
time than their al-Haq duties permitted. Staff-board differences included remaining 
anger on the part of some staffers over Mona Rishmawi’s departure and at the depar-
ture of two members of the founding board, as well as the eventual failure to forge a 
working relationship with the new board. The Enforcement Project was probably as 
much a victim of these turbulent developments as of its own weaknesses.
Among al-Haq workers, there were other reservations about the project. Inter-
viewed for this study, staffers from the time recalled finding the Enforcement 
Project—variously—new, unclear, badly communicated, “parachuted in,” highly 
complex, esoteric, the “fourth generation of human rights work,” “a very strange 
project for us,” and scary—“we weren’t sure where was it taking us.”151 Khaled 
Batrawi, an enthusiastic member of the Enforcement Team, says that the work was 
“not among the known alphabets” of human rights work at the time.152 Internally, it 
was al-Haq’s most controversial project. A number of factors appear to have com-
bined to generate discomfort, starting with the direct engagement with elements 
of foreign political systems. Seeking action from powerful third-party states to 
correct conduct by the occupying power did not hold the same costs for Palestin-
ians in the occupied territories as it would for those working in national systems 
with sovereign governments; nevertheless, for rather different reasons, some at al-
Haq felt that talking to governments was the prerogative of the PLO, as the Pales-
tinians’ political representative. Here, even with Jerusalem-based consuls-general, 
Mona Rishmawi recalls that “it was a big political issue when we started talking to 
them.” The ideas and the work developed apace, and Charles Shammas was not at 
his best in explaining them to the rapidly increasing numbers of staffers assembled 
at the general meeting. Despite the building of an Enforcement Team at al-Haq 
that drew on members from different units, the project was seen as “particular to 
Charles” (whose role at MATTIN was also not always understood) and otherwise 
dependent on non-Palestinian staff. Despite its impact on the substance of the 
second and third annual reports and in interventions, the project did not manage 
to integrate its work into the organization as a whole; it was always somehow iso-
lated. Neither Shehadeh nor Kuttab was engaged with the project, and some had 
doubts that these two were really in support but also felt unable to tell Shammas of 
their concerns. It was expensive, with the UK field representative based in London 
and high travel costs for the advocacy schedule in Europe. European donors were 
particularly enthusiastic about the project and earmarked funds for its support 
at al-Haq;153 but there was a perception of foreign travel, privilege, and prestige 
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associated with the project that, together with this high level of funding, generated 
questions and risked resentment. Even the project’s then innovative use of email 
for communications gave rise to comment, whether for using dial-up modems 
that tied up al-Haq’s phone line, which was needed for the field-workers to call in, 
or because it was one more thing not familiar (and not adequately explained) to 
fellow workers. It was also in the nature of the work that the European advocacy 
and research side suffered from a lack of direct or daily oversight from the al-Haq 
office in Ramallah, although the project was also accused of “overreporting” on its 
activities, taking too much of staffers’ time to explain itself and—from a manage-
ment perspective—filling up filing cabinet drawers with lengthy reporting docu-
ments that nobody had time to read.
Finally, the board that succeeded Shehadeh, Kuttab, and Shammas felt there 
was risk of a conflict of interest. Charles Shammas had himself stayed on the new 
board with a view to providing some institutional memory and aiding the tran-
sition to the new governing body. He did not see a conflict of interest through 
his holding an (unpaid) operational role in the organization’s work, although he 
offered to withdraw. Discussions with members of the new board became increas-
ingly acrimonious, however, and in June 1992 the board decided to terminate the 
project by the end of the year. The reasons given were “the high financial cost of 
the project” and “the administrative complications arising mainly from Charles’ 
double role as a board member and project coordinator. [ . . . ] We are sorry,” wrote 
al-Haq’s then program coordinator to me (al-Haq’s field representative in Lon-
don), “for the unhappy ending of al-Haq’s enforcement project.”154
As it happened, by the end of the summer, Fateh Azzam—an active supporter 
of the Enforcement Project—returned from completing his LLM in the UK and 
took over as program coordinator, in which role he sought to review this decision 
and to revive discussions with al-Haq’s board. But other challenges were also pre-
senting themselves in the organization, and the new board resigned when the staff 
refused to accept its proposals for a new structure examined in chapter 7.155 Azzam 
organized a vote among staff on whether the Enforcement Project should stay with 
al-Haq; the vote, according to Azzam, was for keeping the project, but only by a 
very narrow margin. After five years, support for the project among the staff was 
seriously divided, and Shammas and I left al-Haq.156 Institutional communications 
were maintained through Azzam’s involvement in the advisory board of CIHRE.
Reflecting on the “unhappy ending” of the project at al-Haq, Nina Atallah’s 
observation sums up the thoughts also of others from the time who remain 
engaged in human rights work: “Maybe it wasn’t its time for us at the organization, 
because now we all think it’s important,” she says, “but in its time it was obscure, 
and things that are obscure are usually uncomfortable. I myself couldn’t make up 
my mind.” Issam Younis, a member of the Enforcement Team and subsequently 
founder and director of Al Mezan human rights organization in Gaza, agrees that 
“perhaps al-Haq didn’t appreciate the value of the Project, but the team’s work was 
146    Interventions and Allies
important; today that’s what we organizations do.”157 The invocation of third-party 
state responsibilities through targeted direct interventions and communications 
to a range of third-party (state and nonstate) actors—often by a group of Palestin-
ian organizations—is now standard. In more recent years, al-Haq employed an EU 
advocacy officer based in its Netherlands and Brussels office and has currently a 
section on its website dedicated to this work.
As for the al-Haq Enforcement Project, despite the complicating factors set out 
above, it was, strangely, very much of its time. It sprang from a growing realization 
of the impossibility of accessing local remedies or protections, and the insistence 
that, logically, the law couldn’t let things stop there. In the late 1990s al-Haq, hav-
ing passed through the turbulent years of Oslo and its aftermath and lost nearly all 
of its staff in an organizational crisis, returned to the legacy of its project. In 1998 it 
formed a working group for enforcement of the Fourth Geneva Convention with 
four other NGOs. The next year, in a Newsletter article about the Conference of 
High Contracting Parties convened in July 1999, al-Haq laid claim, possibly for the 
first time, to the organization’s contribution to this work: “al-Haq pioneered 
the movement to raise the issue of Israel’s refusal to apply the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention at the level of the international community.”158 The annual report issued 
by al-Haq (by then under the leadership of Randa Siniora) on the first year of the 
second intifada, In Need of Protection (2002), in its final section developed 
the arguments and implications of the provisions on grave breaches and the 




Field and Legal Research
LSM’s first paid worker was a field researcher, and by the early years of the intifada 
the organization was employing some fifteen field-workers in different governor-
ates of the West Bank and Gaza. The Fieldwork Unit and those who worked with 
it are widely considered the cornerstone of the organization’s work. The rigor of 
the fieldwork methodology was key to the organization’s reputation and credibil-
ity with Israeli and international human rights and other actors. For their part, as 
discussed in chapter 4, the field-workers introduced the organization to different 
parts of the Palestinian community. They informed victims of violations and the 
wider society about their rights, principles of the rule of law, and the wider human 
rights discourse; as their role developed, a number of field-workers were assigned 
as paralegals in towns in the West Bank, with a formal brief to advise on a range of 
issues. The information collected by the field-workers and their close knowledge 
of events in their localities fed directly into the organization’s work program, on 
structural and policy developments.
FIELDWORK METHOD OLO GY
It is hard to overstate the stress that LSM/al-Haq founders and staffers, includ-
ing the field-workers themselves, place on the rigor brought to the fieldwork and 
thence the analysis and presentation of LSM/al-Haq’s work as a whole. “Documen-
tation” (tawthiq) was the basis of everything. New field-workers would accom-
pany established colleagues to the field to observe how to conduct interviews, how 
to take affidavits and complete questionnaires, and how to pursue follow-up; the 
unit coordinator would at times accompany the field-worker to observe the work. 
LSM/al-Haq provided training on types of violations and the rights involved.
The office end of the system was focused around what Fateh Azzam refers to as 
“the all-important meeting of the field-workers.”1 Every Wednesday the coordina-
tor would meet separately with each field-worker and go over piece by piece the 
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information the field-worker had documented. This was followed by a meeting 
of all the field-workers together, to discuss the overall patterns in violations that 
had occurred in each area. Others recall that this part of the meeting might also 
involve field-workers presenting their work as a learning exercise for the group 
as a whole. The unit would then present a written “weekly report on events in 
the field” to the general meeting, where it would be discussed.2 Discussion in the 
general meeting would be aimed at evaluation and analysis, and decision-taking 
on al-Haq’s program in light of the information from the fieldwork unit—“do we 
take this up?” Fateh Azzam recalls finding the organization “absolutely driven by 
developments on the ground.”3
In the 1980s, one of LSM/al-Haq’s main objectives was to establish the facts 
of Israel’s violation of international law, before press coverage of the first intifada 
brought many of these to international attention. After the furor that greeted the 
LSM/ICJ 1985 publication of the report on al-Fara’a prison, Jonathan Kuttab’s com-
mitment (in his letter to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to “retract any 
published material that is proven to be materially inaccurate” was “not a conces-
sion [ . . . ] but an essential ingredient of [LSM’s] nature as a serious human rights 
organisation on which it stakes its credibility.” The first time that al-Haq had to 
amend material inaccuracy in its published material was in 1990. Seventeen Pal-
estinian civilians were shot and killed by members of the Israeli Border Police 
(“at least” another 150 were wounded) at al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, the 
compound that contains al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock.4 A signifi-
cant number of al-Haq staffers (field-workers and others, including researchers) 
decamped to Jerusalem, setting up temporary office in the National Palace Hotel 
to facilitate, over an intense few days, “an in-depth investigation including detailed 
interviews with over 50 eyewitnesses to the events.”5 Field-worker Ahmad Jaradat 
recalled that “we worked on the grounds of the al-Aqsa mosque night and day.”6 
In its first public statement, the organization named one person twice, increasing 
the number of fatalities by one, due to the presentation of the person’s name in two 
different ways. Batrawi (who notes that this error did not originate with the field-
work unit) recalls the wide distribution of the statement of correction as soon as 
the error was identified. Al-Haq’s speedy response meant that its first public error 
did not damage its credibility; its revised “Reconstruction of Events” was (along 
with the report of B’Tselem) appended to the report of the UN secretary-general 
to the UN Security Council as the international community continued to wrangle 
over protection of the Palestinian population.7
This mistake does not appear to have been repeated during these most intense 
years of the first intifada. The insistence on accuracy (diqqa) in its fieldwork 
remains a matter of pride and professional honor, for the field-workers involved 
at the time as well as for other staffers.8 LSM/al-Haq’s awareness of the likely 
 challenge by Israel to its fact-based claims and public interventions, along with 
the professional background of Shehadeh and Kuttab, probably led to the 
choice of the affidavit, or sworn statement, as the “pillar of documentation” at 
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the  organization, and to the long hours that staffers recall being spent in going 
over them in the office.9 Like other things, however, it developed over time. She-
hadeh recalls going to see farmer Sabri Gharib and taking what was probably the 
first affidavit for LSM, in January 1982. The affidavit set out Israeli attempts to 
take over Gharib’s land. It was to be a long struggle for the affiant; in defiance of 
harassment from settlers and the military authorities he took every legal step he 
could (including appealing to the Military Objection Committee and the Israeli 
High Court) but lost most of his farmland to the settlement, although he saved 
his house.10 Sabri Gharib died in April 2012. Shehadeh, who had kept up with 
Gharib’s struggle over the years, wrote, “For me, Sabri’s death marks the end of 
an era when it was possible to believe that law could save Palestinian land from 
Jewish settlers.”11
Back in the early eighties when Shehadeh still believed in the power of the law, 
LSM began to collect a growing number of affidavits from victims of and witnesses 
to a range of violations. Its first Newsletter set out its motivation for this methodol-
ogy. “Although often such violations do not become the subject of legal proceed-
ings, it is felt that they should not go unrecorded and LSM has found that such 
personal testimonies are in many cases more effective in documenting human 
rights violations than the use of questionnaires and other methods.”12 The empha-
sis on sworn statements was not shared by human rights organizations elsewhere 
at the time; interviews might be carried out rigorously and accompanied by cross-
checking and verification of other evidence, but the victim/witness was not asked 
to sign under oath.13 However, the tone of LSM’s explanation—that these events 
should be recorded through testimony—recalls Shehadeh’s account in his journal 
of “the shooting of Hani,” his teenage neighbor shot in the leg by a soldier in 1980, 
and the intimidation of the boy’s mother to stop her from filing charges (when that 
was possible) against the military authorities. He was struck by Hani’s mother’s 
reaction when Shehadeh suggested legal action: “What difference does it make? 
[ . . . ] Just keep those monsters out of my life.” Shehadeh reflected at the time:
In her, I see how anger has gradually, through the years of occupation, given way 
to despair. Anger fuels memory, keeps it alive. Without this fuel, you give up even 
the right to assert the truth. You let others write your history for you, and this is the 
ultimate capitulation. We samidin cannot fight the Israelis’ brute physical force but 
we must keep the anger burning—steel our wills to fight the lies. It is up to us to 
remember and record.14
A decade later, George Giacaman, a Birzeit professor of philosophy and for a time 
research coordinator at al-Haq, found that “reading the affidavits was very mov-
ing.” Affidavits would be taken on a printed form, which after recording personal 
details confirmed that this was a “statement under oath” with the affiant confirm-
ing the truth of the contents, after having been “warned of the legal implications of 
making false statements under oath.”15 In its first publication of a collection of such 
statements in 1983, LSM explained how affidavits were taken:
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They were collected by trained fieldworkers employed by LSM, who took great care 
to assure accuracy and precision. In each instance, information was taken down as 
dictated by the affiant. Questions were asked on points of which he or she might have 
been unsure. The rule against hearsay was followed, as well as other rules relating to 
evidence that are observed in judicial inquiries. Finally, the written version was read 
to the affiant, who was asked to sign it. Only those affidavits that were signed are pre-
sented here. In a number of cases, after the affidavit was prepared and approved the 
person who had given it refused to sign for fear of further harassment.16
A further distinction was made between those who signed affidavits and were 
 content to have their names published with their testimony, and those who signed 
but asked for their names to be withheld, trusting the organization not to use their 
names without permission. Field-worker Ghazi Shashtari recalls that “the main 
challenge was people’s fear .  .  . We had to convince them, the people experienc-
ing the violation. Here, the trust in the field-worker was important.” Iyad Haddad 
similarly remembers that, besides people’s hesitation in the face of this new kind of 
document, “mostly what I’d hear was ‘if your foe is the judge, who are you going to 
complain to?’ meaning there was no trust in the Israeli system, so in the end what 
was the point of al-Haq submitting complaints, etc.”17 Other field-workers from 
pre-intifada days likewise recall some interviewees declining in the end to sign the 
affidavit.18 “Some people didn’t necessarily want to give affidavits,” remembers Zahi 
Jaradat, “but they wanted to talk about what had happened to them.” LSM/al-Haq 
insisted on certain wording, certain forms and formats of documentation, in a 
manner that appeared to some as almost an obsession with how an affidavit should 
be presented or produced. The LSM team decided early on against using notaries 
to take the affidavits, deploying and training field-workers for this  purpose.
There was clearly a desire to put out there the voices of Palestinians directly 
affected by human rights violations. Scholarship has paid considerable  attention 
to the use of first-person testimonials/narratives in the context of human rights 
reporting.19 Al-Haq published sets of affidavits on particular themes and also 
extracted sections from affidavits to insert in other reports. Al-Haq’s  production 
of this form of record shows how the information was marshaled, and how 
much narrative of significance to the affiant may have been found not relevant 
to  documenting the empirical facts that establish a human rights violation.20 In 
the office, the discussion was on how to use the affidavits, how to present them, 
where they could be stored so that they could be cross-checked if necessary for 
evidence, and how to keep the names of affiants safe in case the office was raided 
by the authorities.
By the time LSM issued its first Newsletter, it had also developed other tools 
for documenting violations. “The idea of documenting a range of violations,” says 
Shehadeh, “only came to us gradually.” Zahi Jaradat recalls drafting the first LSM 
questionnaire with Sami 'Ayad on house demolition. By 1984, LSM’s field-workers 
were using questionnaires to document all those subject (currently or in the past) 
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to travel restriction orders and all cases of punitive house demolitions and  sealings, 
as well as what the English Newsletter referred to as all killings of  Palestinians 
by Israeli soldiers or settlers, or members of the Village Leagues.21 The Arabic 
Newsletter, and the printed form of the questionnaire developed at al-Haq for 
the purpose of documentation, used martyrdom (istishhad), rather than killing, 
as the standard expression in the community; the first time the organization used 
the term martyrdom in English for those killed by the occupation forces appears 
to have been in the dedication of A Nation under Siege (1989). Not to use the term 
martyrdom in such contexts, recalled Fateh Azzam, would be almost to pretend 
not to be a Palestinian organization, in the interests of appearing neutral to a West-
ern audience.
Other questionnaire forms in the archives from the mid-eighties include 
one directed at juvenile detainees, which might have been developed in reac-
tion to reports of practice at al-Fara’a prison; wounding (including the means of 
 wounding—“bullets, beating with clubs, beating with gun-butts, other”); treatment 
under interrogation (this questionnaire sought to establish inter alia whether cer-
tain patterns of torture and ill-treatment had been used—“position abuse [shabah] 
and which form; showers; beating; sleep deprivation, food deprivation, insults and 
humiliation, other”); medical care in prison; and one following up the situation of 
Palestinians liberated in the prisoner exchange of May 1985.
The questionnaires illustrate the organization’s interest in documenting the 
violation of rights not only accurately, but within the framework of a structure or 
policy; questions were posed as to follow-up in terms of hospital referrals, com-
plaints, investigations. In examining cases of killing and wounding, they sought 
to determine the degree of deliberation and the immediate surrounding circum-
stances. Accompanying documentation would include medical reports, copies of 
military orders, spent cartridges or rubber bullets, photographs, sketches of the 
site by the field-worker, and an “incident report” from the field-worker setting out 
his (or—later on—her) efforts to document the violation. The emphasis on accu-
racy meant that field-workers would have to return for follow-up if their docu-
mentation was found to be incomplete or “weak” for reasons not apparently to do 
with the incident itself; in the case of affidavits, they might be turned into or incor-
porated within a report should the contents be found to be not suitable for a sworn 
statement. Affidavits were particularly difficult: “they had to be written in such a 
way that any question someone had on reading it would already be answered.”22 
The questioning of victims and of witnesses had to be thorough. Kuttab says, “We 
taught our field-workers to be very skeptical. It was difficult to do; they had to ask 
the questions that a hostile interrogator would ask.” Azzam recalls, “One of the 
reasons people at al-Haq tended to think the local community thought us elitist 
was that the work was in a way so technical, such tiring detail, even to the point 
that you almost have to interrogate people when you’re doing fieldwork.” Affida-
vits were a very constructed form of story-telling, and field-workers  experienced 
152    Field and Legal Research
what Paul Gready has referred to as the “tension between the duty to treat testify-
ing victims with sensitivity and respect, and the duty to ensure that their claims 
about abuses are factually true: the tension between ‘validating the victim’ and 
‘validating the story.’ ”23
The strategy according to Batrawi was that “al-Haq was looking for the truth, 
and no more than that.”24 Kan’an recalls, “Raja and Jonathan used to tell us, cred-
ibility is everything, there are human rights violations here night and day, we don’t 
have to make them up.” Like good human rights investigators the world around, 
field-workers developed a sense for when something was not quite right. In his 
“Memories” of the al-Haq fieldwork unit written for this study, Batrawi cites exam-
ples where good fieldwork (and good instinct) revealed “alleged violations which 
upon investigation had nothing to do with the occupation.” These were exceptions, 
but the motivations for making the allegation were not difficult to discern. The 
death of a family member as a martyr, a shahid, having been killed by the occupa-
tion forces, was more honorable than if the person had been killed as an alleged 
collaborator or by accident involving illegal firearms, and a pension (from funds 
from outside) could be paid to the family of a shahid. If al-Haq had documented 
one such case in error, says Batrawi, “I would have resigned.”25
The field-workers laid great emphasis on the credibility and standing they 
had in their own parts of the West Bank (and later Gaza), where they worked 
for LSM/al-Haq, and on the need for the field-workers to be “in and of ” the 
 community in order to put their interlocutors at ease rather than add to their 
discomfort in distressing times. Particular personal skills were needed. They had 
to judge when to push with more questions and when to decide to come back 
another day; they had to ensure they conducted appropriate follow-up. Other 
demands on the field-workers of a more social nature are also clear. “We told 
people about their rights,” says Kan’an, “and us taking an interest was important. 
Okay, we had no material aid to give them, but having someone listen, document, 
follow up your case [ . . . ] people felt that someone cared about what happened 
to them.” Very focused on the outreach side of his work with al-Haq, Kan’an adds 
that “a human rights  organization shouldn’t be an ‘organization’ as such . . . The 
field researchers are its arms into the community.” If the quality of al-Haq’s field 
research and  documentation made the organization’s credibility internationally, 
the field- workers made it locally.
THE RISKS OF FIELDWORK
Other major challenges came from the Israeli occupation authorities. Being a 
field-worker was demanding and not infrequently dangerous work. Field- workers 
had to travel throughout the governorates in which they worked and beyond 
when called upon; not all had personal transport. There were no mobile phones, 
and regular landlines were not plentiful. Besides the immediate risks of the 
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work taking them out and about in hot spots, their efforts drew the attention of 
the Israeli authorities to their activities. Already in September 1985, as noted in 
chapter 4, LSM field-workers Ghazi Shashtari and Zahi Jaradat had been arrested 
and placed under administrative detention for six months, shortly after the Israeli 
cabinet had announced the reintroduction of administrative detention, depor-
tation, and other measures under Israel’s Iron Fist policy.26 LSM used its next 
Newsletter to explain administrative detention to its readers, having spent much 
of the preceding three months working on this issue.27 The organization also 
reported to its readers on an intervention it had made to its networks suggesting 
that observers attend the appeal hearings. LSM’s careful presentation of the con-
text of the arrests and detention of its field-workers and the organization’s reasons 
for concluding they were held because of their human rights work have been set 
out in chapter 4.28
The risk of arrest for field-workers increased substantially with the outbreak of 
the first intifada in December 1987. Al-Haq’s report on the first year of the upris-
ing, Punishing a Nation, is dedicated to five al-Haq field-workers who had spent 
most of that year under administrative detention, along with Riziq Shuqair, former 
coordinator of the fieldwork unit who had moved to the research unit. His  status—
some three weeks after his arrest—was still unknown by the time the report was 
issued.29 Three of the field-workers were named as “prisoners of conscience” by 
Amnesty International.30
Among the memories that field-workers relate of the time they spent in prison 
are the way in which their human rights work exposed them to arrest, the way 
the authorities reacted to their mention of LSM/al-Haq, and the physical circum-
stances of their arrest and detention. They tell of the support provided to them 
by the organization, often including LSM’s lawyers (Shehadeh, Kuttab, Rishmawi) 
representing them at different stages of the process of their incarceration. They 
also recall the support they received from Israeli human rights lawyers and from 
visitors and letters from lawyers and human rights activists further abroad.31 They 
tell of human rights work they conducted inside prison, from taking a law-based 
stand with the prison authorities, for example refusing to do work for the army, to 
explaining the Fourth Geneva Convention and detainees’ rights to fellow detainees. 
Several found ways of smuggling out to al-Haq affidavits they had taken in prison, 
and reports on prison conditions.32 And then there are more personal memories. 
Zahi Jaradat, for example, recalls having been only recently married when he was 
arrested again in September 1985 at the start of the Iron Fist policy; not questioned 
or charged, when released he was placed under house arrest, required to go from 
his village, Sa’ir, to the city of Hebron once a day to sign in at the police station. He 
spent his months of house arrest reading up on international law; colleagues from 
the office visited, and Batrawi came once a month to deliver his salary.
Kan’an says it was “bitter” to miss out on his children, recalling the reaction of 
one of his young sons when he got out: “In the evening I put on my pajamas and I 
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was sitting there, and he said, ‘Aren’t you going home?’ I said ‘Yes, this is our home.’ 
He said, ‘This isn’t your home, your home is in prison.’ ” Kan’an was detained in 
November 1988, together with Riziq Shuqair:
We’d been to Raja [Shehadeh]’s wedding, me and Riziq. We left and it was so cold, 
it was raining [ . . . ] As we drove through Beit Hanina, we got a stone through the 
window, so Riziq said I should stay with him that night. In the middle of the night, 
the army came for Riziq, and they told me to get in as well.
In A Nation under Siege, al-Haq gave the instances of Kan’an and Jabarin as “two 
cases [that] merit particular attention, illustrating, as they do, both the brutality 
and lack of due process which have characterized Israel’s response to the upris-
ing.”33 Jabarin’s case involved, on his arrest in October 1989, a severe beating in 
the vehicle taking him to the Hebron lockup and then further mistreatment when 
he arrived and after he had complained of the initial beating. Hiltermann con-
siders Jabarin to have had several lucky breaks during this process, failing which 
he might have been “another Ibrahim al-Mtour”: he was seen by other detainees 
in the Hebron lockup where he was beaten and subjected to other mistreatment, 
and these prisoners were released the same day and informed his family. An army 
doctor in the same facility “refused to take responsibility for his condition,” and 
a Druze soldier was concerned and compassionate enough to drive Jabarin to an 
Israeli hospital, where a Palestinian who was working there saw him. Informed 
of the incident, al-Haq intervened with the military authorities and also with 
international human rights organizations, which resulted in further interven-
tions, including by Jimmy Carter.34 Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin wrote back to 
Carter. The case drew “unprecedented international attention,” including in the US 
press. The Israeli embassy in Washington released a statement stating that Jabarin 
had “resisted arrest” and that therefore it had been “necessary to use reasonable 
force to put him in jail.”35 Al-Haq responded as follows:
1. Mr Jabarin was blindfolded and according to eyewitnesses was not resisting  
arrest when taken from his house to the car. In addition, he was blindfolded and 
handcuffed at the time he was beaten.
2. More importantly, in al-Haq’s view, jumping on a person for ten minutes, 
 burning him with a cigarette, and squeezing his testicles cannot be considered 
“reasonable force.” In a letter to former US President Jimmy Carter, Defence 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin reviewed Mr Jabarin’s case and concluded:
3. “As to the beating of the man, it was only moderate enough to convince him to 
accept detention.”36
Despite the various interventions, press columns in the New York Times, and a 
resolution in the European parliament, Jabarin’s one-year administrative deten-
tion order was confirmed.37 His wife Lamia gave birth to their first child three 
weeks after his arrest. Jabarin learned of the birth of their son when he was in 
Ansar III, where there were no visitors, from a photograph in a newspaper brought 
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in one day by the ICRC, a picture of his son in the arms of Jimmy Carter; “that was 
the first time I saw him.”38 Al-Haq’s third annual report of human rights violations 
during the intifada reproduces a translation of a lengthy affidavit in the form of 
his “detention memoirs” which describe conditions in Ansar III and the treatment 
of detainees.39 The memoir is a good illustration of what an al-Haq field-worker 
might consider of relevance to a human rights affidavit—it focuses on empirical 
narrative and does not venture into personal reflection.
INTIFADA EXPANSION
The arrest of the majority of al-Haq’s field-workers in the first year of the uprising, 
combined with the huge increase in the number and range of violations that were 
occurring, led to the recruitment of new members of the unit and a geographical 
expansion, for the first time, into Gaza. Previously, besides close work with Gaza 
lawyers setting up the GCRL and work with Gaza trades unions under its project 
on workers’ rights, LSM/al-Haq had not carried out its own substantive documen-
tation work in or on the Gaza Strip. Its initial focus had been the way in which 
Israeli military orders were changing the local law in the West Bank, and the legal 
history of the Gaza Strip since 1948 had been significantly different, as was the 
judicial system, albeit that the content of the military orders issued for the Gaza 
Strip (by the army’s Southern Command) was substantively the same.
When the intifada broke out, however, it became awkward when the  organization, 
continuing its practice of not publishing or commenting on  information that it had 
not verified through its own work, found itself unable to include the massive viola-
tions taking place in Gaza. This position had caused friction with PHRIC. A con-
sidered but practical response was in order. In Punishing a Nation, the organization 
announced that despite al-Haq not having its own field-workers there, “because 
human rights violations in Gaza are even worse than those in the West Bank, 
documentation which could be confirmed without actual fieldwork is included 
in this report.”40 In 1989, new recruits to the fieldwork unit included Palestinians 
from the Gaza Strip. They also included female field-workers. Batrawi recalls pro-
posing that there should be at least one female field-worker each in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, with a specific geographical remit and a thematic one that 
focused on violations that particularly affected women, such as the effects of tear 
gas on pregnancies. Male field-workers, he adds, found it hard to ask the questions 
that had to be asked of released women detainees.41 In the summer of 1987, al-Haq 
had recruited Randa Siniora to develop a women’s rights project at al-Haq, and it 
was in the second annual report that al-Haq included a separate chapter on viola-
tions of women’s rights during the intifada.42 A woman field-worker recruited at 
the time observed that the division of fieldwork was not usually gendered.
The expansion in the numbers of field-workers and in the violations they 
had to cover occasioned some practical decisions. By way of example, when 
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 administrative detention was reintroduced in 1985, the organization, as we have 
seen, focused considerable energy on researching the legal background, issuing 
its first occasional paper on this subject. At the end of 1986, the organization pub-
lished a list of 37 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza placed under adminis-
trative detention during the course of the year. At the end of 1987, after the start of 
the intifada and the huge increase in violations, the Newsletter gave a number 
of 189 Palestinians from the West Bank placed under administrative detention By 
the time Punishing a Nation was published, the organization was focusing on the 
implementation of the policy, with case examples, and on conditions in deten-
tion centers, reporting that “three to four thousand people had been placed under 
administrative detention since the beginning of the uprising.”43
LSM/al-Haq never set itself the goal of documenting and reporting on all viola-
tions occurring in the occupied territories. Well before the first intifada, decisions 
had to be made on what to investigate and what to cover: “The way of thinking,” 
says Jabarin, “was that nothing was separate from the bigger picture. Is there a 
policy behind this, where’s it going? [ . . . ] It means you don’t see the incident in 
isolation.” It was a question of documenting “certain patterns of violations” rather 
than every violative incident. Batrawi presents the field-workers’ focus during 
his time at al-Haq in the first intifada as documentation of all cases of killing, 
deportation, house demolition or sealing, town arrest, and the closure of educa-
tional institutions (as a collective penalty); and some but not all of other issues 
such as cases of administrative detention, wounding, curfew, the uprooting of 
trees, and the closure of village or camp entrances. Some specific briefs were devel-
oped in response to the documentation requirements of the research unit or for 
campaigns against particular violations that the organization was to start launch-
ing in the early 1990s: here, Batrawi lists refusal to grant family reunification 
(al-Haq’s first campaign was on this subject), house demolition on the pretext of 
no building permit (in connection with the work on town planning), the closure 
of educational institutions, torture, and tax raids.
FROM AFFIDAVIT S TO  
PUBLICATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS
There was early on a feeling that the substantial amount of information being col-
lected had to “go somewhere.” In 1984, al-Haq’s database was introduced as one 
response to “proliferating files.” A particular commitment seems to have been 
felt towards the accumulating affidavits, and this was certainly one of the spurs 
behind the publication of the organization’s first collection. In Their Own Words 
was published by the World Council of Churches in 1983 with the subtitle “Affi-
davits Collected by LSM.” The affidavits were presented by theme, with sections 
titled “Settlers,” “Village Leagues” (in this section the names of the affiants were 
withheld), “House Demolitions and Sealings,” “Universities,” and “Town Arrest.” 
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Tim Hiller, who wrote the introduction to each section, recalls that “the aim was 
to let the affidavits speak for themselves and to provide a fairly dry, ‘objective’ 
introduction to each section.” At the same time, the themes indicate the politi-
cal environment at that time. Israel had invaded Lebanon in the summer of 1982, 
and focus remained on that conflict; support for Israel in different constituencies 
abroad had been affected. The introduction by the director of the Commission 
of Churches on International Affairs stressed concern lest the experience of the 
West Bank and Gaza indicate what was to come should Israel engage in a long-
term occupation.44 And the preface by LSM struck a note of hope for the intended 
impact of the publication, at a time when certainly Shehadeh believed that alert-
ing Israeli public opinion to what was going on would bring pressure from Israel’s 
domestic constituency to desist:
LSM hopes this publication will provide focus for those interested in preventing the 
repetition of the events described here and in putting an end to dangerous trends to 
which allusion is made—especially for Israelis and friends of Israel abroad. By em-
phasizing the human element it provides the opportunity for the meeting of minds 
of people of differing political persuasions in a common concern for justice, dignity 
and respect for human rights.45
The publication, according to LSM, was widely distributed, and within a few 
months the International Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultations had 
published a reply, titled The Other Side. This was more akin to the Israeli Section of 
the ICJ’s response to The West Bank and the Rule of Law. In its first Newsletter, LSM 
reported that the organization “had cooperated with the WCC in answering the 
criticisms made in the reply. The IJCIC have since dropped their demand that 
the WCC distribute The Other Side together with In Their Own Words.”46
The next collection of affidavits to be published was the 1985 al-Fara’a report, 
which arose directly from the work of the fieldwork unit; the report is unusually 
attributed to “the staff of LSM.” After that, extensive use was made of affidavits in 
LSM/al-Haq publications, including publishing extracts and appending full texts 
in the first two annual reports during the uprising, but as Rabbani notes, it is per-
haps “surprising” that more themed collections were not published in their own 
right.47 This did not happen again until a set of fifteen affidavits was published in 
Application Denied (1991), a booklet prepared in support of al-Haq’s first inter-
national campaign, “Stop Separating Palestinian Families!”48 The idea of a cam-
paign was new; while the organization had published studies—mostly occasional 
papers—on particular issues, these were not in the context of a wider consoli-
dated campaign; there were no recommendations for action or specific demands 
on the Israeli authorities. The 1991 campaign, like those that followed, combined 
 publications with other communications—posters, stickers, leaflets, and an 
international speaking tour. Allies were invited to organize meetings and aware-
ness raising activities with al-Haq providing material and speakers, to establish 
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 networks with like-minded groups and organizations, to write to the press and to 
the Israeli authorities or to national governments.49 The issue in focus—the denial 
of family reunification applications by the Israeli authorities—was described by 
Adama Dieng, then secretary-general of the ICJ, as among other measures of 
“cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment suffered by the Palestinian population” 
which are “less prominent and remain in the shadows.”50 In her 1990 study, which 
Dieng’s words prefaced, Whittome opened as follows:
The right to live together with your spouse and children, in your homeland, is fun-
damental. But for Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, 
there is no such right. At best, Palestinians are granted permanent residence in the 
Occupied Territories as a privilege, but not as a right. At worst, they are compelled 
either to live illegally with their families in the Occupied Territories, to live apart 
from their spouse, or to leave the country of their birth and childhood.
This is no accident. On the contrary, it is the result of a calculated policy, system-
atically implemented by the Israeli authorities.51
In preparation for the campaign and in support of the study, al-Haq field-workers 
completed 1,609 questionnaires from Palestinians whose application for family 
reunification had been refused. These included husbands/wives applying for per-
mission for their spouse to join them in the occupied territories, parents applying 
for reunification with their children, and other relatives applying to join families 
in the territories. As Whittome explained, separated Palestinian families would be 
obliged to apply to the Israeli authorities for family reunification in cases where 
residents had fled during the 1967 war and were then prevented from returning, 
where Palestinian residents of the occupied territories married a nonresident and 
wished to live together in the territories, and where “former residents of the Occu-
pied Territories lost their rights to residency under laws and regulations issued by 
the Israeli authorities since 1967.” Al-Haq had been unable to access reliable and 
up-to-date statistics on the full number of applications made, granted, and refused 
by the Israeli authorities since 1967, but believed the field-workers’ 1,609 question-
naires documented only a “relatively small sample” of those rejected.52 Whittome 
pointed out that, at the time of her study, the issue of separated Palestinian families 
was a “relatively unknown and unpublicised subject.” The campaign was designed 
to change that. The subject was low-profile in terms of the attention it attracted, 
but it was devastating—immediately and in the longer term—for the individuals 
and family units affected. As Whittome’s study showed, and as has been shown 
further down the decades, it was part of a systematic policy aimed at forcing as 
many Palestinians as possible out of the occupied territories while taking control 
of the land. The affidavits in the campaign publication vividly illustrate the terrible 
choices that people were being forced to make, the dreadful situations in which 
they lived, and what this was doing to their families.
The campaign was new, but al-Haq’s attention to this subject was long- 
standing. The all-important issue of the “right to residence” and the possession 
Field and Legal Research    159
of an identity card (ID) issued by the Israeli military authorities after the 1967 
 occupation—and how these cards were used by the authorities—were a focus for 
the organization in the early 1980s.53 Cases had been brought to its Legal Advice 
Programme since its establishment at the beginning of 1985.54 Whittome’s 1990 
study was a revision and expansion of a 1987 al-Haq briefing paper on family reuni-
fication. After the early intense years of the intifada, with both the fact and the 
extent of violations more visible to the international community, the organization 
sought to turn the focus onto the policy underlying the more visible violations. 
There was a distinct local impact. Even given the organization’s increased profile 
in the first intifada, Zahi Jaradat recalls that “the welcome was different” after the 
campaigns; there was a “good impact locally,” says Batrawi. Azzam recalls that al-
Haq staffers enjoyed this new form of initiative, which was followed the next year 
by a campaign against house demolition and sealing and then (1993–94, after the 
arrival of the Palestinian Authority) one on “women, justice and the law.”55
AFFIDAVIT S AND THE PALESTINIAN AUDIENCE
The next publication of affidavits was a collection titled Palestinian Victims of 
 Torture Speak Out and was published first in Arabic, an indication possibly of al-
Haq’s increasing attention to distributing the results of its research locally as the 
area prepared to receive the Palestinian Authority.56 Another collection, in 1995, 
appears to have been published only in Arabic, although this does not mean that 
there was never an intention to have it translated. This was a set of documents 
and affidavits published a year after the killing by Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein 
at the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron of twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers on 
Friday, February 24, 1994. A press release issued by al-Haq two days later stated 
that protests in different towns and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip had raised the death toll to forty-nine and some two hundred injured. The 
US/Russia–sponsored peace talks were suspended and the UN Security Council 
argued for three weeks over the text of a resolution (904 of 1994); subsequently, an 
“Agreement on Security Arrangements in Hebron” was signed between the heads 
of the PLO and Israeli delegations to the talks, which led to the installation of the 
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) and the resumption of 
the Gaza-Jericho talks.
Al-Haq’s frustration with this state of affairs was part of the context for the pub-
lication of this collection of affidavits one year after the massacre.57 The 1995 publi-
cation is attributed to researcher Khamis Shalabi and, unusually, to field researcher 
Zahi Jaradat.58 It is presented in three parts: a report and related affidavits on con-
tinuing human rights violations in Hebron during the year 1994; affidavits from the 
February massacre, al-Haq’s press release and a comment by the organization on 
the results of the official Israeli inquiry into events; a record of violations of human 
rights after the massacre by soldiers and settlers, together with a list of sixty-one 
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Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces or settlers in Hebron during the year 
1994. The publication of this report seems to reflect a feeling of responsibility 
on the part of the organization towards its local constituency;59 in the absence 
of any progress on the situation in Hebron, the enormity of the massacre at the 
Ibrahimi mosque demanded a public intervention by way of this publication. Also, 
contacts with the Arab human rights movement had been established and were 
growing since the organization became closely involved with preparation for the 
1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, so there was a growing 
regional, Arabic-reading audience that had not previously been a routine address 
for al-Haq publications.
FIELDWORK AND THE DATABASE
One significant destination for the enormous amount of material collected by the 
field researchers was al-Haq’s database unit. The early development of this sys-
tem has been discussed in chapter 3; in its later development, its software was 
the product of remarkable effort by al-Haq staffer Umar Ayyoub.60 Judith Dueck, 
who became closely involved with the work of HURIDOCS in subsequent 
years, recalls that she accompanied Jonathan Kuttab to a Rome meeting of the 
 organization and that “al-Haq was further along in establishing the priorities of 
the database, so it was able to assist HURIDOCS when they were looking to estab-
lish a database that would serve a number of organizations from elsewhere in the 
world.” Nina Atallah, subsequently head of the database directorate in al-Haq, 
recalls her experience in sharing al-Haq’s systems with other human rights activ-
ists in international fora down the years. However, internally, the work was not 
always  attractive to other al-Haq workers; she even notes wryly that at times “it 
was up and down whether the director got the point.”
The early choice and implementation of an Arabic-English transliteration sys-
tem was tedious for some, but critical to the standardization of a retrieval system. 
The database was—and is—key to al-Haq’s documentation strategy: documenta-
tion was for a purpose, not for its own sake. Joanna Oyediran, who joined al-Haq 
as a researcher in 1994, notes the tensions that could arise here:
The field-workers are going out there and there are so many awful things happen-
ing, they’re taking affidavits and questionnaires, all this information is to show the 
consistency of a pattern, but it can be frustrating. Sometimes it must have felt like 
the researchers were just sitting on it. At least at al-Haq it was going into the database 
and going out as statistics.
Oyediran was one of a number of staffers who suggested that the work would 
have benefited from a greater integration of the field and legal research work. 
Nevertheless, standing by itself, the fieldwork unit was an extraordinary accom-
plishment for the organization. Coordinator Khaled Batrawi gave training courses 
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on fact-finding in different international fora.61 When other Palestinian human 
rights organizations became established, al-Haq field-workers helped with their 
fact-finding and documentation strategies; they gave talks at schools and universi-
ties, and they distributed al-Haq’s Know Your Rights series of information book-
lets  discussed further below, which were published only in Arabic and dealt with 
a mixture of internal human rights issues and rights related to the occupation 
authorities.62 By the early 1990s, field-workers were also trained as paralegals, join-
ing with al-Haq’s legal services unit to provide legal advice on recurrent issues 
(such as family reunification) in offices in Hebron and Nablus for those for whom 
travel to al-Haq’s Ramallah office was becoming increasingly difficult and expen-
sive. Fateh Azzam notes the change in the field-workers’ role in this regard: “At 
first, they were out in the field to get information and bring it back to al-Haq; 
now, we thought of them as extensions of al-Haq in the different areas, distribut-
ing Know Your Rights and other publications, working as paralegals in the offices 
outside Ramallah, a dissemination point.”
In the end, Rabbani credits al-Haq’s field research efforts and methodology 
as the most important factor in building the organization’s credibility. “At the end 
of the day, it was because al-Haq got all its information from the source, the field, 
and did it in a very professional way. If anyone wanted to check out the valid-
ity of the affidavits they’d come back with the same information.” The position of 
(almost) never intervening before documenting an event itself, he notes, “while 
seemingly paranoid, [ . . . ] was not an inappropriate response to the accurate fear 
that one careless mistake by a Palestinian human rights organisation would under-
mine its entire record and severely compromise its reputation.”63 Rabbani reports 
personally retaining “a morbid fear of inaccuracy drilled into me at al-Haq.”
Jonathan Kuttab is particularly proud, not only of LSM/al-Haq’s reputation for 
accuracy, but also of a wider diffusion of the values of accuracy and documenta-
tion in Palestinian society and a greater readiness on the part of foreign actors 
to accept Palestinian statements as true. Developments in the first intifada also 
forced the fact of violations by the Israeli occupation forces into the consciousness 
of the international media and their audiences. It provoked a development in al-
Haq’s research and publication strategy discussed further below.
PUBLISHING ON PRISONS
One of the methodological consequences of al-Haq’s approach was an overall cau-
tion in drawing conclusions once the facts had been investigated; understatement, 
according to Kuttab, was the order of the day. Shehadeh relates this caution to the 
sustainability of the organization: “We were so careful; we weighed at every stage, 
what could we say at any certain point in time.” This shows in the tone of al-Haq’s 
publications, and one example often given by those who worked with LSM in the 
early and mid-1980s was how long it took the organization to use the word torture. 
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In particular, using torture in the title of the 1985 report on al-Fara’a prison was a 
huge step for the young organization: as Shehaheh remembered, “Could we get 
away with it? If not, they’d close us down.” This particular milestone was passed at 
the prompting of Niall MacDermot of the ICJ, which copublished the report. Mac-
Dermot had been on the drafting committee of the Declaration against Torture, 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1975, and the ICJ under his leadership 
had assisted in the drafting of the Convention against Torture.64 The CAT opened 
for signature and ratification in December 1984, just over a month before the ICJ/
LSM report was published. The timing was significant; “the word torture was being 
defined and criminalized at an international level, it was an international story,” 
remembers Mona Rishmawi. Kuttab recalls MacDermot “taking me to task for 
al-Haq being so careful about being neutral” and observing that “yes, we have to 
be objective, but I don’t think we have to be neutral; there is a point when torture 
is torture, and you’re not neutral when you’re dealing with either the torturer or 
the victim.” Some years later, al-Haq was still struggling with this balance in its 
presentation of its material to Palestinian constituency. After a 1987 press con-
ference, al-Haq took issue with one press report that suggested al-Haq “suffers 
from objectivity to the extent that they have started to consider themselves as any 
neutral and outside party, and not a Palestinian party concerned with Palestinian 
human rights.”65
LSM had in fact published an earlier report on al-Fara’a in April 1984, a nine-
sided paper titled “A Report on the Treatment of Security Prisoners at the West 
Bank Prison of al-Fara’a.” The former British army camp had been brought into 
use by the Israeli occupation authorities to detain some of the many Palestin-
ians arrested during widespread protest against the dismissal of West Bank may-
ors in 1982; those taken to al-Fara’a “would be kept, without interrogation, for 
the eighteen days allowed by Military Order 378 and then released.”66 This was 
part of a policy introduced under the Israeli chief of staff in April 1982, “to act 
with force against the agitators and to imprison them at every opportunity.”67 
Arresting them, imprisoning them for the period allowed under military orders, 
releasing them, and rearresting them was, along with other measures, part of a 
policy of tertur.68 In the autumn of 1983, interrogation rooms were constructed, 
and the prison began to be used for investigation and interrogation. Another rea-
son for concern was that the majority of the 250 prisoners being held there then 
were aged fifteen to eighteen.69 LSM’s concern had been shared by elements in 
Israeli society; ACRI held a press conference in March 1984, and there had been a 
petition to the High Court of Justice asking for “an injunction against the military 
commander of the area to order him to show cause why those working on his 
behalf will not be prevented from applying a system of beatings and torture in al-
Fara’a, and why those responsible for torture should not be brought to trial.”70 By 
the summer of 1984, two Israeli army officers—one the head of the prison named 
in extracts from affidavits in al-Haq’s report—had been charged and sentenced in 
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military court.71 Israeli journalists had been interested, reporting ACRI’s allega-
tions of “torture, brutality and inhuman conditions” to break the detainees.72 For its 
part, LSM had for the first time held a press conference in its office, bringing young 
former detainees from the prison to present their experiences or, as Shehadeh put 
it, “to tell their stories in addition to our affidavits.” In this first report, however, 
LSM did not itself describe the treatment as torture, ascribing this description of 
their treatment to the words of the detainees themselves.
As discussed in chapter 3, the furor over the release of the 1985 report seems 
to have stemmed from the timing and direct international exposure that Israeli 
diplomatic officials experienced in Geneva at the Human Rights Commission; 
perhaps it owed some of its impact precisely to the fact that, although still under-
stated in its introduction and explanations of the different sections, the prevailing 
voice was that of the detainees, directly and forcefully presented to the public. 
The motive behind publication of this report in collaboration with the ICJ was 
explained by LSM as follows:
The evidence demonstrates that al-Fara’a is intended to operate as an intimidation 
centre to which groups—mainly of young people—are taken for a certain period, 
given harsh treatment and later tried on the basis of confessions that appear in many 
cases to be extracted against their will, then released. This being the case, it is the 
function which al-Fara’a is intended to serve which constitutes the violation that 
must be stopped.73
This passage illustrates LSM/Al-Haq’s methodological focus on the “why” 
as the context for the “what” of human rights violations that came to its attention. 
The aim of the practices at al-Fara’a appeared to be not “the obtaining of informa-
tion relating to specific events” but rather “humiliation and intimidation.” There-
fore, “detention at al-Far’a should be understood, we believe, in the context of other 
measures aimed at controlling the West Bank population, such as curfews, house 
demolitions and the withdrawal of basic services from whole neighbourhoods.”74
A second report on the conditions in which political prisoners were held was 
issued in October 1984, this time in the newly opened Jnaid prison near Nablus that 
the authorities had presented as a response to overcrowding in other West Bank 
prisons when they opened it in June 1984.75 In this case, the prisoners were mostly 
under forty years of age and serving sentences of ten years or more. The prison-
ers had made attempts to improve their conditions, including interventions with 
the director, Israeli prison authorities, and the minister of the interior. They had 
declared a hunger strike, which lasted for twelve days and drew support from pris-
oners in other facilities and from members of the wider population, who variously 
held sit-ins and general strikes in solidarity. The LSM report included the list of the 
prisoners’ demands and the response from the prison director. The twelve-page 
paper publication, similar in physical form to the 1984 al-Fara’a report, reviewed 
each area of concern: overcrowding; deprivation of exercise, medical services, and 
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food; use of gas, punishment, and control; restrictions on religious worship; and 
isolation from the outside world and the prevention of social contact. It did not 
extract or reproduce affidavits, but referred instead to reports from prisoners; LSM 
members had also visited the prison. As with its previous report, LSM did not 
make specific demands or recommendations; it set out the facts and compared 
them with existing legal standards. 
One development in the Jnaid report was the reference to international legal 
standards. The 1984 al-Fara’a report had reviewed the organization’s concerns at al-
Fara’a in reference to Israeli military orders regulating prison and arrest and deten-
tion procedures in the West Bank.76 The Jnaid report, a few months later, reviewed 
each area of concern not only in relation to Israeli military orders, but also in 
light of international standards; these included, in relation to the medical treat-
ment given to prisoners, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the UN Principles of 
Medical Ethics (1982), and more systematically, the relevant provisions of the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. In explaining its reli-
ance on these rules, LSM explained that “they do not constitute binding law, but 
are internationally recognised principles.”77 The 1985 al-Fara’a report was almost 
entirely free of legal references, letting the affidavits speak for themselves.78 The 
structural intent (control and intimidation of wider Palestinian society) was clear.
Al-Haq’s next reports on prisons were to be produced in the first year of the inti-
fada, as thousands were arrested and new facilities opened by the Israeli authori-
ties; the organization later reported that between December 1987 and May 1992, 
Israel had detained more than eighty thousand Palestinians.79 In May 1988, al-Haq 
produced “Dhahiriyyeh: Centre for Punishment,” a thirteen-page paper about 
another former British army camp near Hebron used to hold thousands of detain-
ees and where the conditions and treatment amounted, according to LSM, to “col-
lective punishment and other degrading and cruel treatment.” Al-Haq invoked not 
only the Standard Minimum Rules and the Fourth Geneva Convention but also 
the UDHR and the ICCPR, in relation to the prohibition on torture. Israel had 
signed the ICCPR but had not yet ratified it. Unlike in its previous prison reports, 
Al-Haq provided a conclusion. Noting that the already notorious conditions and 
the treatment at the detention center were clearly intended to be punitive, it con-
cluded: “It appears that the Israeli authorities believe that by so treating detainees 
it can break their spirit. The prison is thus one of the means used in an attempt to 
force the Palestinians into submission.”80
It was in the next prison report in August 1988 that al-Haq made its first explicit 
demand in a publication. The demand was in the title: “Ansar 3: A Case for Clo-
sure.” This prison, in an Israeli military camp in the Negev desert near the border 
with Egypt, was at the time of the report holding twenty-five hundred Palestin-
ians, mostly in administrative detention. Officially called Ketziot, it was known to 
Palestinians as Ansar 3 in invocation of the Ansar prison camp set up by the Israeli 
occupying authorities in South Lebanon in 1982. Explaining why the analogy was 
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appropriate despite the fact that torture was not a feature at Ansar 3, al-Haq drew 
attention to the physical isolation of the camp, to the rationale—the rounding up 
of huge numbers of Palestinians, the attempt to break their spirit and the spirit of 
wider society—and to the treatment dealt the detainees aimed at humiliating and 
degrading them. Four of al-Haq’s field-workers were held here under administra-
tive detention, and the thirty-three-page report was dedicated to them. The legal 
standards it invoked were similar to those referred to in the Dhahiriyyeh report, 
with the important addition of the fact that holding Palestinians from the occu-
pied territories inside Israel was in direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. Al-Haq concluded that conditions at the prison constituted “inhuman and 
degrading treatment” and called for its immediate closure.
STRUCTUR AL WORK
The Ansar 3 report was to be al-Haq’s last effort in this direction; for the next 
few years, prison conditions were dealt with in chapters in the annual reports of 
human rights violations during the uprising. The prison reports had arisen from 
fieldwork, and while LSM/al-Haq had placed them in an overall contextual (and 
structural) framework, they were something of an exception to its more usual 
work. Al-Haq’s briefing papers issued on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary 
of the Israeli occupation are illustrative of its dominant focus and cover the fol-
lowing topics: the West Bank legal system and structure, the military court system, 
administrative measures of punishment and control, trade unions under Israeli 
occupation, and the suppression of academic, political, and cultural life. Some of 
these resulted in publications.81
Al-Haq’s primary focus can also be seen in the structure of its 1988 conference 
titled “International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories,” men-
tioned in Chapter 4. The “administration” focus explored issues such as financial 
administration and taxation, economic policies, the exploitation of land and water 
resources, trade unions, and the provision of services by mass-based Palestinian 
organizations. The conference also explored the international law implications of 
prolonged military occupation, and strategies of enforcement, through Israeli fora 
and UN-based mechanisms.82 The object of the conference was to bring experts 
to discuss matters that were not, at that time, resolved or even particularly under 
discussion. It was the first international law conference to be held in the territories, 
and Emma Playfair spent a couple of years contacting different experts, meeting 
with them, and explaining the challenges and the objectives of the conference. She 
had some tough meetings, and at least some considered it a political minefield. 
Those who did come found themselves in East Jerusalem at the start of the first 
intifada, confronted with daily news of human rights violations while considering 
their brief on the underlying structure of the occupation. Abdel Karim Kan’an 
remembers driving people back and forth to present testimony: “We really wanted 
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this conference to be successful, we worked so hard for it.” For Shehadeh, the event 
was a breakthrough. A decade after the event, Playfair pointed to an impact wider 
than the particular situation in the occupied territories: “The published views of 
legal experts are an important source of international and customary law, so the 
expert contributions to this conference will directly contribute to the development 
and explanation of humanitarian law.”83 So many outstanding people did come, she 
explains, “all due to al-Haq’s fact-finding—exposing the violations and the wrong-
fulness of the Israeli view on the law—that was al-Haq’s contribution.” 
LSM/al-Haq’s focus from its early years on structural violations and on collec-
tive and economic and social rights was a very different start than was the case, 
for example, with the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, established in 
1989 in the middle of the intifada. Former B’Tselem staffer and director Eitan Fel-
ner notes that “like many traditional human rights groups around the world, its 
work initially focused on civil and political rights.”84 Al-Haq, in contrast, was not 
a “traditional human rights group.”85 Its work started and ended with the struc-
tural context of the violations it addressed. Rishmawi recalls that LSM’s turn to a 
more explicitly human rights focus in these and other matters was prompted by 
Shehadeh’s participation in what Tolley has referred to as “a major 1981 conference 
at The Hague, [where] the ICJ connected development to the rule of law.”86 From 
these ideas, says Rishmawi, “we started thinking in terms of rights as collective 
and individual.” According to Tolley, “ICJ advocacy of development as a human 
right sought to bridge a major North-South divide.”87
Prime examples of LSM’s early publications include the study on Civilian 
Administration in the West Bank, the study on Israel’s Road Plan No. 50 for the 
West Bank, and an LSM occasional paper by Rishmawi on planning and land use. 
In 1985, Shehadeh published what he described as a sequel to The West Bank and 
the Rule of Law: “It is the thesis of this study,” he told his readers, “that the policy 
which Israel has been pursing in the West Bank is intended to drive out the Pales-
tinians, to take over their land, and eventually to annex the occupied territories.”88 
Occupier’s Law was published by the Institute for Palestine Studies in Washington, 
although the title rubric indicated that it had been prepared for al-Haq. 
The book deals in section one with “the various methods by which the alien-
ation of 40% of the land of the West Bank has been brought about” and how 
 Palestinian use of the remaining land was restricted. The second section looks 
at the administrative structures and the three judicial systems in operation—the 
local courts, which were by now precluded from hearing any cases against any 
Israelis, soldiers or settlers; the military courts and tribunals; and Israeli (settler) 
civilian courts in the West Bank—all of which underpinned Shehadeh’s conclu-
sion that “the status which Israel has accorded to the Palestinians in the West Bank 
is that of permanent alien residents.”89 The last section looks at the “extensive 
powers of granting to Palestinians permits necessary for running the day-to-day 
business of society,” justified by Israel’s concept of “security,” but used to “stifle 
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the growth of the Palestinian population” in any number of economic, social, and 
cultural ways. An overview of human rights violations is also included in this last 
section. The second edition of Occupier’s Law included a new introduction cover-
ing international legal instruments applicable in the territories and describing the 
“four  legislative stages of the occupation” to date. In relation to the fourth and then 
current one, which he dated from 1981, Shehadeh observed that this stage had “pri-
marily involved planning regulations pertaining to the use of the extensive areas of 
land that were and are being acquired for Jewish settlement” as well as amendments 
to tax laws that were increasing revenues to Israel from the occupied territories.90
These findings described not only what was, but indeed what was to come. 
In 2008 Shehadeh gave perhaps his most concise and lucid account connecting 
Israel’s colonial plans, as perceived in the eighties by Shehadeh and his colleagues, 
to the dismal results of the Oslo peace process and beyond. In particular refer-
ence to the Road Plan proposed in 1984, to be implemented to connect settlement 
blocs and urban centers inside Israel, bypassing Palestinian towns, he notes: “Oslo 
confirmed all this.”91 The information was already there; and Shehadeh’s bitterness 
at the Oslo process included the lack of attention paid to his own legal input by 
the Palestinian team ignoring the warnings of Israel’s colonial aspirations that had 
been voiced so conscientiously and energetically over the previous years.
Back in 1986, LSM/al-Haq had published its own in-house study on planning 
and land use,92 and was to follow this up with the unusual step of commissioning 
a UK academic expert, Anthony Coon, to produce a study on town planning in 
the West Bank. Coon conducted substantial fieldwork, meeting “planners, archi-
tects, lawyers, surveyors and engineers” as well as “ordinary citizens” of the West 
Bank; al-Haq staff who worked with him recall this as a hugely significant project 
and a major investment by al-Haq.93 Introducing the book to his readers, Coon 
conceded that the subject “might seem like an irrelevant distraction from the 
more substantial issues which arise in a prolonged military occupation.” As he 
explained, however:
Town planning has a more direct and a more intense impact on the quality of the 
lives of Palestinians than it has on the inhabitants of almost any other territory. For 
Palestinians the planning system is of vital concern because it affects not only their 
prospects of future prosperity, but their prospects of nationhood.94
Published the year before the Oslo process was to begin with the 1993 Declara-
tion of Principles, Coon’s study identified as “the principal requirement” the 
 reestablishment of “planning institutions which are representative of and respon-
sive to the needs of Palestinians, for these to be adequately funded, and for them 
to have access to information (in particular the Land Registry).” He also called for 
“international pressure” to be brought on Israel and argued that “ ‘legal’ restric-
tions preventing access to and use by non-Jews of seized land and settlements 
should be abolished.”95 If such measures were not “taken soon,” Coon concluded, 
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“the world should expect the Palestinian human rights tragedy in the West Bank 
to be ever intensified—a tragedy in which the conduct of town planning has long 
been instrumental.”96
Coon’s book was published in the United Kingdom by an academic publishing 
company, although copyright was retained by al-Haq. This particular  experiment 
appears not to have been repeated, although the interest in having substantial 
studies taken on by established publishers abroad, with their own distribution 
possibilities, is also demonstrated by Shehadeh’s work with the Institute for Pal-
estine Studies. In the early 1980s, al-Haq’s directors were also publishing shorter 
pieces abroad, some of which were made available (as “LSM publications”) as 
reprints from LSM/al-Haq. These were published variously in the Review of the 
ICJ, the Journal of Palestine Studies, Le Monde Diplomatique, Hawliat Siyasiyah, 
and in volumes of collected articles. They focused on structural issues: settle-
ments, the juridical status of the occupied territories, land law, and (in Kuttab’s 
case) the acquisition of property.97 The first research paper on a specific legal topic 
by a researcher other than LSM’s directors came about through a request from the 
UK-based Index on Censorship. A US volunteer at al-Haq prepared the article on 
military censorship in the West Bank, published by Index in 1984 and reprinted by 
LSM in 1985. A series of columns and correspondence in the London-based Jewish 
Chronicle criticizing the article and Index’s decision to publish it, and responses 
to these critiques, were appended to al-Haq’s printing of the article in late 1986, 
together with letters sent by Raja Shehadeh to both; this appended material 
exceeded the length of the original article.98
LSM/al-Haq was not a research institute, and it was sometimes at pains to 
stress that it did not consider theory for theory’s sake, but by 1986 the organiza-
tion had found a format for its own research publications. The early occasional 
papers examined particular legal issues developing in Israeli policy and practice. 
The exception in the early years was the paper by Rishmawi mentioned previously, 
which provided a historical examination of the legal status of Palestinian women, 
and—also exceptionally—was published in Arabic.99
Playfair’s 1987 paper on house demolition and sealing, the fifth in the series, 
evolved from a “full report” that had been sent by al-Haq to various organizations 
abroad in August 1986.100 Al-Haq had
noted with alarm a dramatic increase since 1985 in the number of houses demol-
ished or sealed by the Israeli authorities as a punitive or allegedly deterrent measure, 
following the arrest of one of the inhabitants of the house. [ . . . ]
Amongst houses demolished by the Israeli authorities in 1986 were those in the 
West Bank village of Burqa reported in Newsletter 12. These demolitions followed  
the rejection by the Israeli High Court of Justice on 24 March 1986 of petitions made 
by the owners and inhabitants of the three houses. [ . . . ] On reading the High Court 
decision in the Burqa case, al-Haq came to the conclusion that neither the efforts it 
has exerted in the past [ .  .  . ] to oppose this practice, nor the appeals to the High 
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Court, have been to any effect. It concluded that the greatest hope of ending the 
practice lay in the efforts of members of the international community concerned 
with human rights and justice.
In the light of these developments, al-Haq decided to prepare a thorough brief 
about this practice for human rights organisations and individuals locally and world-
wide, and to ask them, if they concur with al-Haq’s view that this is an illegal, arbi-
trary and oppressive measure, to intervene in whatever way they consider most likely 
to achieve the cessation of the practice.101
Al-Haq’s cautious and understated mode of addressing its local and international 
allies is evident here, as is its emphasis on the steps it had taken prior to this 
 “intervention by study” and why it felt it necessary to proceed in this manner. 
Playfair’s paper proceeded methodically through the justifications for the practice 
presented by the Israeli authorities and the High Court, responding with refer-
ence to “local law”—in this case the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (DERs) 
1945, issued by the British Mandate authorities, on which demolition orders were 
based—the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, 
statements by the High Court of Justice, the writings of eminent experts on the 
laws of war, and principles of natural justice and other international law (UDHR). 
The commentary draws on al-Haq’s fieldwork to present cases contradicting the 
statements under examination and to emphasize the impact of the measure. It 
appends a  particularly notorious ruling from the High Court of Justice and two 
sample demolition and sealing orders. The final part of the commentary takes up a 
paragraph in the HCJ’s Burqa decision that clearly contributed to al-Haq’s conclu-
sion that the Court “does not provide an effective forum for review against demoli-
tions.”102 The Court held:
There is no basis to the petitioners’ complaint that house demolition is a form  
of collective punishment. In their opinion, only the terrorists and criminals them-
selves should be punished, and house demolition punishes additional family 
 members. Such an interpretation, if accepted by us, would leave the above regulation 
and its orders void of content, leaving only the possibility of punishing a terrorist 
who lives alone.103
This is an extraordinary example of Cohen’s “interpretative denial.”104 Al-Haq’s 
(and Playfair’s) response was that “a law can be interpreted by reference to the 
fact that it must have been intended to have some effect; but it cannot be deduced, 
from the fact that the apparent intention is forbidden by international law, that 
some other purpose must have been intended.”105
As demolitions and sealings increased exponentially in number and in method 
through the intifada, al-Haq published two further occasional papers on the sub-
ject and launched an international campaign against house demolition in 1992.106 
All drew substantially on al-Haq’s field research. A detailed consideration of Israel’s 
use of the British DERs (1945) in deportations, house demolitions, and sealings was 
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issued during the first years of the intifada, along with a rather ambitiously titled 
research study into the Enforcement of International Law in the Israeli- Occupied 
Territories. This latter, linked with the Enforcement Project, aimed to show “that 
states have a legal obligation to ensure that the Fourth Geneva Convention [ . . . ] is 
applied by Israel within the Occupied Territories.”107 Rabbani identifies this—and a 
later  publication on taxation—as al-Haq venturing into new legal areas including 
the law-based intervention of third-party states.
LSM/al-Haq continually sought to increase the effectiveness of its interven-
tions. Some projects appear not to have resulted in a publication, as with a 1985 
project on what it termed “institutional discrimination,” and on which it corre-
sponded with the World Council of Churches’ unit on racism.108 The 1986 pro-
gram report refers to a substantial fieldwork effort on this, on the basis of which it 
sought to determine “whether a practice is a result of individual or mass conduct, 
or official policy”—the latter category being the one of interest to the organization. 
Three areas of Israeli policy were under examination:
disposition of land, the allocation of resources, and the use of labour. In each area 
field data have been collected and examined with a view to determining the degree 
to which racist policies are being practised against Palestinians in the Occupied 
 Territories, and the short and long-term objectives such policies may be designed 
to serve.109
Evident again are the question “why” as well as “what” and the need to understand 
the policy behind the practice. These were early days to be researching this angle.
LEGAL ADVICE AND KNOW YOUR RIGHT S
One of the criticisms directed at LSM/al-Haq—certainly before it began its 
 campaigns—was that its focus tended to be directed towards mostly external 
actors and public opinion, and more particularly lawyers, human rights organiza-
tions, and activists in Israel, Europe, and the United States. The organization did 
make a concerted effort to develop an “internal” agenda promoting rule-of-law 
and human rights awareness in Palestinian society. Besides the development of 
what was to become a “massive library” on law and human rights for public use,110 
other elements included public lectures and talks, employment of a human rights 
educator to develop material for schools, and articles in the local Arabic press. 
There were two themes in this work: firstly, educating members of Palestinian 
society about their rights, such as they were, vis-à-vis the occupying authorities, 
and secondly, promoting ideas of the rule of law and human rights in relation to 
Palestinians’ conduct towards each other. The challenges of the first were set out in 
the draft program objectives for 1987 as follows:
The promotion of an awareness of the individual and collective rights of Palestin-
ians is a particularly pressing task in a society where a history of social and  political 
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domination has nurtured a sceptical attitude towards the prospect of achieving these 
rights. Moreover, widespread ignorance of the rights and protections that are, in the-
ory, available to them renders the population ill-equipped to use the law to defend its 
vital individual and collective interests.
LSM/al-Haq opened its legal advice program in early 1985. By the end of 1986, 
Mona Rishmawi was sitting twice a week “to offer legal advice to residents in any 
matter related to law; to follow up cases concerning violations of basic human 
rights principles; [and] to adopt cases which do not require court procedures.”111 
The subjects on which advice was being provided included “travel restrictions, 
disappearances of residents or relatives of residents outside the West Bank and 
on the bridges, family reunification, issuance of driving permits [and] registra-
tion of charitable associations.” Some successes had been registered in challenging 
refusal of permission to travel abroad, but family reunification was an area “where 
it has been very difficult to obtain a significant outcome.” Therefore, the organiza-
tion would resort to “employing tactics which may not lead directly to a desired 
final result, but which may nonetheless contribute”—in this case, trying to have 
the authorities release the criteria on which it was denying applications for family 
reunification. The organization set out the incremental development of its posi-
tions: “One of al-Haq’s goals in intervening with the authorities should be—and 
is—to clarify the legal situation under occupation, so as to create a more solid 
legal basis on which to intervene with the authorities and to provide legal advice 
to those whose human rights are violated.”112
As demands on the legal advice program grew, al-Haq made a decision to work 
with an in-house lawyer to train staff as paralegals to implement the majority of 
the work. Jacqueline Shahinian first took on the paralegal role, using materials pro-
duced by the ICJ for paralegals and drawing on assistance from practitioners in 
the United Kingdom; Shahinian was sent to London to look at the Citizens’ Advice 
Bureau and the Citizens’ Law Centres as models. Field-workers were later trained 
as paralegals, and by 1993 the Legal Services Unit was intensifying its activities in its 
new offices in Hebron, Nablus, and Ramallah. The Legal Advice/Legal Services Unit 
was to continue its work even through the organizational crisis that caused the near 
collapse of al-Haq in 1997. Shahinian was kept on by the board when it fired nearly 
all of the other employees, to open the office and follow up on cases at the unit. The 
unit was finally closed by Randa Siniora on the basis of a strategic review she car-
ried out in 2005 as al-Haq’s director; there were other organizations providing legal 
aid, she explained, and at that point Al-Haq’s distinctive strengths lay elsewhere.
Beginning in late 1983, for its first three years the “Legal Corner,” a weekly col-
umn in al-Fajr Arabic newspaper, was written by Mona Rishmawi and covered an 
extraordinary range of subjects that included developments in the law and prac-
tice of the occupation authorities, the concepts of human rights and the rule of 
law, the international human rights movement, and other, more internal issues 
such as tenancy laws, the law of tort (focusing on negligence), “revenge” killings, 
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bounced checks, and “the woman lawyer and the legal profession.”113 According to 
a draft report on the impact of LSM’s publications, the column was “very widely 
read and often provokes discussion and interest in other aspects of al-Haq’s work.” 
The  individual pieces were never collected for publication despite an apparent 
 intention to do so. Revived in 1993 when the organization was staff run, the col-
umn was renamed the “Human Rights Corner” and published in al-Quds newspa-
per, with staff members from across al-Haq’s units writing pieces along with a few 
invited guest contributors. A first set of these columns was republished by al-Haq 
in a 1995 collection.114
Finally, we come to the Know Your Rights series of locally directed pamphlets 
aimed at educating and equipping the community in regard to its legal rights. On 
this, Shahinian comments:
The Know Your Rights concept was a brilliant method to reach the grassroots to al-
low people to change their way of thinking, that even though the occupation will still 
go on making our lives miserable, this should not stop us from both complaining 
and asking why.
Shahinian’s experience at the Legal Services Unit clearly influenced her enthusi-
asm for the Know Your Rights series; in the early nineties, the unit was to pro-
duce a number of leaflets addressing issues commonly raised by those coming for 
advice.115 The Know Your Rights series, produced in Arabic and written by Palestin-
ian staffers, reflected ongoing priorities at the organization. Joost Hiltermann was 
later to state that the series was “one of al-Haq’s most important undertakings dur-
ing its first decade,”116 although other workers were less sure of the series’ impact. 
In part, Hiltermann reflects, the series was a response to the early suspicion that 
“nobody knew what we were about”; the Know Your Rights series showed that “this 
was not just an elite debate that we were fighting in Washington—although that’s 
important—but this is also useful for the community.” The inspiration behind the 
series was not, however, utilitarian, but arose directly from the early aspirations of 
LSM’s leadership that the Palestinian public should have recourse to the law. The 
first three publications in this series were written by Mona Rishmawi, one a year 
from 1982, and it was perhaps inevitable that the very first would deal with “The 
Land,” with the subtitle “Legal Means of Protecting It.” On the inside front cover, 
the rubric reads as follows:
These pages have been prepared to help citizens in the West Bank in the legal means 
to which recourse may be had when their land is at risk of attack. They have been 
written in simple legal language to help the ordinary citizen in understanding them 
and benefitting from them.
This publication urges immediate recourse in the event of “an attack on your land” 
to the Israeli Military Objections Committee, “and not the Israeli High Court of 
Justice as is the prevailing belief among the people.” An “attack” is explained as 
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such actions as “ploughing, planting, grazing livestock, building etc” by “ordinary 
persons or companies,” in which case recourse might be had to the local courts and 
police; and measures such as confiscation, a declaration of the land being “state 
land” or “absentee property” or other of the means through which the occupation 
authorities were taking control of Palestinian land. The booklet advises the reader 
to retain a lawyer, but provides indications of the documents the affected Palestin-
ians would need for their submission to the Military Objections Committee, and 
includes the forms for the submission of an objection. This first Know Your Rights 
publication is focused on local law.
The second, titled “al-Muwatin” (with a subtitle: “Search, Arrest and Military 
Trial”), contains introductory quotes from the UDHR, which the booklet says that 
Israel—as a signatory and a member of the UN—should “respect in its entirety.”117 
The publication “explains the procedures followed during detention and military 
trial as based on Military Orders, especially Order no. 378, without comment-
ing on the extent to which these procedures conform to human rights principles.” 
It appends the full text of the UDHR “to emphasise the importance of human 
rights and in the belief that our compatriots will benefit greatly from knowledge 
thereof.”118 The third in the series (1984) dealt with “town arrest” (or residence 
restriction orders) in light of an increase in resort to this form of administrative 
control and punishment. In this one, Rishmawi dealt with the relevant provisions 
of Military Order 378 applicable in the West Bank apart from Jerusalem, and the 
relevant provisions of the 1945 DERs on the basis of which orders were imposed 
on East Jerusalem Palestinians. She appended both sets of provisions, along with 
Article 87 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (which, it is explained, constrains the 
occupier’s authority) “in the belief that citizens of the Occupied Territories should 
be aware of the international law principles that govern their situation.”
The next booklet in the series turned to internal human rights promotion. “For 
us,” says Kuttab, “human rights wasn’t just about the occupation,” but “the whole 
universal human rights thing wasn’t shared by everyone, it wasn’t on the political 
scene.” In 1986, the organization had observed:
Al-Haq has undertaken to intervene with indigenous institutional structures that 
appear to violate individual and collective human rights, particularly in the areas of 
labour rights and women’s rights. Al-Haq will attempt to confront practices which 
violate existing laws and, more importantly, to press for the application of interna-
tionally recognised principles and covenants on which local legislation is inarticu-
late. This task is particularly challenging for al-Haq, operating as it does in a social 
and political context where the absence of a competent and impartial judiciary and 
system of law enforcement renders the local population relatively powerless and un-
protected vis-à-vis established local institutions and centres of power. Current work 
on labour and women’s issues will continue in 1987 and it is hoped that al-Haq will 
be able to play a more activist role in addressing selected violations of human rights 
in Palestinian society.119
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The Labour Rights Project produced the next two Know Your Rights publica-
tions. The first was directed to Palestinians working in the West Bank and the 
second to those working for Israeli employers. The latter sought to brief the thou-
sands from the occupied territories who went to work in Israel (“behind the Green 
Line”), examining Israeli law from which these workers might “even if only in a 
modest way” benefit, despite “the clear discrimination between Israeli and Pales-
tinian workers.” The first sought to build awareness among Palestinians working 
in the West Bank of their rights under Jordanian labor law vis-à-vis their Palestin-
ian employers.120 Both began by situating workers’ rights as human rights. Both 
invoked international labor standards as articulated by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). The second, for those working for Israeli employers, high-
lighted the right to belong to a trade union and to be protected from arbitrary 
discrimination; the first invoked a set of workers’ rights affirmed by the ILO.
Al-Haq had first begun reporting on its concerns on trade union rights in 1986, 
and the Newsletter explained its interest:
The right of association and the right to trade union activity are universally acknowl-
edged to be fundamental to the development of a just and democratic social or-
der. Al-Haq has recently focused its attention on the treatment of trade unions and 
unionists in the West Bank by the Israeli authorities, and has intervened on a number 
of occasions in connection with arrests, restrictions, closures and other measures. 
Al-Haq has [ . . . ] addressed the Israeli authorities on these matters in light of Israel’s 
proclaimed support for the trade union environment.121
Mervat Rishmawi, whose first paid work with al-Haq was on the Labour Rights 
Project, notes that the project was “focused on provision of legal advice and ser-
vices to workers and trade unions.” In 1986 the organization provided input and 
advice to a group of West Bank trade unions in their submission of a representa-
tion to the ILO regarding Israel’s arrest and detention without trial of a number of 
trade unionists and the deportation of two others. The ILO replied that “the rep-
resentation was not receivable” because, firstly, “the occupation by Israel of Arab 
territories in 1967 cannot be considered as having extended to the Occupied Ter-
ritories Israel’s obligations under Conventions it has ratified,” and  secondly (and 
subsequently), because “actions taken by Israel in the Occupied Territories cannot 
be considered as having taken place ‘within its jurisdiction.’ ”122 These were argu-
ments similar to those that the Palestinian human rights movement was later to 
face from Israeli officials refusing the application of human rights treaties it had 
ratified to its actions in the occupied territories. Al-Haq engaged in a detailed cor-
respondence with the ILO, and the following year, together with the Gaza Centre 
for Rights and Law, the organization assisted two Gazan trade unions in preparing 
a complaint to the ILO’s Freedom of Association Committee after the military 
authorities had banned them from holding their elections and then, when they 
went ahead anyway, refused to recognize the results.123 The complaint was  delivered 
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to the Freedom of Association Committee by al-Haq members who joined an ICJ 
delegation to the ILO’s annual international conference in Geneva.124
The Labour Rights Project was thus the context of al-Haq’s first exposure (albeit 
not as a direct party) to a UN mechanism of “enforcement” that employed inter-
national normative instruments based outside IHL. Project staffers recall that 
al-Haq played a facilitating role between the faction-based unions, “because we 
were seen as being neutral.” Intensive briefing work was carried out with visit-
ing international and regional trade union delegations particularly, after the inti-
fada began. At the same time, Rishmawi notes, the project engaged in intensive 
“national work,” helping with trainings particularly on local labor law and ILO 
standards. The Legal Advice Unit was briefed on services to workers, “although 
we were careful not to take the place of the unions.” Marty Rosenbluth for his part 
recalls “a tension between the unions as a nationalist movement and the unions as 
a workers’ rights movement” which they came across in this work.
The women’s rights project was the second dealing explicitly with “local institu-
tions and centres of power”125 and had begun in informal fashion in 1985. At the 
time there were a number of women’s committees politically affiliated with the dif-
ferent nationalist factions.126 Mona Rishmawi’s participation in the Nairobi NGO 
Forum at the end of the UN Decade for Women (1975–85) provided a framework 
for LSM to launch its own work from a nonfactional base. Rishmawi published 
articles in the Legal Corner series, joined the West Bank Planning Committee to 
prepare for the forum, and coconvened a study day on the conference’s themes 
of equality, peace, and development. Rishmawi’s occasional paper on Palestin-
ian women’s legal status was published in Arabic in 1986, and the following year 
Randa Siniora was recruited to establish and coordinate a Women’s Rights Proj-
ect. Siniora begins her reflections on the project in a piece written for al-Haq’s 
Twenty Years publication with a quotation from the head of a charitable women’s 
organization who suggested, when Siniora met her to introduce al-Haq’s project, 
that Siniora and the organization should rather “go and do something with your 
 partner Amnesty International” (about torture and other violations) and “leave 
women’s problems to be resolved privately and discreetly by the extended family.”127 
Human rights violations by the occupation were considered the proper focus for 
a human rights organization at the time.
Siniora says that al-Haq’s legal and rights focus meant “we weren’t duplicat-
ing” the existing work of the women’s committees. Not long after she joined, 
however, the first intifada “turned everything upside down,” and staffers on the 
Women’s Rights Project, like those on the Labour Rights Project, were pulled into 
the organization’s response to the massive violations from the occupying forces 
(including against women). Sustained work on the internal aspects of these proj-
ects was in practical terms suspended.128 “It wasn’t until a couple of years later,” says 
Siniora, “that we realised that the intifada was a matter of everyday life within the 
Palestinian society, and that we needed to focus on some problematic human rights 
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issues that are not necessarily related to Israeli violations.”129 The project began to 
look at gender-based violence in the Palestinian family and at personal status laws, 
as well as the impact on women of Israeli violations such as house demolition and 
denial of family reunification. The project reached its peak, according to Siniora, 
with the work on “Women, Justice and the Law: Towards the Empowerment of 
Palestinian Women,” a project which involved a range of women’s leaders in con-
ceptualizing and convening workshops around the occupied territories on a set of 
issues comprising health, personal status law, protection against violence, labor 
and social security issues, civil and political rights, and education and profes-
sional training. This work culminated in a major conference in East Jerusalem in 
the summer of 1994, which closed with a mock tribunal hearing cases of violence 
against women and other violations of women’s rights.130
Siniora brought the idea of the conference and particularly the tribunal back 
from her experiences representing al-Haq at the 1993 Vienna World Conference 
on Human Rights and the Bangkok preparatory meeting for the Asia-Pacific 
region that had preceded it. Al-Haq had agreed to become coordinator of the West 
Asia grouping of NGOs. In a packed few months (March–May 1993), Fateh Azzam 
had also attended the first meeting of its kind of Arab human rights organizations 
preparing for the Vienna conference, while Mervat Rishmawi went to Geneva for 
a further preparatory meeting.131 The preparatory meetings, the conference itself, 
and follow-up to the Programme of Action adopted at Vienna exposed al-Haq 
intensively to human rights activists and organizations from the Global South, 
including the Arab world. Seeing itself as part of the Arab human rights move-
ment was something new, and establishing those links was particularly important: 
“We’d been pretty isolated before,” says Azzam. “I was surprised by the welcome 
we got from the Arab groups; I hadn’t realized our work was so well known in 
the region.” A range of impressive activists and organizations from South Asia 
brought to al-Haq new ideas for strategy and advocacy. Mervat Rishmawi says she 
“learned about proper campaigning” from “amazing colleagues from Asia.” For 
Siniora, “it was a huge thing, my first real exposure; I came back asking: How can 
we use law as a tool? How can we refer to international human rights  instruments? 
I met so many women from Asia working on women, law and development.” 
Mona Rishmawi, by then at the ICJ in Geneva, identifies this as the point that 
al-Haq and other national NGOs began to assert their significance as part of the 
global human rights movement and to reevaluate their relationship with the inter-
national NGOs.132
The timing of this process was also critical. The Madrid talks between Israel 
and representatives of Palestinians from the occupied territories had begun in 
December 1991; they were superseded by the Israel-PLO Declaration of Princi-
ples in September 1993 and the lead-up to the Oslo agreements establishing the 
Palestinian Authority. Earlier that year, the Israeli authorities had closed off from 
each other the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, 
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and the Gaza Strip, restricting movement of people and goods between them and 
further preparing the ground—physically—for the fragmentation that exists 
today. By 1994 the Palestinian Authority was partially in place, and al-Haq, along-
side other groups and society at large, was looking to the internal processes to 
be expected of a national authority alongside the occupying forces. Some of the 
impact at al-Haq of these developments is reflected in the series of Know Your 
Rights publications.
Following publication of the second of the labor rights booklets in 1986, there 
was a break of nearly three years before al-Haq returned to the Know Your Rights 
format. The next four publications addressed Israeli policies and practices that 
the organization was also taking up in other ways. The booklet titled Willful 
Killing set out the elements of this crime under the Fourth Geneva Convention 
and addressed issues of evidence (including autopsy) that would establish such 
killings as grave breaches.133 Succeeding Know Your Rights publications exam-
ined Israel’s policy on family reunification, coinciding with al-Haq’s campaign on 
this, and torture, the latter running alongside al-Haq’s major documentation 
 exercise and setting out steps by detainees, their families, lawyers, and NGOs to 
assist the effort to document and seek redress.134
In September 1993, the organization published A Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials, reproducing the 1979 UN text, with commentaries on its 
articles.135 The publication was presented as “a contribution from al-Haq to cur-
rent efforts to re-build Palestinian society.” An extensive introduction by then 
coordinator Fateh Azzam set this publication squarely in the context of the 1993 
Declaration of Principles, particularly the reference to the “strong police force” 
that was to be established by the Palestinian Council.136 “Palestinian society has 
for decades suffered from the different security agencies under whose authority 
it lived,” pointed out Azzam, “so what is a ‘strong police force’?” He drew out the 
rule of law, the role of legislation and the need for just laws, the achievement of 
a balance between the rights and responsibilities of citizens and law enforcement 
officers, and the need there would be for solid training of members of the Palestin-
ian police “so that these principles become a part of each one.”137 Al-Haq’s role in 
police training became an area of organizational disagreement as the Palestinian 
Authority arrived in Jericho and Gaza in 1994. Al-Haq updated Rishmawi’s The 
Citizen in view of the changes to Israeli military legislation since the 1983 original 
and given that “we are still going to be living under these laws,” since “it is expected 
that they will remain applicable at least in the interim period.”138 In August 1994 
al-Haq published the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, a 1988 UN document, with a forthright 
introduction by Azzam that urged the incoming Palestinian authorities to ensure 
respect for these norms and to “provide for legal means to punish every respon-
sible person who deviates from respect for these principles in their entirety, letter 
and spirit [ . . . ] We must start now, not tomorrow.” The introduction concluded:
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Finally, let us repeat here that society always reaps what it sows. If we sow oppres-
sion and violation, we will reap rebellion and instability. If we sow respect for human 
rights, we will surely reap respect for duties, and respect for the Authority itself.139
Two further Know Your Rights booklets, before a break of over a decade, focused 
on building human rights awareness within Palestinian society. The first of these 
was on violence against women, particularly violence in the family, and included 
contact details of two organizations to which women might turn for help.140 
The second, by senior researcher Riziq Shuqair, addresses arguments about the 
cultural relativity of human rights as used against proponents of universality.141 
The debate had been very much in focus at Bangkok and Vienna, and the piece 
draws on documents from these conferences, stressing universality and indivis-
ibility: “in order to refute these [relativist] claims.” Hanny Megally noted in the 
aftermath of Vienna that in the Arab region “one cannot discuss human rights 
without being confronted with everyday issues of religion and culture.”142 Shuqa-
ir’s piece is, however, probably the first time that al-Haq addressed this issue in 
print. Unlike its sister organizations elsewhere in the Arab world, LSM/al-Haq 
had not dealt with challenges from religion or culture when it started with its work 
on the  occupation. Things were changing with a greater focus on society and with 
the advent of the PA, which was soon to deploy arguments of “foreign funding” 
and “agents of the West” against Palestinian human rights NGOs. Shuqair’s piece 
makes only the sparsest of references to the “accumulated gains of divine religions 
and human experience” as the source of the concept of human rights. But in taking 
on and responding to the arguments one by one, the piece reads as an interven-
tion to Palestinian society that staunchly confronts any portrayal of human rights 
as fundamentally a child of the West, a West by which the Palestinian people had 
long been betrayed, and which Shuqair and his colleagues at al-Haq could not 
allow to be represented as the “owners” of the principles on which they based their 
work. As a Know Your Rights publication, it is an unusual intervention, but very 
much of its time.
INVOKING THE L AW
LSM/Al-Haq’s relationship to and invocation of different bodies of law reflected 
developments both in those bodies of law and in al-Haq’s understandings of their 
implications. In its very early years, as seen, the organization was engaged in an 
effort to understand its legal environment and the implications of changes made by 
the occupation authorities.143 Its rule-of-law arguments, focused on Israeli changes 
to local law and quotidian practices of the occupying power that appeared system-
atic and policy based, were bolstered initially with reference to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the Hague Regulations, but also invoked the UDHR in support 
of fundamental norms binding—morally if not by treaty obligation—on Israel. 
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In 1986, for example, an intervention informed the legal adviser of the military 
governor that the harassment of prisoners released in the 1985 exchange violated
sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12 and 13a of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
guarantee the rights of freedom from cruel and inhuman punishment and arbitrary 
arrest, freedom from arbitrary interference in a person’s privacy, freedom of move-
ment, and the right to life, liberty and personal security.144
At the end of 1987, al-Haq reported a more substantial consideration of human 
rights norms in an intervention on the closure of a print shop in a refugee camp. 
Al-Haq considered this a violation of article 19 of the UDHR and article 19 of the 
ICCPR, and invoked country reports and related jurisprudence at the UN Human 
Rights Committee, the Travaux Preparatoires of the ICCPR, and a case from the 
European Court of Human Rights, holding that:
In al-Haq’s opinion Israel is morally obliged to abide by the provisions of the UDHR 
and the ICCPR. While the provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR are not explicitly 
binding on Israel, which is a signatory to both but has not ratified the ICCPR, the 
relevant provisions of these conventions are generally accepted as customary law.145
A year later, al-Haq’s first annual report dealt mainly with IHL as well as Israeli 
military orders and Israel’s use of the DERs (1945), but referred also to the UDHR 
and the ICCPR. Based primarily on al-Haq’s documentation (affidavits, question-
naires and reports), the report described Israel’s response to the uprising as “more 
of the same, but much more”—the scale of repression had changed and so had 
Israel’s response:
Whereas in the past the authorities were reluctant to admit to abuses, let alone con-
done them in public, and would at most seek to rationalise them, the exposure given 
world-wide to Israel’s reaction to the uprising has forced the authorities to go on 
record defending particular policies which even the most casual observer could un-
derstand as blatantly illegal.146
Al-Haq’s task had thus changed; no longer having to prove that violations were 
taking place, the purpose had become “to indicate the scope of the practices that 
occur.”147 Al-Haq’s archives record directors and staffers debating whether to pub-
lish a three-month or a six-month report as the intifada gathered momentum, 
each of these moments passing as the uprising intensified to include widespread 
civil disobedience as well as street protests, a tax revolt, and other resistance. 
The publication was thus not originally intended as an annual report. Rabbani 
recalls that its impact was massive: “nothing like it had been attempted before” in 
 documenting human rights in the occupied territories. The uprising, said al-Haq 
in this report, “has primarily been an act of collective anger” and “a collective 
attempt by Palestinians to protect themselves against the predatory behaviour of 
the Israeli state.”148 Shehadeh observed that the report “was a huge thing, a whole 
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new stage for al-Haq”—and indeed for Shehadeh, who was beginning to find the 
workload unsustainable. The second intifada report, A Nation under Siege, told 
al-Haq’s readers:
This year, al-Haq concludes that the systematic human rights violations in the Occu-
pied Territories, in many cases amounting to “grave breaches” of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, demonstrate that Palestinians live under a state of lawlessness. The total 
absence of effective local remedy, discussed at length in this report, has led al-Haq to 
reiterate its call for international protection.149
A Nation under Siege included an expanded thematic focus and also paid close 
attention to accountability and monitoring. Its final chapter was on mechanisms 
of international protection. For the first time, violations categorized as grave 
breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention were identified in each relevant chap-
ter.  Rabbani finds a “new agenda” reflected in this second intifada report, which 
came in at 672 pages in the hardback publication.
Within a couple of years, al-Haq’s spread of legal focus and organizational 
interest was to increase substantively. Al-Haq’s work on IHL (and particularly on 
grave breaches and the third-party state obligations to which these give rise) and 
IHRL (including the treaty mechanisms that were established to monitor compli-
ance by state parties) came together in Melissa Phillips’s Torture for Security: The 
Systematic Torture And Ill-Treatment of Palestinians by Israel.150 This was the result 
of a marathon fieldwork and research effort that involved detailed interviews with 
over seven hundred former detainees in the West Bank and Gaza, first selected 
randomly and then targeting persons known to have been interrogated while in 
Israeli custody.151 The findings, together with the analysis of policy and statements 
by Israeli government officials, pointed to “a systematic and, indeed, institution-
alized use of torture both to intimidate and to extract information.”152 The study 
exemplifies al-Haq’s work spanning the later years of the intifada and the arrival 
of the PA in Gaza and Jericho; it was felt to be a major achievement by al-Haq 
staffers. Different units were closely engaged with the study: the field-workers, the 
database, and the researchers. Khaled Batrawi recalls the many and specific chal-
lenges of investigating and documenting torture, given that there were usually no 
witnesses for corroboration, detainees were held incommunicado, they were often 
hooded for long periods and thus unable to identify their torturers, who used 
code names, there was a failure to investigate complaints of torture on the part 
of the authorities, and techniques were used that did not leave marks on the 
body.153 The unit put great effort into the documentation. Oyediran describes 
the result as “a very sophisticated study that demonstrated the richness of al-Haq 
staffers’ approaches to social research.”
The collection by the field-workers of the documentation had started in 1990; 
its material basis covered the treatment of Palestinians in Israeli custody over the 
first four years of the intifada, 1988–92.154 As the study pointed out, torture was 
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not new in Israeli prisons, nor was this the first study on the subject. However, 
“what is new is that an overwhelming majority of Palestinians detained have been 
tortured.”155 Just before the intifada began, the report of the Landau Commission 
(but not its attached interrogation guidelines) had been published. The commis-
sion had found that “Shin Bet agents had followed an unwritten but systematic 
policy of committing perjury to conceal the use of physical force and other pres-
sure to extract confessions.”156 Preferring not to use the word torture, the report 
“absolve[d] political echelons of all knowledge and the Shin Bet of any evil inten-
tion in interrogation and court testimony.”157 Landau found that “the future use 
of ‘moderate physical and psychological pressure’ was permissible on the basis of 
legal arguments of ‘necessity’ and ‘justification.’ ”158 These pronouncements were 
the target of sustained advocacy from human rights organizations.
There were two further significant elements in the context for al-Haq’s work 
on torture. In 1991, Israel ratified the CAT.159 When Israel submitted its first report 
to the Committee against Torture in 1994, al-Haq submitted a brief to the same, 
presenting documented cases of torture. Israel had not reported to the commit-
tee on its actions in the occupied territories or in regard to Palestinians from the 
occupied territories detained inside Israel; its arguments that its obligations under 
international human rights law did not apply to the West Bank and Gaza were to be 
maintained for years. The committee disagreed, holding that Israel was in breach 
of the convention in a number of policy areas, including in the use of “moderate 
physical pressure” as recommended by the Landau Commission.160
This appears to have been the first time that al-Haq made a formal submission 
to a UN human rights treaty mechanism, the year after the Vienna conference. It 
marked a development both in the context in which it found itself working and 
in its own thinking, as well as a new international focus for activity. The relation-
ship between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL), and in particular 
the situation of occupied territories under these treaties, was one with which al-
Haq was already engaged. That same year, 1994, al-Haq published a study on the 
applicability of human rights law to occupied territories,161 and its submission to 
the Committee against Torture drew on these arguments to assert the committee’s 
responsibility to investigate Israel’s actions in the West Bank and Gaza.162 Fateh 
Azzam explains that the organization’s developing research interest in IHRL—
having previously focused on IHL—was prompted both by Israel’s 1991 ratifica-
tions and by the declaration by Yasser Arafat that “the PLO was committed to 
respect and incorporate into Palestinian legislation all internationally recognized 
human rights standards,” a statement made to Amnesty International representa-
tives in Tunis in October 1993, and followed by other similar indications.163 The 
fact that key Palestinian staffers had recently taken master’s degrees in IHRL 
gave added energy to the endeavors. The 1994 study examined the applicability 
of both conventional and customary human rights law to occupied territory and 
 theories about how conventional human rights instruments would interact with 
182    Field and Legal Research
 international humanitarian law. It also looked at the responsibilities of the Pales-
tinian “governing entity” in the event that various authorities were transferred to it 
from the occupying power. In the preface, Fateh Azzam, as program coordinator, 
stressed that “al-Haq’s interest is not in the theories of law for their own sake” but 
to locate the standards through which the governing authority could be obligated 
to protect human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory.164
By the time the Torture report was published in 1995, the Palestinian Author-
ity’s own human rights–related conduct was under criticism by al-Haq and other 
human rights groups; the organization’s first publication in this regard, Freedom 
of Assembly, was published in Arabic the same year. The PA was in place in Jeri-
cho and Gaza, and negotiations were ongoing for it to take over other designated 
urban areas of the West Bank. Azzam’s preface to the torture report is squarely 
placed in this context, and foreshadows al-Haq’s approach to the challenges of 
Oslo and the interim period:
In the quest for long-lasting peace, justice must be perceived to have been achieved. 
That justice can only be predicated on a truthful account of past abuses. The major 
documentation effort contained in this study remains an important historical record 
and a contribution, albeit partial, to that account.
Moreover, the analysis of the systematic nature of Israeli torture techniques 
 provides a curious case study of premeditated governmental circumvention of the 
absolute prohibition of torture in international treaty and customary law. A  thorough 
understanding of existing rules and methods of torture in Israeli interrogation facili-
ties will also help to accurately define any changes or forewarning to the  Palestinian 
authorities themselves of the pitfalls and dangers of legitimizing fundamentally 
 illegal practices.
Most importantly, the needs and timelines of this study will never be lost to the 
victims of torture themselves. It is testimony to the fact that their suffering has been 




In January 1994, the distinguished Chilean human rights leader José Zalaquett 
arrived at al-Haq to conduct an intensive evaluation of the organization against the 
background of rapidly unfolding political developments and internal  organizational 
pressures. The previous year, the Israeli authorities had closed off the northern and 
southern parts of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip from each 
other.1 The political negotiations that had been underway in Washington follow-
ing the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference between a delegation of Palestinians from 
the occupied territories (in a joint delegation with Jordan) and an Israel delega-
tion had been superseded in September 1993 with the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles (DoP) in Washington between Israel and the PLO. The DoP was the 
result of a secret parallel political process that had been facilitated by the Norwe-
gians and that set the scene for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.2 The 
first intifada had largely lost momentum by the time that the Madrid  conference 
was jointly convened by the United States and the Soviet Union after the end of 
the Gulf War;3 the limited law-based moves that had been adopted notably by 
Europe in response to Israel’s brutal repression of the intifada were overtaken 
by the US-led drive to get a peace process going. The Declaration of the Palestinian 
State (in the territories occupied in 1967) made by the Palestine National Council 
in Algiers on November 15, 1988, seemed a long time ago.
An expanded mandate and the beginnings of internal fractures had put pres-
sure on al-Haq even as it rallied to respond to internal and external challenges 
through the intifada years. Zalaquett’s intervention came midway between the first 
real cracks appearing in al-Haq (around Madrid in 1991) and the 1997 crisis and 
near-collapse of the organization. Zalaquett was invited urgently by Fateh Azzam 
to help think strategically about al-Haq’s challenges and role in the transitional 
period as Palestinian government became a reality. Al-Haq was now a staff-owned 
and staff-governed organization. This was a novel experience that saw consider-
able output but also consumed much energy. The nineties were a difficult decade 
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for al-Haq; as Mouin Rabbani said, “Oslo gave al-Haq an identity crisis.” In this 
the organization was no different from human rights organizations elsewhere in 
situations of major political transition.4 Bell and Keenan identify how “patterns of 
conflict, the human rights mechanisms available, and the human rights ‘players’ ” 
mutate following agreements on political transition.5 Looking at the situation in 
the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt, as the West Bank—including East Jeru-
salem—and Gaza were now called), Zalaquett identified for al-Haq some of the 
“main variables” that might arise and that “may, in the time to come, impinge 
on the situation of human rights and on the work of human rights organizations 
in the West Bank and Gaza”:6
1. The Israeli-Palestinian agreements
The nature of the agreements that may be concluded, the pace of such process, 
and the possibilities of major difficulties or failure, both in concluding satisfac-
tory agreements or in implementing them [ . . . ]
2. Tensions that might develop within the Palestinian community
Some of the foreseeable tensions are: a) strains between resident  
Palestinians, Palestinians returning from abroad and those remaining abroad;  
b) conflicts between groups advocating competing ideological/political mod-
els for the organization of the now Occupied Territories [ . . . ] c) a possibility 
of growing armamentism and the development of militias within Palestinian 
society [ . . . ]
3. Possible changes in patterns of violations and abuses and in the participation of 
different perpetrators7
[ . . . Al-Haq] may be called upon to pronounce itself with regard to any of the  
following practices:
→ Violations committed by Israeli occupation authorities, whether along the  
previously-known patterns or new ones.
→ Abuses committed by Israeli settlers or other non-governmental Israeli  
actors. [ . . . ]
→ Possible abuses committed by a hypothetical Palestinian authority or  
its agents.
→ Acts of violence and other abuses committed by Palestinian non-governmental 
groups, whether they are in opposition to a local Palestinian authority or in 
favour of it.
→ Permanent or endemic human rights problems which cannot be attributed to 
policy or actions of a given government, but constitute failings or insufficient 
development of the society or its institutions (discrimination against certain 
groups, non politically-motivated police abuses, insufficient protection of labour 
rights etc).
4. Possible developments in the NGO community
[ . . . ] There may be a proliferation of organizations which claim to work on a 
human rights agenda. [ . . . ] One of the main risks is the politicization of the  
human rights debate [ . . . ]
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It is also to be expected that many human rights activists will emigrate to other 
fields of activity such as politics, government or the academia [ . . . ]8
Finally, it is to be expected that the human rights agenda may elicit less 
 interest from the international public opinion and even from the local popula-
tion, because of competing issues.
Many of Zalaquett’s variables did in fact manifest in the oPt. Perhaps most sig-
nificant is his identification of the challenges that would be posed by the nature 
and pace of the political agreements being negotiated after the signing of the 
DoP. The severe limitations placed on the authorities of the incoming Palestin-
ian Authority established in Gaza and Jericho (a “quasi-government” according 
to Mona Rishmawi) were the subject of much human rights concern, including 
from al-Haq.9 But there was also criticism of the postponement until final sta-
tus negotiations (scheduled to start three years into the interim period) of key 
issues including Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and 
external  relations; Edward Said wrote of “the truly astonishing proportion of the 
Palestinian capitulation.”10
For its part, al-Haq entered the transitional period in a somewhat weakened 
state. Like others, al-Haq may not have immediately recognized the intifada for 
what it was, but it had risen to the occasion with an energy that saw it through 
the first intense years, recruiting significant numbers of new staff, widening its 
coverage geographically, and adapting its focus and to a certain extent its output to 
meet the demands of the new situation. Besides the daily violations by the Israeli 
authorities, curfews, and strikes, not to mention the arrest of many al-Haq field-
workers, the political developments put their own stresses on the organization: 
Oslo made it very difficult to leave your politics at the door.
The intifada years had exacerbated burgeoning internal differences, many 
of them viewed as politically affiliated positions towards the ongoing political 
 processes with little to do with human rights per se. Earlier in the intifada, there 
had been disagreement on a substantive issue—the killing of collaborators—that 
was considered as not based on factional politics, but rather on the difference 
between on the one hand a straight human rights approach and on the other a 
perspective that took into account context and community, or perhaps was not 
willing to isolate itself from “the street,” for professional as well as personal rea-
sons. Al-Haq had from its earliest years documented patterns of violations com-
mitted by Israeli armed forces, settlers, and most relevantly here, by Palestinian 
collaborators—notably members of the Village Leagues.11 Although by the late 
1980s the Village Leagues were of little significance, Israel maintained a network 
of collaborators in the oPt which al-Haq in A Nation under Siege divided into 
three categories:  informers inside and outside the prison system (often coer-
cively recruited by the Israeli authorities); “middlemen who make a living acting 
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as  go-betweens” for  Palestinians trying to access the many permits needed for 
 routine life in the  territories; and “armed collaborators, who often sell land and 
wield control through intimidation and violence in their places of residence, in 
many cases receiving instructions directly from the [Israeli] military or the intel-
ligence  services.”12 The chapter titled “Collaborators” dealt with the last group and 
detailed acts of  violence committed by such persons in the second year of the inti-
fada. Its first section, on applicable legal standards, described such collaborators 
as “agents of the state”13 and invoked Article 29 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
to argue that the Israeli authorities were “under a positive obligation to investi-
gate and prosecute” violations of the convention by such collaborators, who as 
Azzam put it “exhibited extreme gangster-like violence and brutality towards the 
community.”14 This was the first sustained treatment that al-Haq had published on 
collaborator violence.
If for al-Haq this was the human rights story of collaborators, that year (1989) 
another story was attracting more attention. The United National Leadership 
of the Uprising (UNLU) called on Palestinians working with the police, Israeli-
appointed village and town councils, and the tax offices to resign from their posi-
tions. Many collaborators also recanted, requiring Israel to rebuild its networks.15 
Local popular committees (soon outlawed) took over law-and-order functions 
on the street in a resort to self-help mechanisms familiar elsewhere when cen-
tral authority withdraws.16 The Israeli authorities stepped up their hunt for wanted 
activists; “death squads” of armed Israelis targeted intifada activists.17 Palestinian 
attacks against alleged collaborators increased, and according to Hammami:
By the end of the intifada’s third year, the collective weight of Israel’s anti-insurgency 
strategies had succeeded in turning the mass-based civilian uprising into a milita-
rized underground movement of armed youth primarily interested in rooting out 
alleged collaborators.18
By October 1989, Amnesty International reported that 130 suspected collaborators 
had been killed in the intifada.19 Al-Haq cited the Amnesty figure in its own report 
for 1989, because the organization did not document such killings, for reasons it 
felt obliged to set out. Technically at this point killings by nonstate actors (not then 
a routine subject of IHRL) were not in the official mandate of Amnesty either,20 
but the fact that Amnesty ran a newsletter story on the subject is indicative of the 
intense interest shown by international human rights groups and media, as well 
as the Israeli media, in this upsurge in Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence. One 
staffer recalled unspecified international organizations asking for information 
from al-Haq on this subject “so they could look even-handed.” Rabbani reports 
that “it was informally suggested that this [al-Haq’s failure to join other public 
condemnations of the killings] stemmed from a mixture of political bias and a fear 
of the consequences.”21
Inside al-Haq, Azzam recalls “very hot debates” on the killing of collabora-
tors and whether, when, and how the organization should take a public position.22 
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During the intifada, al-Haq’s reputation had soared  internationally and locally, 
and this was important to many staffers who welcomed the  name-recognition 
(now positive) that the intifada brought: “We felt and we were felt like a Palestinian 
organization, the intifada took us to the street.” Professionally, as Azzam explains, 
“if you want to get information about a particular event, you need to have access 
and contacts, and if they don’t trust you, you don’t get the contacts.” He continues:
If you come out of the fold on an issue like the killing of collaborators, you “come 
out of your skin” [ . . . ] jeopardizing access is part of it and how the staff felt about 
it—the staff are part of the community too, they’re not outside it, you’re part of the 
community and at the end of the day you go back to them [ . . . ] The debates going 
on in the streets were going on in al-Haq too. It’s not always easy to maintain a strong 
and proper human rights perspective on everything.
Some would argue that in the end al-Haq took a correct legal stand but failed 
to take a strong enough position in human rights terms against intra-Palestinian 
violence.23 Al-Haq had previously documented violations by Palestinian nonstate 
actors and was already working on internal issues such as labor rights and wom-
en’s rights, where elements of Palestinian society could be the major abusers; it 
was soon to face debates on how to address violations by the Palestinian authori-
ties and their agents and other armed groups in the territories. But at this initial 
stage, al-Haq was torn. “Do we talk from a nationalist discourse, or pure human 
rights?” asked Khaled Batrawi, recalling the discussions at al-Haq in 1989. “If it’s 
pure human rights then no-one has the right to deprive anyone of their life [ . . . ] 
There was discussion on this in the organization, and inside each one of us.” People 
at al-Haq were enormously frustrated at the attention given this issue by interna-
tional media—it felt at times like this was the only story anyone from outside was 
interested in, that they provided no context, that they had almost stopped looking 
at Israeli actions in the oPt, and that in the end it was all about getting back to the 
more (internationally) familiar role of Palestinians as villains, not victims. How-
ever, beyond the issue of hostile media coverage lay the substance. Staffer Hanan 
Rabbani recalls “difficult discussions”:
If al-Haq had decided to work on the killings of collaborators it would have affected 
its credibility nationally; but then if you’re setting standards for human rights re-
spect, you need to take that risk. I’m thinking in retrospect here, I don’t think I’d have 
had the courage to think this way then. Now, after years of experience, I think that 
was the most difficult issue to tackle, but organizations should be setting the example 
that human life is not something that we decide to end.
General director Shawan Jabarin concedes that “at that time, it was too embar-
rassing for us to come out and denounce publicly. We were nervous, the board 
was nervous. [ . . . ] Now, no, we’re more mature, as an organization, as people, we 
speak on nationalist issues from a position of strength.” The questions around the 
applicable law and accountability were real; as Playfair observed, “It took a lot of 
time, how to deal with it [ . . . ] But it was happening under our noses, we could 
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have dealt with it, even if international law wasn’t at a stage to deal with it really, 
that shouldn’t have stopped al-Haq. But it was politically charged.”
In the end, after months of external questioning and internal agonizing, al-Haq 
set out in two paragraphs in A Nation under Siege (1990) its position on the killing 
of alleged collaborators:
Al-Haq does not condone the killing of collaborators and, as a human rights orga-
nization, opposes the death penalty, with or without due process, under all circum-
stances and considers the right to life to be paramount. At the same time, actions 
taken by or against collaborators in the Occupied Territories must be judged on the 
basis of the laws of belligerent occupation, in particular Additional Protocol 1 to  
the Geneva Conventions. In al-Haq’s view, both Israel as an occupying power  
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a resistance movement are ex-
pected to respect the Protocol.24
Since the Israeli authorities exercise de facto control over the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, however, they are solely accountable for law enforcement in these territories. 
The PLO, although considered by virtually all Palestinians to be their sole legitimate 
representative, does not exercise control over local legal institutions such as courts, 
prisons, and police. There is, therefore, no legal mechanism available to either the 
PLO, or the Palestinian civilian population, to control and hold to account collabo-
rators and those who attack them. In al-Haq’s view, only an entity (governmental or 
otherwise) which exercises effective law enforcement in territory under its control 
can be held accountable for human rights violations. The military government has 
in fact exercised its prerogative as the sole law enforcement power in the Occupied 
Territories; individuals and groups involved or suspected of involvement in activities 
against collaborators are arrested and severely punished. For these reasons, al-Haq 
does not document killings of collaborators.25
These paragraphs appear in the substantive chapter on collaborators and in the 
introduction to the report, the latter being the only concession al-Haq appears 
to have made to foreground its position on the issue.26 It was, says Azzam, “a soft 
correct position, not a strong one, but correct.” At the launch of A Nation under 
Siege, a “confused delivery” of the position in response to questions from journal-
ists resulted in “negative press coverage,” but Rabbani observes that in the end the 
issue “was basically put to rest.”27 Alongside its public position, al-Haq pursued 
what Azzam calls “quiet diplomacy” with militant activists, “correctly delineating 
the responsibilities of the PLO and its organs under international humanitarian 
law despite the lack of legal mechanism or recourse available to them for bringing 
collaborators to justice.”28 A later, substantive report by B’Tselem on collaborators 
notes internal Palestinian opposition to the killings growing from 1989 onwards 
and particularly after the Gulf War, when senior political figures in the oPt and 
the PLO leadership in Tunis joined the growing criticism of this form of vigilante 
justice that, as Azzam observes, “threatened to sanction and ‘normalise’ in some 
way the ‘unofficial’ use of force within the Palestinian community.”29
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Jumping ahead briefly, somewhat similar debates took place at al-Haq later in 
the nineties, in the lead-up to the second intifada, in relation to armed attacks—
notably suicide bombings—against civilian Israeli targets. Staffers recall substan-
tial debates about the issuing of a statement by al-Haq (one remembered “a long 
discussion which seems extraordinary now”) focusing around how to treat Pal-
estinian nonstate actors, the authors of these acts. Writing in 2005, against the 
background of more suicide attacks in the first three years of the second intifada, 
Fateh Azzam calls al-Haq’s failure to take a clear public position a “serious gap to 
date in al-Haq’s honourable human rights record.”30 Acknowledging the frustra-
tion in the oPt with the outcomes of Oslo, he argues that “the debate around ‘mar-
tyrdom operations,’ as they are often called in Arabic, is framed wrongly”—it is not 
the perpetrator that defines the act but the target:, and “targeting civilians for any 
reason is a crime under international law.”31 The opposing argument in the 1990s, 
he recalls, was not a legal one. Jabarin again attributes the initial failure to speak 
out to weakness in the organization as compared to “when you feel strong in your 
position, when the organization is strong.” The strong position, articulated more 
clearly in later years, is the distinction between the lawful right to resist (within the 
limits of IHL) and targeting civilians (which is outside those limits).
This underlines a fundamental point: that al-Haq did not and does not take a 
principled position against political violence per se.32 Its absolute opposition to 
the death penalty articulated in A Nation under Siege is a specific position. The 
most immediate international legal framework in occupied territory does not pro-
hibit killing but rather regulates it, including by “organised resistance movements” 
whose actions comply with the laws of war.33 At the time LSM was founded, most 
Palestinian political factions recognized armed struggle as one form of resistance 
to Israel’s occupation, even if after the PLO left Lebanon in 1982, according to 
Erakat, for the most part “armed struggle fell into abeyance.”34 A principled posi-
tion on nonviolence was not publicly espoused by the organization, nor does it 
seem there was a discussion as to whether nonviolence should be a part of its 
identity, at least not beyond the founders. It was the armed attacks against civilian 
Israeli targets that raised issues of al-Haq speaking out institutionally in the nine-
ties and the second intifada.
In this, al-Haq differed from other domestic human rights organizations faced 
with similar questions. Steiner’s 1991 report notes that up till a decade or so before, 
violent actions by nongovernmental armed groups were the concern of domestic 
criminal law and not a human rights law matter, a consensus that had now disap-
peared.35 Joe Stork notes human rights groups working on the Kurdish issue in 
southeastern Turkey having to address issues of IHL as the internal armed conflict 
developed and describes as “controversial in the membership” one organization’s 
decision in 1992 to hold all parties (armed groups as well as state forces) account-
able under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.36 Felner’s exploration 
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of the debate in the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) in Belfast 
points up interesting comparisons with the debate in al-Haq (although Felner’s 
own comparison is made with B’Tselem).37 CAJ, as one of its three core princi-
ples, “disavowed the use of political violence as a tool for political ends.”38 With its 
basis in IHRL, CAJ focused from its beginnings on violations by the British state, 
and as discussions increased on whether and how to expand its work to include 
paramilitary violence, undertook a formal debate on the issue over 1991–92 which 
according to Felner was “probably one of the most intense debates in the orga-
nization’s history.”39 Christine Bell, who worked at and with CAJ for many years, 
observes that “the commitment not to support political violence [ . . . ] was a delib-
erate choice, not directly constrained by human rights standards” but implicitly 
making choices about “the applicability of human rights law, and the non-applica-
tion of humanitarian law which might have justified forms of state and non-state 
violence.”40 The distinction between military and civilian targets was not found 
helpful in this context, and Maggie Beirne reminds readers that CAJ “had its roots 
in pacifism and was opposed to the use of violence.”41
Back at al-Haq, the arguments and agonizing and gradual polarization of 
debates continued as the first intifada wore on. A relatively minor disagreement 
arose when in the summer of 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. Hanafi and Taber here 
note that across different Palestinian human rights organizations, “national and 
patriotic motives” (rather than legal ones) led some activists to display a lack of 
conviction that the Fourth Geneva Convention should apply.42 In the end, al-Haq 
did not make a public statement—indeed, it would have been unusual for it to 
comment on a situation beyond its own mandate and against the organization’s 
practice of not making reactive statements. As the United States and its allies were 
building up momentum to send in troops against the Iraqis, Said Zeedani, who 
joined al-Haq as program director in November 1990, recalls: “The spectre of the 
Gulf War was hovering. The first week I’m there, we’re talking about gas masks; 
if Saddam Hussein attacks Israel with biological or chemical weapons, does the 
occupying power have the obligation to provide masks for the civilian population 
of the occupied territories?” When the war started, Ramallah was under curfew 
for weeks, and staffers found other places to work from, such as Kuttab’s office 
in Jerusalem, and sneaked out to borrow neighbors’ phone lines in Ramallah to 
send out public documents through the European field representative (myself, in 
London) using the new dial-up tool of email.
Besides the routine and heavy workload, al-Haq staffers were coming under 
strain from internal disagreements and external developments as the intifada pro-
gressed into its fourth year. Politically, the cooperation between different national-
ist factions that had flourished at the start of the intifada disintegrated, and new 
political challenges arose from Islamist groups (notably Hamas).43 Sectarian divi-
sion between the different factions was to crystallize around the imminent peace 
agreements. In 1991, international attention came back to Israel-Palestine after the 
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end of the Gulf War, and political pressure built towards some kind of resolution. 
Factional tensions made their way into al-Haq. Hajjar refers to the original opti-
mism of the intifada being replaced by “an embattled determination that things 
would not return to the status quo ante.”44 Al-Haq had recruited widely during the 
intifada, and the first real organizational crisis, the rupture between the founding 
board and its first executive director, Mona Rishmawi, had shaken the organiza-
tion and left bitterness in its wake.
As international developments played out, major changes occurred in the roles 
played by al-Haq’s founding group of three. If the staffers were feeling fractious, 
so were the founders, who had stepped back in after Rishmawi’s departure in 1990 
and who, to varying degrees, were ready to quit their engagement with al-Haq. 
They began the process of constituting a new board. In 1991, Shehadeh formally 
left on the grounds that his engagement with the Palestinian delegation to the 
Madrid peace conference (and then the Washington talks) was overtly political 
and incompatible with his al-Haq responsibilities. He had been asked by the Pales-
tinian delegation head, Haidar Abdel Shafi, to advise on how the Palestinian team 
might bring the issue of Israeli settlements into the negotiations, given the exist-
ing terms of reference. Shehadeh was to prepare extensive arguments for an ini-
tial review of existing arrangements, and an outline of preliminary proposals was 
identified by the Palestinian team (and approved by the PLO in Tunis in the spring 
of 1992). These included the rescinding of “discriminatory and extra-territorial 
legislation” and the cessation of new Israeli military orders, as well as framing by 
the Fourth Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations governing the conduct of 
Israel as an occupying power.45 Shehadeh attended talks in Washington as legal 
adviser to the team, but was not allowed into the negotiations room due to Israeli 
objections to the inclusion of any Palestinian with a Jerusalem ID or from outside 
the oPt. In September 1992 Shehadeh ceased his engagement after “instructions 
arrived from Tunis [ . . . ] that there was no meaning for the review of the military 
orders since this can only give those orders recognition and legitimacy.”46
Kuttab left al-Haq’s board at the same time as Shehadeh, the two transferring 
their shares (as the owners of the company) to the new board; Kuttab subsequently 
headed the Legal Committee negotiating the 1994 Israel-PLO Gaza-Jericho 
 Agreement.47 Shammas stayed on for a while to provide some continuity, and also 
continued his work with the Enforcement Project. It was a febrile atmosphere; 
Zeedani recalls that “Madrid was coming, and everyone wanted al-Haq to take it up. 
The issue was how to separate things. We could say so much, but we couldn’t take 
a political stand for or against political action by Palestinian leaders.” A few days 
before the opening of the Madrid Conference, al-Haq sent a memorandum to the 
Palestinian delegation, opening with a reference to the “established international 
law governing Israel’s conduct in the territories occupied in 1967” (particularly the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, and invoking also Security Council Resolution 681 of 
1990) and declaring that “al-Haq takes no position with regard to the merits of the 
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political process in question.”48 The organization was, however, “deeply concerned” 
that, given Israel’s refusal to recognize the applicability of the convention and the 
failure of other states to persuade the United States to support the convention, 
“the process will be allowed to proceed in a manner which circumvents or com-
promises provisions of international humanitarian law.” The memorandum then 
set out Israel’s serious and ongoing violations (settlements, deportation, annexa-
tion, and others) and recalled al-Haq’s own record and standing:
We have spoken out both as an institution committed to defending the established 
norms and standards of human rights and the rule of law against politically moti-
vated encroachment, and as Palestinians determined to realise our internationally 
recognised rights as “protected persons” under the Fourth Convention.
The organization reminded the Palestinian representatives that in accordance with 
Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, they might not concede rights and 
protections guaranteed to “protected persons” under the convention:
In conclusion, until such time as an internationally recognised sovereign authority 
replaces the regime of belligerent occupation in the occupied territories, the present 
opportunity to negotiate interim arrangements can only be utilized to:
1) achieve implementation of the Convention, and
2) resolve other matters and concerns in accordance with the principles of 
 mutuality and reciprocity, without prejudicing the protections established in 
international humanitarian law.
The memorandum set out the legal limits to what could be conceded by any Pal-
estinian representative of the protected civilian population under the established 
terms of IHL which all the states concerned—except Israel in regard to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention—agreed applied de jure to the occupation of the territories.
Al-Haq had done what it could in seeking to uphold the applicable law. As She-
hadeh was to argue, however, the letter of invitation to the Madrid conference had 
already set parameters that were to govern all future negotiations, in particular by 
keeping Israeli settlements out of the remit despite efforts to have them included. 
Certainly, future Palestinian negotiators found the legal approach to be not only 
straitening but inconvenient. From the perspective of Shehadeh and many in al-
Haq, a mechanism envisaged to prevent an occupying power from gaining terri-
tory and resources from its occupation (the convention, and especially Article 47) 
was dismissed in favor of belief in a political process in which the main gain was 
recognition (by Israel and by the United States) of the PLO as the representative of 
the Palestinian people.49 As the local Palestinian delegation continued its efforts, 
with the talks transferred to Washington, al-Haq made a further intervention by 
way of an “Open Letter to Palestinian Public Opinion” stating that any just, com-
prehensive, and durable peace must be based on respect for human rights and the 
rule of law and invoking the right to self-determination of the Palestinian  people.50 
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The letter warned the delegation against negotiating on respect for human rights 
and the application of international law “or waiving them in whole or part in 
return for partial gains.” Al-Haq’s report on the letter concluded that:
Adhering to principles of human rights and the rule of law, and starting from them 
in the struggle for protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, is not an 
interim or tactical matter tied to the phase our people is passing through under oc-
cupation, but is a strategic long-term choice.
Erakat clearly agrees with Shehadeh on the PLO’s approach:
The intifada provided the PLO with a legal opportunity to leverage international 
law and norms, including those it had helped to establish, in its pursuit of Palestin-
ian self-determination. It could have used those legal instruments to demand better 
negotiating terms and/or as a defensive tool to resist Israeli demands; it did neither.51
Erakat attributes this to “a lack of appreciation for the law’s utility and risk, as 
well as a general political miscalculation.”52 Meanwhile, this whole period wit-
nessed considerable turmoil in al-Haq. There was amongst some longer-standing 
members a sense of ownership that in hindsight fed into a reluctance to accord 
authority to the externally recruited incoming management or to the new board, 
made up largely of academics from Birzeit University, lacking, in the eyes of these 
staffers, both human rights and NGO experience. Some date the beginning of the 
problems to the resignations of Shehadeh and Kuttab; for Kan’an, the three found-
ers and Rishmawi had been the “safety valve” for al-Haq. With the staff burned out 
from the intifada years and increasingly riven by factional divisions and personal 
recriminations, there was, according to Said Zeedani, “more talk about benefits 
and raises than about work and the quality of the work.”53 Bell and Keenan list such 
elements as manifesting in organizational crises—or dysfunctionality—in estab-
lished and successful human rights NGOs during political transitions even when 
a peace process is going well.54 That sort of perspective, however, to be offered 
by Zalaquett in 1994, was not yet available to al-Haq workers or management. 
Already in summer 1992, the files show a hand-written letter from the visiting 
program officer of one long-standing funder, addressed to the staff and board 
members of al-Haq:
During the last few days it became clear to me that your present crisis is a very dan-
gerous one. Apparently your board collapses and your senior staff is extremely dis-
couraged. For many other staff members it is only because of their own motivation 
for human rights work that they continue.
Concerned at the time and energy lost in infighting, he set out what he saw to be 
at stake in al-Haq’s “life-threatening crisis,” explaining what he perceived al-Haq’s 
role to have been in the oPt and its impact abroad. Although al-Haq was no longer 
the only Palestinian human rights organization, it would be “a major blow to the 
Palestinian people if al-Haq were to collapse.”
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As it was, al-Haq did not collapse. Later in the year, the board resigned en 
masse when the staff objected to a restructuring plan; the staff argued that they 
had not been involved in drawing it up, that it was overly bureaucratic and did 
not meet the needs of the work.55 Al-Haq needed a body with legal responsibility 
for LSM under company law; the previous board wanted rid of the shares (and of 
responsibility), but Shehadeh and Kuttab were unwilling to take them back. At a 
general meeting, the staff elected six of their number (two men and four women) 
to hold the shares on behalf of all. They voted in an Executive Committee and 
Fateh Azzam as coordinator, taking as their motto “collective responsibility for 
decision-making, personal responsibility for implementation.”
This was the context into which Zalaquett stepped in January 1994, called on by 
al-Haq “to help the organisation consider the immediate and more distant future, 
and how its own role may change to meet the new needs.”56 The months following 
issuance of the Declaration of Principles had been hectic, with workshops and 
meetings to discuss the implications of the DoP for the judicial system and broader 
human rights issues. Al-Haq reported that its contribution had been to stress the 
“universality of human rights” and the duty of every ruling authority to respect 
and guarantee them.57 In a logical move following its interventions to the Pales-
tinian delegation to the negotiations, al-Haq quickly published a Human Rights 
Assessment of the DoP, consisting of a comment and analysis together with the 
declaration, in Arabic and English texts together in one small book.58 It was telling 
that al-Haq had been unable to access the official final text of this most significant 
political agreement and had to work from “final drafts” accessed through two dif-
ferent sources on the Palestinian side. The al-Haq comment did not include the 
caveat that had opened its memorandum to the Palestinian team going to Madrid, 
distancing itself from judgment of the political process per se. It did, however, 
open its analysis with the potential impact of the DoP—in al-Haq’s reading—on 
the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, its widest  consideration of the 
principle that it had often invoked but not yet studied. The organization voiced 
concern that this right could be impaired in the “interim period” by “substan-
tial changes” that interpretation of the DoP might allow to happen,59 concern at 
“the absence of any human rights provisions and the failure to agree expressly 
to the amendment of Israeli military legislation and practice” and consequently 
at the prospects for human rights protection during the interim phase, and con-
cern at the obscurity over the jurisdictions of the Israeli and Palestinian authorities 
and the threats this held for human rights accountability in the coming interim 
period.60 These “three basic human rights issues” were elaborated in the assess-
ment in some detail, including that “the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip continues to be that of occupied territories, and Israel the Occupying Power” 
and therefore “legally responsible for upholding humanitarian standards in all 
areas of authority that have not been transferred in full to the Palestinian author-
ity.”61 Al-Haq also invoked for the first time the right of Palestinian refugees “to 
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decide to return or receive compensation” in the context of the DoP, and wel-
comed the prospect of direct, free, and general political elections, another issue 
that preempted the many variables soon to be raised by Zalaquett.62
As for the incoming Palestinian authorities, al-Haq called on them to  incorporate 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and the two International 
Covenants into domestic legislation and to “respect the provisions of Protocol II 
in the event of any internal armed conflict arising in the future.”63 Shortly after the 
DoP was signed, al-Haq announced that it “views positively” statements made by 
Yassir Arafat to the effect that the PLO was “determined to respect human rights 
standards as internationally recognised and to apply them entirely in Palestinian 
legislation.”64 In its press release, al-Haq made two key points that were preoccu-
pying the organization: the importance of the independence of the work of non-
governmental human rights organizations and its hope to establish cooperative 
relations and exchange information with the Authority “without this leading to 
constraints on the rights of NGOs in future human rights work.”
These concerns were to be heightened in the coming period, but for the 
moment the growing Palestinian human rights movement was joined by what 
was to become the National Human Rights Institution for the territories.65 Initially 
called the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights (later changed 
to the Independent Commission on Human Rights), the PICCR was established 
by decree by Arafat in Tunis before his entry to the oPt through an initiative 
led by Hanan Ashrawi, a Birzeit University professor and high-profile member of 
the Palestinian delegations to Madrid and Washington.66
Despite these initially hopeful moves, al-Haq was in considerable turmoil. The 
Human Rights Assessment had been produced through discussions where often, 
Azzam remembers, “the debates were fundamentally political,” insisting nonethe-
less that “the legal position always won.” In his 2005 overview of al-Haq’s history, 
Azzam summarizes as follows the “rancorous debates” in wider society about Oslo 
and the PA, which “al-Haq was not spared”:
whether the gradual approach of incremental agreements could possibly  
work, whether the Declaration of Principles did in effect give up Palestinian rights, 
especially the refugees’ right of return; whether the PLO as a liberation movement can 
indeed become a state in formation and transform the individualized  authoritarian 
leadership style into accountable institutions of governance.67
During the early Oslo years, Azzam notes that these wider issues “resurfaced every 
time a violation or programme or event was brought up for discussion, and truth 
be told, it was an exhausting process for the over-worked staff of al-Haq.”68 Being 
staff-owned and staff-run probably allowed more space for these arguments than 
might have happened in a more vertical institutional structure. Focusing on human 
rights implications gave coherence to al-Haq’s public response, but the debates 
were ongoing and were clearly picked up by Zalaquett. For his part, Zalaquett’s 
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input clearly framed discussions at the organization around its different roles. 
Many interviewees for this study either referred explicitly to Zalaquett’s input or 
invoked the choices he had set out for the work ahead; some ruefully observed that 
they should have paid more attention to his warnings about the risks of transitional 
moments. The arguments within al-Haq generated by the arrival of the PA (and its 
security/police forces) focused on two or three particular issues: foremost perhaps 
was how to deal with the PA, how to treat it, what the relationship should be, and 
what tone al-Haq should adopt. Those interviewed recalled that the question was 
not about whether al-Haq would monitor the actions of the PA from a human 
rights perspective, but how this should be conducted: how to play the watchdog 
role and how—or indeed whether—to play the “propositional” or advisory role. 
“Some wanted al-Haq to play the same [watchdog] role  combating the PA as we 
did on the occupation,” said Iyad Haddad, “and this political position, coming 
from outside al-Haq in that sense, impacted on the work inside the organisation.” 
Mustafa Mar’i explained it as “some said it doesn’t matter where they come from, 
the PA is the power in the country and we deal with it accordingly; others said we 
needed to go more softly, bear in mind this is a different situation.”
Mar’i, who came to al-Haq in 1992 to direct the Legal Services Unit, stressed 
the tensions between these different approaches: “I think the right approach was 
somewhere in the middle, but we couldn’t engage in constructive discussion with-
out having already made up our minds about where we wanted it to end—it wasn’t 
a real discussion, in a way.” Nina Atallah agreed: “It was never a real discussion. 
People were for and against Oslo, but we’d mix things up and go back and forth 
[ . . . ] Nobody gave a clear idea.” For Atallah, this was particularly frustrating: “I 
needed to know for the database, the lines weren’t clear, there was no agreement 
on methodology, nobody had a clear picture of how to deal with [reports of vio-
lations by the PA and its agents].” There were legal issues to be clarified, includ-
ing the “central concept of accountability”—al-Haq had noted the confusion in 
its Human Rights Assessment.69 But fundamentally, these arguments seem to have 
been fueled as much by political positions as by confusion over the nature of the 
PA as a legal address. Azzam recalls that, while al-Haq agreed that the occupation 
was not over just because the PA had been created, “the more extreme view in the 
organization held that the PA was just an agent of the occupation.”
Al-Haq staffers made an early visit to the newly arrived PA in Jericho and met 
with a senior official, a visit which Abdel Karim Kan’an explained as follows: “We 
wanted to clarify that we were an objective, independent, neutral human rights 
organization—neutral in the sense that if there’s a violation we document it, no 
matter who the perpetrator.” Azzam remembers explaining what al-Haq was and 
being met with a gracious but paternalistic response (“let me know if you need 
anything”); “we had to explain, there may be things that we’ll disagree on, we’ll 
have to go on the record, that’s how we work. He said we’ll take care of it, we’re 
here now.”70 Azzam summarizes the organization’s strategy: “In the early post-
Oslo years it was to engage the PNA in a constructive dialogue, combined with 
Fallouts    197
 training. This was perceived to be a ‘must’ strategy in the beginning, to assure the 
PNA that no political aims lay behind human rights advocacy.” But this was not to 
be pursued “at the expense of public discussion of unacceptable practices and the 
strategy of ‘shaming.’ ”71 Bell and Keenan express this as the challenge for human 
rights NGOs “to learn how to co-operate without being co-opted.”72
But it was within the wider idea of the “propositional” role as identified by 
Zalaquett that more heated debates arose. The issue of training—particularly of 
the PA police force—prompted particularly fierce disagreements—or, as Azzam 
puts it, “quite heated debates” in and out of general meetings.73 Al-Haq did in fact 
engage in organizing human rights training courses for the Palestinian police and 
security forces early on, and Mar’i remembers this as a “big issue” and one of two 
that probably contributed to “speeding up the ‘split’ in al-Haq or making it more 
visible”; those against taking up this role “argued that we’ll be seen as responsible 
for their actions post-training, or it might be used as a cover.” Batrawi, a vigorous 
supporter of this step, shows some of the tensions when he describes the argument 
arising from Zalaquett’s report over what al-Haq’s role as watchdog or advisory 
might be:
The organization was split over the training. I said I’m doing it [ . . . ] A Palestinian 
Authority is a million times better than an occupation, and our role now is to play 
watchdog and advisory. Advisory means promoting human rights in society. The 
people [Palestinians returning] from outside had a military mentality, some you’ll 
never change [ . . . ] but there’s a new generation, these shabab of the police are the 
intifada shabab, the prison shabab [ . . . ] Others said, if we train them, we’ll be held 
responsible. I said, medical colleges graduate doctors but aren’t responsible for the 
doctors’ mistakes, and doctors don’t grant life. I said, if only one Palestinian law en-
forcement officer gets the idea from doing this training, it’s still a good thing to do, 
better than sitting drinking coffee and doing nothing.
It was also suggested that contacts made through training of security personnel 
could lead to informal avenues of access and (occasionally) time-sensitive tip-offs 
in cases of torture and ill-treatment. Others at al-Haq also supported the training 
but were less than sanguine about the results. One remembers being confronted 
at the end of a course with “a young guy who said to me, ‘Okay, this is all very 
nice, but if my boss tells me go teach this guy a lesson, what am I going to do: I’ll 
teach the guy a lesson.’ [ . . . ] It was all a bit different in reality.” Another alleged 
that at some point, “certain individuals” at al-Haq were drafting responses to the 
organization’s interventions for the Palestinian security forces to use: “the point 
here being that these guys weren’t even learning.” Issam Younis generally recalls:
Mostly the attitude was, how can we help the PA? I went to Jericho, many of us went 
to do training for police officers [ . . . ] This was the vision and I think it was correct. 
Others said you don’t get human rights respect by training, it’s a waste of time. But it 
was still important. So the result was that al-Haq came out of the situation with the 
idea that the occupation is continuing, the PA is ongoing, and al-Haq saw a role in 
building [capacity] and assistance and also monitoring.
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The “building capacity and assistance” included not only providing training 
but also, to a lesser degree apparently, providing advice to the PA on human rights 
issues in the context of its ongoing negotiations. This was also controversial in 
al-Haq—Mar’i lists it as the second issue that precipitated the split in the orga-
nization. Mar’i was involved in one such exercise in the context of al-Haq’s large 
family reunification campaign, which included building an informal coalition of 
Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations to work on a joint position. He 
recalls being sent as unnamed legal adviser to the Palestinian delegation, sitting 
around till the early hours in Arafat’s Jericho compound in order to provide the 
briefing for discussion with the Israeli side about Palestinians displaced in 1967. 
Al-Haq had agreed that Mar’i could go, unnamed, and if he wished to say some-
thing to the Palestinian team he would call the negotiators out of the meeting, say 
it, and then they would return to the meeting. Mar’i’s reflections on the experience 
resonate with Shehadeh’s disappointment in Arafat’s lack of interest in legal argu-
ments, and stress his sudden, tangible grasp of the difference between how IHL 
was intended to protect the rights of the occupied population and what was going 
on with Israel:
We’re not actually negotiating with them, we’re rather at their mercy, it’s what they 
are willing to give. Look at how they treated us from the time we got to the Green 
Line, you have to wait, get a permit, they want you to know, leave no doubt who’s in 
control. This leads you to really understand the Geneva Convention rules on nego-
tiations between the occupying power and the occupied population, I really felt that 
then, because you have to think as well, “What happens to me after this?”
In the end, says Mar’i, “I only did it once, I told the organization it probably didn’t 
have a lot of value.”
Issues also arose over organizing prison visits and the need to ensure access 
through the PA. And if everyone agreed that al-Haq would be monitoring PA con-
duct, there remained the issue of approach. Haddad recalls that some in al-Haq 
argued that the organization should address the responsible PA officials privately, 
rather than going public right away. By the summer of 1994, al-Haq’s Newsletter, 
reporting a year after the DoP, noted that al-Haq had decided (as standard prac-
tice) to adopt an approach of “quiet diplomacy” and gave examples. There had 
been violations by the police, but “it is too early to jump to conclusions and it is 
not yet clear whether these violations were of isolated nature or resemble some-
how a systematic approach by the PNA.”74 The organization’s first press release on a 
human rights violation by PA police and security agents came in July 1994 after 
a death in Palestinian police custody. It accompanied a letter to the Palestinian 
minister of justice and the interior. The violation of detainees’ rights in PA custody 
was relatively quickly a significant concern for Palestinian human rights groups.
Similarly, as noted, Mar’i’s publication on freedom of expression under the 
PA (the first such report issued by al-Haq on PA violations) was first sent to 
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the  Palestinian authorities for comment before being released; no comments were 
received. There was also the more routine matter of language, which as ever preoc-
cupied al-Haq. Oyediran recalls being asked to draft a press release on the estab-
lishment of the State Security Court and the news of unfair trials being held in 
the middle of the night; she titled it “Al-Haq Condemns President Arafat’s State 
Security Court” and took it to Azzam, who changed the wording to something 
like “Al-Haq Objects to . . .”: “I made all the changes but they didn’t get saved [ . . . ] 
so the version that was translated into Arabic and sent out was my original draft.” 
At the next weekly meeting, Oyediran recalls an intense discussion: “Some were 
saying that we should never use ‘condemn’ in a press release—this was agreed at 
the meeting,” but apparently some factions inside al-Haq really liked the original 
and “photocopied it and distributed it in huge numbers.”75
Al-Haq’s website (in its ‘Brief History of al-Haq’) refers to the events of this 
period coyly as “internal disagreement over how to approach the new situation 
created by Oslo.” But for all the disagreements, this was a very productive time 
with the Newsletters recording a veritable whirl of activity. There was a huge 
amount going on to which the organization felt obliged to respond. Fateh Azzam 
stresses the huge impetus to al-Haq’s work provided by the political agreements, 
the prospect of formal Palestinian political authority and governance (however 
limited), and the arrival of the PA. Then there were the closures imposed by the 
Israeli authorities, construction of the bypass roads, increasing settlement activi-
ties, and administrative punishments to quell resistance. Azzam attributes the fact 
that the organization pulled through this period to the new focus on human rights 
law: “The only thing that kept us together, that made it possible to think about this 
stuff, was human rights law. The commitment to human rights was what helped 
us get through.” It was also one of the reasons that Azzam invited in Zalaquett, a 
recognized expert on human rights in periods of transition.
Zalaquett’s report identified al-Haq as among the “core” human rights organi-
zations in the international movement: “It is generally perceived in the West Bank 
and Gaza, as well as abroad, that al-Haq is the premier human rights organisation 
in the region.”76 It had created awareness of human rights values and the rule of 
law. Its main work had been “to oppose the practices of Israeli Occupation that 
contradict individual and national rights of Palestinians,” doing this by “profes-
sionally documenting patterns of abuses and specifying how they contradicted 
international norms.” The organization’s “primary target (until recently) was a for-
eign audience that could use al-Haq’s material and multiply its message” with the 
impact on the occupying power (as well as on parts of Palestinian society), getting 
back “mostly as a reverberation of this internationally-aimed message.”77 Zalaquett 
concluded this section as follows:
From a professional viewpoint, al-Haq sought to uphold the high standards set 
up by the main human rights organizations. This meant: a) to use as its normative 
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 framework uncontested international norms; b) to base its conclusions on rigorous 
fact-finding; c) to adopt a style of objectivity and accuracy in reporting; and d) to 
refrain from taking positions on issues which are alien to a human rights agenda.78
By functioning in this way, Zalaquett observed, “al-Haq laid a cornerstone in the 
Occupied Territories for the subsequent development of the local human rights 
movement.” The field now, he noted, had “become more crowded and varied” with 
more organizations being set up and some of the challenges recognizable from 
other contexts being raised. His main critique was of a rather reactive response to 
various major political changes of recent times (the intifada and current political 
transformations), although he suggested that the organization’s engagement in this 
review process was one way of seeking to overcome this tendency and to think 
things through systematically.79
Zalaquett’s exploration of possible human rights agendas for al-Haq in the 
changing context acknowledged that the organization was in fact already engaged, 
albeit not systematically, in many of the new fields of work, as well as pursuing 
its core “oppositional” agenda of documenting human rights violations related 
to the Israeli occupation. Just after his report was delivered came the massacre 
in Hebron’s Ibrahimi mosque by Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein, and in June al-
Haq was calling for the disbanding of Israeli “death squads”—special units car-
rying out summary executions in the oPt—as well as working on the closure of 
the oPt.80 New fields of work included for Zalaquett “contributing from a human 
rights perspective to the establishment of Palestinian institutions and policies,” 
a “propositional” human rights agenda “by nature more controversial than an 
‘oppositional’ one.”81 Al-Haq’s internally contested involvement in human rights 
training for the security forces was specifically noted by Zalaquett as a possible 
area of work. Al-Haq had also already made interventions to the Palestinian del-
egation to the Washington talks as well as publishing a human rights analysis of 
the DoP; it had convened a seminar on the independence of the judiciary in Jeri-
cho and, in the summer of 1994, announced that with campaign partners (PHRIC 
and the Palestine Amnesty groups) it had secured funding for the first year of a 
major human rights education campaign.82 It also published some “first thoughts 
on human rights criteria” for the elections that were foreseen in the political agree-
ments with Israel (Oslo) and that used as its main law reference the ICCPR.83 This 
piece did not, however, deal with the link between human rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law, which Zalaquett had raised in his evaluation as one of the things 
that al-Haq might need to articulate: “Most prominent human rights organisations 
do not make explicit connections between human rights and a particular political 
system,” he observed, but particularly since the mid-1980s there had been “wide 
explicit acceptance that human rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions 
are intimately connected.”84 He proposed that al-Haq might need to elaborate 
more on what it understood by the “rule of law” and the relationship between the 
rule of law and the democratic system:
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This may entail a certain declaration of principles about the connection between hu-
man rights and democracy. No doubt, the matter may be contentious, but it might 
prove necessary if al-Haq decides in the future to get involved in issues of political 
participation, fair elections etc as human rights issues.85
This would include the results of “a more conscious effort at systematizing the 
international norms/values [al-Haq] will use as a reference” in its future human 
rights work. These principles would form part of its organizational culture and set 
of beliefs, be included in training of staff (new and old), and be presented as brief 
texts that could be reproduced in the opening pages of al-Haq’s publications. This 
recommendation surely sprang from Zalaquett’s perception of the divisions grow-
ing among al-Haq staff and was intended to encourage the organization to have 
things out in a manner that focused on the tools that human rights offered. The 
result would be an explicit consensus on internal principles that al-Haq had never 
really articulated. It was after the organizational crisis of 1997 that the organization 
seems to have paid serious attention to organizational consensus on its mandate, 
its human rights framework, and its values. Recalling Zalaquett’s visit to al-Haq, 
Randa Siniora mused: “He warned us about the dangers of transitions, how it had 
gone in South America and many organizations had collapsed. And although he 
warned us, we did not learn from this lesson, I think.”
The specific issue of democracy and elections had not so far been in al-Haq’s 
vocabulary, as it had been addressing the occupying power; however, it did become 
involved in monitoring the first elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, 
an activity that Zalaquett noted some international human rights organizations 
now engaged in “as a human rights activity.” On the constitutional law side, al-Haq 
was soon to publish on the draft basic law and was deeply engaged in legislative 
critique in the following years, often in coalition with other organizations. Prob-
ably the best-known effort in this regard was the intense and ultimately successful 
work by the Palestinian Network of NGOs, established in 1994, on the draft NGO 
regulation law that the PA adapted from an Egyptian model.86 Hajjar puts this 
in the context of the PA’s desire to have control over funds coming in to the oPt 
(after the World Bank launched a substantial NGO trust fund for the oPt in 1995) 
and its dismissal of (and growing antipathy to) the “operational autonomy” of Pal-
estinian civil society that had developed during the decades of Israeli occupation.87 
The draft NGO law can be seen as the beginning of the deterioration of the rela-
tionship between the PA and Palestinian human rights organizations.
Zalaquett’s third area of possible future work was “political legacy and over-
coming the legacy of past human rights violations,” a major preoccupation in 
other countries including, of course, Chile. In his comment, he noted that al-
Haq appeared to see no role for itself in this now.88 This was not the time for a 
reconciliation process with Israel; the internal conflicts of other societies posed 
some significantly different challenges from those experienced by the Palestinians 
under occupation. The turn to international criminal law after the second intifada 
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(by PCHR followed by al-Haq and other Palestinian organizations) was a 
response to Israel’s sustained success in denying any access to remedy by the 
occupied  population, but it was not an attempt to tackle the political legacy of 
the ongoing occupation.
Zalaquett then moved on to the human rights agenda that involved monitoring 
the performance of the PA and other Palestinian groups, in which al-Haq’s early 
efforts have already been discussed. Aware of the exceptional situation of the Pal-
estinian groups, Zalaquett simply observed: “This human rights agenda is the one 
most typically undertaken by local human rights groups all over the world, but in 
the presently Occupied Territories it will be a novel one, when the time comes.”89 
Similarly, considering work on “third generation” or “collective” rights, he noted 
that for Palestinian human rights organizations “the specific issue of national 
rights, as [an] expression of ‘collective rights,’ is of course constantly present.”
Then he turned to “fighting ‘internal’ or ‘endemic’ violations and protecting and 
promoting ‘civil rights.’ ” Zalaquett’s presentation to al-Haq of what he meant by 
“civil rights” is interesting:
Civil rights are of course a part of the set of internationally recognized human 
rights. Here we use the expression “civil rights” with the connotation given in certain 
 English-speaking countries—a campaign for the improvement in the protection of 
the rights of individuals, which does not presuppose that such rights are being pri-
marily violated by a deliberate governmental policy, and which sometimes seeks to 
refine or enlarge the content of the rights being protected, beyond what is stipulated 
in international norms.90
Al-Haq was already involved in a major year-long campaign on women, justice, 
and the law, a society-focused effort directed by a steering committee under the 
auspices of al-Haq that culminated in a major conference in September 1994.91 
Among other initiatives, interviewees also picked out work on disability rights, 
including the rights of persons disabled by injuries in the intifada and those whose 
disabilities were neither intifada nor occupation related. The study  considered 
the obligations of the occupying power but also addressed Palestinians with 
 disabilities, their friends and carers, offering a reference for future Palestinian for-
mulations of disability legislation.92
The final part of Zalaquett’s report to be recalled here is his consideration of 
structure and organizational culture. On the positive side, he noted that staff had 
an adherence to human rights values, and to staff development. Less positively, 
“there is a lack of awareness of or regard for managerial skills” and “it may be said 
that managerial capabilities are somewhat lacking at all levels of al-Haq.”93 This 
was when al-Haq was staff owned and staff run, but it is likely that many at the 
organization would have felt the comment generally applicable to the organiza-
tion’s set-up. It was to be a number of years before improvement was to be seen 
and felt. Zalaquett continues:
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Within the organization, certain key notions have developed, which seem to reflect 
dominant political internal values. They include the concepts of internal democracy, 
collective decision making and participation, as well as the above-mentioned notion 
of staff development. It is to be remarked, however, that the counterpart notion of 
staff responsibility and accountability does not seem to form part, in any comparable 
degree, of the same set of internal values. (This is not to say that al-Haq staff does 
not appreciate responsibility, but rather that the notion of internal democracy within 
al-Haq means more the rejection of the idea of a one-person-show than a clearly 
articulated notion of an alternative model, in which participation and delegation has 
a counterpart in accountability.)94
Some al-Haq staffers remember the two-year staff-run experiment with affection: 
“These were perfect years,” according to Haddad, marked by greater transpar-
ency and feelings of belonging (and ownership) and “not counting the hours you 
worked”—although, he added, “some got very relaxed, perhaps it went too far.” But 
as time wore on and the challenges of Oslo and the new political situation grew, 
the time needed every week for discussion also grew. Some staffers felt the absence 
of a decision maker of last resort and raised the point made by Zalaquett in this 
regard, that the accountability part of the equation was not working.
Zalaquett conducted a workshop with al-Haq staffers to discuss the prospect 
of reestablishing a board. He reported that some had doubts as to whether suit-
ably qualified persons could be found; that some felt that a board should reflect 
different political tendencies while others wanted members who were politically 
independent; and yet others wanted board members who were “close to al-Haq’s 
culture.”95 At the end of 1994 and after nearly two years of the staff-run experi-
ment, al-Haq’s staff agreed it was no longer sustainable. “It was almost like we’d 
discovered the limits of too much democracy” said Azzam, while Atallah recalled 
“feeling the lack of something outside, when you’re working in the organization 
and you’re [also] taking the decisions, it’s hard to be objective. People are people.”96 
Al-Haq proceeded to recruit for a new board from outside the organization and 
very soon, as Azzam departed for a Ford Foundation consultancy, new program 
and administrative directors.
The organization proved difficult to manage, however. Al-Haq staffers (current 
and former) interviewed for this study almost invariably wanted to talk about the 
crisis (azma) that happened within a couple of years, when the organization was 
all but closed down by its board. As some pointed out, this could only be because 
al-Haq meant so much to those involved—it was “such a massive thing”—and the 
implosions were so destructive for the organization “partly because people cared 
so much.” Staff, management, and board stress different elements of what went 
wrong. It should go without saying that there is no one truth in this narrative, no 
way of presenting this particular part of al-Haq’s history in a way that can  satisfy 
those who were there and that does justice to the complexities of the engage-
ment with the organization of so many highly motivated and strongly  committed 
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 individuals working things through in a hugely charged political context. What 
follows should be read with that in mind.
There is some agreement that many staffers (particularly those of longer stand-
ing) had difficulty in accepting the authority of new board members (even though 
they had agreed they needed a board) and an externally recruited management 
with no familiarity with al-Haq’s rather particular culture. The organization was 
for years, according to various interviewees, verging on the unmanageable. There 
was dissatisfaction or resentment over new appointments, promotions made, or 
preferments shown. Strong personalities were involved, and the staff began to fall 
increasingly into two camps: those who fell politically into the PF-aligned camp 
and those who did not, although there was a smaller third set trying to stay out 
of it. This did not necessarily make the second group “anti-PF”; indeed, some of 
them had traditionally been closer to that political tendency than to other Pales-
tinian factions. Rather, their concerns were framed as a defense of more political 
(factional) pluralism among staffers and board and an anxiety that the organiza-
tion itself was at risk of developing a factionally partisan public profile. Signifi-
cant differences among political groupings outside the organization began to be 
reproduced inside, in substantive discussions and approaches. George Giacaman 
agrees that even earlier there were attempts to “get your own people in,” stressing 
however that this was by no means peculiar to al-Haq but rather was happening 
across the range of NGOs; Palestinian political factions, but particularly the left, 
had been weakened after Oslo, and this was one of the fallouts.97 However, many 
other organizations were already more politically homogenous (and didn’t require 
their employees to leave their politics at the door). This may be why al-Haq was 
disproportionately affected by the incursion of factional politics during the Oslo 
period. The factional disagreements centered at least in theory around the politi-
cal context. The fact that there had still been no real agreement on organizational 
approaches to the PA, as had been recommended by Zalaquett, was identified 
by some as being at the heart of the problem. Sectarian politics permeated work 
discussions and affected personal working relationships. Staffers complained of 
polarization in the staff body, serious underproductivity, some individuals “play-
ing dirty” to get ahead, others intimidated into keeping quiet in case what they 
said was later used against them. Al-Haq became an increasingly unhappy place 
to work.
As for the board and in-house management, managerial styles were starkly 
different from the staff-run days. The individuals were not familiar with al-Haq’s 
in-house culture and were felt by some staffers to be taking sides in the increas-
ingly split staff body, lining up with the “PF camp.” Administrative requirements 
were perceived as overly hierarchical: “I began to feel like an ‘employee,’ not an 
active member in an association to which I belonged,” recalled Haddad, in a com-
ment that underlines the regret felt by some staffers at the loss of the egalitarian 
ethos of the staff-run years. Some staff refused to comply, some stopped talking to 
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 colleagues in increasingly poisoned relationships, some found difficulty in coop-
erating with line managers from the other camp. In the late summer of 1996, the 
staff union addressed an “Appeal to Save al-Haq” to the members of the board of 
trustees. This followed one-on-one interviews conducted by union delegates with 
the Ramallah-based staff to elicit views on what was holding back al-Haq’s work 
and how the identified issues might be resolved.98 The appeal acknowledged that 
responsibility for the dire situation in the organization was shared between staff, 
board, and management, but had a list of demands for the board. These included 
allowing the general director to get on with the job (an acknowledgment of the 
tension between general director and board) and completing its own task of 
designing and implementing a full restructure and related review of job descrip-
tions and salary scales (an implicit criticism of board processes). Significant 
 numbers of staffers complained of an absence of evaluations and a lack of clear 
lines of responsibility and leadership.99 Further, the union appeal stressed that the 
board should “show sensitivity to things that affect or challenge the independence 
and neutrality of the organisation,” as al-Haq’s work requires “maintaining com-
plete neutrality in regard to political issues” and “loyalty [  .  .  .  ] to the cause of 
human rights.” This invocation of al-Haq’s founding principles was to be repeated, 
but it did not manage to galvanize the board or management or to reduce the 
intensity of increasingly acrimonious relations with and between staff members.
At the end of 1996 the head of the research unit, one of the most senior and 
long-standing of al-Haq workers, who had become increasingly vocal in his criti-
cism of management and board, was temporarily suspended and then issued a 
warning. In the first months of 1997, things seem to have come to a head with 
hints from certain staff (aligned with the board) that dismissals of other colleagues 
were imminent. This sealed a long list of complaints, some repeating the concerns 
from the earlier appeal. A memorandum titled “Where the Board Has Crossed 
the Line” was drawn up by a group of staffers with concerns over the conduct of 
board members and the direction in which they were seen as taking the organiza-
tion.100 This document seems to have been the justification for the action taken in 
March 1997 by four of the six staff members to whom the LSM company shares 
had been transferred when the organization became staff run and staff owned in 
1993. The six company shares had not yet been transferred to the new board of 
trustees appointed in 1995. In March 1997, two of the six employee-owners were 
not available in Ramallah; one was abroad on a temporary leave of absence for 
a consultancy, and one was in administrative detention. The four present at al-
Haq at that time, disturbed by events at the organization, went to the bank to 
freeze the accounts, changed the locks at al-Haq, and announced that “as owners” 
(legally) of al-Haq (that is, of the LSM Company) they were taking over: the board 
was to resign and its decisions would be nullified. The public justification for the 
action given was the perceived politicization of the board and the resulting threat 
to al-Haq’s reputation and ability to continue its work. They carried nearly half the 
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permanent staffers with them. Staffers who disagreed with them concede some 
genuine concerns and underlying good faith (“they had a point, but it wasn’t the 
right way to do things”) given the parlous state of the organization. Nevertheless, 
for this opposing group, as expressed in a letter to human rights NGOs in the 
oPt, what had happened was a “betrayal of trust” and a dangerous precedent that 
impugned the legitimacy of al-Haq as an organization.101
For the next month or so, al-Haq staffers were expected to turn up to work, 
but very little got done. Those who opposed the takeover (for them, the “coup”) 
insist that they were in the majority among the employees, albeit by a narrow 
margin. Al-Haq was split down the middle. The employee-owners formed them-
selves into a management council and wrote to the donors. Those opposed asked 
the board to stay and also wrote to the donors. The board declined to resign. The 
fifth shareholder returned from abroad and joined her name to those opposed 
to the takeover. People remember the fax machine being locked down, stories of 
one colleague physically attacking another (found “farcical” or “exaggerated” in 
retrospect), and extremely hurtful personal abuse and recrimination. Oyediran 
recalls representatives of donors seeking her out to ask what was “really” going 
on: “I refused to answer. I’m not neutral just because I’m a foreigner; it was really 
inappropriate.” Palestinian staffers on both sides of the divide assert that there 
were attempts at external political interference in the organization at this time. 
Closer to home, some insist that Raja Shehadeh was fully aware of (and was at the 
least not opposed to) the group of four’s intent to assert the prerogatives of share 
ownership and dismiss the board in an attempt, as it were, to save the organiza-
tion from itself; Shehadeh’s support would certainly have given them considerable 
confidence. And particular censure is reserved for a key human rights player in the 
West Bank who was approached to help with the crisis at al-Haq but who, accord-
ing to different reports, played an extremely negative role and appeared to prefer 
the prospect of the collapse of a rival NGO to the opportunity to pull a peer back 
from the brink. The crisis at al-Haq perhaps pointed up weaknesses in the wider 
movement and its allies.
Negotiations continued between the two sides among the staffers, the board, 
and the management. In May an agreement was reached between the board of 
trustees, the governing council of the LSM company (the six staff sharehold-
ers, “employee-owners”), and the staff, to the effect that the six governing coun-
cil members would relinquish their shares to a new board of trustees. Pending 
this new board being constituted and becoming operational, the shares would be 
transferred to the trusteeship of two trusted parties external to the organization, 
one of these being Raja Shehadeh. Names of persons to approach for a new board 
were agreed on, and the existing board undertook to follow up and transfer its 
authority. A final clause assented to a two-man team to “review the situation of 
the organisation” in cooperation with and under the direction of the new board 
of trustees when constituted.102
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Said Zeedani became chair of the new board, finding the organization in a 
“disastrous situation [ . . . ] It was appalling to go to the office, they were fighting 
all the time and no work was getting done, there were no reports, the library was 
in disarray, the database  .  .  . ” and himself at least initially in a minority on the 
new board in fighting to keep al-Haq alive as an organization. The review team 
reported in August.103 The report found that the most serious organizational prob-
lem was “a fractious, insubordinate and entrenched organizational culture [ . . . ] 
that is inconsistent with efficient and effective operation.”104 Describing as difficult 
or impossible “work-related cooperation across the divide” of the two factions, 
and of some employees with the administration, the report declared:
This divisive, uncooperative atmosphere results most immediately from the 
 employee-shareholder takeover of al-Haq and forced resignation of the then board 
of directors in February/March 1997, an event that was seen as absolutely necessary 
by some employees but as absolutely improper by others. But the roots of the divi-
sion and of al-Haq’s dysfunctional institutional culture in general lie much farther 
back in the past. The number of remarkably different governing structures that al-
Haq has experienced in its eighteen-year history [ . . . ] is probably best seen as the 
fundamental cause.105
After reviewing briefly the different forms of governance that al-Haq had seen in 
the years since its establishment, the report came back to the idea of staff invest-
ment in the organization, that feeling of ownership that the founders had sought 
so consciously to build at the beginning:
Overall, there is a strong sense of what might be called “personal sovereignty,” or 
“staff sovereignty” among long-term employees of the organization, a sense that, as 
is frequently said, “we are al-Haq.” To the extent that this indicates a strong commit-
ment to the organization and a belief in its principles, this is an admirable sentiment. 
However, to the extent that this implies that staff are not subject to supervision and 
may not be held accountable to anyone else inside or outside the organization, it is 
destructive.106
Here, the report invoked Zalaquett’s 1994 evaluation, and in particular his find-
ing of the relative absence of the “counterpart notion of staff responsibility and 
accountability,” a lack which the 1997 review team now found “even more evi-
dent at al-Haq.” Zalaquett was referenced again in their finding of a noticeable 
deterioration in the quality of al-Haq outputs since the events of February/March 
1997, some of which they considered “very damaging” to al-Haq. They warned that 
Zalaquett’s finding that al-Haq was widely considered a professional standard-
setter was a perception that “may have slipped already.”107 And in their discus-
sion on institutional strategy, they stressed the importance of the current period 
and the significance (from a human rights perspective) of the establishment of 
the PA, invoking Zalaquett’s recommendation that a human rights approach to the 
PA should include not only monitoring but also “programs that contribute from 
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a human rights perspective to the establishment of Palestinian institutions and 
 policies.” They noted that in their interviews, many staffers had raised the point 
that al-Haq’s approach to the PA was still ad hoc and lacking a systematic strategy, 
and concluded:
It should also be noted that the failure over the last two years to evolve a comprehen-
sive strategy vis à vis the Palestinian authority is a significant factor in the current po-
larization among al-Haq staff. The absence of a clear strategy has led to differences, 
or perhaps exacerbated other existing differences, among the staff.108
The report ended with an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of five 
options for al-Haq’s future to be considered by the board of trustees. The options 
ranged from the most severe (dissolution of the organization) to the least (reor-
ganization). Said Zeedani and like-minded colleagues on the board fought for the 
middle option, reconstruction, which according to the report
would entail the early termination of all current employees, followed by a board-
directed period of planning and redesign of the organization. The planning period 
would lead in three to six months to a competitive recruitment process to hire staff 
required to carry out the new program of the reconstructed organization.109
In the autumn, after meetings to explain and discuss, the board proceeded to ter-
minate all staff contracts. Jacqueline Shahinian was asked to come in to keep the 
legal advice office operational.110 The rest of the staff went off in different direc-
tions. It was a shock. Zahi Jaradat remembers, “I felt dismissed, it’s not good to 
work for fourteen years and get thrown out, it was a big thing for me,” although 
with hindsight, Atallah reflects that “in the end it was a wise decision.” The whole 
thing had been a painful ordeal. Some of the wounds from that time are not com-
pletely healed, although there have been personal reconciliations. One of the 
group of four reflected:
The day after we took the decision [to take over the organization], I knew it was a 
mistake. Not that there wasn’t a real issue, but we tried to solve it the wrong way 
[ . . . ] It was a lack of respect to the history of the organization. If I had my time again 
I wouldn’t do it.111
Zeedani was honored by al-Haq at its thirty-year celebration for the efforts he 
put in; for himself, he says that he is “really very proud to have contributed some-
thing to save the organization at that time.” Al-Haq was not going be a casualty of 
Oslo; Zeedani and other board members (all volunteers) spent months engaged in 
intensive structure and program design, recruitment processes, and fundraising. 
In recreating the organization in the new situation (“a new al-Haq”), the issue, 
Zeedani said, was not so much the PA, but an increasingly crowded field with new 
and specialized human rights organizations in addition to the well-established and 
high-profile PCHR in Gaza and LAW in Beit Hanina. Zeedani also emphasizes one 
very important thing that had not gone wrong with al-Haq: the financial  systems 
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were tight and transparent, despite everything else going on, there were no issues 
of financial mismanagement or corruption such as those that were later implicated 
in the collapse of LAW.112
After some months, a new director and some key new staffers were recruited. 
In the late summer of 1998, al-Haq’s Newsletter reappeared in both English and 
Arabic, although with some differences in detail for the different audiences; 
in both editions the cover feature was the first death penalty sentences carried 
out by the PA.113 The Arabic edition, where the piece about al-Haq was placed at 
the beginning, under a title referring to the reorganizing and restructuring of al-
Haq, started with an acknowledgement that “it is no secret that al-Haq has been 
through a tough period of internal crisis.” It thanked its board of trustees and those 
local and international individuals and organizations that had helped it through 
for the sake of the continuing benefit to Palestinian society represented by al-Haq’s 
existence. The English version thanked former al-Haq staffers for their work; that 
came as the last item. Both texts then addressed the issue of al-Haq’s mandate in a 
manner that suggested an attempt to clarify its normative referential frameworks 
and especially the organization’s work in regard to the PA, as Zalaquett had sug-
gested might be necessary:
Al-Haq has long been known for its character as a “Legal and Human Rights Research 
Organization.” As such, added emphasis will be placed on the research conducted. Its 
research will be concentrated in two main areas: 1) investigating Israeli violations of 
Palestinian human rights and examining those issues which will be discussed during 
final status negotiations (settlements, status of Jerusalem, etc.); and 2) monitoring 
and reporting the human rights situation in the areas administered by the Palestin-
ian Authority and assisting in the creation of sound civil society structures.
In analyzing Israeli practices, the organization will continue to rely as it has done 
in the past on international humanitarian law, given the continuing occupation. We 
will also refer to human rights commitments made by Israel, as defined by the trea-
ties and conventions into which Israel has entered. Moreover, Israel’s membership in 
the United Nations also imposes certain legal obligations upon it which al-Haq will 
continue to point to and seek enforcement of.
Al-Haq believes in the universality of human rights and that they should be ap-
plied to friend and foe alike. The Palestinian National Authority cannot be exempted 
from the applicability of the same principles Al-Haq demanded to be respected by 
the Israeli occupation. Yet the nature of relationship between Al Haq and the Pal-
estinian authorities is necessarily different. We have greater access to Palestinian 
decision-makers, and a greater ability to influence and convince them to act in ac-
cordance with human rights principles. Furthermore, we have a unique opportunity 
to participate in training the new authority and its personnel in respect for human 
rights, and to use our credit and credibility in the past and current fight against Israe-
li violations to demand and insist on proper behavior by our own National Authority. 
Therefore, al-Haq will continue to offer assistance in the institutionalization of the 
principles of the rule of law within the work of the Palestinian National Authority. 
Al-Haq’s concern for this issue is at the heart of its mandate and is the key element in 
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the protection of human rights. Al-Haq will offer all it can to inform the authorities 
of the requirements of the rule of law, to encourage them to adopt legislation, mecha-
nisms and procedures that will assure the institutionalization of these concepts that 
restrain the abuse of power.114
Thus, in relation to the PA, the organization intended to act both as watchdog and 
as adviser. Its approach to Israel was explicitly expanded to included treaty-based 
human rights as well as other areas of UN-related advocacy in which al-Haq was 
to become very involved. The legal advice services were to continue, but with the 
emphasis on legal research went a much reduced focus on and capacity for field 
research and monitoring.
The new director resigned in 2000, and the board recruited former staffer 
Randa Siniora as director. Other key and long-standing members rejoined, includ-
ing Shawan Jabarin, Nina Atallah, and Zahi Jaradat. Under Siniora’s leadership, 
al-Haq began to come back into its own, a process at least partly enabled by the 
values and commitment instilled in the early years of the organization under 
the “triumvirate” of Kuttab, Shammas, and Shehadeh, albeit tempered by some 
distressing lessons. When Siniora left at the end of 2005, Jabarin was appointed 
as her successor at al-Haq, where at the time of writing he remains, the longest-
serving general director the organization has had since its establishment in 1979.
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Epilogue
Al-Haq these days is rather more of a conventional organization than when it 
started. After close engagement with the coalition working on the development 
of the Palestinian NGO law, al-Haq finally departed from its company framework 
and in early 2004 registered under the Palestinian law.1 It has a board of direc-
tors, the members of which are elected for three-year terms by and from within 
the membership of a General Assembly. The General Assembly consists of “work-
ing members” of al-Haq. These members are approved by the board, the applica-
tions accepted on a set of conditions including that they be “active and [ . . . ] have 
interests that are attested in the field of defending human rights and freedoms and 
to be an expert or academic personality with advanced academic degrees in the 
field of human rights and freedoms,” and be over the age of thirty.2 The board of 
directors, inter alia, is charged with hiring and firing, approving terms and con-
ditions, and approving the budget. Al-Haq’s website makes it clear that decision 
making in the organization lies with the general director, who consults with the 
heads of al-Haq’s three departments: Finance and Administration, Legal Research 
and Advocacy, Monitoring and Documentation. These four make up the Steering 
Committee, which meets weekly. There is still a regular general meeting of the 
whole staff, but it convenes on a monthly basis and there is no suggestion it carries 
organizational authority: al-Haq “encourages teamwork but also has clear lines of 
responsibility and accountability.”
Al-Haq confronts extraordinary times and extreme challenges that cur-
rently present bleak prospects for the achievement of the organization’s vision of 
seeing “the rule of law and standards of international human rights and humani-
tarian law implemented and adhered to, so that Palestinians can enjoy equal 
treatment with respect to their human dignity, free from occupation and with 
the full realisation of their right to self-determination.”3 The year 2017 witnessed 
a number of significant anniversaries: a hundred years since the 1917 Balfour 
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Declaration, seventy years since the 1947 Partition Resolution at the UN, 
fifty years since the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank (including East 
Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, and thirty years since the outbreak in 1987 of the 
first intifada. The following year, 2018, marked seventy years since the Nakba in 
1948. In June 2017, al-Haq published a statement marking fifty years of occupation 
(issued jointly with six other groups) and noting two further “grim milestones” 
falling that same week: fifteen years since the occupation authorities starting 
working on the Wall, and ten years of the closure and naval blockade of Gaza.4 
The years since 2000 also saw the eruption of the second intifada, during which 
al-Haq’s offices on Main Street, Ramallah, along with those of many other NGOs, 
were broken into by Israeli soldiers who destroyed equipment and wreaked 
havoc with the files; many areas under PA jurisdiction were reoccupied and—as 
Hajjar puts it—the PA infrastructure eviscerated.5 Suicide bombings inside Israel 
began to follow Israel’s “targeted assassinations” of leaders of the Palestinian 
resistance.6 In 2004 President Arafat died in France after three years confined 
to his compound in Ramallah, with allegations of poisoning quickly following 
his death. Widespread security breakdown preoccupied al-Haq and other parts of 
civil society. The victory by Hamas in the legislative elections of 2006 was resisted 
by Fatah, and the subsequent battle between the two factions in 2007 (referred 
to by Erakat as a “US-supported attempted coup”)7 left Hamas in control of 
Gaza, Fatah in power in the West Bank, a suspended Legislative Council unable 
to act, an increasingly divided judicial system, security forces with little account-
ability, competition between the different ruling authorities, factional retalia-
tions against individuals and agencies, and serious lack of public funds following 
retaliatory actions by Israel (e.g., withholding tax credits) and Western donors to 
the PA.
The human rights implications of this division were enormous. In a 2007 con-
sultancy paper on the challenges and opportunities of defending human rights in 
the oPt, Iain Guest noted:
After a year of Israeli incursions, targeted assassinations, poverty and international 
isolation, Palestinians are increasingly sceptical about the value and purpose of hu-
man rights. The decision by Western governments to insist on elections and then 
reject the result has created further cynicism.8
Al-Haq has issued and joined calls for national unity and reconciliation.9 It coop-
erated with allies in documenting and seeking redress for violations of the laws of 
armed conflict in the three sustained Israeli attacks on Gaza, as discussed briefly 
below.10 It documented Israel’s continuing seizure and expansion of its control over 
Palestinian land and resources and the violations of IHL and of human rights law 
to which Israel has continued to resort in order to quell opposition to this pri-
mary agenda, including the Wall and policies designed to strip East Jerusalem’s 
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 Palestinians of their residency rights in favor of Israeli settlers and further isolate 
Arab Jerusalem from its Palestinian hinterland.
Al-Haq has continued to take on a wide set of the functions identified by José 
Zalaquett as possible approaches to the Palestinian authorities. In regard to Pal-
estinian society more broadly, as well as cooperation with Palestinian schools and 
universities (including law clinics), al-Haq has engaged with a range of partners 
to develop programs and analytical and educational materials; for example, it 
partnered with the Israel/Palestine section of the Global IHL Resource Centre of 
Diakonia to provide highly regarded training on IHL. The organization also has 
a growing sense of its place in the regional and international human rights move-
ment, notably through the vehicle of its Center for Applied International Law. The 
center contains al-Haq’s public library as well as hosting seminars, training, and 
other events focused on the practical application of international law. Among the 
goals is the “transfer [of] al-Haq’s practical experience in the areas of international 
humanitarian and human rights law to activists and students from Arab coun-
tries.”11 The year 2011 saw the center partner with the Tunis-based Arab Human 
Rights Institute to provide its first regional human rights seminar (in Tunis);12 
and since 2015 it has run applied international law summer schools in Ramal-
lah for postgraduate law students and researchers invited from around the world. 
This growing sense of regional and indeed global leadership is shown in publi-
cations that seek to disseminate the methodological lessons learned by al-Haq 
field researchers and database workers down the decades. First among these is an 
Arabic-language Guide to the Documentation of Human Rights Violations aimed at 
“placing the experience of the first human rights organisation in the Arab world, 
al-Haq, in monitoring and documenting human rights violations into the hands of 
human rights activists in the Arab region, so that they can take from it whatever is 
appropriate for their own field of work.”13
A second, related publication is in English and not drawn from al-Haq’s direct 
experience but rather authored by a former Royal Artillery instructor in the Brit-
ish army who subsequently worked with NGOs including Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International in field investigations. In his introduction, Shawan 
Jabarin explains that he first encountered the author when investigating inci-
dents in Nablus during the second intifada, and that “expert reports in different 
areas are considered important documents for supporting any file related to the 
criminal prosecution of Israeli war criminals.”14 By this time, it had become clear 
that the international community was not going to hold Israel accountable for 
alleged war crimes and other laws of war violations committed during the massive 
assault on Gaza in 2008–9. The UN-commissioned fact-finding mission into vio-
lations by both Israel and Hamas was boycotted by Israel but attracted huge efforts 
from the Palestinian human rights community, including al-Haq. The substantial 
report that resulted (the “Goldstone report”)15 noted inter alia:
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The Mission was struck by the repeated comment of Palestinian victims, human 
rights defenders, civil society interlocutors and officials that they hoped that this 
would be the last investigative mission of its kind, because action for justice would 
follow from it. It was struck, as well, by the comment that every time a report is 
published and no action follows, this “emboldens Israel and her conviction of being 
untouchable.” To deny modes of accountability reinforces impunity, and tarnishes 
the credibility of the United Nations and of the international community. The Mis-
sion believes these comments ought to be at the forefront in the consideration by 
Members States and United Nations bodies of its findings and recommendations and 
action consequent upon them.16
No action was taken by the Security Council on the recommendations in the 
report, which included referral of the situation in Gaza to the prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
Seven of the UN Charter, should the Gazan and the Israeli authorities not at least 
commence good-faith investigations within a six-month period. Pressure was 
applied by the Obama administration on the Palestinian delegation not to push 
for its proposed resolution to the Human Rights Council, and the Palestinian side 
gave in, only to reverse its agreement to defer once the magnitude of the reaction 
to its decision among its Palestinian constituency manifested itself.17 The bitter 
story of the Goldstone report gave substantial impetus to the efforts by al-Haq and 
other Palestinian human rights organizations to activate more direct Palestinian 
access to the ICC, as discussed below, and thus to equip themselves with the tools 
required to deal with not only IHL and international human rights law but also, 
now, with international criminal law.18
As for its work in regard to the conduct of the Palestinian Authority, noted in the 
previous chapter, al-Haq did get involved in election monitoring after the arrival 
of the PA, but does not seem to have had the conversation about human rights and 
democracy that Zalaquett proposed should take place in such circumstances.19 In 
more conventional human rights work, it has published legal critiques and analy-
ses of draft laws and the implementation of enacted legislation, and institutional 
challenges (the establishment of the State Security Court for example); and taken 
positions of principle, notably against the death penalty since its implementation 
in the West Bank and Gaza. It has engaged widely in human rights training, and 
it has intervened on countless occasions by letter and memo to Palestinian offi-
cials about a range of issues within its mandate of defending rights and freedoms 
and promoting the rule of law.20 The organization—or rather, certain individu-
als at the organization—is also informally consulted or otherwise contacted by 
individuals working with different branches of the Palestinian Authority to pass 
on time-sensitive information about situations of concern, sometimes enabling 
timely intervention.
Al-Haq’s appeals to the PA invoke Palestinian law as well as human rights and 
rule-of-law principles. The State of Palestine had its status upgraded at the UN 
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in 2012,21 and two years later acceded to seven of the core international human 
rights treaties (as well as the Geneva Conventions).22 There is now a range of more 
specific obligations that may be invoked and a variety of new institutional mecha-
nisms and considerations at work in the PA in relation to human rights and inter-
national law. For example, al-Haq took a leadership role in challenging the PA’s 
Cybercrimes Decree Law of 2017 and the subsequent draft decree law amending it. 
A comment by al-Haq describes the complex layers of communications and inter-
actions involving Palestinian governmental institutions (ministries, legal advisors, 
committees, the office of the Public Prosecution) and nongovernmental actors 
(al-Haq and other civil society organizations), the Independent Commission for 
Human Rights, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the UN OHCHR. Towards the 
end of 2017, the PA’s Committee on the Alignment of Legislation with  International 
Conventions (on which al-Haq was sitting, with DCI-Palestine, as nonvoting 
civil society participants to discuss the Cybercrimes Law) rejected the amend-
ments proposed by al-Haq and others. Al-Haq’s comment on this affair notes:
Consequently, questions arise about the significance of this Committee, the 
role it plays, and the continued role of civil society organisations in debating 
 regulations upheld by the official authorities in spite of explicitly contravening the  
provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law, international conventions, and relevant in-
ternational standards.23
Lori Allen’s 2013 critique of PA and security figures acting “as if ” human rights 
mattered beyond the rounds of training and going through the motions, might 
seem to apply here, although not to the Palestinian NGO actors and indeed not, 
it seems from this narrative, to all the Palestinian officials. But Allen’s analysis does 
give some idea of the different levels at which Palestine, as a weak state, “performs” 
human rights.24 At the same time it sheds light on how al-Haq, along with other 
Palestinian human rights organizations, is responding to the use of decrees by the 
Ramallah-based Palestinian executive to issue legislation in the sustained absence 
of the Palestinian Legislative Council since the Fateh-Hamas split. In a January 
2018 meeting that it hosted about the Law by Decree on the High Criminal Court, 
al-Haq joined forces with over two hundred civil society organizations to call for 
the decree law to be repealed and for lawyers to decline to appear before the Court; 
constitutionally, the decree law did not “satisfy the prerequisite of necessity” that 
was required by the Basic Law for executive approval of such legislation in the 
absence of the PLC.25
Much of al-Haq’s immediate public-facing work, whether regarding viola-
tions by Israel or addressing the PA, is now carried out in established or ad hoc 
coalition with other groups. Al-Haq works in a much more populated human 
rights field than when it began. In 2007, Iain Guest noted over twenty-five hun-
dred NGOs registered with the PA, estimating the number of those fitting “the 
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 conventional profile of professional human rights monitors” as just under forty.26 
Al-Haq remains the largest and most established in the West Bank. Along with Al 
Mezan and PCHR in Gaza, it is one of the three preeminent core or “generalist” 
Palestinian human rights organizations; a fourth, LAW,27 had expanded during 
al-Haq’s difficult years to take the latter’s place as the leading West Bank human 
rights organization, but LAW came to an ignominious end in the early 2000s in a 
financial scandal that did much to increase public skepticism about human rights 
NGOs.28 The organizations that cosigned al-Haq’s statement on fifty years of occu-
pation are more specialized, and include one community action group based in 
al-Quds University, a Jerusalem civic coalition, and others focusing on refugees 
and prisoners’ rights.
Al-Haq engages with other Palestinian human rights NGOs and rights-based 
groups in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip (most closely 
with Al Mezan, directed by former al-Haq researcher Issam Younis, but also with 
PCHR, directed by Raji Sourani), inside Israel’s 1948 borders (Adalah), and in 
the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan, where al-Haq encouraged Syrian colleagues 
as they established the Al-Marsad Arab Human Rights Centre in 2003. Formal-
ized  coalitions in which al-Haq participates include the Palestinian Human Rights 
Organizations Council (PHROC) and the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO). 
Single-organization public statements about particular developments are less 
frequent. On the other hand, al-Haq has been criticized for electing not to pub-
licly associate itself with the Palestinian civil society initiative calling for boycott, 
divestment, and sanctions (BDS) which was launched in 2005: one long-standing 
friend of the organization attributed this to an “organizational mystique of being 
apolitical,” but it may also be linked to institutional survival.29
One of the most prominent examples of outward-facing cooperation with 
other oPt human rights NGOs in recent years has been conducted in parallel 
with extremely internal, confidential cooperation, investigation, and development 
of argumentation by the organizations involved. This has been the sustained coop-
eration firstly in lobbying the Palestinian authorities to sign on to the statute of the 
ICC despite explicit threats and/or inducements designed to prevent such a move 
by Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others; and secondly in gath-
ering evidence from the field of alleged crimes by Israeli individuals that come 
under the jurisdiction of the Court. An interview from 2016 with Raji Sourani of 
PCHR and Shawan Jabarin of al-Haq is deftly presented as a forum where “two 
of the most prominent Palestinian human rights defenders [  .  .  .  ] discuss their 
commitment to the legal process despite the political realities that limit its promise 
to deliver justice.”30 In it, Sourani provides some background on PCHR’s work on 
grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, previous Palestinian attempts 
to persuade the first ICC prosecutor to intervene in regard to violations during 
Israeli attacks on Gaza, and US and EU pressure applied to dissuade the Palestin-
ian leadership from signing on to the ICC Statute once it became clearly eligible 
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after its status was upgraded at the UN.31 The PA refrained from signing the ICC 
Statute when it ratified other international treaties in April 2014. Sourani describes 
intense lobbying of the Palestinian authorities after Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza, 
not only by human rights organizations and other civil society groups, but by all of 
the various political factions (including Islamist groups) to have President Abbas 
sign on, arguing, among other points, that the very legitimacy of the PA required 
it to defend (and be seen as defending) Palestinian lives. In the end, the Palestin-
ian leadership signed the Rome Statute at the very end of 2014, the day after the 
UN Security Council “failed to adopt a draft resolution that would have affirmed 
the ‘urgent need’ to reach within 12 months a peaceful solution to the situation 
in the Middle East and would have paved the way to a Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital.”32 The ICC prosecutor opened a preliminary investiga-
tion to examine the situation in the acceding state party. The PA did not itself 
at that time submit files relating to alleged crimes on its territory. Erakat observes 
that “the Palestinian leadership has pursued ICC jurisdiction formulaically, with-
out any appreciation for its political nature.”33 But the Palestinian human rights 
 community was not waiting for the PA to act in this regard, and, as Sourani put it 
in the interview, the PA had learned from the “tragic and strategic mistake made on 
the Goldstone file” and was not standing in the way of the NGOs.34
By the end of 2017, al-Haq, PCHR, Al Mezan, and Al-Dameer had submitted 
five substantive communications to the ICC prosecutor in The Hague support-
ing allegations of particular war crimes and crimes against humanity attributable 
to identified Israeli military and civilian individuals with high levels of author-
ity and responsibility. The first contained evidence from Israel’s 2014 offensive 
against Gaza, with “illustrative instances of murder, persecution, torture and other 
inhumane acts as well as intentional attacks on civilian persons and objects and 
extensive destruction not justified by military necessity.” The second focused on 
crimes committed in Rafah by the Israeli military in a specific four-day concen-
trated assault in August 2014, following Israel’s invocation of the so-called “Hanni-
bal doctrine” when an Israeli soldier went missing and was presumed kidnapped; 
this file focused on “unlawful attacks against Palestinian civilian population and 
their infrastructure and property.” The third dossier presented evidence to argue 
that Israel’s extended closure of the Gaza Strip constituted the crime against 
humanity of “persecution” under the Rome Statute. The fourth concentrated on 
the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) to present evidence for “the crimes of 
persecution and apartheid” against the occupied Palestinian population, “forc-
ible transfer” of the occupied population and the “implantation of Israeli settlers 
in their stead,” the “extensive appropriation and destruction as well as pillaging 
of Palestinian property,” and three hundred cases of “wilful killing and murder.” 
The fifth communication argued that Israel was “unable and unwilling to con-
duct effective investigations into international crimes committed during the July–
August 2014 Israeli military offensive,” as a matter of policy and structure. “Justice 
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for  Palestinian victims must be obtained as a prerequisite for genuine and last-
ing peace,” said Jabarin.35 In late 2019, the ICC prosecutor finally moved on the 
 “situation of  Palestine” and submitted “the question of territorial jurisdiction” to 
the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber. Al-Haq and its allies gave a qualified welcome 
to the move, producing a lengthy intervention that concluded that “the PTC 
examination [  .  .  .  ] is a redundant and moot point, amounting to an unneces-
sary delay in the progression of the situation to full investigation.”36 Subsequently 
the  organizations submitted their observations to the PTC, and the International 
Commission of Jurists argued similarly in an amicus brief that failure to accept 
jurisdiction “would run counter to the [Rome] Statute’s object and purpose of 
combatting impunity for serious crimes under international law.”37
It is in giving the lie to official Israeli self-images of justice and the rule of law 
as the basis of its governance (as well as in holding the Palestinian authorities to 
account) that current Palestinian human rights work, albeit in much more com-
plex circumstances, most closely evokes the impetus that established al-Haq in the 
late 1970s. The level of violations and the extraordinary degree of impunity built 
into the Israeli systems as Palestinian lives, homes, and livelihoods are destroyed 
in front of the world’s media time and again have combined to provoke searches 
for new avenues of redress. At the same time, the situation has provoked a refusal 
to participate in redress systems designed for form alone. In a high-profile move 
in 2016, B’Tselem announced that after twenty-five years of investigating and sub-
mitting complaints for Palestinian victims and survivors of abuse of force by the 
Israeli military, it had come to the conclusion that “cooperation with the mili-
tary investigation and enforcement systems has not promoted accountability, but 
helped lend legitimacy to the occupation regime and whitewash it.” It has decided 
to “stop playing a part in the system’s charade.”38
Accountability is a central pillar of the work of many Palestinian human rights 
groups. Attempts have been made to have individual third-party states investigate 
and prosecute alleged grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention commit-
ted against members of the protected Palestinian population by high-level Israeli 
officials, as originally explored by al-Haq’s Enforcement Team. Al-Haq’s current 
accountability focus developed from a “war crimes project” instituted in 2006 
and then expanded to include other venues, processes, and actors.39 The universal 
jurisdiction work was led from the mid-2000s on the Palestinian side by PCHR, 
taking off after the second intifada when, as Hajjar puts it, Israel became “the first 
state in the world to publicly proclaim the legality of ‘pre-emptive targeted kill-
ing’ ” after a post-Oslo “doing-and-denying phase.”40 Al-Haq has also worked with 
allies to mobilize third-party legal systems in defense of international law, for 
example in the United Kingdom in a petition for judicial review of UK conduct on 
arms sales to Israel in regard to Israel’s breaches of international law in its 2008–9 
assault on Gaza.41 Michael Kearny traces the development of these litigation initia-
tives to the ICJ’s 2004 advisory opinion on the Wall and its confirmation of state 
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responsibility and individual criminal accountability in the oPt.42 And al-Haq has 
directed efforts towards investigating, publicizing, and sometimes seeking to liti-
gate in third countries on foreign businesses with co-ventures, partnerships, and 
other contractual relationships with Israeli settlement-based enterprises, contend-
ing that “the presence of companies in illegal Israeli settlements and the exploita-
tion of Palestinian natural resources by such companies [ . . . ] constitute manifest 
violations of international law.”43 This work is done in close cooperation with allies 
outside the oPt and draws momentum from the preparation by the UN OHCHR 
of a “database of all business enterprises engaged in certain specified activities 
related to the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” pursu-
ant to a 2016 Human Rights Council resolution. Publication of the database was 
delayed for some years, but a first release was made early in 2020.44 The organiza-
tion was the 2019 recipient of the Human Rights and Business Award from the UN 
Forum on Business and Human Rights, which called al-Haq “a recognised leader” 
in the development of this area of human rights work in the region.
After returning from the brink of dissolution in the late 1990s, al-Haq has 
consolidated its position within the regional human rights movement, through 
joint interventions (notably with CIHRS), issue-specific coalitions such as that 
on the death penalty,45 and membership (sometimes in elected leadership roles) 
of regional networks—notably EuroMed Rights46—and international alliances 
including FIDH, OMCT, and Habitat International Coalition.47 Al-Haq remains 
the West Bank affiliate of the ICJ.48 To some extent, these networks continue, in a 
world of communications unimagined in al-Haq’s early years, to play their role in 
the “boomerang” effect described by Keck and Sikkink, amplifying al-Haq’s mes-
sages and projecting them internationally whence they reverberate back, to Israel 
and nowadays to the PA.49 They also play a vital solidarity role as al-Haq becomes 
increasingly targeted by Israel. In 2017, for example, OMCT wrote an open let-
ter to the UN secretary-general, Antonio Guterres, regarding “slandering state-
ments” made to the press by Israel’s permanent representative about al-Haq and 
Al Mezan. The language used by the Israeli ambassador recalls that used against 
LSM in its early days:
Ambassador Danon said that “Al Mezan is an organisation which cooperates with 
Hamas, an internationally recognised terror group,” and linked “Al Haq ( . . . ), led by 
Shawan Jabareen” to the so-called “PFLP terrorist organisation.” Ambassador Danon 
went on falsely characterising both human rights groups as “supporters of terrorism,” 
and “inciters of violence.”50
But this is not just more of the same. In March 2016 al-Haq issued a statement put-
ting on record the increasingly vicious harassment of the organization (false com-
munications to donors and staff members, smear campaigns, etc. through social 
media) that the organization noted as “coinciding with, and as a result of, the prog-
ress achieved at the level of the International Criminal Court and  decisions at the 
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EU level regarding the labelling of settlement products.” The reason for the state-
ment was that this campaign had now risen to the level of death threats made in 
anonymous phone calls to Shawan Jabarin and another staff member.51 The com-
plex context of the so-called war on terror, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and US and 
European interventions in other wars in the region since the uprisings of 2011, 
together with Israel’s critical identity as a key US ally (if not indeed its vanguard) 
in regional power and resource struggles, embolden extremists in a divided Israel 
and mute those attempts that European states might make to defend the principles 
of international law. European states’ interventions and their narrowing security-
lens view of the region have weakened key third-party states as potential allies in 
seeking Israel’s respect for its international law obligations in relation to the Pales-
tinian population of the oPt.52
The concept of “lawfare” links two areas of official Israeli policy and discourse 
that have been identified by scholars as marking twenty-first-century develop-
ments, along with the global “war on terror” paradigm and the related war model 
(as compared to a policing model) within which the Israeli state engages with 
Palestinians in the oPt post-Oslo.53 Lawfare, according to Kearney, is a “critique 
of human rights activism and advocacy [that] emerged in response to human 
rights litigation during the ‘war on terror’ [ . . . ] . Its primary goals are to delegiti-
mize human rights activists and discredit international law.”54 Neve Gordon argues 
that human rights organizations are themselves “increasingly being constituted 
as a security threat” in order “to enable primarily Israel and the US to carry out 
military campaigns unhindered.”55 Nongovernmental projects and commentators 
hostile to Palestinian attempts to invoke international law in defense of their rights 
have deployed the lawfare narrative “to present Palestinian engagement with the 
law as being the latest and most invidious manifestation of the terrorist threat.”56
Gordon and Kearney agree that Israeli official discourse took up the lawfare 
narrative “to limit the content and application of IHL in Israel’s wars” after the 
publication of the Goldstone report and the arrest warrant issued in London in 
late 2009 against then Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni;57 for Gordon, “the report 
itself was reconstituted in the Israeli public domain as a national threat.”58 Israeli 
prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu told an Israeli security institute (against the 
background of the Goldstone report) that “organisations that claimed to sup-
port the principles of human rights and international law [were] the third stra-
tegic threat to Israel’s security”—that is, “third after Iran and Hizbullah.”59 Israeli 
human rights groups that had cooperated with or provided information to the 
UN fact-finding mission were rounded on with substantial official and public vit-
riol, as was Richard Goldstone; the single largest donor to Israeli human rights 
groups announced it would not provide funding to Israeli groups supporting the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction against Israeli officials.60 Draft laws to restrict 
sources of foreign funding for groups supporting the universal jurisdiction work 
or associating themselves with the BDS movement reached different stages of the 
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legislature.61 In June 2018 the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplo-
macy issued a report “calling on the European Union and EU states to halt their 
direct and indirect financial support and funding to Palestinian and international 
human rights organisations that ‘have ties to terror and promote boycotts against 
Israel.’ ” Al-Haq and its NGO partners considered that this “reveals the State 
of Israel’s direct official involvement in smear campaigns against Palestinian 
human rights organisations and their European partners.”62
The other area is what Hajjar terms “state lawfare.”63 If the first form of lawfare 
involves the Israeli state (and others) impugning Palestinian attempts to mobilize 
the law as something to be resisted in the (global) war on terror, then this second 
form concerns the Israeli state’s arguments for and application of doctrines of IHL 
that seek to render “lawful” serious violations of IHL rules. Hajjar’s focus is on 
both Israeli and US policy arguments for the legality of their publicly declared 
targeted killing policies. Erakat considers this “legal work” by Israel, supported in 
large part by the United States, to constitute “two fundamental and interlocking 
shifts. The first was to unsettle the applicable legal framework regulating the Israeli 
state’s relationship to Palestinians. The second was to change the laws of war that 
regulated a belligerent’s right to use force more generally.”64 Hajjar notes the docu-
mented (but denied) history of Israel’s extrajudicial executions in the oPt from the 
first intifada, with an increase in the 1990s following the redeployment of Israeli 
troops from Palestinian Area A and suicide bombings of Israeli targets (including 
civilian targets) from 1993. She dates the public adoption of “targeted killings” as 
a “lawful” policy within the war model of engagement from early in the second 
intifada. Concluding on the policies in both Israel and the US, she notes:
These attempts exemplify state lawfare because they deviate from and defy interna-
tional consensus about what is lawful in the conduct of war and armed conflict. In 
the case of Israel, the asserted right to engage in targeted killing in Gaza and the West 
Bank hinges on the (internationally rejected) proposition that they are no longer 
occupied and therefore are legitimate sites of warfare, and that extra-judicial execu-
tion of people who ostensibly cannot be arrested is a legitimate form of national 
self-defense.65
Hajjar quite rightly points out that as a manifestation of “state lawfare” this is not a 
departure for the Israeli state, which in the first months of the occupation changed 
its mind about the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
since then has declined to recognize the restraints it places on the conduct of an 
occupying power. The annexation of East Jerusalem, Israel’s policies of land expro-
priation and settlement, and its “pioneering legacy of ‘legalizing’ torture (in 1987)” 
are other cases in point, away from the conduct of military action.66
Another important change to the way al-Haq works now lies in its relations 
with human rights organizations in and from Arab states. It was particularly 
after Oslo that the Palestinian groups began to develop sustained relationships, 
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 sometimes formalized in networks. Besides the opening up of communications and 
the fact that al-Haq had met and worked with some of its Arab counterparts in the 
lead-up to the Vienna World Conference, these groups were beginning to meet 
together more frequently, and the establishment of the PA meant that al-Haq had 
many more political and governance issues in common with human rights groups 
in Arab states.67 After initial disagreements about how al-Haq might approach the 
PA and something of a honeymoon period with the newly established author-
ity, patterns of executive overreach and interference, security abuses, and judicial 
shortcomings and lack of capacity began to manifest and to be challenged by Pal-
estinian civil society. The struggle with the PA over the NGO law has already been 
noted; more recent years have seen an encroachment of executive interference and 
threats of further closure of space for dissent, inter alia with the Cybercrimes Law. 
Across the region (and indeed elsewhere), with the “war on terror” and particu-
larly after the Arab Spring, draconian legislation and arbitrary implementation 
put human rights organizations and individual defenders at substantial risk—for 
example, laws criminalizing libel or slander of public institutions or heads of gov-
ernment or “disseminating false information,” severe restrictions on the freedom 
to legally constitute associations, and constraints on the receipt of funding for 
human rights work, in particular foreign funding.
The “foreign funding debate” has been particularly vehement in Egypt, with 
some early human rights actors there arguing against taking funds from outside 
agencies, both for pragmatic political reasons (how it looks to the constituency) 
and for reasons of principle—that it should be possible to raise sufficient funds 
from internal sources, to rely on the voluntarism of participants in the move-
ment, and to avoid the risk of locally determined human rights priorities being 
overtaken by donor-driven agendas.68 As the Arab movement professionalized 
(often at the pressing of funders) and European and US governmental and private 
(foundation) donors made funds increasingly available for human rights work in 
the Middle East, and indeed for human-rights-and-democracy work (this the eli-
sion noted by Zalaquett in his report to al-Haq), governments hostile to scrutiny 
from their domestic groups used the fact of foreign funding to allege a range of 
dubious intentions and suspect backers and to impugn the patriotism of those in 
receipt of funds aimed (according to that narrative) at changing the nature of the 
national identity and priorities at the behest of foreign powers. There appears to 
be widespread acceptance of official discourses to the effect that human rights is a 
fundamentally Western concept, that the discourse is deployed in a power struggle 
against authentic national values, and that foreign funds (at least potentially) work 
against the sovereign interests of the state.69 In Palestine, Eyad El Sarraj, head of 
Gaza’s Community Mental Health Programme and one of the first commission-
ers general of the national human rights institution (ICHR), noted in a reflection 
on his arrest and detention by the PA that “the usual line is that human rights 
are Western and used in particular by the United States to control Palestinians 
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and Arabs. A human rights activist is, therefore, suspect.”70 According to Hajjar, 
for many Palestinians there is “an enduring perception that human rights remain 
an instrument of Western governments, often invoked in ways that discriminate 
against Arabs and Muslims.”71 
And indeed there is plenty of evidence that the human rights discourse has 
been very inconsistently deployed by European powers and the United States.72 
Indeed, one of the major obstacles to promoting human rights in Palestine and the 
wider Arab state region is the selectivity in approach to enforcement of interna-
tional law displayed by powerful third-party state actors. Often these precedents 
are related to inaction on Palestine/Israel compared with action on (against) 
Arab states; one example often cited (and noted by al-Haq at the time) is the 
West’s response to Iraq’s 1991 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, while Chase 
refers to “the counterproductivity of a US invasion of Iraq [in 2003] that invoked 
human rights as one of its justifications—albeit in passing and artificially.”73 As 
Megally observes, “double standards of this kind were and are recited all over the 
Middle East and North Africa,” with considerable negative impact on the idea of 
“human rights.”74
These debates have infused and conditioned the human rights debate in 
Palestine since Oslo. Raji Sourani told the 1998 meeting on the Arab human rights 
movement, for example, that “nobody raised the question of foreign funding 
before the Oslo accords” but that now the Palestinian groups were being “accused 
by the Palestinian National Authority of being organisations with secret agendas, 
implementing the will of foreign governments, even though their activities are 
fully transparent and accountable.”75 The point about transparency was made in 
contrast to widespread corruption in the PA. There was Palestinian executive inter-
est in controlling the inflow and use of funds from abroad, as well as, probably, 
in distracting attention from stories about internal PA corruption, and the gen-
eral objection of a government (in this case, recently installed, and itself heavily 
dependent on foreign support, financial and other) to criticism from domestic 
human rights groups about violative practices. A 1999 report from the office of 
the UN’s Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) on support 
to the rule-of-law sector in Palestine showed some twenty million dollars (of a total 
of something over one hundred million) having gone to NGOs focused broadly 
on human rights, legal development, and civil education.76 Hammami and Haj-
jar have both analyzed the attacks against the NGO sector that followed in the 
public arena, with NGOs “vilified as ‘fat cats’ exploiting donor funds for their own 
enrichment and at the cost of an increasingly destitute population.”77 Hammami 
further noted:
In quiet, some sectors of the NGO community noted the alarming disparity between 
the amount of donor money channelled through NGOs to human rights and legal 
issues (even if the most conservative estimates are used), and the paltry impact these 
NGOs have had on the rule of law and the protection of human rights.78
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This remains key. Al-Haq, alongside its peers in the Palestinian human rights 
movement, was and is implicated not only by public distrust of and resentment 
at funds coming in from abroad, but also by a lack of belief in the capacity of 
the human rights and international law effort to have any impact in improving 
salient features of life in the oPt.79 In 2012, Shawan Jabarin acknowledged that 
“in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, there is little faith in the principles of 
human rights. Notions of justice, accountability and international law mean too 
little to too many.”80 If the chief factor for this was Israel’s repeated performance, 
the  second was “the international community’s apathy and what often amounts 
to complicity in the deteriorating situation” across the oPt. Jabarin’s piece insisted 
nevertheless on holding the PA to account, in that “human rights should not sim-
ply be a by-product of good governance” (part of Allen’s “performance” of human 
rights), but rather should be fundamental to the governance project itself: “Ulti-
mately, for as long as the PA continues to dismiss its obligations and refuses to 
respect the rule of law, neither liberation nor justice will ever come to Palestine.”
The challenges are enormous, and for many the situation appears bleaker than 
ever. Al-Haq is not alone in arguing that it may no longer be adequate or appro-
priate to frame what is happening in the oPt as “merely” occupation. Note has 
already been made of the developments in the law of armed conflict particularly 
since the 2003 US-led invasion and subsequent military occupation of Iraq. But 
the recent recognition of “the transformative goals of certain occupations” (such 
as the project in Iraq with its “stated purpose of reforming their political systems 
in a democratic direction”) does not apply to Israel’s purpose in the oPt; and nor 
yet has Israel conformed to the “conservationist principle” which requires mini-
mal intervention in the existing legal and economic order of occupied territory.81 
John Dugard, an eminent South African jurist and at the time UN Special Rappor-
teur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 
1967, summarized his argument in his 2007 report (when the occupation reached 
forty) as follows:
The international community has identified three regimes as inimical to human 
rights—colonialism, apartheid and foreign occupation. Israel is clearly in mili-
tary occupation of the OPT. At the same time elements of the occupation consti-
tute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law.  
What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features 
of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the occupying Power and  
third States?82
For Dugard, the question was whether an occupation that may have begun as a 
lawful (if temporary) regime becomes unlawful when it clearly “acquires some of 
the characteristics of colonialism and apartheid” and continues for, then, nearly 
forty, now over fifty years – and if so “what are the legal consequences?”83 Dugard 
said that “clearly none of the obligations imposed on the occupying Power are 
Epilogue    225
reduced as a result of such a prolonged occupation.” He referenced a 1990 paper 
by Adam Roberts, a reprise of the latter’s paper to Palestine’s first international 
law conference convened by al-Haq in January 1988.84 Dugard argued for these 
questions to be put to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. 
Meanwhile, popular references to “Israeli apartheid” increased after the second 
intifada.85 In the event, Dugard’s home state, South Africa, provided follow-up to 
the questions in his report through a major international law research project led 
by a South African–funded team and involving researchers from al-Haq, under 
the title Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid?86
Dugard concluded his 2007 report with a vehement indictment of the failure 
of the West to “demonstrate a real commitment to the human rights of the Pal-
estinian people. [ . . . ] There is no other case of a Western-affiliated regime that 
denies self-determination and human rights to a developing people and that has 
done so for so long.”87 References to colonialism as a frame through which to view 
Israel’s treatment of the oPt have increased in the face of Israel’s relentless expro-
priation and exploitation of land and water resources for use by Israeli settlers, 
and its denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination. Al-Haq’s 2017 call on 
the international community to act to end the occupation fifty years on invoked 
Israel’s “broad colonial aims” and stated that “Israel’s occupation and associated 
policies and practices fragment the Occupied Palestinian Territory, violate the col-
lective and individual rights of Palestinians and amount to colonialism.”88
The year 2017 also saw the publication and then withdrawal of a report com-
missioned by ESCWA from a team comprising Richard Falk, who followed 
Dugard as Special Rapporteur, and Virginia Tilley, editor of the report and the 
book from the South African–led project on occupation, colonialism, and apart-
heid. The ESCWA-commissioned report was specifically to consider the ques-
tion of apartheid in relation to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian people.89 The 
authors declared that they were “aware of the seriousness of this allegation” but 
that “available evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Israel is guilty 
of policies and practices that constitute the crime of apartheid as legally defined in 
instruments of international law.”90 The reaction from Israel and the United States 
was, according to Falk, “what can only be described as hysteria.”91 UN secretary-
general Antonio Guterres instructed the ESCWA head, Rima Khalaf, to have the 
report taken off the website; she refused and resigned; the report was withdrawn. 
Falk said it reminded him of the US reaction to the Goldstone report. The PHROC 
expressed its dismay at this “political pressure,” declared that the member organi-
zations (including al-Haq) would adopt the report’s conclusions and analysis, and 
called on the prosecutor’s office at the ICC “to take [the report] into account dur-
ing its preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine.”92 Besides intense 
hostility and sensitivity to any invocation of apartheid as a descriptor for Israeli 
policies and practices, because of the image of apartheid South Africa, the fact that 
apartheid (as a crime against humanity) falls within the ICC jurisdiction raises 
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again for Israel and its allies the red flag of criminal proceedings in a tribunal 
governed (at least in theory) by a conception of the rule of law not compatible 
with that developed and projected by Israel as part of its narrative of state lawfare.
Facing the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the occupation, in his 2016 panel 
interview alongside Sourani, Jabarin insisted that “Palestine, in its legal and 
 jurisprudential aspects, is a test for the whole system of international law.”93 The 
anniversary-laden year of 2017 started with the Israeli Knesset purporting to “reg-
ularize” the status of Israeli settlements built on expropriated private Palestinian 
land in the West Bank, and ended with the United States declaring recognition of 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the imminent relocation of its embassy from 
Tel Aviv; both are surely indications of annexation rather than occupation.94 Pro-
tests in Jerusalem and a sustained hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners marked 
the months in between. Al-Haq’s public response to the so-called “Trump Decla-
ration” denounced the violations of principles of international law that Trump’s 
move endorsed, including the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force, 
and asserted that “the recognition of Israel’s unlawful annexation of East Jeru-
salem amounts to complicity in an unlawful settlement enterprise which was 
condemned by Security Council Resolution 2334 in 2016.”95 It called on the UN 
General Assembly to refer a request for an advisory opinion to the ICJ on “the 
question of Israel’s annexation, colonization and apartheid,” notably substituting 
“annexation” for “occupation”; it called on High Contracting Parties to the Geneva 
Conventions to convene a meeting to address Israel’s breaches; and EU states to 
take the lead in facilitating peace negotiations in the place of the United States. Its 
call on the Palestinian political authorities can be compared with its intervention 
in 1991 with the Palestinian delegation setting off for Madrid when it emphasized 
the limits set by IHL on representatives of a protected population, but took “no 
position with regard to the merits of the political process in question.”96 Faced with 
the so-called Trump Declaration on Jerusalem, al-Haq insisted:
It is imperative that the Palestine Liberation Organization immediately and perma-
nently end peace negotiations with US President Trump, who is positioning the US 
as a transgressor of international law. In light of the deliberate sabotage of the status 
of East Jerusalem, Al-Haq calls [for] the disbandment of the Palestinian Authority’s 
security coordination and all political coordination with Israel, which is effectively 
entrenching the occupation and facilitating Israel’s colonial agenda.97
This is a weighty call made in light of a reckoning that, on balance, the gains of 
Oslo are more than outweighed by losses both already inflicted and on the hori-
zon. It is not one that al-Haq would have made in its formative years; it illustrates 
the urgency felt at the risk that the Trump declaration and subsequent action pose, 
as al-Haq put it, to “the entire international legal system [ . . . ] and the reciprocal 
maintenance of peace and security.”
In April 2020 there followed a more detailed “Open Letter to the UN Security 
Council on Israel’s Plans to Annex the West Bank” in the wake of the release by 
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the US administration of its Peace to Prosperity Plan and reports of an agreement 
on the future of the occupied Palestinian territory between the two men poised to 
lead Israel’s government (Netanyahu and Benny Gantz) after successive inconclu-
sive elections. US secretary of state Mike Pompeo was reported as stating that “the 
annexation of parts of the West Bank is ultimately Israel’s decision to make.” Al-
Haq’s intervention presented many of the mechanisms available to third states set 
out in its 1990 “Representation to States Signatory to the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion” discussed in chapter 5. Reminding the Security Council of the “obligation to 
ensure respect as an essential component of third state responsibility” under IHL, 
al-Haq insisted that “to fail in this obligation is to legitimise colonialism, consoli-
date apartheid, and to fatally undermine efforts at securing enjoyment of human 
rights through the rule of law.” Thus, al-Haq invokes key elements of its resistance 
agenda dating back to its establishment in 1979, and forward to a future which, 
post COVID-19, many hope will involve a reconfiguration or reconstruction of the 
lawful means through which peoples and communities seek more generous, more 
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Established in Ramallah in 1979, al-Haq was the first Palestinian human rights organization 
and one of  the first such organizations in the Arab world. This inside history explores how 
al-Haq initiated methodologies in law and practice that were ahead of  its time and that proved 
foundational for many strands of  today’s human rights work in Palestine and elsewhere. Lynn 
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one set up a human rights organization under military occupation? How would one go about 
promoting the rule of  law in a Palestinian society deleteriously served by the law and with 
every reason to distrust those charged with implementing its protections? How would one 
work to educate overseas allies and activate international law in defense of  Palestinian rights? 
This revelatory story speaks to the practice of  local human rights organizations and their 
impact on international groups.
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needed now, at a moment when human rights have never been more delegitimized on the 
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“Clear, concise, accessible, and detailed, this unique book sheds extensive light on how and 
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pation of  the Palestinian territories, the development of  the human rights movement in Pales-
tine and globally, and the creation and management of  civil society organizations.” 
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Palestine, International Crisis Group
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